With protests sweeping across Tbilisi and other Georgian cities in reaction to a foreign agent law modeled on the Russian equivalent from 2012 (a bill that was withdrawn early Thursday), the growing divide between a society that favors European integration and a government seemingly hostile to such aspirations is boiling to the surface.
As the war in Ukraine has undeniably marked the end of the previous international order, Russia’s protracted invasion has also had reverberating consequences throughout the post-Soviet space itself, most notably in Central Asia and the South Caucasus.
In Georgia, Russia’s war against Ukraine has caused a palpable dichotomy between the Georgian government and its people: as the ruling party elites favor pragmatic relations with Moscow while the people feel a sense of fellowship with Ukrainians who have been resisting the Russian armed forces for over a year.
Georgians have a long history of rejecting subjugation by Tsarist and then Soviet authorities, and such sentiments were once again brought to the forefront of the Georgian national conscience following the brief Russo-Georgian War in August 2008. This conflict was, according to the European Court of Human Rights, initiated by the “shelling of Tskhinvali by the Georgian armed forces,” however, it saw Russian troops easily push past Georgian defenses deep into the country. Then-Prime Minister of Russia Vladimir Putin even threatened to hang then-President of Georgia Mikheil Saakashvili “by the balls.”
This war is often cited as Putin’s first step towards territorial expansion, as the Russian government subsequently recognized the independence of the two de facto states of Abkhazia and South Ossetia where the Russian armed forces retain a presence to this day — a reality Georgians highlight as Russian occupation of 20 percent of their territory. However, it is important to note that Moscow had the opportunity to march its troops all the way to Tbilisi as well as to annex (and not only recognize) the territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, but chose against such a course of action, casting some doubt on the initial characterization of Putin’s ambitions of taking territory in the former Soviet space.
The reality is that amidst the dissolution of the Soviet Union ethnic rivalries, which were mostly held in check by Soviet authorities, were unleashed and burgeoning Georgian nationalism found itself in direct opposition to the Abkhaz and Ossete national movements of their own. In late 1990, following parliamentary elections in Tbilisi which resulted in victory for the Round Table–Free Georgia coalition led by Zviad Gamsakhurdia, whose speeches had included strongly anti-Ossete remarks, the regional assembly of South Ossetia declared its own “sovereignty” (which, in this context, meant somewhere between enhanced autonomy and independence).
The result was a fierce reaction from Tbilisi, which revoked South Ossetian autonomy and dispatched police and nationalist militias to the territory. With the violence reaching extreme levels, Soviet interior ministry troops were sent to diffuse the situation. With regards to Abkhazia, following its own declaration of sovereignty in the summer of 1992, Georgian militias attacked the territory resulting in a one-year war and the displacement of hundreds of thousands. In addition to the wars fought against these breakaway republics in the early 1990s, Georgia also found itself embroiled in a civil war.
From the mid-1990s up until the war in 2008, reconciliation of ethnic differences was viewed as the key to resolving the question of these breakaway territories. However, since the events of 2008, the focus has strongly shifted towards deoccupation (a common trope visible throughout the streets of Tbilisi), a belief only more widely held since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine last February.
Following the invasion, the ruling Georgian Dream party in Tbilisi decided against imposing sanctions on Moscow, while continuing trade with Russia through their shared land border. In addition, the ruling elite have often directly confronted the Ukrainian government, most recently over the return of Buk missile systems as well as Ukrainian President Volodimyr Zelensky’s pleas for Saakashvili’s release from jail.
The Georgian Dream party — founded in 2012 by the billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili who served as Prime Minister for just over a year from 2012 to 2013 and more recently as party chairman from 2018 to early 2021 — is still widely believed to be ruled behind the scenes by the oligarch. His commercial ties with Russia from the 1990s have been heavily criticized and offered as an explanation for the non-confrontational relationship which Tbilisi has maintained with Moscow since the invasion last year, as well as the estrangement the Georgian government has provoked between itself and the West over the last few years.
While Ivanishvili is ostensibly no longer affiliated with the government, it is generally understood that he is directing broad policies from behind the scenes, especially those which relate to foreign policy and Russia in particular.
Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, thousands of Georgian citizens poured onto the streets of Tbilisi and other cities to show their support for Kyiv and their frustration with their own government's policy towards Moscow. As one Georgian peace builder born in Abkhazia told me, the invasion of Ukraine was a very emotional period for Georgians as it recalled the trauma which they had experienced, especially at the hands of Russians. Furthermore, members of Georgian Dream often refer to Saakashvili’s United National Movement party and its members as the “war party” given their push for enhanced Georgian support, either directly or indirectly, for Ukraine and for a more hawkish position on Russia.
While expectations among analysts and civil society in Tbilisi remain optimistic that any negotiated settlement over Ukraine will involve discussions on occupied Georgian territory, some international experts tell me that Georgia’s alienation of Western partners may dampen such opportunities when the moment arises for responsible diplomacy in Ukraine.
While de-occupation remains the principal goal for Georgians, they (as well as their potential future backers in any negotiated settlement) would be wise to remember that the origins of the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia stem from ethnic disputes and that only de-occupation coupled with reconciliation will contribute to a peaceful resolution of these decades-old antagonisms. What reconciliation will look like will be determined by Tbilisi, however, its implications will resonate well beyond the border between Georgia and Russia.
Without proper reconciliation, there exists an acute danger of ethnic violence breaking out again should Russia completely falter in Ukraine, or even if a negotiated settlement provides for the withdrawal of Russian troops. For the United States, it will be crucial to remember that NATO was not willing to defend Georgia in 2008 and it is highly probable that the South Caucasus nation will not be joining the Alliance’s ranks any time soon, thereby guaranteeing it so-called Article 5 security. Once this has been accepted, it may be possible for Washington to support Tbilisi in proposing a solution that will grant the necessary ethnic rights to the Abkhaz and Ossete peoples.
Therefore, Washington will need to ensure its policy is one that duly considers the ethnic dimension of the conflicts and does not merely view deoccupation as the only requirement to ensuring a stable and prosperous Georgia. Furthermore, the United States and NATO should be wary of any attempts to supplant the Russian military presence in Georgia with one of their own, given the clear refusal by Moscow to accept such a dynamic on its southern flank.
Progress on political reform and economic development in Georgia is something the West should encourage and support for its own sake. For Georgia, much like its neighbor Armenia, geography is inescapable, and the country is destined to remain in a region dominated by the regional powers of Russia, Turkey, and Iran. For this simple reason, Tbilisi is fated to maintain reasonably good relations with its neighbors and attempts by Washington to push for hostile rhetoric or actions, against either Russia or Iran, will not benefit the Georgian people nor the region more broadly.
While the current government in Georgia is clearly one which favors pragmatic relations with Russia and has seemingly turned its back on the process of democratization, the Georgian people generally remain committed to a return to a pro-EU foreign policy. As Georgians take to the streets in the thousands to protest a draft foreign agents law which many say is inspired by the Russian government’s own eponymous law, it will be important to not provide false hopes nor unreal expectations, but Washington and Brussels should ensure that they do not turn their backs on the people of Georgia either.
