U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo says the Trump administration’s foreign policy is based on restraint and realism. But U.S. foreign policy actions across the world suggest a lack of understanding for what the concept means in practice. Restraint values diplomatic engagement over military coercion and domination. so don’t be fooled by Pompeo’s hollow language. The latest video from the Quincy Institute explains:
When the Ukraine aid bill hit President Joe Biden’s desk Wednesday, everything was already in place to speed up its impact. The Pentagon had worked overtime to prepare a massive, $1 billion weapons shipment that it could start sending “within hours” of the president’s signature. American officials even pre-positioned many of the arms in European stockpiles, an effort that will surely help get the materiel to the frontlines that much faster.
For Ukraine, the new aid package is massive, both figuratively and literally. Congress authorized roughly $60 billion in new spending related to the war, $37 billion of which is earmarked for weapons transfers and purchases. The new funding pushes Washington’s investment in Ukraine’s defense to well over $150 billion since 2022.
Beyond new weapons, the new outlays also provide a much-needed morale boost for Ukrainian soldiers, who have struggled to hold the line against Russia as their stockpiles have dwindled. But the key question remains the same as it did last week: Does Ukraine have a real chance to turn the tide and win the war?
Experts say it’s a mixed bag at best. On the plus side, the new aid dramatically reduces the chance of near-term disaster, like a collapse of the Ukrainian frontlines followed by a rapid Russian advance.
But the assistance has a limited impact on the fundamentals of the conflict, including Ukraine’s growing disadvantage when it comes to manpower. Put simply, the package can only help if Kyiv manages to dramatically expand the number of fighters at its disposal ahead of an expected Russian counteroffensive this summer.
“I would expect the situation to probably continue to deteriorate over the next three months, but if mobilization goes according to plan and the U.S. aid is unblocked then the situation should improve from autumn onwards,” a relatively optimistic Polish analyst told Reuters.
Ukraine recognizes this bind and is pulling out all the stops to swell the ranks of its military. Following the passage of a new law broadening eligibility for conscription, Kyiv temporarily suspended all consular services for military-age Ukrainian men living abroad — unless, of course, they need help to come home and join up. Ukraine is also offering incentives to boost voluntary recruitment, including new rules that allow recruits to choose their unit and specialization, as well as the length of time they will serve.
But none of these efforts will pay off before a likely Russian offensive this summer, meaning that Ukraine may well lose more territory this year. The outcome of Russia’s offensive will also provide an important indicator of Ukraine’s chances for long-term success, especially given the impact that even minor Russian advances could have on the internal politics of Kyiv’s backers.
When it comes to potential peace talks, the new aid package provides some notable upsides. “Importantly, it could reduce Russian optimism about the long game and thus make Moscow more inclined to compromise,” Samuel Charap of the RAND Corporation told Politico.
But that advantage remains hypothetical so long as both Kyiv and Washington remain committed to retaking all of Ukraine’s pre-2014 territory, according to George Beebe of the Quincy Institute, which publishes Responsible Statecraft.
“Additional aid would be justified — indeed, it would arguably be required — if it were to be used as leverage in a broader diplomatic strategy for negotiating a compromise settlement of the war,” wrote Beebe, who previously led Russia analysis at the CIA. “But it is tied to no such strategy.”
Beebe fears that, without a clear strategy for victory at the negotiating table, the new aid package “will almost guarantee that Ukraine will continue throwing its dwindling reserves of manpower into a war it cannot win.”
In other diplomatic news related to the war in Ukraine:
— Ukraine and Russia agreed to return a group of displaced children to their home countries following the countries’ first known face-to-face negotiations in months, according to France 24. The exact details of the swap remain murky. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said 16 Ukrainian children returned home via the Qatari-mediated deal, while Russian officials claimed that 29 Ukrainian minors and 19 Russian children would be repatriated.
The swap showed rare progress on a particularly thorny issue for the warring parties. Ukraine alleges that Russia essentially kidnapped Ukrainian children in Russian-occupied areas and forcibly shipped them out of Ukraine, a claim that has led to charges against Russian officials at the International Criminal Court. Moscow, for its part, claims that the children were mostly orphans who were sent away from the frontlines for their own safety.
— The Biden administration secretly sent long-range missiles to Ukraine after securing promises that the weapons would only be used to hit targets within Ukrainian territory, according to CNN. Washington had previously chosen not to give Kyiv the missiles due to fears about potential escalation as well as dwindling Western stockpiles. While the risk of escalation remains, increased missile production led the Pentagon to drop its readiness concerns.
— The Ukraine aid package quietly authorized the Biden administration to seize up to $5 billion in Russian assets held within the United States in order to help fund Ukraine’s war effort, AP News reported. In theory, the White House could start confiscating the money before the end of the year, though AP notes that Biden plans to work with allies on a coordinated set of seizures, which could delay the move. Such coordination would provide cover for European Union states that collectively hold over $200 billion in Russian assets. Moscow has pledged to fight any asset seizures in court and said it will retaliate in kind if the West moves forward with the plan.
U.S. State Department news:
In a Tuesday press briefing, State Department spokesperson Vedant Patel condemned Russia’s imprisonment of Wall Street Journal reporter Evan Gershkovich and called for his immediate release. “Russia should stop using individuals like Evan Gershkovich and Paul Whelan, who has also been detained for five years, as bargaining chips,” Patel said. “Evan and Paul should be released immediately.”
France's President Emmanuel Macron attends a tribute ceremony for the Vercors resistance fighters and civilian victims as part of the commemorations of the 80th anniversary of the Liberation of France, at the cemetery in Vassieux-en-Vercors, southeastern France, on April 16, 2024. Photo by Bony/Pool/ABACAPRESS.COM
President Emmanuel Macron is pursuing an old Gaullist dream: a militarily and geopolitically autonomous Europe under the leadership of France.
The present strategy by which Macron is pursuing this goal is to present France as the military vanguard of Europe in the defense of Ukraine, through the suggestion that French and other NATO troops could be sent to that country:
“There is no consensus today to send ground troops in an official, accepted and endorsed manner,” he declared after a summit of European leaders in February. “But in dynamics, nothing should be excluded. We will do everything necessary to ensure that Russia cannot win this war.”
When this idea was immediately rejected by other NATO governments, including the United States, the United Kingdom and Germany, Macron doubled down rhetorically by accusing the Germans and others of cowardice.
Some have dismissed this as mere cosplay, Macron dressing up as de Gaulle, just as British politicians are incapable of resisting the temptation to pretend to be Churchill. Others have suggested that it is chiefly motivated by domestic politics. Faced with a steep rise in support for Marine Le Pen’s Rassemblement National (formerly the Front National), which traditionally sympathized with Putin, Macron is hoping to damage and isolate it by emphasizing the threat from Russia.
These analyses have some truth to them, but also underestimate the seriousness of Macron’s aim and Europe’s position. His dream has deep roots in French history and culture, and also corresponds in certain respects to the Europe’s real needs,
Unfortunately — and perhaps, God forbid, tragically— the strategy by which Macron is seeking to achieve his goal is to a considerable degree directly contrary to the goal itself, as well as being completely contrary to de Gaulle’s own ideas. It is a military and military-industrial strategy unaccompanied by adequate armed forces, or a real military-industrial base or political strategy, not to mention domestic political support.
In the words of Jean de Gliniastry, a former French ambassador to Moscow:
“There is a message, a warning to the Russians, while remaining ambiguous…[But] you have to walk on both legs: the military aspect and the diplomatic aspect. And for now, I don’t see the latter.”
Macron stated that Russia must not “win” the war; but, like all the other leaders of NATO, he has never defined what he means by this. Perhaps he means fighting Russia to a standstill followed by a compromise peace. In private conversations, however, French officials simply echo the U.S. line that only the Ukrainians can make peace — and the Ukrainian terms for peace require not a stalemate, but the complete military defeat of Russia.
The need for Europe to develop a capacity for self-defense should be obvious. Having nailed themselves to the Biden administration, European governments have very belatedly woken up to the realization that the next president may well be Donald Trump, and that the U.S. commitment to Europe may radically diminish. Indeed, given U.S. problems at home and in the Middle East, plus growing tension with China, this commitment is likely to diminish in future whether or not Trump is elected.
However, Macron’s hope that the supposed threat from Russia will prompt Europe to unite militarily behind French leadership vastly exaggerates both French military power and European willingness to follow France’s lead. After years of budget cuts, the French army is far too weak to intervene in Ukraine without full U.S. support. When in 2011 President Nicolas Sarkozy of France tried to take the lead in the “humanitarian intervention” in Libya, within a very few weeks he was begging an unwilling President Obama to take over the operation on behalf of NATO, for fear of a humiliating Anglo-French failure.
In terms of appealing to other European countries, Macron’s hawkish stance on Ukraine is targeting East European partners. These governments, however, are precisely the countries with the most deeply-rooted determination to opposeEuropean strategic autonomy and maintain until the bitter end the closest possible alliance with the United States.
As Macron has himself stated, long-term European strategic autonomy also depends on a huge growth of Europe’s military-industrial base. This however depends on the full participation of Europe’s industrial powerhouse, Germany. Quite apart from German unwillingness to accept French leadership, the German economy is faltering and even facing “deindustrialization”, in part because of the end of cheap Russian energy as a result of the war and Western sanctions.
If the German industrial economy steeply declines, it will wreck Europe’s ability to develop an adequate military-industrial base. It is also likely to produce social and political anxiety, gravely undermining Germany’s role as a pillar of the European Union and European democracy. And far from leading to support for European strategic autonomy, fear of Russia has already driven Germany into even greater dependence on the United States.
When it comes to whipping up French domestic fear of Russia, the danger for Macron is that it will not work, and the danger for France, Europe, and the world is that it will. At present, polls show French public opinion opposed to direct intervention in Ukraine by a margin of almost three to one. This suggests that should Macron actually send troops to Ukraine, there will be a tremendous public backlash against him. Barring nuclear war, very few people in France feel truly under threat from Russia.
The risk of course is that all of his efforts to generate fear will lead Macron to be trapped by his own propaganda. If Russia does break through the Ukrainian lines and advance rapidly, he will either have to confess his own and France’s impotence in the face of a supposedly mortal Russian threat — or actually send French troops to Ukraine.
Russian commentators have stated categorically that if French or any other NATO troops are deployed in Ukraine, they will be attacked. Meanwhile, a limited deployment of French troops would not stop (though they might slow down) an overwhelming Russian advance. France would then have to either accept a qualified defeat and peace on Russian terms, or beg for U.S. intervention — at which point we would be heading rapidly towards nuclear annihilation.
Perhaps the oddest thing about Macron’s position, and that of the French establishment, is that, while it derives from de Gaulle’s dream of European leadership, it completely misunderstands — or betrays — de Gaulle’s vision. The General, it may be remembered, withdrew France from NATO’s military structures in protest against Washington’s refusal to inform France about U.S. nuclear forces on French soil. He sought an independent French role in international affairs, and, as part of this, sought détente with the Soviet Union and spoke of Europe “from the Atlantic to The Urals.”
De Gaulle’s hopes in this regard were frustrated by the iron constraints of the Cold War. When de Gaulle was president, Soviet tank armies were stationed in central Germany, less than 200 miles from the French border. In principle at least, the Soviet Union was dedicated to a revolutionary ideology that threatened everything de Gaulle stood for: at the time Moscow supported a large and powerful French Communist Party.
Today, the nearest Russian forces are nearly a thousand miles from France’s borders, and both Soviet Communism and the French Communist Party are long dead. It seems overwhelmingly probable, therefore, that instead of lining up with the U.S. against Russia, de Gaulle would have grasped the opportunity for France to take the lead in ensuring European peace by seeking compromise with Moscow.
After all, when de Gaulle fought as a French soldier in the First World War, it was as an ally of the Russian Empire against Germany.
Sophia Ampgkarian contributed to the research for this article.
Americans give higher priority to countering the power and influence of Russia and China and finding a solution to the conflict between Israel and Palestinians than they did six years ago, according to a new survey released Tuesday by the Pew Research Center.
Conversely, policies aimed at promoting human rights, protecting refugees, and strengthening the United Nations are not as compelling to many citizens as they were in 2018, according to the survey, which was conducted during the first week of April.
At the same time, the survey of 3,600 adults found big differences of opinion between respondents who identified as Democrats and Republicans or as leaning toward either party, and between younger and older respondents of what they consider to be “top priorities” for long-term U.S. foreign policy aims.
Democrats and younger participants in the survey were far more likely to rate climate change, defending human rights, and reducing U.S. military commitments overseas as “top priorities.” Republicans and older voters, by contrast, were far more likely to rate containing China and Iran, supporting Israel, and “maintaining the U.S. military advantage over all other countries” as “top priorities.”
At the same time, the survey found that foreign policy did not appear to be as important to the general public this year as it appeared five years ago. Asked which is “more important for President Biden to focus on,” 83% of respondents identified “domestic policy” over “foreign policy” (14% ). Asked the same question with respect to former President Trump in July 2019, respondents favored “domestic policy” by a narrower margin – 74% to 23%.
A second poll of the same respondents released by Pew Tuesday found that views of the United Nations have become somewhat more negative over the past year, with only a slight majority (52%) voicing an overall “favorable” opinion of the world body, down from 57% one year ago. As in the “priorities” survey, the poll found major differences in political and age differences in opinions about the U.N., with Democrats and Democratic-leaning and younger respondents having significantly more favorable views than their Republican and older counterparts. The poll also found that respondents with more education were also more likely to have a favorable opinion of the U.N. than less educated respondents, although the differences were not nearly as great as the partisan and age gaps.
In the first survey, respondents were asked to rate a total of 22 long-range foreign policy goals by whether they should be considered “top priority,” “some priority,” and “no priority.” Of the 22 goals listed this year, six had not been listed in previous surveys by Pew, so comparisons with past sentiment could not be made. Three of the new goals – “strengthening NATO,” “supporting Israel,” and “supporting Ukraine” – were directly relevant to ongoing conflicts that have dominated headlines but were far less salient three years ago when Pew last conducted a “priorities” poll.
As in previous surveys of this kind, particularly since 9/11, two of the three goals that were rated “top priority” the most respondents were “taking measures to protect the U.S. from terrorist attacks” (73%) and “preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction” (63%). “Reducing the flow of illegal drugs into our country” – a new goal not previously listed – was rated as a “top priority” by 64% of respondents (although only 34% of the youngest respondents (18-29 years old) agreed with that assessment).
Other goals that were rated by a majority as a “top priority” included “maintaining the U.S. military advantage over all other countries” (53%), “reducing the spread of infectious diseases”(52%), “limiting the power and influence” of Russia (50%) and China (49%).
The biggest differences between the latest “top priority” goals and those that Pew found in 2018 included containing China’s influence and power, which rose from 32% six years ago to 49% ; finding a solution to the Israel-Palestine conflict (from 18% to 29%); and containing Russia (from 42% to 50%). Support for maintaining U.S. military primacy also rose by a more modest 4% over the six years, although the goal of “getting other countries to assume more of the costs of maintaining world order,” also rose two points to 42%.
The survey also bolstered the notion that younger Americans are significantly more idealistic than their older counterparts. Besides the goal of staunching the flow of illegal drugs, differences of 40 percentage points or more between the pool of respondents aged 18-29 and the oldest group (65 and older) were found with respect to containing China (28% versus 72%), “limiting the power and influence of Iran” (17% versus 61%), and maintaining U.S. military primacy (31% versus 71%). The youngest respondents were also considerably less concerned about containing Russia and North Korea, and “supporting Israel” was rated a “top priority” by only 7% of the youngest group.
Partisan differences were often almost as great, although the 55-percentage point gap between Democrat- and Republican-inclined respondents over “dealing with climate change” as a “top priority” (70% versus 15%) was particularly dramatic. Gaps of 20% or more were found on “supporting Israel” (8% Democratic versus 39% Republican), reducing illegal drugs (51% versus 79%), maintaining military primacy (41% versus 68%, “supporting Ukraine” (37% versus 12%), aiding refugees (30% versus 7%), fighting diseases (63% versus 41%), defending human rights (36% versus 15%), getting other countries to bear costs of maintain world order (54% versus 33%), strengthening the UN (40% versus 20%), and containing Iran (29% versus 49%).
