Neocons wanted an Azeri uprising against Iran. They didn't get it.

With Iran resisting the U.S./Israeli onslaught for the second week, what was supposed to be a quick transition to a pro-U.S. regime following the decapitation strike that killed Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is fast turning into a quagmire. While the U.S. and Israel continue to sow mayhem on Tehran from the skies, the previously unthinkable option of sending ground troops to Iran is gaining ground.

First, an apparent plan was being hatched to employ Kurdish fighters to take on Tehran. Then, when drones, allegedly flying from Iran although Tehran denied it, struck the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic of Azerbaijan — hitting an airport terminal and a village school, and wounding four civilians — the stage appeared set for the opening of a northern front against Iran. Here was an alleged act of aggression from Iranian territory against Israel's closest partner in the South Caucasus. It offered the pretext to goad Azerbaijan into joining the U.S.-Israeli war on Iran.

Azerbaijan's President Ilham Aliyev called the drone attack "an act of terror.” In a combative speech, he vowed retaliation and called Iran’s Azerbaijanis (who constitute an estimated 20 million Iranians, or twice the population of the Republic of Azerbaijan) his “compatriots” for whom Baku provided a “beacon of hope.” He also declared that Tehran had deliberately “smeared” Baku in the eyes of Iranian Azerbaijanis by accusing it of permitting Israeli warplanes access to its airspace during Israel’s 12-day air campaign against Iran in June.

All of that was music to the small but vocal group of neoconservative hawks perched at D.C. think-tanks, such as Hudson Institute’s Mike Doran, a former National Security Council official in the George W. Bush administration, and Brenda Shaffer who has performed undisclosed work for Azerbaijan’s state oil company SOCAR. Shaffer has promoted Iran’s disintegration along ethnic lines in her work for the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. Doran and Shaffer appeared to be inciting Baku to join the fray against Tehran.

Despite Aliyev’s tough rhetoric, however, the hawks must be disappointed by his response, which so far has been mainly symbolic. The Iranian ambassador was summoned to the foreign ministry and handed a protest note. In practical terms, vehicle border crossings with Iran have been suspended, a measure that has mostly affected Russian, Azerbaijani, and Georgian truck drivers transporting goods to and from Iran.

Then on Sunday Aliyev spoke on the phone with his Iranian counterpart, Masoud Pezeshkian. According to the Azerbaijani read-out, Pezeshkian thanked Aliyev for personally visiting the Iranian embassy in Baku to express his condolences over Khamenei’s assassination and for pledging humanitarian support to Iran. He reiterated Iran’s official position that it was not involved in launching the drones towards Azerbaijan, echoing the official line of the Islamic Republic that blamed Israel for a “false flag” operation.

Aliyev also conveyed his condolences to the Iranian people for the death and destruction they have experienced.

Significantly, following the conversation, Aliyev ordered the reopening of the border; its closure lasted a total of only four days. The Nakhchevan airport resumed its operations.

This de-escalatory impulse was reinforced by Baku's closest allies. The Organization of Turkic States (OTS)—which includes Turkey, Azerbaijan, and the Central Asian republics—issued a joint statement in which they condemned the drone attacks "from the territory of Iran." Not "by Iran."

That careful diplomatic wording reveals where Baku and its Turkic partners stand. They are showing solidarity and support for Baku while avoiding casting blame on Tehran and thus providing cover for Aliyev to pull back from escalation.

This matters because the OTS countries are precisely the states that neoconservatives and Abraham Accords advocates have been busily courting. Their vision, promoted most actively by figures like Joseph Epstein from the Turan Research Center at the Washington-based Yorktown Institute, was always for an "alliance of moderate Muslim states” from the Gulf to the Caspian — a wall of secular Sunni-led countries allied with Israel against Iran.

On the face of it, the return on that investment is looking meager. When push came to shove, these states are choosing diplomatic ambiguity over confrontation with Iran and a pro-Israel alignment. The much-hyped expansion to Central Asia of the U.S.-brokered Abraham Accords, with Kazakhstan formally joining last year, appears to be producing more symbolism than substance too. Kazakhstan, an OTC member, condemned the drone attack (without attribution) in a separate statement, and called for a joint investigation by Azerbaijan and Iran.

To understand Azerbaijan’s reluctance to join the war, one needs only look at the map — and Baku’s vulnerability becomes evident.

Azerbaijan's energy infrastructure—the oil and gas platforms and pipelines that underpin the entire economy — sits within easy reach of Iranian drones and missiles. In particular, the Baku-Tbilisi (Georgia)-Ceyhan (Turkey) pipeline, known as BTC, has become the economic lifeblood of the Azerbaijani state — and a key source of oil for Israel. In early 2026, the share of Israeli oil imports from BTC reached 46%.

According to Azerbaijan’s official media, up to 80% of the oil transported through this pipeline is of Azerbaijani origin. Disruption to its operation would severely damage the country’s economy. The Gulf states learned this lesson, which is why they have consistently chosen de-escalation with Tehran over confrontation. Azerbaijan is proving to be no different.

Another reason for Aliyev’s caution is Turkey’s restraining role. While also targeted by Iranian missiles apparently designed to hit the giant Incirlik Air Base used by the U.S. military, Ankara’s worst nightmare is the emergence of an independent Kurdish entity in western Iran which it would regard as a direct threat to its territorial integrity and security.

Most critically, Iranian Azerbaijanis, much more numerous than those in the Republic of Azerbaijan, have shown no interest in seceding from Iran, much less in joining Baku in a “Greater Azerbaijan.” The majority appear to identify with Iran, with many playing key roles in Iranian governance: the slain Ayatollah Khamenei was ethnically Azeri, as is President Pezeshkian and countless other members of Tehran’s elites.

Despite the efforts of exiled “South Azerbaijani” activists, pan-Turkist propaganda appears to have made only limited inroads among Iranian Azerbaijanis.

None of this is to suggest that the hawks’ project to lure Azerbaijan into the war has run out of steam. If the war continues for weeks or months, as now seems likely, the “humanitarian aid” that Aliyev has professed to be willing to offer Iran could plausibly turn into “humanitarian intervention” to protect his ethnic kin, a possibility that Baku’s pro-regime commentators openly entertain. That could include encroaching deep into Iranian territory to create what the latter call a “buffer zone.”

Pressure will also grow on Aliyev to reciprocate for Israel’s help in his war with Armenia in 2020. Turkey, which also supplied weaponry to Azerbaijan in that conflict, would likely be opposed, however.

In any case, the best way to prevent the northward spread of a conflict that already involves in one way or another well over a dozen countries is to end the war as soon as possible and to stop listening to neoconservative hawks in Washington.