VIDEO: FDD's online harassment against critics of Trump’s State Department
The role Foundation for the Defense of Democracies served as a messaging hub for a controversial taxpayer-funded project, has never been revealed until now.
Earlier this month, Responsible Statecraft reported — based on recently obtained documents via a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit — that the hawkish DC think tank Foundation for the Defense of Democracies was at the center of an online harassment campaign funded by the State Department that targeted Americans, including journalists, and human rights advocates, because of their opposition to Donald Trump's Middle East policy. Quincy Institute Multimedia Producer Khody Akhavi breaks the story down:
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Top image credit: U.S. Air Force crew chiefs watch as F-35A Lightning II’s taxi following military actions in Venezuela in support of Operation Absolute Resolve, Jan. 3, 2026. (U.S. Air Force Photo)
The U.S. military certainly put on an impressive display Saturday during the raid to capture Nicolás Maduro.
It’s a testament to the professionalism of the staff and operators that they were able to design such a complex operation, coordinating ground and naval forces with all the supporting air, communications, and logistical elements. The 140-minute operation apparently went off without a significant hitch as evidenced by the fact that the mission was accomplished without losing a single American.
Senior civilian and military leaders also showed courage in ordering such an audacious plan. They certainly channeled the spirit of the movie “Patton,” with the line mistakenly attributed to Frederick the Great: “L’audace, l’audace, toujours l’audace” (audacity, audacity, always audacity).
The same leaders should now embrace the spirit of another iconic movie quote. During the first game of the season in the second-greatest baseball movie of all time, “Major League,” the character Willie Mays Hayes makes a basket catch at center field. Upon returning to the dugout, his manager shakes the outfielder’s hand and tells him, “Nice catch Hayes, don’t ever f&%#ing do it again!” (“Bull Durham” is No. 1.)
In some way, the success of Operation Absolute Resolve makes the episode more dangerous than if the mission had failed. That is because success can lead to overconfidence — and costly mistakes.
In the wake of a spectacular military operation involving a lot of fancy aircraft and special forces, it is easy to start believing that warfare is nothing more than the proper application of technology. But what happened in Venezuela is the exception, not the rule.
Wars rarely unfold as either side anticipated. If you disagree, ask the French about the Maginot Line, or Vladimir Putin about the march to Kyiv. Better yet, ask Maduro how his air defenses and Praetorian Guard performed over the weekend.
The same is true for the more limited use of force. For every raid on Entebbe there is an Operation Eagle Claw, the botched 1980 hostage rescue operation in Iran.
The high chance of setbacks matters — and not only because a failure might undermine a tactical objective. More significant is the risk of accidental escalation. Undoubtedly, the Pentagon developed tactical-level contingency plans for Operation Absolute Resolve, including a potential response to a downed helicopter or captured soldiers. But what about contingency plans at the strategic level of war? If U.S. commandos had failed to locate or apprehend Maduro, what would leaders in Washington have done next?
President Trump and his advisers wanted to remove the leader of Venezuela, drag him to New York City to stand trial for alleged drug trafficking, and give greater access for U.S. companies to the world’s largest oil reserves. To achieve those objectives, they were unwilling to commit to a Normandy-style invasion involving massed troops, so the military presented an alternative that relied mainly on aviation and special forces teams. The strike force went in with a bang to blind the enemy and then commandos were flown in to capture Maduro and his wife and leave the Venezuelan capital, all in less than three hours.
But had that precision operation failed, the president would have faced a dilemma. And therein lies the real danger with a mission of this kind.
Any military action not only burns readiness, but also political capital. If the Maduro raid failed, would the president have simply walked away, with the Venezuelan leader fulminating against U.S. imperialism and dancing on state television? Or would he have escalated by ordering an invasion and risking the lives of young infantry soldiers, with uncertain consequences in a country twice the size of California, including territory patrolled by armed militias and battle-hardened Colombian guerrillas?
That question should be debated before any administration contemplates any military action. The threshold for moving ahead should be the infantry standard. That is to say, a president who greenlights a surgical strike must either be willing to fail, or otherwise willing to send in ground forces to achieve the strategic objective.
Worryingly, the good planning, good conditions, and good fortune that permitted Maduro’s smooth capture appear to have tempted Trump to test his luck again. He has previously threatened to seize the Panama Canal and, in the days following the raid in Caracas, he has threatened military action against three more countries in Latin America: Colombia, Cuba, and Mexico.
In at least two of those cases, he seems to have regime change in mind. He warned the Colombian president, whom the United States sanctioned in October for alleged drug running, to “watch his ass.” And he described Cuba’s government as “ready to fall.” In Mexico, his apparent goals are only slightly more modest: crushing multibillion dollar drug cartels.
Any military operation in any of those countries could easily go south, and lead to far costlier U.S. involvement than anyone anticipated. Unlike the Venezuelan military, for example, Colombia’s armed forces are battle-tested, U.S.-trained, and employ U.S.-made weapons.
In a previous era, for better or worse, the United States was willing to shoulder far greater military burdens in the Americas. Beginning in 1912, the United States occupied Nicaragua on and off for more than 20 years. Today, notwithstanding the return of the Monroe Doctrine, the U.S. public does not have the stomach for that type of commitment, and nor does Trump. He should consider that as he evaluates other potential targets for what he is told will be short-duration, surgical strikes.
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Top image credit: Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Saar and Somaliland President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi participate in a joint press conference during Saar's visit to Somaliland on January 6, 2026. (Screengrab via X)
Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Saar arrived in Somaliland Tuesday for an official visit to the disputed territory, just 10 days after Israel became the first country to recognize its independence from Somalia.
The trip, which Somaliland officials quickly trumpeted on X, highlights Israel’s enthusiasm about its budding ties with the breakaway state, which lies on the northern side of the Horn of Africa, roughly 160 miles from Yemen by sea. “No one can ignore the strategic location of Somaliland,” Danny Danon, Israel’s ambassador to the United Nations, told the Wall Street Journal. “The straits are a strategic point,” he added, referencing the territory’s position at the mouth to the Red Sea, through which 30% of global shipping trade travels.
Both countries have a lot to gain from the new relationship. Israel gets a rare ally in Africa and a strategic outpost on the Red Sea, and Somaliland gets a first step toward the global recognition that it has sought for the past three decades, following atrocities committed by Somalian authorities against its people.
But the costs of the surprise move have already started to come into focus. The decision drew sharp backlash from the international community, with 14 of the 15 United Nations Security Council members condemning Israel’s decision. (The sole exception is the United States, which defended Israel but refrained from recognizing Somaliland itself.) Somalia, which is a member of both the African Union and the Arab League, warned that the move may be part of a plot to relocate Palestinians from Gaza, slamming it as a sign of “utter disdain for law and morality.”
So it is that, by recognizing Somaliland, Israel has made a bold bet — one premised on the idea that mere diplomatic blowback should not deter it from expanding its military influence into the Horn of Africa, where other Middle Eastern powers have been jockeying for influence in recent years. Somaliland, for its part, has made an ambitious bet of its own, based on the theory that recognition by a regional pariah is better than no recognition at all. But, given the possible destabilizing effects of the move, could both countries come to regret their decision?
“The potential fallout from this, if it does go ahead, in terms of instability in the region — I just cannot imagine how bad this can get,” said Samar Al-Bulushi, a non-resident fellow at the Quincy Institute, which publishes RS. “The potential for backlash from groups in the region, who I think would have popular support, is tremendous and frightening.”
Beggars can’t be choosers
Supporters of an independent Somaliland have a lot of evidence in their favor. During the colonial period, British authorities governed Somaliland as a separate entity from the rest of the territory that would one day become Somalia, which Italy controlled at the time. Somaliland even briefly existed as an independent state in 1960, garnering recognition from roughly 30 other countries.
But, within days of declaring independence, Somaliland officials made the consequential decision to enter into a union with neighboring territories and form what we now know as Somalia. Profound political problems plagued the state from the start. These challenges eventually grew into a civil war, during which the Somalian military killed at least 50,000 Somaliland civilians in acts later described as genocide.
This violence led Somaliland to declare its independence in 1991, with its capital in Hargeisa. Despite never gaining international recognition, it has functioned as a de facto independent state ever since, according to Matt Bryden, a former United Nations official who now works as a strategic consultant in Kenya. The local government has even managed to create a fairly democratic system for its 6 million inhabitants, spread across a territory roughly equivalent to the size of Florida.
Supporters of Somaliland independence also point out that reintegration with the Somali government would likely lead to bloodshed. “They don't want to rejoin the larger federal state of Somalia, and to make them do that would require force,” said Peter Harris, a political science professor at Colorado State University.
Still, the international community has held strong in its opposition to Somaliland’s independence. One reason for this is widespread fear that recognizing Somaliland will bolster efforts by other separatist movements, undermining stability across Africa and the Middle East, where such movements proliferate. (Just last week, separatist forces in Yemen attempted to declare an independent state in the country’s south.)
But perhaps most consequential is the fact that Israel, in particular, made the decision to recognize Somaliland first. Alongside the announcement of Israel’s recognition came a sea of rumors about what Hargeisa may have given up in the deal. Somali officials have made particularly attention-grabbing claims, alleging that Somaliland is now set to host an Israeli military base and perhaps even camps for Palestinians forcibly displaced from Gaza.
Somaliland officials have emphatically denied these allegations, both in public and in private conversations, according to Bryden, who recently visited Hargeisa and spoke with officials. But there is little doubt that the new relationship will increase Israel’s presence in the country, perhaps starting with a “listening post” or some other intelligence operation pointed toward Yemen, Bryden said.
Even a small Israeli presence could draw a violent response from its regional foes, according to Andreas Krieg of King’s College London. “Any perceived Israeli node in Somaliland would likely attract hostile attention from the Houthis and their partners, not only for direct retaliation but to demonstrate that the Gulf of Aden is not a sanctuary,” Krieg told RS. “The risk would be escalation by proxy, increased pressure on shipping and greater volatility around commercial infrastructure linked to Berbera [Somaliland’s primary port] and adjacent corridors.”
Somaliland also faces a risk that Israel has now poisoned the diplomatic well, given that few states in the Middle East or Africa want to be seen as following Israel’s lead in international affairs, particularly following Israeli atrocities in Gaza. Even Harris, who supports independence, conceded that the move creates a “potential liability” for Hargeisa. “If the leaders of Somaliland were going to choose a country to recognize them first, it wouldn't have been Israel,” he said.
An ever-expanding ‘cold war’
Israel may have been the state that made the first move, but there’s good reason to believe that another country is actually in the driver’s seat. “Many people argue that, behind the scenes, it's the UAE that supported and even encouraged this Israeli recognition of Somaliland,” said Cameron Hudson, an independent political analyst and a former Africa director in the U.S. National Security Council. Bolstering this argument is the fact that Emirati border officials quietly began accepting Somaliland passports, despite not officially recognizing the breakaway state.
In recent years, the UAE has dramatically expanded its presence in East Africa, investing in infrastructure and diplomatic relationships across Somalia, Kenya, Ethiopia and Sudan. Abu Dhabi has developed a particularly close relationship with officials in Somaliland, where it has built a port and a military base. Meanwhile, Emirati officials have developed an increasingly close relationship with Israel, which they view as a useful partner in balancing against other Middle Eastern powers.
In this sense, the Israeli entry into East Africa represents a new escalation in the growing “cold war” between Middle Eastern states for influence and investment opportunities in the region, according to Hudson. “First and foremost is this confluence of security and economic interests, and overlaid on top of that is this regional competition — regional competition for markets, regional competition for legitimacy,” he told RS. “The Horn of Africa and into Africa, that's the emerging market” for Middle Eastern economies, he added.
This competition — which pits the UAE and Israel on one side against Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey on the other — has already had devastating consequences on regional stability. In Sudan, for example, Emirati support has allowed the Rapid Support Forces to fight the Sudanese military and expand its territory to include Darfur, where the RSF has carried out widespread massacres in recent months. The Sudan case could provide a frightening preview of the future for Somalia, which even today struggles to maintain security and fight the insurgent group Al Shabaab, if the troubled country falls prey to this sort of “rabid regional competition,” Hudson said. (This has already started to play out in some ways, given Turkey’s emphatic support for the government of Somalia and its territorial integrity.)
In the near term, the UAE will likely try to use its “network of client states” in East Africa to promote its interests in Somaliland, according to Hudson. These include Ethiopia and Kenya, both of which have become beholden to Emirati interests because of significant UAE investment there in recent years. But it remains unclear whether that will be enough to persuade these countries to recognize Somaliland given the strong opposition of the African Union, which is based in Ethiopia.
Realistically, the United States is the only country powerful enough to force the issue of Somaliland independence, experts told RS. Some Republicans, including Sen. Ted Cruz (R-Texas), have thrown their support behind the breakaway state, but the Trump administration has yet to indicate any public interest in recognizing Somaliland. Still, analysts believe that President Donald Trump might be persuaded to back Somaliland’s independence if the country joins the Abraham Accords, which could lead to recognition from countries like Bahrain and Morocco as well.
Regardless of what happens in the near term, it is now clear that Middle Eastern powers are determined to press their interests in East Africa, whatever the consequences. “A lot of the rivalries within the Middle East are now starting to spill over into the Horn of Africa region,” Al-Bulushi said. “It will be the people of the Horn of Africa that pay the price.”
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Top image credit: Miha Creative via shutterstock.com
For months, foreign policy analysts have tried reading the tea leaves to understand the U.S. government’s rationale for menacing Venezuela. Trump didn’t leave much for the imagination during a press conference about the U.S. January 3 operation that captured Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro.
“You know, they stole our oil. We built that whole industry there. And they just took it over like we were nothing. And we had a president that decided not to do anything about it. So we did something about it,” Trump said during a press conference about the operation on Saturday.
It’s not about the drugs —or democracy. In Trump’s telling — at least at that moment — this operation was about oil.
Even before the dust settles, some investors are already responding to this call for foreign investment in the oil industry. A former Chevron executive, Ali Moshiri, told the Financial Times that he is raising $2 billion for Venezuelan oil projects already. “I’ve had a dozen calls over the past 24 hours from potential investors. Interest in Venezuela has gone from zero to 99 per cent,” Moshiri told FT. His firm, Amos Global Energy Management, has already identified Venezuelan assets to invest in.
Charles Myers, chairman of consulting firm Signum Global Advisors, told the Wall Street Journal he is planning a trip to Venezuela in March along with some 20 other hedge funds and asset managers from the finance, energy, and defense sectors. “There is a huge amount of interest in Venezuela reconstruction opportunities,” said Myers.
Venezuela has the world’s largest oil reserves, though underinvestment and sanctions have left the energy infrastructure in poor condition. Plus, Venezuela's reserves are also mostly extra-heavy crude, making it an expensive endeavor to extract. Francisco Monaldi, director of Latin American energy policy at Rice University's Baker Institute for Public Policy, estimated it could require $10 billion per year over the next decade.
To incentivize interest, the Trump administration has been telling oil companies that they could be compensated by the U.S. government for their rigs, pipelines, and other seized properties, if they go back into Venezuela and invest. “A tremendous amount of money will have to be spent, and the oil companies will spend it, and then they’ll get reimbursed by us or through revenue,” Trump said during an NBC interview. U.S. Energy Secretary Chris Wright will meet with representatives of Chevron, ConocoPhillips, and Exxon later this week.
The companies eligible for reimbursement of seized assets could include Exxon and ConocoPhillips, which have long claimed they are owed billions of dollars in compensation from Venezuela over assets seized in 2007 by Maduro’s predecessor, Hugo Chavez. ConocoPhillips and Exxon are seeking $8 billion and $1.6 billion respectively, though Venezuela has consistently refused to pay. With Maduro gone, those companies may have a higher chance of recovering that money if they go back into Venezuela and renegotiate joint ventures with the government. Exxon and ConocoPhillips’ stocks both jumped more than 2% on Monday.
It’s not immediately clear what Delcy Rodriguez, the de facto new president, will do to facilitate American investment. “She's essentially willing to do what we think is necessary to make Venezuela great again,” Trump said to reporters. Rodriguez is credited with helping expand Venezuela’s oil production, impressing Trump administration officials along the way.
Rodriguez has a close relationship with private industry such as Chevron, the only major American company currently operating in Venezuela. Because Chevron is already on the ground and has a close relationship with Rodriguez, the Houston company’s stock is seen as an obvious winner. Chevron’s stock jumped 5% on Monday.
Refiners could also profit from the change in leadership, as more Venezuelan oil reaches American refineries. Marathon and Valero jumped 6% and 9% respectively on Monday.
But it’s Paul Singer, a major Trump donor, who is set to be one of the biggest winners. Singer’s investment firm, Elliot Investment Management, bought Citgo, a subsidiary of Venezuela’s state-run oil company for the bargain price of $5.9 billion. The sale of Citgo to Singer’s firm in November, amid the build-up of military forces in the South Caribbean, was forced by a Delaware court after Venezuela defaulted on its bond payments.
Singer is also a major Trump donor, having donated $5 million to Trump’s super PAC and $1 million to defeat one of Trump’s fiercest Republican critics, Rep. Thomas Massie (R-Ky.). Singer has been called a “vulture” for his tactic of buying up distressed assets, sometimes assisted by longtime ally Secretary of State Marco Rubio. In 2016, then-Senator Rubio pressured Argentina into a payment of $4.6 billion to Singer and other creditors to settle debt they had bought, according to journalist Greg Pallast.
Many oil companies and investors are no doubt concerned about Venezuela’s volatility, the daunting task of extracting heavy crude oil, and the high overhead costs of investment. But not everyone is deterred. Just days out from Maduro’s capture, others are already looking at Venezuela as a boon for their bottom line.
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