Reality check: North Korea won’t give up its nukes

During North Korea’s parliamentary session last week, Kim Jong Un, the North Korean leader, delivered a speech expressing his clear willingness to engage in diplomacy with the United States. But under one strict precondition: the United States must stop seeking to denuclearize North Korea.

“Personally, I still have good memories of U.S. President Trump,” Kim said in his speech. He added, “If the U.S. drops its hollow obsession with denuclearization and wants to pursue peaceful coexistence with North Korea based on the recognition of reality, there is no reason for us not to sit down with the U.S.”

Kim emphatically rejected the possibility of diplomacy conditioned on denuclearization, stressing that “there will never, never be denuclearization for us,” and North Korea’s status as a nuclear power is “irreversible” and untradeable for sanctions relief.

Kim’s remarks reaffirm a statement from July made by his sister, Kim Yo Jong, who then described the relationship between her brother and Trump as “not bad” and urged Washington to drop its demand for denuclearization in order to restart diplomacy.

Kim’s statement is a straightforward response to Trump, who has been repeatedly calling for North Korea’s return to dialogue since his second term began early this year. Although Kim seems open to a new round of talks with Trump, he is also drawing a clear line. The position he adopted in the aftermath of the 2019 Hanoi summit’s breakdown — that he will never negotiate with the U.S. for denuclearization again — remains firm and will not change. If Trump and his administration keep holding onto the goal of denuclearizing North Korea, do not expect diplomacy.

Pyongyang’s stern rejection of denuclearization is disturbing and hard to accept for Washington, but it also provides a reality check as the Trump administration seeks to engage North Korea. Trump may have fond memories of his talks with Kim Jong Un from 2018 to 2019 and may hope for a repeat. The harsh reality is that diplomacy with North Korea based on “denuclearization” looks more unlikely than ever.

When the Hanoi summit collapsed, a number of experts lamented that Washington had walked away from the best nuclear deal it would ever get from North Korea. Such observations were not exaggerated. Leaving aside the technical aspects of Pyongyang’s offer to dismantle its main nuclear complex, which would have marked not entirely satisfying yet meaningful progress, Washington also overlooked how unique an opportunity it was to get Pyongyang to even consider rolling back its nuclear program — the regime’s only security guarantee.

It is difficult for adversaries to set aside feelings of mutual distrust and hostility and engage in diplomacy to discuss compromises, especially for the weaker and more vulnerable side. For the perennially impoverished and unstable regime in Pyongyang, abandoning nuclear weapons, even on a gradual, long-term basis, is an extremely risky choice facing the far more powerful U.S.-South Korea alliance. That said, there were presumably motivations strong enough for Kim Jong Un back then to take a shot at high-risk negotiations with the U.S. — whether a lack of confidence in his nuclear deterrent against Trump’s threats of “fire and fury,” a desire to develop his country’s economic development with U.S. support, or uncertainty about the prospect of long-term ties with China and Russia.

However, such motives for Pyongyang to consider denuclearization appear to be largely irrelevant today. North Korea has dramatically advanced its nuclear and missile capabilities and is now better positioned to deter the U.S., should Trump escalate military threats as in 2017 to pressure Kim. North Korea has also formed an unprecedentedly tight strategic alliance with Russia and improved its relations with China as well. Both Russia and China no longer oppose and challenge North Korea’s nuclear buildup as they used to. In fact, Russia can now be seen as an open supporter of North Korea’s nuclear buildup; it actively helps Pyongyang evade sanctions and sustain its economic lifeline, and might even be sharing limited nuclear technology with the regime.

In sum, Pyongyang’s leverage to resist U.S. pressure has expanded significantly, while Washington’s leverage to pressure Pyongyang has substantially eroded. It seems only logical that Kim is ruling out any possibility of diplomatic negotiations that are conditioned on denuclearization.

Thus far, Washington appears to be largely in denial of this reality. Earlier this week, just days after Kim’s remarks, Secretary of State Marco Rubio, with his South Korean and Japanese counterparts, declared a "resolute commitment to the complete denuclearization of North Korea,” reaffirming the decades-long U.S. position. The consequences of continuous denial would be predictably counterproductive, with Pyongyang’s nuclear arsenal just getting larger and more sophisticated.

As the Trump administration explores a path to diplomatic negotiations with North Korea, it must reassess its objectives. Instead of seeking to denuclearize Pyongyang, Washington should aim for less ambitious goals. Kim seems fiercely determined not to let go of his nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, he has not necessarily expressed objection to a nuclear freeze and arms control measures. This leaves a negotiating space that may be far from ideal but could still serve to advance regional and global security interests — such as freezing North Korea’s nuclear production, moderating North Korea’s military and nuclear doctrines and deployments, preventing North Korea from selling its nuclear and missile technology overseas, and more.

One important thing for Trump and his administration to keep in mind as they pursue negotiations with North Korea is that the process should be accompanied by communication and coordination with South Korea. A more pragmatic U.S. approach to negotiations with North Korea, centered on nuclear freeze and arms control, would earn Seoul’s support; it would align with the direction the Lee Jae-myung administration seeks to promote and also resonate with over 90% of South Koreans who believe denuclearizing North Korea is impossible. But should a potential U.S.-North Korea deal exclude coordination with Seoul and fail to address South Korean security interests, it would severely damage the U.S.-South Korea alliance and intensify South Korea’s temptation for nuclear development — consequences Washington should want to avoid.