Warmongers in meltdown as Trump heralds Iran deal

I wrote yesterday that the United States and Iran were on the verge of an agreement. Trump appeared to confirm as much a few hours ago with an unusually disciplined Truth Social post — grammatically coherent, diplomatically measured, and notably devoid of his customary theatrics or ritual humiliation of the opposing side.

That restraint matters. Unlike his earlier proclamations of imaginary breakthroughs, this statement carried the tone of a serious diplomatic signal rather than political indiscipline. Its timing, moreover, appeared disconnected from market considerations or domestic spectacle. My own sources in Tehran likewise confirm that a major breakthrough has been reached, though it remains contingent on final approval — precisely as Trump indicated.

So what does all of this mean? What do we actually know about the contours of the agreement? How significant was the role played by regional actors in securing the breakthrough, and what explains Europe’s near-total irrelevance in the process? If this arrangement is merely a Memorandum of Understanding, where do the principal vulnerabilities lie as negotiations enter a second phase?

Moreover, can Trump successfully sell the deal at home? What steps can — and likely will — Israel take to sabotage the agreement? And if a final deal is secured, how profound would Israel’s strategic defeat be?

Let me try to address these questions one by one.

First of all, the full details remain unclear. But according to reporting by Amwaj.media —much of which I have independently corroborated — the agreement entails a comprehensive cessation of hostilities, including in Lebanon; the gradual release of Iran’s frozen assets; and an end to America’s “blockade of the blockade” in the Strait of Hormuz.

Maritime traffic through the Strait would resume under joint Iranian and Omani oversight. Once these measures take effect, the parties would have an additional 30 days to negotiate a final agreement. That second-stage accord is expected to address both the nuclear issue and the long-term status of the Strait.

Significant progress, however, already appears to have been made on the nuclear file, and, as I understand it, broad principles for its resolution have largely been agreed upon.

In essence, this agreement restores the situation to where it was always supposed to be following the announcement of the original ceasefire. From the outset, the ceasefire was intended to be regional in scope and to include Lebanon. There was never supposed to be a “blockade of the blockade” — an absurd scheme concocted by the Foundation for Defense of Democracies that only served to undermine America’s strategic position.

Nor was commercial traffic through the Strait meant to remain disrupted. The genuinely new elements are limited sanctions relief for Tehran and a formal commitment to resolve the nuclear issue within the next 30 days.

Yet while reaching this point is undeniably significant, there is still no real deal until a final agreement is secured. And the 30-day window, though short, nevertheless offers ample opportunity for spoilers on all sides to sabotage the process.

The regional buy-in — and the fact that Trump announced the agreement only after speaking with a wide array of key regional leaders, including those of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Pakistan, Turkey, Egypt, Jordan, and Bahrain, in addition to a separate call with Israel’s Benjamin Netanyahu — is highly significant. This regional anchoring affords Trump a degree of political insulation in Washington. Faced with inevitable accusations from hawks that the agreement amounts to defeat or that it betrays Israel, he can point to broad regional support as evidence that America’s principal partners in the Middle East prefer diplomacy to escalation.

Indeed, compared to President Obama’s 2015 nuclear agreement, the regional engagement surrounding Trump’s deal is objectively deeper, broader, and more politically consequential. Obama’s agreement was negotiated despite resistance from Israel. Saudi Arabia and the UAE; Trump’s appears to be taking shape with active regional backing. Europe’s near-total absence from the process is nevertheless striking — though hardly problematic. By this point, Europe’s diplomatic irrelevance in major Middle Eastern diplomacy has become so normalized that its exclusion barely registers.

Judging by the public panic now emanating from Washington’s war hawks and pro-Israel circles, however, the next 30 days are likely to be politically brutal for Trump. FDD is already openly attacking him. AIPAC is amplifying lawmakers denouncing the agreement. An adviser to the former Crown Prince of Iran has accused Trump of “total surrender.” Many of the same allies who enthusiastically applauded Trump’s decision to initiate the war are now turning on him for choosing diplomacy over permanent escalation.

Senior Israeli politicians, however, may choose a more cautious approach. Rather than confronting Trump directly, they are likely to let their proxies in Washington wage the public battle on their behalf.

Israeli elections are approaching, and Trump remains deeply popular among Israeli voters, while Netanyahu has thus far failed to convert the popularity of the Iran war into a decisive electoral advantage. A direct public clash with Trump over the agreement could therefore prove politically dangerous for Netanyahu. Trump, if provoked, could inflict substantial damage simply by signaling support for one of Netanyahu’s challengers.

Trump may have hinted at this dynamic a few days ago when he — seemingly out of nowhere — told reporters that he enjoys a “99% approval rating” in Israel and could run for prime minister there himself. On the surface, it sounded like another episode of characteristic Trumpian bravado. But in context, it may well have been a pointed warning to Netanyahu and Israel’s political establishment that Trump can damage them far more than they can damage him.

There should be little doubt, however, that if a final agreement is reached — and any lasting agreement will almost certainly require substantial, if not total, sanctions relief for Iran — it would constitute a devastating strategic defeat for Tel Aviv.

Israel’s two wars have, paradoxically, strengthened Iran’s deterrence posture, exposed Israel’s inability to confront Iran without overwhelming American military backing, and inflicted incalculable damage on America’s global standing and aura of military supremacy.

Indeed, the cumulative effect may be so severe that the pursuit of uncontested American global primacy is no longer a realistic option. At the same time, support for Israel within the United States has eroded dramatically across nearly every demographic group except older Republican voters.

Most importantly, sanctions relief would liberate Iran’s economy from decades of constriction and gradually shift the regional balance of power away from Israel and its vision of a “Greater Israel.” For precisely that reason, Israel will almost certainly do everything within its power — behind the scenes — to sabotage the agreement before it becomes irreversible.

But Israel is not the only threat to the deal. Both Washington and Tehran will have to exercise extraordinary discipline to ensure that their competing narratives of victory do not strengthen the hardline opposition camp in the other country. Throughout the negotiations, Trump has shown remarkably little sensitivity to how his inflammatory social media posts complicate Tehran’s ability to compromise. Iran must now avoid making the same mistake. Public triumphalism in Tehran could easily undermine Trump’s political capacity to deliver the agreement domestically.

The Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesperson’s recent tweet comparing the outcome of Trump’s war to the failed Roman attempts to subjugate the Sassanidian Persian Empire is a case in point. Whatever its domestic appeal in Iran, such rhetoric risks hardening opposition in Washington at precisely the moment when restraint and strategic ambiguity are most needed.

At the end of the day, for the Phase II negotiations to succeed — and for any agreement to prove durable — both sides must be able to claim victory.