The growing protests in China against the PRC regime's draconian Zero-COVID policy are significant. How significant is too early to tell.
If the Chinese authorities respond with violent repression and loudly blame the protests on foreign forces, this could ignite even larger demonstrations, and ones directed against the regime in general. Slogans of “CCP step down,” and “Xi Jinping step down,” have already been heard on Chinese streets. Equally important, even if the regime weathers this outbreak of protest, the Chinese New Year is coming up in late January, a time in which Chinese traditionally visit their families. If the draconian Zero-COVID policy is still in place at that time, and travel and homecomings are obstructed, it is extremely likely that protests will reemerge in even greater force.
Washington needs to be very careful in responding to these events. If it overtly lauds or encourages the protests, it will only feed the paranoia of the PRC regime and strengthen the inevitable accusation that the demonstrations are a creation of outside forces. This will almost ensure violent repression. If the U.S. says too little, however, it undermines its simplistic narrative of the world being divided between democracy and authoritarianism.
The best response at this point would be to take note of the large protests as an indication of the pressures that Zero-COVID have produced in Chinese society, and offer to work with Beijing ASAP to distribute vaccines within the country.
The Chinese got themselves into this mess by stressing how effective their independent, non-Western handling of the virus has been, by resisting the importation of more effective Western vaccines, and by not vaccinating the elderly at sufficient levels. The West should not strengthen the disastrous PRC policy by adopting an ideological approach to the events in China. This will just cause the Chinese authorities to double down.
One can expect several Members of Congress to attempt to use the protests — and any repressive Chinese government response — to argue for even greater levels of containment and pressure on Beijing. While criticizing its draconian COVID policies and repressive response is justified, trying to use events in China to deepen the rift between the two countries would be feckless and irresponsible, resulting in an even more unstable, polarized global environment.
Michael D. Swaine is a Senior Research Fellow on East Asia at the Quincy Institute and is one of the most prominent American scholars of Chinese security studies.
Protesters chant slogans in support of freedom of speech and the press, amid broader nationwide unrest due to COVID-19 lockdown policies, in Chengdu, China in this still image obtained from undated social media video released November 27, 2022. Video obtained by REUTERS
The Ukrainian Defense Contract Group (UDCG or Ramstein) meeting in Germany this week has been officially postponed as President Biden bowed out to instead focus on the fallout from Hurricane Milton.
Initially planned for October 12, Ukrainian President Volodomir Zelensky was supposed to share his plans with Western policy makers and defense contractors at the meeting, saying “we will present the victory plan, clear, specific steps for a just end to the war.”
While the Ramstein summit has been postponed, Ukraine’s Western allies seem to be shifting their stances on how the war can, or should end. Former NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg recently indicated that Ukraine may have to give up some territorial integrity in exchange for peace or even NATO membership. Stoltenberg had previously explicitly ruled out any land for peace deals.
Western allies may be coming to a decision point on how they will move forward with the Ukraine-Russian war. Zelensky is regularly meeting with NATO allies, and said they are consistently affirming support, but still refusing to cross certain lines. For example, UK Prime Minister Kier Starmer reaffirmed the United Kingdom’s support for Ukraine after a meeting with the Ukrainian president on Thursday.
But when asked about allowing Ukraine to use British-made long range missiles deep into Russian territory, a spokesperson said, “We obviously want to put Ukraine in the strongest position. But no war has ever been won by a single weapon. And on Storm Shadow specifically, there has been no change to the UK government’s position on the use of long-range missiles.”
Further weapons packages and NATO assurances were likely to be approved at the Ramstein meeting, according to U.N. Secretary General Mark Rutte. ”What we need to do is to focus on what NATO can do,” he said. “What NATO can do is help to strengthen Ukraine's hands by providing enough military support. That's why I'm so happy that next Saturday we will participate in the Ramstein meeting.” Additional weapons packages were guaranteed at the previous meeting in 2023.
The postponement of this important confab is surely disappointing for Zelensky as it is preceded by Russian successes on the battlefield and a shift in opinion amongst Ukrainian soldiers and civilians around the war. Vice President Kamala Harris also recently refused to say if she would support a Ukrainian ascension into NATO if elected. Additionally, fiscal realities in Europe are shifting German and French support for Kyiv.
In other Ukraine are new this week:
On Tuesday Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban said that Ukraine is not able to beat Russia on the battlefield and called for a ceasefire. Reuters reports that Hungary has also decided to place a hold on a pending $50 billion G7 loan to Ukraine until after the American election. “We don't want to block anything, we just want to convince European leaders to change their strategy (on Ukraine) because the current strategy does not work,” Orban said.
Ukraine claims to have hit a North Korean weapons cache in Russia. On Wednesday Al Jazeerareported that a Ukrainian spokesperson announced that a drone attack in Bryansk successfully destroyed this strategic weapons cache. The Ukrainian General Staff said, “the arsenal stored ammunition for missile and artillery systems, including those delivered from North Korea, as well as glide bombs.” This comes as North Korean engineers and officers are reported to be assisting Russia in the conflict.
Russia continues to make territorial gains. Last week it captured Vuhledar in Ukraine's southeast, and this week Russian troops have now entered Toretsk, a city about 50 miles north, according to the New York Times. A Ukrainian Army spokeswoman, Anastasia Bobovnikova, confirmed late Monday that Russia had entered the city.
In this week’s October 7th State department briefing:
State Department Spokesperson Matthew Miller was asked about Moscow’s recentsentencing of an American citizen to prison for allegedly fighting as a mercenary in Ukraine. Miller said the United States has limited information as of now, and urges Moscow to grant consular access to him for Washington.
Miller did not answer a question concerning the report that North Koreans were killed fighting for Russia.
Another Azerbaijani war against Armenia with potential for significant regional destabilization is imminent. Yet, it is preventable.
Azerbaijan, supported by Turkey and Russia, claims the right to an extra-territorial “corridor” through Southern Armenia. Following the United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP29 — November 11-22, 2024) in Azerbaijan’s capital Baku, when the world attention is elsewhere, the risk of an Azerbaijani offensive to grab the “corridor” by force will increase significantly.
Armenia could preempt this violent outcome by urging comprehensive negotiations with Azerbaijan, also engaging regional and global powers.
The September 2023 Azerbaijani offensive against the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (NKR) and the ethnic cleansing of the Armenians there fundamentally altered the geopolitical landscape and terminated the November 9, 2020 tripartite ceasefire agreement that ended the 44-day Azerbaijani war against the unrecognized NKR. The agreement was signed by Armenia, Azerbaijan and Russia, based on which Azerbaijan claims the right to a “corridor” through southern Armenia’s Syunik Province, which Azerbaijan calls “Zankezur.”
With the tripartite agreement, labeled as a “statement,” the parties pledged to “a complete ceasefire and termination of all hostilities in the area of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict” (Article 1). Further, they agreed to deploy Russian “peacemaking forces … along the contact line in Nagorno-Karabakh and along the Lachin Corridor,” connecting NKR to Armenia (Article 3).
The purpose of the tripartite agreement formulated in Article 1 ceased to exist with the complete breakdown of the ceasefire when Azerbaijan launched an all-out offensive against NKR on September 19, 2023. The nine-month Azerbaijani blockade of the Lachin Corridor preceding the offensive breached Article 3. And the premature withdrawal of the Russian “peacemaking forces” from NKR in April 2024, also breaching Article 3, confirmed the end of the agreement. With the material breaches of these three fundamental clauses, the tripartite agreement could be considered terminated in accordance with Article 60 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
Moreover, unlike the reference to the “Lachin Corridor” in Article 3, the tripartite agreement does not use the term “corridor” for the transportation link through southern Armenia. Instead, the agreement stipulates four obligations in Article 9: (a) “economic and transport connections in the region shall be unblocked;” (b) “Armenia shall guarantee the security of transport connections” between Azerbaijan and its Nakhichevan exclave for “unobstructed movement of persons, vehicles and cargo in both directions;” (c) the Border Guard Service of Russia “shall be responsible for overseeing the transport connections;” and (d) subject to agreement between the Parties, the construction of new transport communications to link Nakhichevan with the western regions of Azerbaijan will be ensured.
Consequently, the “economic and transport connections” foreseen are not limited only through southern Armenia for Azerbaijan’s use, but also must be “unblocked” throughout the region, including for Armenian transport through Azerbaijan to Russia and elsewhere (a). The transport connections through Armenia must be under Armenian sovereignty, otherwise it could not “guarantee the security” (b), and it must be “subject to agreement between the Parties” (d), meaning further negotiations will be required, if not requiring a new agreement between Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Russia, the signatories of the tripartite agreement.
For strategic considerations and goodwill, Armenia may decide not to consider terminated the November 9, 2020 tripartite ceasefire agreement, and instead may prefer to negotiate the terms of the communication links in accordance with the agreement. While resisting concessions demanded by Azerbaijan, Armenia could consider offering secure and guaranteed transit rights between Azerbaijan and Nakhichevan, a core Azerbaijani need, regardless of the label used, “economic and transport connections” or “Zangezur Corridor.” The transit rights must be under clearly defined terms and subject to strict Armenian sovereignty and control, but with international monitoring. The agreed transport connection must not interrupt Armenia’s border and communication links with Iran.
Additionally, Armenia and Azerbaijan must agree on customs, border security, and inspections, if any. Reciprocal rights for travel through Azerbaijan must be considered as well. The agreement must also safeguard against the specter of any territorial claims from Armenia.
Last month, Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi warned Russia and Azerbaijan that any corridor through southern Armenia must not block the border between Armenia and Iran — “territorial integrity of our neighbors or redrawing of boundaries is totally unacceptable and a red line for Iran.”
To sweeten the offer, Armenia could consider a joint Armenian, Azerbaijani, and international community financed infrastructure development consisting of rail, highway, bridges and tunnels for the benefit of both countries and to promote regional integration. Azerbaijan has already commenced the development of a rail and highway infrastructure on its side of the border to connect with the “economic and transport connections” through southern Armenia yet to be agreed.
Armenia and Azerbaijan could also consider demilitarizing certain border areas linked to the corridor infrastructure development based on reciprocity and security guarantees, thus creating a buffer zone and reducing future military confrontation risks. Whether military personnel and equipment will be allowed across the corridor should be part of the agreement to be negotiated.
De-escalation of mutual hostile rhetoric to build trust could be part of the negotiations for an agreement on the corridor, including the release of the 23 Armenian prisoners now held in Baku. Border delimitation and delineation, and the renunciation of the threat or use of force by Azerbaijan must be part of any corridor agreement.
Regional powers, including Iran and India, could be instrumental in persuading Russia to deter Azerbaijan from a military seizure of the “Zangezur Corridor” and instead to pursue the peaceful alternative outlined in this article. Once on board, Russia in turn could convince Turkey to support the peaceful alternative for the corridor linking Azerbaijan mainland with its Nakhichevan exclave, Turkey and beyond.
Strong, coordinated messaging from the U.S. and Europe to Azerbaijan could go a long way that the threat and use of force is unacceptable, and that any economic and transport connection arrangement must be negotiated peacefully and must respect Armenia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Sanctions must be on the table if Azerbaijan escalates tensions or threatens the use of force again.
The U.S. and EU could have an active involvement in the peace process, providing a neutral platform for negotiations and ensuring that an agreement is implemented in good faith. The U.S. and Europe must be mindful not to undermine Russian and Iranian support for an agreement on the peaceful resolution of the Azerbaijani claim of a corridor. Without input from both Iran and Russia, the current rhetoric over “Zangezur Corridor” is likely to lead to renewed Azerbaijani aggression against Armenia.
It is imperative that Armenia act proactively to prevent a new war in the South Caucasus. By leveraging diplomatic pressure, economic incentives and disincentives, and security guarantees, powers in the region and beyond can assume a crucial role in averting a new crisis and supporting a peaceful resolution. Armenia, while maintaining its sovereignty, can offer carefully crafted compromises to create a win-win outcome for all.
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U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken walks on Independence Square in Kyiv, Ukraine May 14, 2024. (Paparazzza/Shutterstcok)
It is said that Henry Kissinger asserted that little can be won at the negotiating table that isn’t earned on the battlefield.
In several wars in recent weeks, U.S. officials have echoed that approach. State Department spokesperson Matthew Miller recently said that the U.S. “supports[s] a ceasefire” in Lebanon while simultaneously recognizing that “military pressure can at times enable diplomacy.” Meanwhile, Secretary of State Antony Blinken has expressed the doctrine as doing “all that we can to strengthen Ukraine’s position on the battlefield so it has the strongest possible position at the negotiating table.”
But during the Biden administration, the iteration of Kissinger’s doctrine has gone well beyond the generals supporting the diplomats. The diplomats are now outpacing and pushing the generals. In the Biden administration, despite the promise to open “a new era of relentless diplomacy,” the State Department has metamorphosized into the hawkish arm of the Pentagon.
Blinken has promised that “from day one… as what Russia is doing has changed, as the battlefield has changed, we’ve adapted… And I can tell you that as we go forward, we will do exactly what we have already done, which is we will adjust, we’ll adapt as necessary, including with regard to the means that are at Ukraine’s disposal to effectively defend against the Russian aggression.”
It is the Pentagon that has counseled restraint. They have argued that the uncertain benefits of longer range strikes do not outweigh the risk of escalation. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin has maintained that “long-range strikes into Russia would not turn the tide of the war in Ukraine’s favor,” and agrees with the intelligence community that Russia is capable of quickly moving most of its assets out of range.
This is not the first time the debate on escalation has featured unexpected sides. While, soon after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the State Department argued that “real diplomacy” does not take place at times of aggression, it was General Mark Milley, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who advocated for diplomacy and said that the goal of a sovereign Ukraine with its territory intact would require “a long, very difficult, high casualty-producing war.”
Milley further argued that “You can achieve those objectives through military means…. but you can also achieve those objectives maybe possibly, through some sort of diplomatic means.” Once again, it was the top general who advocated for diplomacy while the top diplomat argued for more war.
It is also not the first debate on long-range missiles. On May 15, before the U.S. had approved even limited longer-range strikes into Russia, it was the State Department that first floated giving the green light. Asked about the U.S. ban on Ukraine’s use of American equipment to strike into Russian territory, Blinken replied that, “We have not encouraged or enabled strikes outside of Ukraine,” before adding, “but ultimately Ukraine has to make decisions for itself about how it’s going to conduct this war…. these are decisions that Ukraine has to make, Ukraine will make for itself.”
The State Department has from the start abdicated diplomacy. We know that on December 17, 2021, Putin proposed security guarantees to the United States with a key demand of no NATO expansion to Ukraine. But rather than negotiate, Derek Chollet, counselor to Secretary Blinken, later revealed that the U.S. at the time did not consider NATO expansion to be on the bargaining table.
At the end of a full term in office, the Blinken State Department does not have a single diplomatic victory to boast about. At the start of his term, Biden promised to "offer Tehran a credible path back to diplomacy." He promised he would “promptly reverse the failed Trump policies that have inflicted harm on the Cuban people and done nothing to advance democracy and human rights.” He promised a different foreign policy than Trump’s "abject failure” in Venezuela. And he promised a new approach to North Korea that "is open to and will explore diplomacy."
The Blinken State Department has delivered on none of these promises and has failed to attain a ceasefire in Gaza or in Ukraine. Instead, it has availed itself of a one tool tool box of coercion, be it sanctions or military force. It has fallen to the Pentagon to suggest diplomacy and to question unrestricted use of force.
Meanwhile, it was General Charles Q. Brown Jr., the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other senior Pentagon officials who recently raised the question at the White House of whether over-reliance on military force has emboldened America’s partners to be increasingly aggressive and cross American red lines.
Diplomacy has often in the past partnered with military force. But in the Biden administration, the State Department has abdicated diplomacy and reduced itself to the hawkish arm of the Pentagon which has, paradoxically, been the louder voice for diplomacy.
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