'Regime change' might be biggest failure in Operation Epic Fury

On March 29, President Donald Trump claimed that his war against Iran had effectively brought about “regime change” in Iran, since the United States and Israel had assassinated a significant number of its most senior political and military officials, including Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and Ali Larijani, Secretary General of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council.

The president has claimed that “we’re dealing with different people than anybody’s dealt with before. It’s a whole different group of people,” and that the remaining Iranian leaders are more moderate and reasonable.

But the regime in Tehran has not fallen. As we argued immediately after the war was launched on Feb. 28, Iran’s political and military institutions have depth, are resilient, and can weather the ongoing storm of assassinations.

But have these assassinations truly brought to power a more moderate cadre of Iranian leaders, as the president claims? The answer is a resounding no.

Consider the new Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, son of the slain Khamenei senior. Born in 1969, the young Khamenei fought in the Iran-Iraq war. He studied in Qom’s seminaries, and was taught by some of Iran’s most hardline clerics, particularly Ayatollah Mohammad Taqi Mesbah Yazdi, who passed away in 2021 and is considered the spiritual leader of Jebheh Paydari [the Steadfastness Front], the most radical right-wing political group in Iran.

So, while the elder Khamenei was a pragmatist when it came to foreign policy, his son may very well turn out to be a non-compromising hardliner.

Next, consider the fact that, out of the five leading strategists of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps identified in 2012, three are still on active duty, including Brigadier Gen. Ahmad Vahidi, Gen. Mohammad Ali (Aziz) Jafari, and Rear Adm. Ali Akbar Ahmadian. Vahidi, a former commander of the IRGC’s Quds Force, who also served in the past as interior and defense minister, is one of Iran’s most anti-American and anti-Israel hardliners.

Consider, too, Larijani’s successor, retired IRGC Brigadier Gen. Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr, an expert in asymmetric warfare, Iran’s main strategy in its wars with the U.S. and Israel and a hardliner. Born in 1954, Zolghadr, who is referred to as Mojtaba Khamenei’s “man,” was appointed by President Masoud Pezeshkian, who chairs the SNSC. He has a radical background in politics and has always been aligned with the hardline elements in Iran’s political establishment.

Zolghadr took part in armed struggle against the regime of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and fought in the war with Iraq in the 1980s. During Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s presidency (2005-2012), Zolghadr was involved in internal security, serving as deputy minister of interior for security affairs, and deputy chief of the judiciary, which has always been controlled by hardliners. The late Khamenei had always preferred individuals with links to the security establishment, and following the same philosophy is imperative in wartime. Appointing a man with Zolghadr’s background and experience is therefore not surprising.

Thus, we should expect a much more hawkish posture in Iran’s strategic conduct of its defensive war than in Larijani’s era, and hence a much stronger stance in any negotiations with the United States. The Islamic Republic will never agree to negotiate based on the maximalist terms included in the Trump administration’s 15-point proposal.

It is imperative to view Zolghadr in the broader context of the strategies that the SNSC has devised to overcome the challenging problem of replacing the assassinated leaders with successors. In this context, it is also important to understand the views of the second-generation IRGC officers who are rising to power.

Even a glance at most of the assassinated military commanders indicates that they were men whose world views were shaped by the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and defense of their nation during the Iraq-Iran war of 1980-1988. Their assassinations have led to the emergence of a new generation of younger commanders who have not only remained loyal to the 1979 Revolution, but have also served in the IRGC’s Quds Force over the past 25 years, and whose views of world affairs have been shaped by their direct or indirect engagements in the wars in Lebanon, Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen, Sudan, and Syria, as well as in the Balkans.

Aside from the Balkans, the younger IRGC officers have had to directly face either or both the United States and Israel as their main adversaries. They have experienced firsthand the destruction and ripple effects of these U.S. interventions.The combination of the two hawkish sets of distinct experiences, those of Zolghadr — someone with the status of a senior commander respected by the old guard — and the second-generation IRGC commanders, will in fact facilitate Iran’s doctrine of forward self-defense, and horizontal escalation that moves beyond absorbing the pain.

This new framework of reciprocity raises the regional and global costs of retaliation.

Iran’s strategy of asymmetric war was developed by Zolghadr, the late Lieutenant Gen. Qasem Soleimani, and other members of the IRGC old guard. It was designed to gain leverage over the physical presence of U.S. military bases and troops in the region, using them as part of an expanding target list for retaliation. The leverage has expanded to include not only the American network of bases that serve both U.S. and Israeli interests, but also other facilities or financial institutions in the region that are wholly or partially owned by American companies.

In an interview published on March 30, Trump also claimed that the U.S. is talking with Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, Speaker of Iran’s Parliament (the Majles). Born in 1961, Ghalibaf is a retired IRGC brigadier general and former commander of its air force wing, as well as a former commander of the national police force. With a reputation for a strong-fisted anti-riot response, he has always been close to conservative factions in Iran, but has also tried to present himself as a pragmatist, as when he served as mayor of Tehran.

It is not clear whether Ghalibaf has any mandate from the SNSC to negotiate with the United States. Regardless, he has proven clever and smart on how to convey impactful messages on X, such as the one that addressed the U.S. stock market which garnered more than 14 million views.

The net results are that Trump and Israel’s goal of “regime change” has not been achieved, and a new hardline leadership has taken over. The IRGC, with or without Zolghadr as Secretary-General of the SNSC, has the upper hand in directing the political and military affairs of an aggressive war of choice imposed on Iran by two nuclear adversaries and, perhaps more importantly, its aftermath.