Can Gulf states really stay out of war with Iran?

President Donald Trump’s war on Iran is almost a month old, and, as expected, the countries most affected are the six members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). The question now is whether these six governments will see no other option but to risk all by entering the military fight alongside the U.S. and Israel.

Iran has targeted the Gulf states to a far greater extent than it has Israel: 83% of Iranian missiles and drones have been aimed at the GCC, in contrast to only 17% directed at Israel. The United Arab Emirates has sustained by far the most attacks: as of March 26, Iran had launched 2,187 attacks that had killed 8 people and injured 161. Kuwait is the second most targeted state, with 951 attacks that resulted in 5 deaths and 103 injuries. Saudi Arabia is the third, with 802 attacks resulting in 3 deaths and 15 injuries.

Tehran’s focus on the UAE may reflect the fact that Abu Dhabi normalized relations with Israel in 2020. However, Kuwait has not normalized with Israel and yet has sustained the second most attacks, indicating that the physical proximity of both the UAE and Kuwait may also impact targeting decisions. All the GCC states have close security partnerships with the U.S. and host American military installations, making them all targets from Iran’s perspective.

On March 14, Iranian Foreign Minister Araghchi called on “brotherly neighbors to expel foreign aggressors” whose “only concern is Israel,” playing on a widespread perception that the U.S. is far more committed to Israel’s security than that of its GCC partners, as evidenced by the race to secure interceptors in the first weeks of the war.

Despite the high volume of attacks, the air defenses of the GCC have been largely successful at protecting their populations, as demonstrated by the high number of attacks and relatively low casualty rates. Yet the war poses a far greater threat to the GCC’s long-term economic model. Some have speculated that the attacks on the Gulf states could scare away the thousands of South and Southeast Asian laborers who are the backbone of their economies: thus far, most of those killed have been from this underclass of workers, rather than Gulf citizens.

However, the promise of work will likely continue to attract those desperate for the chance to support their families. Wealthy expats, in contrast, are less likely to return. The UAE and Qatar in particular rely heavily on their reputation for luxury and glamor, which has attracted thousands of wealthy expats and influencers. Many will leave due to the threat of a possible future conflict. Foreign investors, tourists, and transit travelers may also be slow to return, and some may avoid the region entirely.

This is particularly dangerous for Saudi Arabia, at a time when Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has invested hundreds of billions of dollars in Vision 2030, his plan to reduce the kingdom’s economic dependence on fossil fuels. While Saudi Arabia has the region’s largest economy, it also has the largest population in the GCC, meaning it has slimmer margins than ultra wealthy states like the UAE and Qatar, which can comfortably support their tiny citizenries.

This fundamental vulnerability to regional instability drove the Crown Prince’s decision to de-escalate tensions with Iran, resulting in the normalization of relations in March 2023.

Yet almost immediately after Trump launched the war, reports emerged that Saudi Arabia had urged the U.S. to attack Iran, with the Washington Post citing four anonymous officials on February 28. On March 24, the New York Times also reported that Riyadh was pushing the U.S. to continue the war. The Saudi government strenuously denied this, although Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan bin Abdullah asserted that the kingdom’s patience has limits and that it reserves the right to repel Iranian aggression.

On one hand, both Israel and the U.S. have pushed hard for the Gulf countries to actively attack Iran, or at least to allow the Americans to launch attacks from their territory, which the GCC states have thus far refused. It is possible that reports of the crown prince’s support for U.S. attacks on Iran are fabrications to serve this agenda.

On the other hand, although Riyadh may have initially tried to prevent the war, now that it has begun, MBS may simply feel it is preferable for the U.S. to incapacitate Iran rather than to leave it wounded but even more paranoid and dangerous.

This leaves the question of whether the Gulf states will join in the attacks on Iran. The UAE appears to be pushing for the Gulf states to align more closely with Israel and the U.S. “I think Iran’s full-throttle attack on the Gulf states will actually strengthen the Israeli role in the Gulf,” said Anwar Gargash, a prominent adviser to Emirati President Mohamed bin Zayed. “[A] lot of us in the Gulf today don’t see the missiles coming from Israel; we see the missiles coming from Iran.”

Relatedly, in a March 24 post on X, Dubai’s deputy chief of police wrote, “O people of the Arab Gulf… strengthen your cooperation with Israel—this is advice. There is no good in the countries of the region at all.” This provoked significant pushback: Saudi commentator Turki Al Rumaih posted this rejoinder: “What has Israel offered its allies in the region during this war?” Kuwaiti think tank CEO Abdulaziz Al Anjeri described Israel as “a security, moral, and strategic burden,” and warned that trusting it amounts to “placing trust in the source of danger.”

Meanwhile, speculation swirled that the IRGC had been infiltrated by the Mossad and that strikes on key Gulf facilities were actually part of Israel’s attempt to goad the GCC into joining the war.

However, if most Gulf states do not appear likely to normalize with Israel as a result of the war, that leaves the question of how they will address their newly evident vulnerabilities. Eight days after Israel struck Doha on September 9, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan signed a mutual defense agreement. On February 4, Egypt and Turkey signed a military cooperation agreement. Recently in Riyadh, the foreign ministers of Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Turkey, and Egypt discussed the possibility of a four-way security pact at Ankara’s urging.

U.S. bases have proven to be more of a liability than a source of security, although Gulf states have invested so heavily in the U.S. security relationship that a transition away from it would be both costly and slow. And yet the Gulf states would be wise to consider alternatives, as I wrote in a report for the Quincy Institute that was published just two days before Trump launched this war that has so devastated their economies and societies.

Trump has told aides that he expects the conflict to end within weeks. But, with the deployment of thousands more U.S. troops to the region, it is unclear to what extent his remarks are intended to calm jittery markets and lower oil prices.

Meanwhile, Iran allowed six vessels to transit the Strait of Hormuz on March 23, a tiny fraction of the historical average of 138 vessels a day. Although the Gulf countries have been the most directly affected, the whole world is feeling the effects of Trump’s needless war.