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Biden 'surges' aid to Ukraine, this senator wants guardrails on it

Biden 'surges' aid to Ukraine, this senator wants guardrails on it

Sen. Lee says Presidential Drawdown Authority, which the president just cleared out for Kyiv, has been abused

Reporting | Washington Politics

President Joe Biden announced a “surge” of more than $8 billion in military aid for Ukraine during a visit this week by president Volodymyr Zelensky. It was in part, a way to allocate funding before the fiscal year deadline on September 30 and to ensure the flow of weapons to Kyiv would continue through the end of 2024.

The administration is drawing from two pots of money here. One is the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative ($2.4 billion), which allows Kyiv to use the money to buy directly from American defense contractors. This means in most cases it will take a while to get those weapons built and ready for transfer.

Second, is the Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA). In this case, the president is announcing $375 million in weapons from existing Pentagon stockpiles, but he is also directing the remaining $5.5 billion available in that fund to be allocated immediately before the Monday cut-off. He says the stockpiles will then “be replenished.”

Existing Pentagon stockpiles have dwindled to critical levels since the U.S. began a steady stream of weapons — everything from 155mm shells, HIMARS, Stinger anti-aircraft missiles, Bradley fighting vehicles, javelin missiles, mortar rounds, Patriot missiles systems and everything in between, including spare parts and field equipment. In the last tranche of funding approved by Congress in April, there was $7.8 billion in PDA and $13.4 billion to replenish stockpiles. It is not clear how much has been spent on the latter, but experts say it can take months if not years for industry to replace some of this equipment.

It is for that reason that Senator Mike Lee (R-Utah), with co-sponsor Sen. Marsha Blackburn (R-Tenn), have introduced a bill this week that would put guardrails on future drawdowns of the PDA. It makes it more difficult to raise the $100 million cap on annual PDA allocations (which Congress has done obviously numerous times for Ukraine), issues a stricter definition of “unforeseen emergencies” for the president to announce drawdowns, and restricts drawdowns to 20-day windows after an emergency is declared.

It also prohibits the president from accessing PDA if the remaining value of drawdown authority exceeds the amount of funding available for stockpile replenishment.

But this comes at a time when many of the senators’ colleagues are pushing Biden to do more. For example, Sen. Roger Wicker (R-Miss.), ranking Republican on the Armed Services Committee, lashed out at Biden before his surge announcement.

“It is unfortunately typical of this administration to wait until the last possible moment to announce full use of the PDA,” Wicker said in a statement. “Brave Ukrainians are fighting and dying defending their country so that Americans and Europeans won’t have to. President Biden needs to expedite the actual transfer immediately. They need weapons, not words.”


Responsible Statecraft asked Lee about these efforts in an email exchange earlier this week:

RS: Please share with us why you have seen urgency in modifying the Presidential Drawdown Authority tools now?

Senator Lee: The Biden administration’s use of presidential drawdown authority for Ukraine is unprecedented. Drawdown authority is not a long-term aid strategy and has never been. These are not reserve stocks intended to be used as foreign aid — these are weapons that U.S. troops could need at any moment in higher-priority theaters, namely the Indo-Pacific. But the Biden administration has run the shelves bare until at least 2030. The Biden administration threw 60 years of precedent out the window and irreversibly jeopardized our military readiness for Ukraine. That is why Congress must close the loopholes and remove undue executive discretion that the Biden administration has capitalized on for two years.

RS: There are a number of Republicans, with Democratic assistance, readying ways to keep the aid flowing to Ukraine even if President Trump is elected and wants to put the brakes on it. Is there resistance to this in the House and Senate today? There doesn’t seem to be as much talk about conditioning aid among Republicans as there was before the massive new aid bill was passed in April.

Senator Lee: After two years of recklessness, more than $175 billion later, and with nothing but empty stockpiles to show for it, Republicans, like the American public, are growing skeptical of continued aid for Ukraine, and I believe they will be less inclined to appease President Zelensky’s demands the next time he comes knocking.

RS: As of this writing President Zelensky is currently traveling to the United States for the UN General Assembly and to meet with the presidential candidates and President Biden. He is also visiting an ammo manufacturing plant in Pennsylvania in an effort to convince American leaders to not only give his country more weapons, but to get approval to use those weapons to attack deep into Russia. Should he get approval for these long range attacks into Russia and if not, why?

Senator Lee: The U.S. should not permit Ukraine to use our long-range weapons to strike Russian territory. Doing so would defeat Ukraine’s principal objectives of self-defense and territorial integrity — President Zelensky’s claimed mission for more than two years. Long-range strikes into Russia would inherently alter Ukraine’s strategic footing and make the U.S. complicit in offensive action towards Russia. That is a needless risk for us to take against a nuclear-armed adversary. Every time the Biden administration gives in to one of President Zelensky’s demands, it moves us closer to direct conflict with Russia.

RS: After two and a half years of war in Ukraine and U.S. support for it, how does Senator Lee see the chances for “victory” for Kyiv and what does he believe should happen now to end the war to achieve both independence for Ukraine and stop the bloodshed?

Senator Lee: This conflict will continue as long as the U.S. funds it. President Zelensky has no incentive to negotiate or entertain peace talks as long as the consistent message of the Biden administration is: “as long as it takes.” The fastest way to end the conflict on favorable terms is to make clear to President Zelensky that U.S. aid is not limitless. Reforming presidential drawdown authority, the Biden administration’s tool of choice, is a necessary first step.

RS: In the major aid package for Ukraine in April, a condition was placed in which the administration was supposed to issue a plan detailing "a strategy regarding United States support for Ukraine against aggression by the Russian Federation: Provided, That such strategy shall be multi-year, establish specific and achievable objectives, define and prioritize United States national security interests…” The deadline for this plan was in June, and it came and went without a report until the White House quietly issued a classified version earlier this month (members are now trying to get that unclassified). Is the administration taking the concerns of Congress — that there is no war strategy tied to the billions of dollars the US is spending on it — seriously?

Senator Lee: If the Biden administration were convinced that it could align support for Ukraine with U.S. interests and resources, we would have had a strategy two years ago. The fact that it took more than two years and an act of Congress to force the administration’s hand proves that the administration is content to ignore congressional concerns. No one should put any stock in a “strategy” crafted by the Biden administration. If Congress wants to meaningfully change the administration’s posture on Ukraine, it must start reigning in the authorities at its disposal.

RS: Has there been a strong case made for continued war in Ukraine as a critical U.S. interest beyond the domino theory that Russian President Vladimir Putin will set his sights on Poland and other European countries if not stopped in Ukraine?

Senator Lee: Russia’s performance in Ukraine disproved the notion of an existential Russian threat to Europe or U.S. interests. Russia has struggled to project power or achieve military objectives in its own backyard. That’s not to say that Russia isn’t a formidable threat, but it is hyperbolic to suggest that the fate of Poland or Eastern Europe depends upon Ukraine.


Sen. Mike Lee (Gage Skidmore/Flikr/Creative Commons) and President Joe Biden (White House/Flickr/Creative Commons)

Reporting | Washington Politics
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The Bunker appears originally at the Project on Government Oversight and is republished here with permission.


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Blob exploiting Trump's anger with Putin, risking return to Biden's war

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Donald Trump’s recent outburst against Vladimir Putin — accusing the Russian leader of "throwing a pile of bullsh*t at us" and threatening devastating new sanctions — might be just another Trumpian tantrum.

The president is known for abrupt reversals. Or it could be a bargaining tactic ahead of potential Ukraine peace talks. But there’s a third, more troubling possibility: establishment Republican hawks and neoconservatives, who have been maneuvering to hijack Trump’s “America First” agenda since his return to office, may be exploiting his frustration with Putin to push for a prolonged confrontation with Russia.

Trump’s irritation is understandable. Ukraine has accepted his proposed ceasefire, but Putin has refused, making him, in Trump’s eyes, the main obstacle to ending the war.

Putin’s calculus is clear. As Ted Snider notes in the American Conservative, Russia is winning on the battlefield. In June, it captured more Ukrainian territory and now threatens critical Kyiv’s supply lines. Moscow also seized a key lithium deposit critical to securing Trump’s support for Ukraine. Meanwhile, Russian missile and drone strikes have intensified.

Putin seems convinced his key demands — Ukraine’s neutrality, territorial concessions in the Donbas and Crimea, and a downsized Ukrainian military — are more achievable through war than diplomacy.

Yet his strategy empowers the transatlantic “forever war” faction: leaders in Britain, France, Germany, and the EU, along with hawks in both main U.S. parties. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz claims that diplomacy with Russia is “exhausted.” Europe’s war party, convinced a Russian victory would inevitably lead to an attack on NATO (a suicidal prospect for Moscow), is willing to fight “to the last Ukrainian.” Meanwhile, U.S. hawks, including liberal interventionist Democrats, stoke Trump’s ego, framing failure to stand up to Putin’s defiance as a sign of weakness or appeasement.

Trump long resisted this pressure. Pragmatism told him Ukraine couldn’t win, and calling it “Biden’s war” was his way of distancing himself, seeking a quick exit to refocus on China, which he has depicted as Washington’s greater foreign threat. At least as important, U.S. involvement in the war in Ukraine has been unpopular with his MAGA base.

But his June strikes on Iran may signal a hawkish shift. By touting them as a decisive blow to Iran’s nuclear program (despite Tehran’s refusal so far to abandon uranium enrichment), Trump may be embracing a new approach to dealing with recalcitrant foreign powers: offer a deal, set a deadline, then unleash overwhelming force if rejected. The optics of “success” could tempt him to try something similar with Russia.

This pivot coincides with a media campaign against restraint advocates within the administration like Elbridge Colby, the Pentagon policy chief who has prioritized China over Ukraine and also provoked the opposition of pro-Israel neoconservatives by warning against war with Iran. POLITICO quoted unnamed officials attacking Colby for wanting the U.S. to “do less in the world.” Meanwhile, the conventional Republican hawk Marco Rubio’s influence grows as he combines the jobs of both secretary of state and national security adviser.

What Can Trump Actually Do to Russia?
 

Nuclear deterrence rules out direct military action — even Biden, far more invested in Ukraine than Trump, avoided that risk. Instead, Trump ally Sen.Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.), another establishment Republican hawk, is pushing a 500% tariff on nations buying Russian hydrocarbons, aiming to sever Moscow from the global economy. Trump seems supportive, although the move’s feasibility and impact are doubtful.

China and India are key buyers of Russian oil. China alone imports 12.5 million barrels daily. Russia exports seven million barrels daily. China could absorb Russia’s entire output. Beijing has bluntly stated it “cannot afford” a Russian defeat, ensuring Moscow’s economic lifeline remains open.

The U.S., meanwhile, is ill-prepared for a tariff war with China. When Trump imposed 145% tariffs, Beijing retaliated by cutting off rare earth metals exports, vital to U.S. industry and defense. Trump backed down.

At the G-7 summit in Canada last month, the EU proposed lowering price caps on Russian oil from $60 a barrel to $45 a barrel as part of its 18th sanctions package against Russia. Trump rejected the proposal at the time but may be tempted to reconsider, given his suggestion that more sanctions may be needed. Even if Washington backs the measure now, however, it is unlikely to cripple Russia’s war machine.

Another strategy may involve isolating Russia by peeling away Moscow’s traditionally friendly neighbors. Here, Western mediation between Armenia and Azerbaijan isn’t about peace — if it were, pressure would target Baku, which has stalled agreements and threatened renewed war against Armenia. The real goal is to eject Russia from the South Caucasus and create a NATO-aligned energy corridor linking Turkey to Central Asia, bypassing both Russia and Iran to their detriment.

Central Asia itself is itself emerging as a new battleground. In May 2025, the EU has celebrated its first summit with Central Asian nations in Uzbekistan, with a heavy focus on developing the Middle Corridor, a route for transportation of energy and critical raw materials that would bypass Russia. In that context, the EU has committed €10 billion in support of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route.

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On June 30, President Trump signed an executive order terminating the majority of U.S. sanctions on Syria. The move, which would have been unthinkable mere months ago, fulfilled a promise he made at an investment forum in Riyadh in May.“The sanctions were brutal and crippling,” he had declared to an audience of primarily Saudi businessmen. Lifting them, he said, will “give Syria a chance at greatness.”

The significance of this statement lies not solely in the relief that it will bring to the Syrian people. His remarks revealed an implicit but rarely admitted truth: sanctions — often presented as a peaceful alternative to war — have been harming the Syrian people all along.

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