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NYT the latest in showcasing bad US-China takes from DC experts

A recent essay by former Biden officials is just one of many promoting policy that, if realized, would only lead to escalation and crisis

Analysis & Opinion | Asia-Pacific
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A New York Times essay by former Biden administration officials Mira Rapp-Hooper and Ely Ratner published on Nov. 16, “Trump’s China Gamble Is Backfiring,” offers yet another in a long line of depressingly similar and one-sided arguments about China and U.S. China policy appearing across America’s major newspapers and foreign policy journals.

The narrative goes like this, invariably: Beijing is ever more threatening in dire ways; Washington is responding inadequately; and only steadily increasing seemingly unlimited levels of American (and, in some examples, allied) military power and counter-pressure will restore stability and protect the West.

Largely missing is a serious examination of how American and Chinese policies interact in creating perceived threats, and how credible reassurances, alongside deterrence, might reduce the danger and create lasting peace and prosperity.

This outlook began to emerge to prominence with Washington’s embrace of strategic competition as the framework for U.S. China policy in late 2017. But a particularly explicit statement appeared some years later, in Matt Pottinger and Mike Gallagher’s April 2024 Foreign Affairs essay, "No Substitute for Victory." Its subtitle declared that America’s competition with China must be won, not managed. In this influential essay, efforts to stabilize relations were portrayed as jeopardizing success against Beijing’s supposedly implacable ambitions.

Subsequent prescriptions vary, but the underlying pattern is clear. In the Wall Street Journal, for example, Seth Jones argues that America is losing its ability to deter China and calls for substantially higher defense spending to restore deterrence, to the exclusion of virtually anything else.

In Foreign Affairs (a particularly prominent publisher of this viewpoint), former Biden officials Kurt Campbell and Rush Doshi advocate pooling allied capabilities to counter underestimated Chinese power; Ely Ratner and Nick Danby urge exploiting China’s vulnerabilities; and Michael Beckley and Hal Brands repeat the need for greater forward military power, industrial mobilization, and allied coordination. In The Washington Quarterly, Evan Braden Montgomery and Toshi Yoshihara propose broader countercoercive options including possible escalation against mainland Chinese targets.

And a report issued by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) led by Jones recommends placing American industrial production on a wartime footing to confront China and Russia.

These authors do not hold identical views. Some acknowledge escalation risks, criticize American mistakes or endorse diplomacy. Nonetheless, their detailed prescriptions overwhelmingly concern strengthening deterrence, restricting and weakening Chinese capabilities and organizing counterpressure. Far less attention, if any, goes to establishing mutually credible limits on both sides’ behavior.

In this literature, China presents a clearly formidable and growing challenge to American security, prosperity and international influence across military, economic and technological domains — and, in the strongest formulations, an existential threat to the so-called U.S.-led “rules-based” global order.

Moreover, Beijing’s ambitions are treated as so entrenched that stronger resistance becomes the principal (and virtually only) means of changing its behavior. Accommodation is frequently depicted as encouraging further Chinese assertiveness or aggression, without adequately distinguishing unilateral concessions from reciprocal reassurance and restraint.

There are certainly grounds for concern about Chinese military expansion, economic coercion and pressure on Taiwan, for example. But identifying such conduct does not explain its causes, establish the limits of Chinese ambitions or determine which American responses would improve security. Nor does an erosion of American military superiority (often stressed in the literature) necessarily establish that effective deterrence requires restoring that superiority.

The Rapp-Hooper–Ratner essay illustrates the problem. It attributes continued Chinese assertiveness to President Donald Trump’s accommodation, citing pressure against Japan, military exercises around Taiwan and expanding military facilities. Yet these examples establish Beijing’s continued assertiveness much more clearly than they establish that American accommodation encouraged it.

The authors themselves acknowledge that China’s economic campaign against Japan followed Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s November 2025 remarks about possible Japanese intervention over Taiwan, a clear provocation to Beijing. More strikingly, the December 2025 blockade exercises they cite began 11 days after Washington announced an unprecedented $11.1 billion Taiwan arms package.

Neither circumstance excuses Beijing’s coercion. But both call into question an explanation centered on insufficient American resistance. Overall, the authors do not demonstrate how anticipated American passivity affected the timing, scale or duration of these actions.

Their account also gives inadequate attention to the interactive nature of the U.S.-China rivalry. In this dynamic, each side describes its own measures as defensive and necessary, while treating the other’s responses as evidence of aggressive intent. Military deployments generate counter-deployments; technology restrictions encourage retaliation and efforts to eliminate dependencies; political signals regarding Taiwan prompt increasingly coercive demonstrations.

Beijing bears responsibility for its choices. But Washington must also examine how its policies affect those choices. These analyses give insufficient attention to how American policies might intensify the Chinese behavior they seek to prevent, and how reciprocal adjustments might interrupt that process.

Of course, acknowledging this interaction does not imply equal responsibility for every confrontation. It means recognizing that a strategy based on continually increasing the adversary’s insecurity can strengthen the very tendencies it seeks to counter. Deterrence must convince Beijing that specific acts of aggression will fail. Reassurance must also convince it that restraint on its part will be reciprocated and offer better outcomes than an escalating, zero-sum rivalry.

Mind-numbingly similar calls for a united front against China face another problem. Many governments across the Global South, and some American allies and partners, resist organizing their relations with Beijing around Washington’s strategic priorities. They might oppose particular Chinese actions, but also highly value trade, investment and diplomatic cooperation with Beijing. Their reluctance to simply align with the U.S. in an anti-China front reflects interests and judgments that cannot be overcome by more emphatic warnings about the Chinese threat.

Washington and Beijing should pursue constructive strategic stability by pairing credible deterrence with mutual reassurance, verifiable restraint and practical steps to prevent and manage crises. Over Taiwan, as I have argued before, Washington should make clear that it remains open to any peaceful, un-coerced settlement freely supported on both sides of the Strait, while Beijing should reaffirm at the presidential level its non-use of a timetable for unification and measurably reduce its military pressure.

By repeatedly publishing analyses heavily weighted toward greater pressure and deterrence, major American media outlets offer the public an unduly narrow debate about the nature of the Chinese challenge and the U.S. and allied policies needed to address it. Far more analysis should ask what enduring political relationship competitive measures are ultimately intended to produce, which threats require resistance, which insecurities can be reduced through reciprocal commitments, and where substantive cooperation is possible.

Continuing to elaborate ways of deterring and weakening China while neglecting credible mutual reassurance and the search for positive-sum policies risks turning the prevention of war into preparations that make war more likely. A serious debate must examine both the dangers of insufficient deterrence and those of increasing pressure without establishing mutually credible limits and a viable basis for a constructive form of coexistence.


Top Photo Credit: Color image highlighting a news headline featuring Donald Trump and Xi Jinping through a magnifying glass on a computer screen. Kolkata, West Bengal, India, September 23, 2026 (favoritesphoto / Shutterstock.com)
Analysis & Opinion | Asia-Pacific

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