Thinking twice about that US-China superwar

President Donald Trump has proved, yet again, why America’s founders wisely insisted that only Congress could declare war.

The legislative branch must empower the government’s chief executive to, in the words of Constitutional Convention delegate James Wilson, “involve us in such distress.” Had Trump followed the law, he may never have launched his disastrous attack on Iran.

Yet much worse would be a conflict between the U.S. and People’s Republic of China. The PRC is a great power, possessing an expansive economy, a burgeoning military, and nuclear weapons. Hostilities would almost certainly spread to the Chinese mainland and leapfrog across America’s Pacific possessions and bases, perhaps even reaching the U.S. homeland.

Combat also could entangle neighboring states and disrupt trade with and through Northeast Asia. Pyongyang might see American preoccupation with Taiwan and China as an opportunity to launch the Second Korean War. And the fight would not necessarily remain conventional: never have two major powers possessing nuclear weapons openly battled over interests perceived by both as vital.

No one wants such a war. Still, Taiwan has become a dangerous tripwire for just such a conflict. Indeed, Taipei has bulked up its lobbying operation in the United States in an attempt to preserve Washington’s implicit security commitment. As Trump’s decision to launch a lawless war of choice against Iran highlights, there is a real risk that he or a future president could succumb to reckless hubris in the Pacific.

Indeed, the likelihood of similar misjudgment is great. In the case of Taiwan, many U.S. policymakers simply assume that Beijing would not challenge America. Just tell Beijing what Washington expects, intoned Leon Panetta, former White House chief of staff, defense secretary, and CIA director, and the denizens of Zhongnanhai wouldn’t dare challenge America: “I think frankly if China understands that we’re serious about that, China’s not going to do that.”

Panetta is wildly optimistic. History and security make the island state a vital concern for China, while Taiwan matters not at all for America’s direct defense. The Chinese people view it as part of their nation, while few Americans know where it is. Moreover, distance matters. Taiwan is barely 100 miles off China’s coast but 6,000-plus miles from the American mainland. It is far easier and less expensive to deter than project power.

Absent support from nearby states, Washington would find it almost impossible to defend Taiwan, yet none of Washington’s Asia-Pacific allies have committed to join America and thereby become a permanent enemy of the region’s most powerful nation.

No doubt, American officials hope such a decision is never necessary, that the threat alone deters the PRC from taking military action. Indeed, that is the basis for Washington’s policy of “strategic ambiguity,” which assumes Beijing won’t test its unstated defense commitment while Taipei won’t provoke China. Alas, those nations are just as likely to get Washington’s decision wrong, which would make war more likely.

Moreover, if deterrence fails, the PRC is likely to preempt U.S. and allied action by hitting American bases and forces alongside those of Taiwan. In any conflict, Washington almost certainly would retaliate against Chinese facilities across the mainland, which in turn could trigger Chinese attacks on American targets, perhaps including Hawaii and the continental U.S. A dangerous, and potentially catastrophic, escalatory spiral would beckon.

Even victory would not be forever. Beijing undoubtedly would rearm and try again, rather like Germany responded to its loss in World War I. Washington would have to maintain an oversized military for years, decades, perhaps forever, to protect Taiwan. Yet just six weeks of bombing Iran, a middling power at best, left the Pentagon desperately short of munitions that would be vital for any China contingency. The fiscal burden of presuming to defend most of the known world in Asia, Europe, and the Middle East will grow ever more onerous as Uncle Sam’s finances continue to deteriorate and Congress proves unwilling to even pretend fiscal responsibility.

Perhaps even more challenging would be a Chinese decision to avoid a military assault on Taiwan and initiate a quarantine or blockade instead. The PRC has been steadily increasing naval pressure on the island state.

Reported the Wall Street Journal: “Chinese forces constantly fly, sail, probe and patrol close to Taiwan, signaling to the island’s 23 million people that Beijing’s hard-power buildup makes their resistance to a takeover futile.”

In response, the U.S. would be forced to initiate hostilities without the obvious provocation of direct attack. Would Americans support conflict over free transit for a territory as close to China as Cuba is to America? In 1962 President John F. Kennedy almost took the U.S. into war against the Soviet Union over the latter’s intervention in Cuba. How many Americans would be willing to risk the reverse today?

Of course, there is an informal war party in the nation’s capital, ever ready to race into war with the enemy du jour. Many members angrily denounce their critics — for instance, Steve Bannon, the well-heeled beneficiary of a Trump pardon, has criticized yours truly for insufficient bellicosity toward China. Bannon sensibly denounced Trump’s Iran misadventure but is willing to risk a far more dangerous war with Beijing, like so many others in the nation’s capital.

This is simply mad. The most important principle underlying U.S. policy toward Beijing should be avoiding conflict. Of course, a Chinese attack on Taiwan would be “terrible,” warned Dennis Blair, former commander-in-chief of U.S. Pacific Command and Director of National Intelligence. However, war would be catastrophic for both nations, ruinous for Asian states, and terrible for the world.

Imagine a globe-spanning naval battle, with both sides interdicting commerce. Imagine a collapse in Asian trade, far worse than the consequence of Iran’s blockade of the Strait of Hormuz. Imagine a North Korean invasion of the South, backed by the PRC and Russia. Imagine steady military escalation as human and materiel losses mounted. Imagine Beijing’s leadership turning to nuclear weapons.

Unfortunately, even Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth acknowledges that the U.S. often loses in official war games. When Washington emerges victorious, its losses are typically still huge — two (and sometimes more) aircraft carriers, one or two dozen ships, hundreds of aircraft, and thousands of personnel. And many exercises simply don’t game the consequences of nuclear strikes. Are Americans prepared to risk their homes and nation so Washington can forever dominate China along its coast, thereby imposing what the U.S. would never accept?

This doesn’t mean the U.S. should do nothing to help Taiwan defend itself. Washington should sell weapons to Taipei, especially those most useful in defeating a blockade and invasion, such as anti-ship missiles. American officials should seek to unite major industrialized states to threaten trade penalties and economic sanctions if the PRC initiates force against Taiwan. Washington also should consider relaxing its opposition to friendly proliferation by its Asian allies.

However, Washington’s most important policy objective involving China should be avoiding conflict. Military force should always be a last resort. Full-scale war with a great power armed with nuclear weapons can be justified only when truly existential interests are at stake. The Taiwanese should be free to decide their own future. However, protecting that right, though a worthy end, does not warrant America risking a nation-ending clash with the PRC or anyone else.

Policymakers who believe that the U.S. should be prepared to go to war over Taiwan should initiate a public dialogue. How many Americans are willing to back such a conflict? It is essential to have that debate today, before a U.S. president recklessly commits the nation to a war against China.