Follow us on social

google cta
Iraqi border with Iran closings

US-imposed border closures the latest attempt to pry Iran from Iraq

Not surprisingly, these moves are likely to have the opposite effect — here’s why


Analysis & Opinion | Middle East
google cta

Washington’s latest attempt to restrict Iraq’s economic relations with Iran exposes a serious contradiction in the U.S. approach toward Baghdad.

While Washington seeks to establish an expanded bilateral partnership following the withdrawal of its forces from Iraq, it continues to push Baghdad to become part of Washington’s confrontation with Tehran. This policy risks strengthening those political forces in Iraq that Washington seeks to weaken.

On November 8, Iraqi Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein revealed that the U.S. Treasury had demanded the closure of all but two border crossings with Iran. This in turn followed Trump’s alleged threat to strike Iraqi armed factions if they participated in renewed fighting on behalf of Iran.

Earlier in October, the Treasury imposed sanctions on an Iraqi bank accused of facilitating Iranian sanctions evasion and supporting armed organizations. Earlier measures targeted militia commanders and individuals allegedly exploiting Iraq's oil industry.

But Iran retains an enduring influence in Iraq, a result of both geography and close historical and religious ties. More important is the question of security. Iraq neither can nor wants to serve as Washington’s, or indeed anyone’s, military bulwark against Iran. This thinking has further solidified in Baghdad amid the ongoing war in which Iran has effectively weathered U.S. pressure.

The U.S. has tried to pull Iraq away from Iran under previous Iraqi governments without success. But the latest attempt is driven by the understanding that the current Iraqi prime minister, Ali al-Zaidi, is a politician particularly suited for this kind of mission given his experience as a businessman and his highly transactional approach to foreign policy. Washington also believes that al-Zaidi, as a man hailing from outside the Iraqi political system, would be better able to integrate the Iran-leaning militias into the state.

Yet the problem is that al-Zaidi — having emerged from the Shia Coordination Framework, which includes factions maintaining close relations with Tehran — must balance competing interests while strengthening state institutions. American pressure risks weakening those Iraqi politicians who favor pragmatic cooperation with Washington. Iran-backed factions could portray stringent U.S. demands as evidence that Washington continues to disregard Iraqi sovereignty.

Such arguments may resonate with constituencies that are already critical of decades-long U.S. military operations carried out unilaterally within Iraq’s borders.

Washington appears to believe that disbanding the militias (now postponed by Baghdad to June 2027) would both limit Iran’s influence and benefit Iraq over the longer run. This idea is appealing, but actually carrying it out would not necessarily result in diminishing Tehran’s influence.

Iranian penetration of Iraqi government and society is much greater than just its influence with militias, however powerful they may be. The country’s ministries and other state institutions are packed with bureaucrats and politicians imbued with strong pro-Iranian sentiment. The web of financial and political links between the two countries is such that the notion of “freeing” Iraq from Iran by “disbanding the militias” reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of their relationship.

Limiting Iran’s influence will take a significant amount of time and should ideally go hand in hand with helping create a better investment climate for American and other Western companies. Some moves in this direction have been made. On November 8, Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister for Energy Affairs Mohsen al-Mandalawi met U.S. Chargé d’Affaires Stephen Fagin to discuss implementation of economic agreements worth some $60 billion announced during al-Zaidi's visit to Washington in July.

Promoting closer ties between Iraq on the one hand and Turkey and the Gulf states on the other would also constitute an important step. Syria might not be Iraq’s perfect analogy, but Damascus’ pivot to Turkey and the Gulf states after the fall of the Assad dynasty clearly reduced Iran’s influence there.

Increasing pressure on Iraq over its close ties with Iran at this moment, when U.S. efforts to defeat Iran militarily have clearly fallen short, appears especially ill-timed. The Islamic Republic might be economically highly vulnerable because of Washington’s blockade and tightening sanctions regime, but the country appears to have weathered the external threat. Iran’s neighbors are now more hesitant to pressure the Islamic Republic, which has also managed to reconstitute its military capabilities.

Moreover, Iraq has already suffered substantial economic damage due to disruptions to oil exports through the Strait of Hormuz as a result of the war. On November 8, Hussein estimated Iraq’s losses from the conflict at approximately $60 billion. Although Iraqi oil exports, which account for approximately 90% of government revenue, recovered to around 3.5 million barrels per day in October, compared with 2.65 million in September, the deterioration in government revenues has exposed the country's structural vulnerabilities. Further restrictions on cross-border commerce would impose additional costs on an economy with limited capacity to absorb them.

Economic relations with Iran are also far more extensive than Washington’s demands appear to acknowledge. Bilateral trade reached approximately $12 billion in Iran’s fiscal year ending in March 2025. The Kurdistan region alone reportedly conducts approximately $5 billion in annual trade with Iran. These commercial connections sustain transportation companies, wholesalers, agricultural producers, merchants, and border communities. Their disruption would affect Iraqi businesses whose operations depend on regular cross-border movement.

Moreover, the consequences could extend beyond conventional trade. Iraq has long relied on Iranian natural gas to fuel electricity generation, even as Baghdad has pursued alternative energy supplies. Economic disengagement from Iran is therefore not simply a matter of political willingness. It requires alternative infrastructure, financing, and supply chains that cannot be established overnight.

The Development Road initiative running from Turkey to the Gulf region via Iraqi territory might also serve as an option that would allow Baghdad to lessen dependence on Iran. But the project’s implementation is still in its early stages, and some accommodation with the Iran-aligned militias over ensuring security along the route will be of critical importance to advance the project.

Thus, continued American efforts to constrain Iraq’s regional engagement risk strengthening precisely those political forces that Washington seeks to weaken. Rather than reducing Iranian influence, political pressure could undermine Iraq’s institutions, encourage anti-American mobilization, and diminish Baghdad's willingness to cooperate with Washington on security and economic issues.


Top photo credit: Iraqi security forces stand at the Shalamcheh border crossing with Iran after Iraq closed the crossing following airstrikes on the Iranian side that security sources said killed an Iraqi citizen, Iraq, April 4, 2026. REUTERS/Mohammed Aty
Analysis & Opinion | Middle East

Newsletter

Subscribe now to our weekly round-up and don't miss a beat with your favorite RS contributors and reporters, as well as staff analysis, opinion, and news promoting a positive, non-partisan vision of U.S. foreign policy.