Turkey's BRICS gambit is just what Russia ordered

On September 4, Kommersant reported that Yuri Ushakov, aide to President Vladimir Putin, confirmed that Turkey is requesting full membership to the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) and that the organization would begin reviewing the request in advance of the BRICs Summit this fall.

The event will be held in Kazan, Russia, on October 22-24. Ushakov also underscored that Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan will attend.

The Russian aide’s announcement ended months of speculation and followed a Bloomberg article on September 2 claiming the country had “formally asked to join the BRICS group of emerging-market nations.” Erdoğan administration officials, speaking under anonymity, noted that one reason for the formal application was that the “geopolitical center of gravity is shifting away from developed economies.”

Noted Russian political scientist Alexander Safonov offered insight into the rationale for Ankara’s decision:

"Turkey is one of the states that is conveniently located in terms of global trade routes, including between Europe and Asia. This factor forces the government of the republic to seek as many contacts as possible through which these logistical features can be used. And, of course, BRICS as one of the modern leading economic platforms gives it more opportunities in this regard, including for establishing relations with China, Russia, and Iran."

Membership clearly would provide Turkey with the opportunity to increase its already high level of imports from China and Russia. It would also offer greater access for exports to these countries and lower the Ankara’s reliance on the United States and European Union.

In addition, Turkey may see BRICS as a potential new source of finance. As mentioned in the Bloomberg article, “the BRICS touts itself as an alternative to what its members see as Western-dominated institutions such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. New members can potentially get access to financing through its development bank as well as broaden their political and trading relationships.”

Although Turkey claims that it intends to uphold its NATO membership and responsibilities and that the move is a formal continuation of its multipolar strategy to reach new markets and secure new trade routes, the decision may not be based entirely on the potential for increased economic opportunity.

Turkey’s BRICS gambit can also be viewed as a signal of its continued frustration with ongoing EU membership talks. They started in 2005 but have stagnated since a crackdown on Turkish opposition groups following a failed coup in 2016 and lingering questions regarding Erdogan’s commitment to democratic values.

The European Union expressed concern regarding the bid to join the BRICS organization, saying that as an EU membership candidate, Ankara had to “respect” the EU’s “values” and foreign policy preferences, despite its being free to join the alliances of its choosing.

The application to BRICS may also signal Turkey’s continued anger with the inability of the United States, specifically, and the West, generally, to stop Israel’s assault on Gaza and fears of a more widespread military conflict in the Middle East. Erdogan is already in a difficult political situation trying to balance his interests with NATO, on one side, and Muslim countries, from the other.

For example, on July 28, Erdogan, who has consistently engaged in strong rhetoric during Israel’s 10-month war in Gaza, suggested that Turkey could intervene militarily in a speech to his ruling Justice and Development (AK) Party. Al-Jazeera quoted Erdogan: “We need to be very strong so that Israel cannot do these ridiculous things to Palestine. Just as we entered Karabakh, just as we entered Libya, we can do something similar to them.” Some experts have suggested that Turkey will likely not intervene, but keep lines of diplomacy open.

However, the rhetoric followed Turkey’s restriction of some exports to Israel in April followed by a full halt to trade with Israel in early May. In response, Israel said it would scrap the country’s free trade agreement with Turkey in retaliation. The two countries had a trade volume of $6.8 billion in 2023 and Israel was the ninth largest importer of Turkish goods.

In addition to the reasons highlighted above, Turkey’s present interest in joining BRICS may be related to the fact the upcoming BRICS Summit is being held in Kazan and its success is incredibly important to Moscow. The impact of joining now could be mutually beneficial to both Moscow and Ankara as the two have maintained strong bilateral relations since the outset of the Russian Invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

Turkey, acting as a mediator, nearly negotiated a peace settlement in Istanbul during April of 2022 and was part of the Black Sea Grain Initiative agreement between Russia, Ukraine, Turkey, and the United Nations, which allowed Ukraine to export grain and fertilizer via a safe maritime corridor in the Black Sea. In addition, Turkey never joined the West in imposing sanctions on Russia and has become a top buyer of Russian crude oil.

Returning to Erdogan’s remarks, his mention of the enclave of Karabakh should not be dismissed as it is a pointed reference to Turkey’s staunch support for Azerbaijan. Moreover, the two countries’ strong ties were possibly a key underlying reason for Russian President Putin’s timely visit to Azerbaijan last week. It is doubtful that Putin had not spoken with Erdogan before he secured Azerbaijan President Aliev’s attendance to the BRICS Summit as well as Azerbaijan’s intention to join BRICS.

This development is somewhat unexpected considering Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’s comments just two months ago that BRICS needed to take a break on new members after adding Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates in January 2024. But clearly Russian attitudes have changed in just a brief time.

Shortly after Lavrov’s remarks, Ushakov underscored that with the BRICS Summit being held in Russia this year in Kazan the “special mission” of the Russian presidency is to “register” new members. As such, Turkey’s addition to BRICS in October would be touted by Moscow as a major development towards a truly multipolar global framework as well as an alternative for the Global South and other unaligned countries to western institutions.

Moreover, it is not surprising that Putin also recently invited Mongolia’s President, Ukhnaagiin Khurelsukh, to Kazan, marking three potential new members to BRICS in about a week.

“This will be the first event of this level after the expansion of this organization. I hope that you will participate in the BRICS Outreach —BRICS Plus format,” Putin said to his Mongolian counterpart.

This Turkish twist in the BRICS story has clearly created international headlines about the upcoming summit in October. The announcement garnered the global attention that Moscow deemed necessary to assure the event is successful towards achieving Moscow’s objectives.

Whether the Summit delivers on securing Ankara's membership, as well as others like Malaysia and Thailand who have announced their intentions to join, will perhaps be another matter. It is important to recall that Argentina and Saudi Arabia had once announced their intentions to join several years ago but still are not members.