Taiwan shouldn't become the thorn we use to provoke China

Japan’s Prime Minister, Sanae Takaichi, caused an ongoing diplomatic row with China in November when she stated that a Chinese blockade of Taiwan would likely constitute a threat to Japan's survival and require the mobilization of the Japanese Self-Defense Force.

Her statement marked a departure from the position of previous Prime Ministers, who followed a policy of strategic ambiguity on the Taiwan issue, mirroring the longstanding position of the United States.

China responded predictably to the comments, hitting Japan economically, culturally, and militarily by stopping seafood imports, canceling Japanese film screenings and concerts mid-show, and deploying naval and air assets to the waters between Japan and Taiwan. Although the spat is still ongoing, the result is already clear: relations between the two countries have soured, and Taiwan is no better off than it was before the crisis, even if its citizens and supporters abroad feel temporarily vindicated by the PM’s rhetoric.

This incident bears a strong resemblance to August 2022, when then-speaker Nancy Pelosi and five other Democrats visited Taiwan, becoming the highest-ranking member of Congress to visit the island since Newt Gingrich in 1997. China condemned the visit, with Xi Jinping warning President Biden he was playing with fire. China also carried out live fire artillery exercises in response, and there were an unprecedented number of Chinese air force intrusions across the unofficial median line separating the two sides.

Some concluded the visit created a “new normal” in cross-strait relations in which such gray zone warfare is the rule rather than the exception.

Defenders of Pelosi’s visit and Takaichi’s statements adhere to a misguided belief that strong statements and actions in support of Taiwan deter aggression. Their beliefs ultimately rest on the view that, if it could, China would attack Taiwan tomorrow, and it is only their lack of relative military power and fear of U.S. intervention that prevents them from doing so. They cite China’s increasing naval and amphibious capabilities, increased military activity in the Taiwan Strait, and U.S. intelligence assessments that point to 2027 as a potential timeline as evidence of this impending action.

While it is undeniable that China’s capabilities have improved, it is wrong to attribute increased military activity to unilateral aggression and conclude the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has a firm timeline for action. Although it is true that, according to the Center for Strategic and International Studies’ Maritime Transparency initiative, Chinese ADIZ violations increased from 69 in September 2020 to 325 by June 2024, the month-by-month data reveal an ebb and flow. Intrusions peaked at 446 in August of 2022 following the Pelosi visit. They also shrunk to near-2020 levels in late 2023 during the lead-up to Taiwan’s January 2024 presidential election.

After the more independence-leaning Democratic Progressive Party won the election, intrusions ramped up almost immediately. This pattern suggests that aggressive actions in the Strait are reactive, not proactive.

The oft-cited 2027 target for invasion was dubbed the “Davidson Window” after Admiral Phil Davidson, who warned in congressional testimony that China was planning to invade Taiwan by that year. Since that hearing, Davidson’s comments have been clarified by numerous officials, including then-CIA Director William Burns, who downplayed the threat, saying the 2027 date is a readiness goal, not a deadline to act.

Meanwhile, at a high-level 2024 San Francisco meeting, one U.S. official reported that Xi himself grew exasperated at the frequent mentioning of 2027 as the target date for invasion, saying he had no knowledge of such plans.

It seems more likely that China does not want to use force to take Taiwan, but could feel compelled to do so in specific circumstances. China’s own statements on the topic of Taiwan have been remarkably consistent across the decades. China has issued three white papers on Taiwan since 1993. In each of them, they echo the same basic position: China prefers peaceful reunification but reserves the right to use force in response to perceived Taiwanese separatism or foreign interference.

Accordingly, U.S. actions and statements intended to deter China have the opposite effect, backing the Chinese government into a corner until it feels obligated to stop what it views as foreign interference.

Unfortunately, recent actions by the United States reinforce rather than dissuade the notion of likely American involvement. As Jake Werner, Director of the Quincy Institute’s East Asia Program, points out, the 2025 National Security Strategy (NSS) released in December seems to deepen, rather than walk back, U.S. commitments. Specifically, the NSS holds that Taiwan is a strategic location, implying a willingness to defend it, and that the solution to preventing conflict is a massive military buildup combined with pressuring allies to facilitate the expansion of U.S. posture in East Asia.

Actions such as these would add teeth to the provocative comments of policymakers and could be interpreted by Beijing as crossing a red line regarding foreign interference.

What should the United States do, then? For the last four decades, the U.S. has successfully had its cake and eaten it too, normalizing relations with China and preserving a free Taiwan by adhering to strategic ambiguity and avoiding firm commitments. Although not as exciting or emotionally rewarding as confronting the bully that is the CCP, it has been remarkably effective in preserving peace in the region for over 40 years, and departures from it seem to make the situation worse, not better.

The United States should continue this time-tested path, making clear to China that any attempt to unilaterally change the situation will result in severe economic consequences at the very least. Toward Taiwan, the U.S. should make clear that it is not its benefactor, will not support it in its independence efforts, and that it needs to start taking its own defense more seriously. The United States should make future arms sales contingent upon Taiwan's implementation of necessary military reforms and an increase in its defense spending.

After this, the United States could resume sales, focusing on cheap, expendable platforms that enhance asymmetric capabilities and avoiding large, expensive legacy platforms.

Having spent significant time in Taiwan, including the frontline island of Kinmen, I deeply desire to see Taiwan remain a free, independent country in practice, if not in name. I admittedly see the appeal of and feel vindicated by statements of support. And yet, there is a difference between feeling safe and being safe. Categorical statements of support for Taiwan from world leaders in recent years have made Taiwan less, not more secure.

If we continue down this path, we will bring about the very outcome we seek to avoid. For all its recent criticism, strategic ambiguity has kept peace in the region for 40 years, and reflects a smart, pragmatic foreign policy that places mutual benefit and peaceful coexistence over ideological grandstanding and Cold War mindsets. If we want to preserve the delicate peace in the region, we must return to this and resist the temptation of empty platitudes, political stunts, and commitments that we cannot back up.