Will Gulf states turn to Israel for protection from Iran?

In the wake of the American-Israeli war on Iran, and Tehran’s retaliatory missile and drone attacks on Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members, Gulf Arab states are reassessing their long-held assumptions regarding the U.S. security umbrella.

While it remains unlikely that any GCC state will break defense ties with Washington, the Gulf Arab monarchies are almost certain to seek broader security partnerships. This trend, which predates February 28, is now set to accelerate, driven by the Trump administration’s disregard for Gulf Arab officials’ warnings against attacking Iran and America’s apparent indifference to their security interests.

A pressing question is how Israel might emerge as a regional security partner that GCC states can rely on to bolster their autonomy from the United States. Analysts such as Daniel Levy, president of the US/Middle East Project and a former Israeli negotiator, note that the “Greater Israel” project goes beyond territorial expansion, aiming also to position Israel as a necessary security partner by exploiting Gulf states’ growing fears of Iran.

As the Middle East’s most powerful military force, renowned for its advanced technology and intelligence capabilities, Israel naturally appeals to Gulf Arab monarchies seeking greater autonomy from the United States. Somewhat paradoxically, it also offers GCC members indirect access to Washington’s decision-makers.

“Historically, we have noticed that most Gulf countries courted Israel in order to get closer to the Americans,” Karim Emile Bitar, a lecturer in Middle East Studies at Sciences Po Paris, told RS.

“It was their way of making sure that Israel would lobby on their behalf the U.S. administration, and sometimes Gulf countries would compete with one another to get closer and closer to Israel in order for Israel to act as their interlocutor and intermediary in the United States and to curry favor with the U.S. administration.”

It is important to note that Gulf monarchies are not a monolith, and their perspectives on Israel as a security partner differ. At one end are Oman, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia, which are not favorable to deepened cooperation with Tel Aviv. At the other is the UAE, which has deepened its partnership with Israel in recent years and will likely expand cooperation in defense, security, and intelligence sharing in response to Tehran’s aggression. Bahrain, and possibly Kuwait, may follow in Abu Dhabi’s footsteps.

The UAE-Israel rapprochement has already led to some unprecedented developments. Axios reported on April 26 that Israel secretly deployed an Iron Dome system with troops to the UAE early in the U.S.-Israel-Iran war, marking the first time the system was used outside Israel or the U.S. Demonstrating the depth of Emirati-Israeli military cooperation, the system reportedly intercepted dozens of Iranian missiles targeting the UAE.

This must be seen in the context of Abu Dhabi’s perception that fellow Arab countries and regional institutions offered insufficient support during the conflict. Fairly or not, this view will probably prompt the UAE to strengthen its partnerships with Israel, the U.S., and China. Following its recently announced departure from OPEC, the UAE may continue distancing itself from Arab multilateralism, potentially withdrawing from the Arab League and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation later on.

“The UAE has invested so much, reputationally and logistically, in its relationship with Israel,” Mira Al Hussein, a fellow at the Alwaleed Centre at the University of Edinburgh, told RS. “It may diversify its security partners, but it will effectively move in parallel with Israel.”

It would be logical for Bahrain — an Abraham Accords state increasingly reliant on Abu Dhabi — to view Israel as an ever more valuable defense partner in the evolving regional security landscape. Its geography, economic constraints, and sectarian dynamics leave it especially vulnerable to Tehran, further incentivizing Manama to deepen security ties with Tel Aviv.

Kuwait warrants attention. Although it has long opposed the Abraham Accords, its current leadership may move toward a form of de facto normalization with Israel. The country’s historically pro-Palestinian stance was shaped by its parliamentary politics, but the erosion of its democratic institutions, rising Iranian threats, and closer alignment with Abu Dhabi, including deepening Kuwaiti-Emirati security coordination, increase the chances that Kuwait will accept Israel as a security partner.

“With parliament dissolved, it is more possible for the state to take on a decision which has always been unpopular publicly and has been made illegal by parliamentary legislation. But, in my view, normalization for Kuwait would have to carry with it substantial defense benefits,” explained Courtney Freer, an assistant professor in the Department of Middle Eastern and South Asian Studies at Emory University.

Saudi Arabia’s calculus differs sharply from the UAE’s, largely because public opinion remains firmly opposed to closer ties with Israel. Even as an absolute monarchy, the kingdom faces greater difficulty suppressing political dissent.

Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman “understands fully well that it would be very unpopular to accelerate this normalization process,” Bitar argued. “Even though there is no love lost between Saudis and Iranians, many [Arabs in the Gulf], and particularly Saudis, still view Israel as an enemy, or at least a strategic threat — a country trying to establish a regional hegemony that would be detrimental to the interests of most Arab countries.”

“Israel, like the UAE, seems to be pushing toward chaos and fragmentation and playing off the existential angst of minorities in Lebanon, Syria, and North Africa,” Bitar continued. “[But] the Saudis, like the Turks and Egyptians, are mostly in favor of stability, the regional status quo, and preventing state collapse in these countries, and do not see these [Emirati/Israeli] policies aimed at fragmenting the Middle East favorably.”

Bombed by Israel last year, Qatar sees both Tel Aviv and Tehran as threats. Rather than relying on either, Doha is likely to strengthen ties with Saudi Arabia and Turkey to address emerging challenges, while continuing to pursue cautious diplomatic engagement with Tehran.

Oman’s top diplomat, speaking at the Manama Dialogue in November 2025, argued that Israel, not Iran, poses the greatest regional threat. Seeking to remain a credible diplomatic bridge between Washington and Tehran, Oman has carefully avoided actions that could strain its ties with Iran, refraining from publicly condemning Tehran after drone strikes on Omani port cities during the U.S.-Israel-Iran war and skipping the April 28 GCC summit, which was expected to issue anti-Iranian statements.

Iranian threats, Washington’s unpredictability, and evolving regional dynamics complicate Gulf Arab security calculations. While the UAE, Bahrain, and possibly Kuwait move toward embracing Israel as a security partner, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Oman are unlikely to follow that lead. Across the Gulf, the pursuit of autonomy is prompting selective partnerships, constituting an uneven recalibration shaped by both pragmatism and enduring social and political constraints.

Any alignment with Israel risks eroding legitimacy and sparking internal unrest, especially given the widespread rage in the Arab world over Israel’s brutal campaign in Gaza, which many leading human rights groups have deemed a genocide.