Trump's window for face-saving exit may be closing now

The developments of the past 24 hours may prove a turning point in this war: Israel and America’s escalation by striking oil facilities at the Qatari-Iranian Pars field, and in Asaluyeh, Iran's massive retaliation against oil and gas installations in Saudi, Qatar and beyond, which shot up oil prices, the near downing of an American F-35 fighter by Iran, and Secretary Bessent's revelations that the U.S. may un-sanction Iranian oil on the waters to bring down oil prices.

As I said already on the fourth day, the U.S. has lost control of this war. It had a Plan A, but no Plan B.

Plan A came crashing down after it became clear that the assassination of Ayatollah Khamenei neither brought the implosion of the theocracy nor their surrender. As a result, Washington is increasingly letting the Israelis drive the bus, by virtue of them having a plan, even though their plan does not serve U.S. interests (the Israelis want to prolong the war to degrade Iran's entire industrial base, regardless of what happens to energy markets, Trump's presidency, and security in the region as a whole.)

The Israeli strike against the Pars field, coordinated with the U.S., is particularly important because it violated a promise Trump made to Qatar back in September 2025 that Israel would no longer be allowed to strike Qatar.

But that gas field is shared by both Iran and Qatar, hence it was an attack on Qatar as well as on Iran. With American coordination. This — and the impact on energy markets — may explain why Trump took to social media to blame Israel for the attack and publicly forbade them from striking further energy fields.

But Bessent's comments about un-sanctioning Iranian oil currently sitting in tankers on the sea are the most important. Though it's primarily done to push down oil prices, it appears that we may have nevertheless entered sanctions relief territory out of necessity.

I wrote several days ago that Tehran is very unlikely to end the war even if the U.S. pulls out and declares victory. Iran has leverage for the first time in years and will seek to trade it in. It has publicly demanded a closing of American bases, reparations, and sanctions relief in order to stop shooting at Israel and open the Straits. The first may happen over time anyway, the second is highly unlikely, but the third — sanctions relief — may become more plausible as the cost of the war rises, and escalation strategies become increasingly suicidal for Trump.

As I have explained, a return to the pre-war status quo is unacceptable to Tehran because it will not only be in a degraded state, but also in a continuously weakening state because its pathways to sanctions relief have been blown up. If Iran weakens further, it will only invite further American and Israeli aggression, Tehran believes, because it was the false perception of Iranian weakness that created the "window of opportunity" to attack Iran in the first place.

Sanctions relief is, as a result, a necessity to ensure that the war doesn't restart.

But here is where Iran may miscalculate. Trump may not yet have reached the point at which the cost of continuing the war is so high that he opts to offer sanctions exemptions to select countries to get Iran's agreement to open the straits and end the war. He will likely only reach that point once it's clear that his base is starting to turn against the war in a serious manner.

At that point, Trump will face a time crunch. He will need a narrative in which he declares himself a victor — with his base believing it. Absent the ability to convince his base that he has won, the benefit of ending the war may not outweigh the cost of continuing it. And as soon as his base starts turning against the war, his ability to convince them of his victory starts to wane.

Mindful of the fact that negotiating this end may take an estimated 7-10 days at best, which is different from the 24 hours or so it took to negotiate the unconditional ceasefire in June, Tehran may overplay its hand and only agree to enter these negotiations at a point at which the length of the negotiations may exceed the time Trump has left to convincingly declare victory and provide himself a face saving exit.

Getting the timing of this right will be very difficult for both the U.S. and Iran. Israel will do all it can to sabotage any such off-ramp, including killing Iranian's negotiators. But it will become increasingly clear — if it hasn't already — to Trump that all his escalatory options only deepen the lose-lose situation he has put himself in.

That's why Trump should never have listened to Netanyahu in the first place.