Ukraine's 'shoot the archer' strategy is far from a silver bullet

The story of the Ukraine war is one of “wonder weapons” and their failure to deliver.

First it was HIMARS. Then the Abrams tank. Then F-16s. Then ATACMS. Over and over, Kyiv and its backers have issued urgent demands for a new weapon or capability billed as the key to turning the tide of the war in Ukraine’s favor. Each time, after protesting, the U.S. chose to give in. And each time, the promised silver bullet failed to solve Kyiv’s battlefield challenges.

Now, Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky and his champions in the U.S. Congress are back with their next request: the intelligence, targeting support, and weapons to find and destroy Russian ballistic missile launchers inside of Russia. As in previous instances, the plan is described as foolproof, an “easy” fix for Ukraine’s air defense challenge, and nearly costless for American taxpayers.

But this new proposal is none of these things. Not only will the plan fail to protect Ukraine’s cities, but it will take another step toward a direct U.S.-Russia war while leaving the U.S. homeland exposed in future conflicts. The Trump administration should dismiss the latest Ukrainian appeal as counter to American interests.

The motives behind Kyiv’s “shoot the archer” strategy are easy to understand. Facing the coming winter with few of the Patriot air defense interceptors that it needs to protect against Russian ballistic missile attacks, Ukraine hopes it can use strikes of its own to disable Russia’s launchers pre-emptively.

The approach is not novel. The Trump administration has adopted the same strategy in its recent campaigns in the Middle East, first against the Houthis and then against Iran, seeking to remove the ability of each adversary to fire missiles at U.S. bases, partners, and commercial ships. Similarly, during the first Gulf War, the U.S. military exerted considerable effort searching for scud missile launchers in the desert to prevent Iraqi attacks on U.S. forces and regional neighbors.

In each of these cases, even with far superior conventional military capabilities and advanced intelligence and weapons, U.S. efforts were much less successful than anticipated or advertised. During the 1991 Gulf War, for example, the U.S. operation involved 1,500 sorties but resulted in few — if any — confirmed successful hits on Iraqi scud missile launchers. The Pentagon instead turned to special forces personnel who roamed the desert looking for the launchers. The U.S. failure to suppress Iranian missile fire has been just as stark. Despite over 10,000 American sorties, Iran still retains 50% of its missile launchers according to some reports, many now hidden underground.

Should Ukraine decide to go after ballistic missile launchers inside of Russia, its challenges would be different from those the U.S. faced in the Middle East. To launch Iskander and other ballistic missiles, Russia relies on mobile systems positioned in regions close to Ukraine, concealed in dense forests, tree lines, or even in old industrial buildings and warehouses. In addition to being hidden, the launchers can travel at fast speeds and across off-road terrain, allowing Russian soldiers to use “shoot-and-scoot” tactics and making it harder for Ukraine to identify and target launchers before their location changes — especially at night, when many Ukrainian operations will occur.

Kyiv has requested from the United States several types of support for its campaign against Russian missile launchers. Its top priority is permission to use Starlink over Russian territory. This capability would, in theory, allow Ukraine to more easily destroy the Russian launchers responsible for ballistic missile attacks by providing targeting, command and control, and counter-electronic warfare support to facilitate Ukrainian drone operations inside Russian territory.

U.S. policy experts have also floated an alternative type of assistance that could facilitate Kyiv’s efforts to hunt Russian missile launchers, suggesting Ukraine could use extended-range attack munitions (ERAM) fired from its F-16s. The United States has already approved the sale of these munitions, but currently Ukraine can only use the missile in its older Soviet aircraft. Ukraine’s F-16s also lack the software and hardware integration needed to dynamically update targeting locations for the ERAM, a necessity for hunting mobile launchers. Upgrading this technology would be fairly straightforward, and this would give Ukraine both the targeting support and munitions it needs to go after Russian launchers.

Either type of support would enhance Ukraine’s ability to prevent ballistic missile attacks at their source, but neither offers anything close to a guarantee of success. Indeed, the fundamental challenges associated with any effort to find and destroy mobile missile launchers would remain.

Ukraine would also face obstacles that the United States did not have to grapple with in Iran. Whereas the United States had the ability to operate across Iranian territory without restrictions, U.S. senators have only asked that Ukraine be given permission to use Starlink 300 km into Russia. Russia’s large size would allow it to simply move launchers outside this range and then continue attacks. On top of this, Ukraine’s limited F-16 fleet is already under strain, lacking sufficient spare parts, waiting for repairs, and facing a shortage of pilots. Ukraine might succeed in destroying some number of Russian launchers, but it is unlikely to prevent severe damage to the country’s cities and infrastructure in the coming winter.

Even if Ukraine could reliably strike Russian missile launchers with a high rate of success, however, giving Kyiv this capability would be a mistake for the United States. Whether it provides more advanced munitions, upgrades Ukraine’s F-16s, or provides Ukraine access to Starlink over Russian territory, enabling Ukraine’s hunt for ballistic missile launchers inside Russia would substantially expand the U.S. role in the war and drag it ever closer to a direct conflict with Russia.

After all, if the Trump administration gives into Kyiv’s demands, Ukraine would be using U.S. intelligence, U.S. satellite networks operating over Russian territory, and possibly U.S. aircraft and weapons to shoot targets inside of Russia. Ukrainians would still be pulling the trigger (or firing the missile or launching the drone), but in all other ways, the mission and its execution would be an American one.

Russia would surely see this as a serious provocation and use it as justification for an expansion of its alleged hybrid campaign against NATO members. This, in turn, could worsen the pre-existing risk of a wider war that drags the United States in, caused by miscalculation or an uncontrolled escalation spiral. Russia might also increase support to Iran or other U.S. competitors by providing weapons and intelligence, putting U.S. forces elsewhere in danger.

Finally, there is the precedent that the United States would set by allowing the use of Starlink over Russian territory. For now, it is only Washington with access to the type of global satellite capability that Starlink provides, but soon Russian and China will have their own networks. Once the United States has allowed the use of Starlink over Russian territory by a third party, there is nothing to stop Moscow or Beijing from making the same decision with their own versions of the technology, leaving the U.S. homeland more vulnerable in the future.

When Ukraine asked for Tomahawk missiles in 2025, the Trump administration wisely broke Biden’s cycle by denying the request on the grounds that stockpiles were too scarce and the capability too escalatory. Trump should do the same today. A campaign to hunt Russian missile launchers would only marginally reduce attacks on Ukraine’s cities and would do so at an unacceptably high cost to American interests in the near and long-term.