# Responsible Statecraft - Complete Content > Responsible Statecraft: complete content export for LLMs - 24 sections and the 100 most recent articles. Navigation index: https://responsiblestatecraft.org/llms.txt **Site Overview:** - Domain: https://responsiblestatecraft.org - Total Sections: 24 - Recent Posts Included: 100 - Content Word Count: ~86660 words - Last Updated: 2026-10-02 - Generated: October 2, 2026 11:45:12 **Important Information:** - Site ID: 26264603 - Markdown version: append .md to any URL - Total sections: 24 ## Site Structure - [Analysis & Opinion](https://responsiblestatecraft.org/analysis/index.md): The latest analysis and commentary on U.S. foreign policy from Responsible Statecraft (5048 posts; HTML: https://responsiblestatecraft.org/analysis; RSS: https://responsiblestatecraft.org/feeds/analysis.rss) - [Reporting](https://responsiblestatecraft.org/reporting/index.md): The latest reporting on U.S. foreign policy from Responsible Statecraft (1156 posts; HTML: https://responsiblestatecraft.org/reporting; RSS: https://responsiblestatecraft.org/feeds/reporting.rss) - [Latest](https://responsiblestatecraft.org/latest/index.md): (2689 posts; HTML: https://responsiblestatecraft.org/latest; RSS: https://responsiblestatecraft.org/feeds/latest.rss) - [Specials](https://responsiblestatecraft.org/specials/index.md): (437 posts; HTML: https://responsiblestatecraft.org/specials; RSS: https://responsiblestatecraft.org/feeds/specials.rss) - [Featured Video](https://responsiblestatecraft.org/featured-video/index.md): (3 posts; HTML: https://responsiblestatecraft.org/featured-video; RSS: https://responsiblestatecraft.org/feeds/featured-video.rss) - [Regions](https://responsiblestatecraft.org/regions/index.md): (5268 posts; HTML: https://responsiblestatecraft.org/regions; RSS: https://responsiblestatecraft.org/feeds/regions.rss) - [Europe](https://responsiblestatecraft.org/regions/europe/index.md): The latest coverage of Europe from Responsible Statecraft (2586 posts; HTML: https://responsiblestatecraft.org/regions/europe; RSS: https://responsiblestatecraft.org/feeds/regions/europe.rss) - [Middle East](https://responsiblestatecraft.org/regions/middle-east/index.md): The latest coverage of the Middle East from Responsible Statecraft (4059 posts; HTML: https://responsiblestatecraft.org/regions/middle-east; RSS: https://responsiblestatecraft.org/feeds/regions/middle-east.rss) - [Africa](https://responsiblestatecraft.org/regions/africa/index.md): The latest coverage of Africa from Responsible Statecraft (581 posts; HTML: https://responsiblestatecraft.org/regions/africa; RSS: https://responsiblestatecraft.org/feeds/regions/africa.rss) - [Asia-Pacific](https://responsiblestatecraft.org/regions/asia-pacific/index.md): The latest coverage of Asia-Pacific from Responsible Statecraft (1883 posts; HTML: https://responsiblestatecraft.org/regions/asia-pacific; RSS: https://responsiblestatecraft.org/feeds/regions/asia-pacific.rss) - [Latin America](https://responsiblestatecraft.org/regions/latin-america/index.md): The latest coverage of Latin America from Responsible Statecraft (487 posts; HTML: https://responsiblestatecraft.org/regions/latin-america; RSS: https://responsiblestatecraft.org/feeds/regions/latin-america.rss) - [North America](https://responsiblestatecraft.org/regions/north-america/index.md): The latest coverage of North America from Responsible Statecraft (1707 posts; HTML: https://responsiblestatecraft.org/regions/north-america; RSS: https://responsiblestatecraft.org/feeds/regions/north-america.rss) - [Video Section](https://responsiblestatecraft.org/video-section/index.md): Watch the latest analysis on issues of war and piece from Responsible Statecraft. 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Texas is hardly alone. Diesel prices have climbed nationwide since the war began, with the national average now around $6.45 per gallon, up from $3.76 when the war began in late February, according to data from AAA. A number of other states have recently taken steps to try to ease the costs of gas and diesel amid the ongoing war. As the midterm elections near and the war’s costs hit voters’ wallets, Abbott's declaration is a window into a larger problem for Republicans across the country, including some in deep red states. An increasing number of Republicans are being forced to spend money and political capital defending seats that they carried easily in recent elections. “The Iran War is proving to be a drag on Republicans, even in solidly Republican states,” Brian Darling, a Republican strategist and former counsel to Sen. Rand Paul (R-Ky.), told Responsible Statecraft in an email, noting that because inflation, caused in part by the war, is driving independent voters toward Democratic candidates. “These states are exposed to the consequences of the Iran War because the candidates are not distancing themselves, nor providing an off ramp, to President Trump on ending the war,” Darling added. In Texas, two September polls showed Abbott trailing Democratic state Rep. Gina Hinojosa for the first time in the race. Emerson, the only firm in the New York Times polling tracker to have surveyed voters both before and after the start of the war, showed a five-point swing toward Hinojosa. Since August, the nonpartisan Cook Political Report has shifted Senate races in five states — Texas, Iowa, Kansas, Georgia, and South Carolina — toward the Democratic party, though some remain likely GOP holds. Three states that President Donald Trump won by double digits in 2024, namely Texas, Iowa, and Ohio, are currently rated as “toss-ups” in the Cook ratings. This week, Trump added Nebraska, which he won by more than 20 points, to his midterm speaking tour. Independent polling in the state is sparse, but the race appears to be tightening, and populist independent challenger Dan Osborn has been a vocal critic of the war. The war itself is broadly unpopular, giving Republicans another reason to worry that its economic costs could become politically damaging. But so far, analysts say, the economic effects appear to be registering more clearly with voters than the conflict itself. The economic exposure may be especially acute in Republican territory. Much of the GOP coalition rests on rural voters, who tend to drive greater distances, according to Joshua Blank, the research director for the Texas Politics Project at The University of Texas at Austin. These voters' local economies are also more dependent on farming, trucking and other fuel-intensive industries. That does not mean the war is solely responsible for voters’ economic pain. Political columnist Peter Roff told RS that its effects have been overstated, pointing to lingering inflation and other structural factors that are more to blame for keeping fuel prices elevated. But he acknowledged that such distinctions can be difficult to sell politically when voters see prices rising at the pump. As Jack Hunter wrote in RS last week, Republicans in tight races around the country are increasingly taking note and trying to distance themselves from the war’s economic fallout, with some beginning to call for the conflict to end. But that rhetorical opposition has yet to turn into action. When given opportunities to constrain Trump’s war-making authority, most Republican lawmakers have continued to stand behind him. Only five Republican Senators have voted in favor of any of the 14 legislative efforts to constrain Trump’s ability to wage war without congressional approval. Only one of those five — Susan Collins of Maine — is up for re-election in November. Two will already be leaving the Senate come January. Luke Nicastro, a senior editor at the American Conservative, argued last week that Republicans (outside of the five senators) who are today talking about affordability are hoping voters don’t pay attention to the fact that they couldn’t muster the courage to actually vote against the war, which is causing the gas and grocery prices to spike in the first place. Such a strategy can only work if voters can be counted on to actually separate the affordability issue and the ongoing war in their minds as they head to the polls. “Those Republican candidates are in a jam because they only have a few weeks to engage in intense electoral cognitive therapy to get these voters to compartmentalize their reality,” Charles McElwee, an editor at RealClearPolitics, told RS. Democrats have certainly noticed the hypocrisy. The party’s Senate campaign arm put out a press release in September listing the past statements and votes of strong support for the war from thirteen GOP nominees, including those in Florida, Iowa, Mississippi, Ohio, South Carolina, and Texas. “Despite national backlash, nearly every Senate Republican, including those in tight races in key Senate battleground states, just voted to continue the price-hiking war in Iran,” the press release reads, adding that this “comes after GOP Senate candidates shamelessly and desperately scrambled to paper over their extensive records supporting, advocating for, and defending the unpopular war.” In some cases, the about-face from candidates has been remarkably swift. Rep. Ashley Hinson, the GOP nominee for Senate in Iowa, recently said her constituents “shouldn’t have to foot the bill” for the war in Iran. As recently as last month, she called the same war “out of sight, out of mind for so many Americans” because it is “thousands of miles away.” Depending on the the district, some Democratic candidates have made explicit the connection between the war and the economy, while others have centered affordability without putting the war itself at the heart of their message. For example, in the fight for the Senate seat vacated by the late Lindsey Graham in ruby red South Carolina, Democrat Annie Andrews is only trailing Graham's sister, Darline Nordone Graham, by 2.5 points in the Real Clear Polling average. She talks more about gas and diesel and has only criticized Graham once for not voting to invoke war powers during her very short time in office. For Republicans, that leaves little room for error as election day approaches. While experts say that costs for goods like diesel are expected to stay elevated even after any wind-down of the war, Darling says that progress toward a negotiated agreement “would give hope to many that there is a plan to get diesel prices down.” But the political pressure will only grow if prices continue climbing. “Every gas station in America posts the current price of gas,” Darling added, “and that is a daily advertisement on the progress President Trump is making to resolve the Iran War.” --- ### Will Trump's efforts to boost Bolsonaro blow up in his face? **Published:** October 2, 2026 | **Author:** Nick Cleveland-Stout | **Section:** Latin America **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/brazil-elections-2026/.md This Sunday, Brazilian voters head to the polls to decide whether leftwing incumbent President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva will win a historic fourth term. Lula’s challenger is Flávio Bolsonaro, who has styled himself as a more moderate version of his father, former President Jair Bolsonaro, the rightwing firebrand who is serving a 27-year prison sentence for an attempted coup. The tight electoral contest has been defined by the economy, crime, and scandal, as a probe into a prominent jailed banker revealed that he financed a new hagiographic biopic about the elder Bolsonaro at Flavio’s request. If neither candidate receives more than 50% of the vote on Sunday, which is a near-certainty, the race will go to a runoff on October 25. According to an AtlasIntel/Bloomberg poll released on Tuesday, Bolsonaro would receive 47.7% of the votes in a potential runoff, compared to Lula’s 47.6%. But in the final days of the campaign, one question looms large: what will the United States do? Although Trump has not formally endorsed him, Bolsonaro is undoubtedly Washington’s preferred candidate. The administration has clashed with Lula’s government over trade, Cuba, and Venezuela, as well as a desire for access to Brazil’s rare earths supply. Trump is also personally close to the Bolsonaros. Often at the request of the Bolsonaro family, the U.S. has engaged in a pressure campaign to weaken the Lula government, sparking fears of further interference. --- ### Is Bibi cruising for a bruising by trolling Erdogan over Syria? **Published:** October 1, 2026 | **Author:** Fatih Kocaibiş | **Section:** Middle East **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/netanyahu-erdogan-turkey/.md During a speech at the United Nations last week, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu railed against Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, calling him a “tyrant.” “Now he wants to take over Syria,” Netanyahu said. “Well, that's not surprising because he calls for Israel's destruction almost every single day.” The comments come amid growing tensions between Israel and Turkey. In August, Israeli warplanes struck the Abu al-Duhur Airbase in northwestern Syria, roughly 43 miles from the Turkish border. The strike left craters in the runway and, as with earlier attacks around T4 and Palmyra in the Homs province, was carried out without prior notice to Ankara. As Israeli aircraft approached the Turkish border, they were tracked by Turkish radar, bringing months of political and diplomatic tension between the two countries a step closer to direct military confrontation. The Netanyahu government presents these strikes as preventive, aimed at stopping a larger Turkish encroachment into Syria before it starts. Israel’s concern is Turkey, which, alongside the United States, has become one of the main military and political partners of Syria's post-Assad government. But Abu al-Duhur points to the opposite risk. In the absence of an immediate military threat, strikes aimed at preventing a potential future Turkish deployment may do more to raise the risk of a future conflict than to reduce it. --- ### Reignited violence in Ethiopia threatens to engulf the entire region **Published:** October 1, 2026 | **Author:** Dan M. Ford | **Section:** Africa **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/ethiopian-civil-war-tigray/.md Ethiopia is on the brink of another civil war. Last week, fighting between rebels and federal forces in the northern Tigray, Amhara, and Afar states left hundreds dead. These clashes may signal the start of a potentially devastating conflict in a country still recovering from a bloody civil war that killed approximately 600,000 people between 2020 and 2022. Fighting began as seven rebel groups from across various parts of the country announced the formation of a military coalition called the Ethiopian Peoples’ Forces Alliance for Survival. The alliance’s expressed aim is to remove the federal government headed by Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed Ali from power. Major fighting has thus far remained confined to the northern Tigray state, where the previous civil war took place. The leading rebel group, the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), made significant territorial gains across the state last week, seizing control of Alula Aba Nega International Airport in the Tigrayan capital of Mekelle, as well as airports in the nearby cities of Axum and Shire. In response, Ethiopian Airlines shut down all service to those airports, cutting off much of Tigray to commercial air transit. Following advances by rebel forces in Tigray, the Ethiopian military seems to have regained some territory in recent days. On Monday, the Ethiopian government and allied militias announced they had recaptured the strategic town of Alamata, about 75 miles south of Tigray’s capital. Among those joining forces with the TPLF in this expansive rebellion is the Fano National Movement, a separatist coalition based in the country’s northern Amhara state that sided with the federal government against the TPLF in the last war. Once rivals, the TPLF and the Fano have now made common cause against the Ethiopian government. In recent years, the Fano has been actively pursuing its own effort to end the “oppression” of the Amhara region from the country’s federal government and has clashed in armed conflict with federal forces in pursuit of that end. This new alliance thus accords with the Fano’s aim of securing greater independence from what it views as an overbearing federal government. The recent uptick in violence follows months of growing tensions in Ethiopia. In May, the TPLF reclaimed control over the political administration of Tigray, arguing that the Ethiopian government had failed to follow through on its end of the Pretoria Agreement, which ended the previous civil war. In the months since, sporadic fighting between federal forces and the TPLF has sprung up throughout Tigray. And the Ethiopian government’s drone warfare — which has killed civilians — has focused the attention of human rights activists, who argue such attacks should be investigated for possible war crimes. Washington’s response to the renewed conflict has thus far mostly followed a wait-and-see approach, though growing violence in the country is beginning to attract attention on Capitol Hill. On Monday, Semafor reported that Senate Democrats, led by Sen. Jeanne Shaheen (D-N.H.), are pushing Secretary of State Marco Rubio to intervene in the conflict, though it remains unclear what such an intervention could look like. The White House placed visa restrictions on unnamed TPLF officials in June following reports of clashes between the rebel group and federal forces. But just a couple weeks ago, Washington lifted sanctions on officials and the military of neighboring Eritrea — sanctions that the Biden administration had put in place during the previous war in an effort to curb Asmara’s role in that conflict. With these sanctions removed, Eritrea may find it easier to intervene in a renewed Ethiopian civil war. In another case of twisting alliances, Eritrea was aligned with Ethiopia during the previous civil war, having viewed the TPLF and its aspirations as a threat to its own interests. But growing animosity between Ethiopia and Eritrea in the years since the Pretoria Agreement was signed has pushed the small coastal country to shift its support away from the federal government in Addis Ababa and toward the TPLF. The root of the Eritrea-Ethiopia discord comes down to Ethiopia’s renewed determination to gain access to the Red Sea. Over the past couple years, Ethiopian officials have increasingly demanded free access to Eritrea’s Red Sea Port of Assab, which was under Ethiopian control until Eritrea’s independence from the country in 1993, at which time Ethiopia lost its coastline. Ethiopia has since signed an expensive agreement requiring it to pay between $1.5 and $2 billion annually in fees to neighboring Djibouti to use its Red Sea port, on which Addis Ababa relies for the vast majority of its maritime trade. Another important player in the region’s complicated geopolitical chess match is Egypt, which has a long-running dispute with Ethiopia over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). The GERD, which was inaugurated on September 9, 2025 after about fourteen years of construction, is a massive dam upriver on the Nile that is the continent’s largest hydropower generator. Egyptian officials claim that the dam puts Egypt’s water security at risk, arguing that Ethiopia’s control of the dam will limit the amount of water that flows downstream, severely threatening Egypt’s vast irrigation system that sustains its agricultural economy. As a result, Cairo has sought to gain leverage with Addis Ababa, in part by providing diplomatic support and, at times, military assistance to those of its neighbors with which it has strained relations or even overlapping territorial claims. They includeEritrea (via diplomatic support), Sudan (via diplomatic support and possible arms sales), and Somalia (via diplomatic support and troop deployments). Sudan and Somalia themselves are in the throes of intense domestic conflicts. The Sudanese army is struggling in a brutal civil war against the Rapid Support Forces for control over the country. Meanwhile, Somalia continues its decades-long fight against armed groups while having to contend with the growing relations forming between foreign governments and multiple Somalian regions that claim independence from the central government. This tangled web of alliances, mixed with intense domestic conflicts in surrounding countries, will make it difficult to contain a Tigrayan war. A multi-layered regional war has thus become a distinct possibility. For now, the United States has little choice but to wait and see what happens, though targeted sanctions focused on entities that could fan the flames of war (such as Eritrean officials) should be considered on a case-by-case basis. But any military intervention should be entirely off the table, particularly as the United States remains preoccupied with the mess caused by its ill-planned war against Iran. --- ### They aren't uniformed, but these US companies are fighting for Ukraine **Published:** October 1, 2026 | **Author:** Ted Snider | **Section:** Europe **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/us-tech-companies-in-ukraine/.md This summer, Microsoft announced that “it will extend its provision of technology support to Ukraine through the end of 2027,” providing technology, cybersecurity support, and other assistance to "help Ukraine maintain essential digital services during the war.” Not only U.S. weapons, but a host of U.S. tech companies have gone to war in Ukraine. This includes PayPal, now one of the biggest multinational online payment systems in the world, which got into the act, cutting off access to all Russian accounts when Moscow invaded Ukraine in February 2022. Palantir initially offered its services to Ukraine for free. Meanwhile is has used the Ukraine War as a proving ground for its emerging technology, has worked with Ukraine to develop AI to sift and analyze battlefield intelligence and plan and coordinate deep strike operations. This now extends to controlling drone swarms and identifying targets. It now has partnerships across numerous Ukraine ministries, including a huge deal announced in May to broaden the use of AI across all military and civilian defense operations. In 2022 Palantir’s market capitalization was less than $25 billion, today it is closer to $450 billion. Meanwhile, Elon Musk’s Starlink satellite systems make it possible for the Ukrainian armed forces to communicate, track the movement of Russian troops, and select targets. In his book The Russo-Ukrainian War: Follies of Empire, Richard Sakwa says the provision of that ability “was crucial for Ukraine’s early success in defeating the Russian advance on Kiev.” While Musk has been opposed to the Ukrainian military using Starlink for deep strikes into Russia — a position he affirmed in August — Ukraine’s use of Starlink for mid-strike drones has clearly transformed the war in Ukraine. Jennifer Kavanagh, Senior Fellow & Director of Military Analysis at Defense Priorities, told RS that “Ukraine would not be able to carry out its current military campaign without Starlink's support.” Last year, Musk claimed that the Ukrainian military’s “entire front line would collapse if I turned it off.” Providing free satellite service to Ukraine became expensive for Musk. A year and a half into the war, Musk threatened to terminate his services unless the U.S. government picked up the tab. So, they did. The Polish government has also said that it pays for Starlink services in Ukraine, contributing $50 million a year. Microsoft’s mobilization for Ukraine has been much quieter. Most of us thought the war began on February 24, 2022. According to Microsoft president Brad Smith, it started the day before. “That’s when we saw 300 Russian-coordinated cyberattacks all seek to down the Ukrainian government.” That’s also when, in the words of the New York Times, “Microsoft threw itself into the middle of a ground war in Europe.” As the story goes, “wiper” malware attempted to wipe clean the data of hundreds of server systems belonging to the Ukrainian government. Microsoft’s Threat Intelligence Centre was the first to see it, according to Henry Farrell and Abraham Newman in their book, Underground Empire: How America Weaponized the World Economy. Separated by an ocean, Microsoft personnel “were manning Ukraine’s front lines.” They quickly shared their intel with Ukraine’s cyberdefense officials, and, within hours, Ukraine’s virus detections systems had been updated and the attacking code had been blocked. Microsoft, Farrell and Newman write, had forged “a closer relationship with the Ukrainian government and the national security advisors and team there.” They had become Ukraine’s “shield… against waves of attacks.” As if its own nation, Microsoft announced that they “condemn this unjustified, unprovoked and unlawful invasion by Russia,” and immediately “suspend all new sales of Microsoft products and services in Russia.” In 2022, the New York Times wrote how tech executives, including those from Microsoft, were granted security clearances and sat in on secure briefings by the NSA and U.S. Cyber Command. Microsoft and Google were the sources behind most of the shared actionable intelligence. At the time, Microsoft had established “24/7 sharing of threat intelligence” so that “work closely with Ukrainian government officials and cybersecurity staff” they could “identify and remediate threat activity against Ukrainian networks” and “defend against attacks.” In a revealing interview four years ago, Microsoft president Brad Smith said what Microsoft has “done first is, frankly, to support and defend Ukraine.” He said Microsoft had worked with the government to move 16 of the 17 Ukrainian ministries into the cloud. Drawing a military analogy, Smith spoke like a cyberwar general, comparing the situation to a classic military maneuver: “you’ve got to disperse your defensive assets so they’re not vulnerable to a single attack.” According to a June 2026 Microsoft report, the tech giant has spent more than $700 million providing Ukraine with technology and cybersecurity. If Microsoft were a country, that would rank it in the top 25 supporters of Ukraine. The Russian-Ukrainian war has changed the nature of warfare. Rifles and tanks, The Wall Street Journal opines, are “going the way of sword fights and cavalry charges” now that “thumbs on joysticks have largely replaced fingers on triggers and more fighting is done on screens and less in trenches.” Though Brad Smith says Microsoft is “a company and not a government or country,” he has “made it clear,” according to the New York Times, it “is not a neutral one.” Huge tech companies, like Microsoft, SpaceX and Palantir, like countries, have chosen sides and allied with the U.S. and Ukraine, partnering with them as essential players on a transformed battlefield. The technology these companies have sent to Ukraine has been as important as the weapons that allied countries have sent. “Your ability to identify the right technology and implement it will determine what happens on the battlefield,” Palantir CEO Alex Karp said in 2023, adding that Palantir is “responsible for most of the targeting in Ukraine.” In the same year he said he’s “in favor of a robust posture in America” and that Palantir wants people who want to be on the side of the West, making the West a better society, more able to defend themselves.” When Russia invaded Ukraine, the U.S. and its partner countries sent weapons. Tech giants like Microsoft, SpaceX, and Palantir sent technology, expressed their ideological loyalty to Ukraine, and joined its side in the war. Many might think that behavior is natural, especially when the cause is considered a righteous one back home. Others may believe it crosses a line, that it helps prolong a destructive war that won’t ultimately be won on the battlefield, while bolstering profits for shareholders and salaries for company executives. Somehow, that doesn’t feel right. --- ### Gen. Burhan digs in as Trump's visa-for-ceasefire scheme blows up **Published:** September 30, 2026 | **Author:** Elfadil Ibrahim | **Section:** Africa **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/sudan-civil-war-news/.md On the morning of September 24, Abdel Fattah Burhan should have been standing at the podium of the United Nations General Assembly in New York. Instead, he was in Khartoum. The general who leads Sudan’s army and chairs its Sovereignty Council had been offered his American visa on a condition, which, as detailed by Reuters, involved signing the 90-day ceasefire that Massad Boulos, President Donald Trump’s adviser for Arab and African affairs, had been pitching for months. Burhan rejected the condition, telling a crowded stadium in Khartoum on September 26 that “we do not want a visa to any country...we will stay here with you until we die here in this country.” This episode caps a year in which American policy toward Sudan’s civil war has steadily become more hostile toward Burhan and his Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) — the very party that Boulos in a May interview called the “constitutional institution” that must be preserved. Sudan has been at war since April 2023, when its army, the SAF, fell out with the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), a paramilitary group it once had nurtured. The fighting has produced the world’s largest displacement crisis and famine in parts of the country. Both sides stand accused of atrocities, but the worst have been attributed to the RSF, whose capture of el-Fasher in October 2025 bore what the U.N. called “hallmarks of genocide.” At present, the SAF holds battlefield momentum. Over the past year, it has clawed back the capital, Khartoum, and swathes of territory in the country's center. Just days ago, it captured Sodari, a strategic town in North Kordofan state. The string of victories now place the SAF at the gates of Darfur, the RSF’s stronghold and the very region from which the SAF and its allied forces were violently ejected last year when el-Fasher fell. Given battlefield dynamics and the growing number of high-level defections that are hollowing out the RSF, an outright military victory appears in sight for the first time since the war erupted. It is against this background of shifting momentum that America has ratcheted up pressure, with almost all of it, in practice, on the side that is winning. Washington has reached for several tools over the last year. In January, 2025, it imposed sanctions on Burhan himself, for refusal “to participate in international peace talks” and “indiscriminate bombing of civilian infrastructure.” Months later, in May 2025, the U.S. government determined that the Government of Sudan, which is led by the SAF, had used chemical weapons. In early September, a “secret dossier” pointing to chemical weapons use by the SAF was reported by the New York Times and the Washington Post, building on information supplied by a “Middle Eastern intelligence agency.” The allegation is serious and adds weight to Washington’s earlier determination. However, the program appears to have been wound up, it produced no confirmed fatalities, and the dossier contained no victim testimony. The dossier originated with Israeli intelligence, according to sources who spoke to Middle East Eye. That detail is significant given Israel’s reported recent contacts with RSF leadership, as well as Israel’s regional alignment that tilts heavily toward the paramilitary group’s primary foreign patron, the United Arab Emirates (UAE). As the chemical weapons report leaked, the U.S. was also in the process of attempting to expand an arms embargo on Sudan at the U.N. The measure originally restricted weapons flows only to RSF-dominated Darfur; Boulos and America’s U.N. ambassador, Michael Waltz, have pushed to extend it across all of Sudan. On paper, this is even-handed. It applies to both sides “with no carve-outs,” as Boulos and Waltz explained in a Foreign Policy article. In practice, a blanket embargo hits the army hardest. The SAF is the internationally-recognized government, and its arms purchases are, by that logic, legitimate acts of a state defending itself; an embargo would reclassify those purchases as contraband. The RSF, meanwhile, is a paramilitary with no such standing and therefore has nothing to lose. Also noteworthy is the fact that Boulos consistently declines to name the UAE. Conflict experts, American lawmakers and America’s own sanctions have identified Abu Dhabi as the RSF’s principal foreign backer, supplying the drones, armored vehicles, and Colombian mercenaries that have given the paramilitary its edge. Asked directly by the BBC about Abu Dhabi’s role, Boulos offered only that “there might be some traders or whatever that are doing these sorts of supplies.” Indeed, a crucial dynamic shaping Sudan’s civil war is the growing rivalry between the UAE and Saudi Arabia. In November 2025, Crown Prince Muhammad Bin Salman (MBS) pressed President Donald Trump at a White House meeting to get involved in peacemaking in Sudan. Burhan welcomed the move, and reportedly told MBS by phone before his trip that the war could not end without American pressure on Abu Dhabi. That framework was Riyadh’s, and it was decisively pro-army: Saudi Arabia sees the SAF as a bulwark against state collapse, not as one of two morally equal combatants, as Washington and Abu Dhabi do. Since Trump’s commitment to “start working on Sudan,” in November, however, the president’s attention has since been consumed by a grinding war with Iran, leaving the Sudan file to Boulos, whose brief spans the entire African continent. Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, meanwhile, have drifted apart on several fronts. The Emirates quit OPEC, of which Riyadh is the de facto leader, in the spring. It has also deepened defense ties with Israel amid the U.S.-Iran war, while Saudi Arabia has taken an entirely different path, entering into the Mecca Defense Pact with Turkey and Pakistan, a move that is widely viewed as designed to curb Israel’s hawkishness and establish collective deterrence. Saudi banks have quietly also tightened scrutiny of transfers to the UAE, subjecting them to the kind of enhanced anti-money laundering scrutiny reserved for high-risk jurisdictions. Cargo trucks at the shared border have reportedly been queuing for days this summer awaiting Saudi clearance. Anwar Gargash, an Emirati presidential adviser, insisted publicly in New York that “the areas of interest between us and Saudi Arabia far outweigh any sort of disagreement.” But the reporting suggests otherwise. For Riyadh, the stakes in Sudan are only increasing. Its war against the Houthis across its southern border has recently re-opened following Houthi gains along Yemen's western coast. A second fractured state on the Red Sea — one potentially overrun by a group Saudi Arabia neither trusts nor controls — has looked, from Riyadh, like a threat since day one. This fear is what prompted the kingdom to co-host the first round of ceasefire talks in Jeddah at the war’s outset. As a result, Saudi Arabia is pushing back, and its patience with Washington's handling of the Sudan file appears to be thinning. According to The Africa Report, Riyadh recently threatened to quit the “Quad,” the mediation group convened by Washington, which includes Cairo, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. In New York, Saudi Arabia's foreign minister sat down with Egypt’s foreign minister, and the foreign ministers of its Mecca Pact partners, Turkey and Pakistan, all of whom back Sudan's army (Turkey supplies drones; Pakistan has sent armoured vehicles). They issued a statement expressing support for Sudan’s “legitimate national institutions" and rejecting “parallel entities” — explicitly pro-army, anti-RSF language from a meeting neither Washington nor Abu Dhabi attended. Back in Khartoum a few days later, Burhan said Sudan could not be “blackmailed,” in reference to his denied visa. It is not a flattering view of a peace process that needs his cooperation to work. It is also increasingly a view shared by all of America’s Middle Eastern partners, with one exception. --- ### Goodnight Baghdad: US troops leave Iraq after 23 years **Published:** September 30, 2026 | **Author:** Dan Grazier | **Section:** Middle East **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/us-withdrawal-iraq/.md The Iraq War was already four-years-old when I walked down the ramp of a C-17 at Al Taqaddum Air Base in April 2007. The fact that I am writing these words is proof that I survived that deployment and a subsequent one to Afghanistan in 2013. In the years since, I transitioned back into civilian life, established a new career, and saw my kids grow up and escape the nest. During nearly all of that time, there were still American troops on the ground in Iraq. I have a son serving in the military today. He has never been to Iraq, but I can absolutely sympathize with the Iraq veterans who came home from the war only to see their sons or daughters deploy to the same war zone. Because American military service has increasingly become a family affair, there must be a quite a few Thanksgiving conversations where a father listens to his son’s Iraq stories and then retells his own adventure tales that begins with “back in my day in Iraq…” Had anyone told me while I was dodging IEDs in the summer of 2007 that I would be asked to write a column at the age of 48 about the last American troops leaving Iraq today, I would have rightly questioned what the United States was doing there. I believed at the time that we were fighting terrorists and helping to create a free Iraq. Two decades later, I have no idea why we were really fighting there. I do know that my Marines and I survived some close calls. I also know that nearly 5,000 Americans did not survive their Iraq deployments since the 2003 invasion, along with several hundred thousand other casualties between US contractors, our allies, and the Iraqi people. A question I wrestle with today is if I had been killed in Iraq, what purpose would my death have served? I don’t have a good answer for that question and the mere fact that the last Americans are coming home from Iraq 19 years later leads me to believe I never will. My grandfather fought in Europe during World War II. He could say that he had helped defeat totalitarianism because his war ended when he was still young. I watched people continuing to deploy to mine after I entered middle age. At this point, I don’t really want an answer to my question. But I would like to see all that was lost in Iraq: the people who were killed, the broken lives of those who came home, the resources, and even a bit of our collective innocence transform from the waste it is today into a sacrifice. People and societies make sacrifices by relinquishing something of value for some useful purpose. The best way to turn all that was lost in Iraq into a sacrifice is by learning the right lessons from the experience and then properly apply them moving forward. One such lesson is the limits of military action. The Iraq War began under, to be generous, questionable circumstances and then meandered through a variety of strategies that all shared the same vague goal of a stable, democratic government in Baghdad. Military power wiped out Saddam Hussein's government in a month. Then it took the military supported by all elements of national power more than two decades to get even close to that goal. Baghdad today is less one dictator but still oppressed in so many ways — economically, socially, politically. It is more pro-Iranian and sectarian, with factions that are largely glad to see us go. Indeed, as the remaining hundreds of troops depart today under a U.S.-Iraqi agreement, Baghdad is launching four "Sovereignty Days" to commemorate. Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, and now Iran are all cautionary tales. It is hardly a novel observation to note that it is relatively easy to start a war. Ending one is another matter entirely. The United States is pretty good at starting wars. It has a pretty lousy track record at the other end. One of the best things we can do as a society for those we lost in all our recent conflicts is to avoid the messy business of concluding a war by not starting them in the first place. During a stroll through my Arlington neighborhood on Sunday, I walked around the Marine Corps War Memorial. The names and years of all the campaigns in which Marines fought are inscribed around the black granite base of the monument. The inscriptions for Afghanistan and Iraq both have the starting year inscribed, but neither commemoration has an end date. The memorial is currently surrounded by a chain link fence while workers refurbish the iconic statue. It is my earnest hope that this project includes carving the end dates to both of those wars as a tangible sign that they are well and truly over. It is my earnest prayer that it is a long time before another campaign is added. --- ### Venezuela blowback may have a long fuse. It always does. **Published:** September 30, 2026 | **Author:** Antonio De Loera-Brust | **Section:** Latin America **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/us-intervention-latin-america/.md In 1927, Augusto Cesar Sandino began an insurgent campaign against the U.S. occupation of Nicaragua. Under orders from President Calvin Coolidge, the U.S. Marines had intervened in Nicaragua to settle a civil war between a conservative government and liberal rebels. In his manifesto, Sandino responded by effectively declaring war on the United States. He also specifically denounced former liberal leaders who had agreed to put down their arms in the face of U.S. intervention. Speaking of General Moncada, the leading liberal officer who had agreed to end his revolt in talks convened by future Secretary of State Henry Stimson, Sandino wrote: “Nobody gave him the authority to abandon the ranks of the revolution to make secret agreements with the enemy.” One imagines there are Chavistas in Venezuela with similar feelings about interim President Delcy Rodriguez right now. Having intervened to end the civil war in Nicaragua, the U.S. soon found itself embroiled in a bitter counter-insurgency campaign against Sandino’s men. More than 100 Marines would ultimately be killed in Nicaragua between 1927 and 1933, when the U.S. withdrew and the new Roosevelt administration adopted the Good Neighbor Policy of non-intervention in Latin America’s internal affairs. Sandino reported no hard feelings, inviting U.S. citizens to come to Nicaragua but “as workers, not as bosses.” Yet Sandino’s happy ending would not last. In 1934, just a year after the U.S. withdrawal, Sandino was captured and executed by Nicaraguan forces loyal to General Anastasio Somoza, who had been trained by the occupying U.S. Marines. In 1936, Somoza took over Nicaragua in a military coup, ruling until his own assassination in 1956. Somoza’s sons would then brutally govern Nicaragua until 1979, when they were overthrown by a new revolutionary group. That group called itself “the Sandinistas” after Augusto Sandino’s rebellion nearly 50 years earlier. The Sandinistas still rule Nicaragua today. Under the leadership of former revolutionary Daniel Ortega, Nicaragua has become an undemocratic virtual dictatorship. According to Rep. Maria Elvira Salazar (R-Fla.), Sandinista Nicaragua also poses a national security threat by providing a potential airfield from which Chinese bombers could reach the United States. A similar argument was made back in the 1980s, when the prospect of a communist takeover across Central America motivated the United States to commit or support horrific acts of violence in Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala. Fears of a Communist Central America also manifested in popular culture, such as the 1984 film “Red Dawn,” in which Nicaraguan troops join Soviet forces to invade rural Colorado. Many of these alarms are clearly unfounded, or at least are greatly exaggerated; if China did wish to attack the U.S., they have more effective means of doing so than bombers from Nicaragua. Yet whatever genuine threat Nicaragua does pose should be understood as blowback for the U.S. intervention in Nicaragua all the way back during the Coolidge Administration. Without the U.S. intervention in Nicaragua in 1927, there would have been no Sandino insurgency. Without a Sandino insurgency, then there would have been no Somoza dictatorship, no Sandinista movement, no Contra war, and no Ortega dictatorship today. Possibly no Central American migrant crisis either. What can we learn from this? Americans are not good at reflecting on history. We tend to judge the failure or success of presidents by two- to four-year election cycles, not the slow burn of resentments and grievances accumulated around the world over decades. Most Americans, even those who’ve heard of the Iran-Contra Scandal, probably do not know that the U.S. occupied Nicaragua in the late 1920s and the early 1930s. There are likely people working in American politics and government who have heard of the Sandinistas without having heard of Augusto Cesar Sandino, the Sandinista namesake. Could Calvin Coolidge, when he sent the U.S. Marines into Nicaragua in 1927, have possibly imagined he had planted the seeds of considerable trouble for Ronald Reagan in 1987? It’s doubtful. As the United States heads into the November 2026 midterms, President Donald Trump’s obvious and dramatic foreign policy failures will be on the ballot — first and foremost the disastrous war with Iran. In the face of such a profound failure, the Trump administration is promoting the 2026 capture of Venezuelan President Nicholas Maduro as a win. Despite questions about transparency, U.S. officials have eagerly touted a deal to obtain unprecedented control of Venezuela’s oil resources as a direct response to the Iran War-driven energy crisis impacting Americans’ wallets. Even among critics of the Trump administration’s subsequent Venezuela policy, there seems to be a growing consensus that the military operation to capture Maduro in January was at least a tactical success. Overall, the Donroe Doctrine seems to be working, bringing greater U.S. influence in Latin America than ever. Long gone is the non-interventionist approach of Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s Good Neighbor Policy. The Trump administration argues the results justify the approach. As Secretary of State Marco Rubio put it: “For the first time in 15, 20 years, the overwhelming majority of the countries in the Western Hemisphere are now led by pro-American leaders and pro-American governments.” But appearances can be deceiving and success short-lived. Just because a particular foreign policy doesn’t immediately blow up Hormuz-style doesn’t make it wise. Just because the blowback doesn’t arrive before the next election doesn’t mean it never will. Pro-American governments have been brought into being through gunboat diplomacy and open election interference – but for how long? In all likelihood, there are new Sandinos and new Maduros being created under our noses in places Washington policymakers haven’t heard of — yet. Nearly 8 out of 10 Venezuelans oppose the Trump-Rodriguez deal to let the U.S. take over Venezuela’s oil. Presumably at least some of them will be willing to do something about it. When will their rebellion come? What form will it take? What U.S. response will be best able to mitigate negative consequences while also resolving root causes? Will the U.S. even remember what those root causes are when the day arrives? These are all questions the Trump administration will not have to face directly. Donald Trump has no more elections to run, and likely won’t live to see the full consequences of the anger he has generated across Latin America. When the blowback inevitably takes shape, Democrats and Republicans alike should remember that the era of gunboat diplomacy in the early 20th century was followed by an era of revolutions, insurgencies, and even a genuine nuclear crisis in the middle of the 20th century. In the case of Nicaragua, it took nearly 50 years for the bill of 1927-1933 to come due. We’re still paying that tab now. What will the tab for Trump’s adventurism look like come the second half of the 21st century? Some of us will be unfortunate enough to find out. --- ### Record number vote to raise hell over settler violence in West Bank **Published:** September 30, 2026 | **Author:** Blaise Malley | **Section:** QiOSK **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/senate-west-bank-violence/.md Every Senate Democrat but one voted to advance a resolution that would have forced the State Department to produce a report regarding violence against American citizens, as well as other Israeli violations of human rights, in the West Bank. With only Sen. Rand Paul (R-Ky.), however, crossing party lines to support the measure, the resolution failed by a vote of 47-51. Sen. John Fetterman (D-Pa.), who has consistently been the lone Democratic holdout on a series of Iran war powers votes, once again broke with his party. Though the resolution ultimately failed, the vote count is nonetheless yet another sign of congressional Democrats’ rapid movement on questions regarding the U.S.-Israel relationship. When Sen. Bernie Sanders (I-Vt.), one of the co-sponsors of the bill voted on today, introduced similar legislation in January 2024, it failed by a vote of 72-11. Comparing this result to the vote two and half years ago, John Ramming Chappell, senior non-resident fellow at the Center for International Policy, said it was “remarkable that nearly every Democratic senator voted to scrutinize Israel’s human rights record.” The resolution was partly a response to nine American citizens who have been killed by Jewish settlers or Israeli security forces in the West Bank since the start of 2022, and for whom, in the words of Sen. Chris van Hollen (D-Md.), there has been “no accountability” and “no justice.” The Trump administration, notably its ambassador to Israel, Mike Huckabee, has occasionally spoken out against the violence but has made no policy changes to address it. “While the world’s attention has been on Gaza, this same government has been carrying out a slower, but no less brutal campaign in the West Bank. As of last month, the United Nations has documented more than 1400 incidents of settler violence this year alone,” Sanders said on the Senate floor Tuesday. “The Trump administration, rather than confronting this violence, has lifted sanctions on violent settlers. This violence does not even spare American citizens (...) Enough is enough. The United States cannot continue to bankroll this violence and look the other way,” he added. The vote was seen as a relatively easy one for Democrats to support, as far as bills critical of Israel are concerned. Had it passed, the legislation would not have automatically led to any policy changes, but rather forced the State Department to produce a report to shed light on human rights abuses. In addition, pro-Israel Democrats have typically been more likely to take votes against Israel when they concern policies in the West Bank as opposed to Gaza. Speaking to Responsible Statecraft shortly after the bill was introduced in late August, former State Department official Josh Paul, who resigned over the Biden’s administration’s Gaza policy, called rebukes of violent settlers in the West Bank “low-hanging fruit.” In advance of Tuesday’s vote, Demand Progress senior policy advisor Cavan Kharrazian said in a statement that the resolution was “a long-overdue first step” that “should be the bare minimum for any senator.” As the party gears up for election seasons where the U.S relationship with Israel is sure to play a central role, Chappell told RS events like these should send a signal. “This vote is a clear indication for Democratic presidential hopefuls that they will be expected to reevaluate the relationship with an emphasis on accountability and international law,” he said. --- ### Clock ticking on Democrat effort to kill flawed US-Saudi nuke deal **Published:** September 29, 2026 | **Author:** Sahar Khan | **Section:** Middle East **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/saudi-nuclear-deal-opposition/.md President Donald Trump may be touting a new nuclear cooperation agreement with Saudi Arabia, but members of Congress are already moving to block it, saying it does not do enough to prevent Saudi Arabia from getting a bomb or impose the same inspection standards required of other nuclear countries. Democratic Reps. Gregory Meeks, Brad Sherman, John Garamendi, and Don Beyer have introduced a joint resolution of disapproval against the pact, arguing that it lacks two safeguards Washington has sought elsewhere: a commitment against enrichment and reprocessing, and the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Additional Protocol. Their challenge comes amid a war with Iran that has made the region’s nuclear risks even harder to contain than a year ago. The Democrats’ resolution is important but faces long odds. Democrats would need enough Republican support to pass it in both chambers, and if Trump vetoed it, opponents would need two-thirds majorities in the House and Senate to override him. Furthermore, Congress would have to vote on it during the 90-session-day period of review or the pact takes effect automatically. The clock on that started when Trump sent the deal to Congress in late August. Irregardless, there are questions swirling around the deal’s viability. First, Trump has made Saudi normalization with Israel a condition. Riyadh continues to insist on a pathway to Palestinian statehood before any normalization with Israel is considered. Second, the Trump administration’s reluctance to support the Kingdom amidst a wave of attacks by the Houthis is creating tensions. So, while the agreement weakens the standard Washington is seeking in any eventual nuclear negotiation with Tehran, it may fall apart even before its most sensitive nuclear provisions are ever implemented. --- ### Do Democrats have bold enough ideas to break from the past? **Published:** September 29, 2026 | **Author:** Sam Fraser, William Hartung | **Section:** Washington Politics **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/democratic-party-foreign-policy/.md By any measure, 2026 has been a disastrous year for President Donald Trump’s foreign policy. An Iran war in which Trump promised quick victory has turned into a protracted farce dragging down the world economy. The president’s “reciprocal tariffs” were gutted by the Supreme Court, and his administration’s trade agenda remains deeply unpopular. Even his regime change operation in Venezuela, an apparent success, was broadly rejected by the American public and has put the United States into an imperial caretaker role in that country that could prove complicated and costly. It is no surprise, then, that the president’s approval rating on foreign policy has sunk by almost 30% since his inauguration for his second term. With Trump’s overall polling numbers cratering, Democrats appear to have a decisive advantage in November’s midterms. Yet this has not translated into a lead in foreign affairs, where polling suggests the two parties are essentially tied. This reality may stem from the fact that, while Democrats have correctly lambasted the president’s actions abroad, the party — and especially its top leadership — has yet to articulate a vision for U.S. foreign policy that reckons with how Trump’s two terms have changed the world and America’s role in it. While Trump’s first presidency could be viewed as an aberration from the normal course of American politics, his second has been more consequential: a “rupture,” as Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney memorably put it in his Davos speech early this year. American partners who have relied on U.S. markets or security backing can no longer hope for a return to normalcy after Trump. They are acting accordingly: in the past year, U.S. allies in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East have engaged in a flurry of activity, inking new trade and defense agreements in a long-term effort to reduce dependence on the United States. If Democrats are to regain some credibility on foreign policy with audiences both at home and abroad, they must show a similar willingness to break with the past. Yet this willingness has so far been in short supply. While some leading party figures acknowledge that a return to business as usual is impossible, their prescriptions have continued to echo the agenda of the Biden administration: restoring U.S. leadership, renewing alliances, and crafting an international coalition to compete with China. As much as former President Joe Biden’s foreign policy struggled under the weight of its contradictions, a retread of his agenda would face even more daunting challenges. Can the United States credibly claim to lead its allies — much less the world — when it has repeatedly shown that its commitments don’t outlast a single presidency? Will any partners want to double down on ties with a hegemon that has proven so eager to exploit dependencies for short-term gain? And what kind of international program can the American public be expected to support after years of anger at the status quo and Trumpian disruption alike? The Democrats have yet to address these questions in a serious way. Fortunately, the intra-party struggle taking place around the U.S. relationship with Israel has created an opening for a broader reevaluation of Democratic foreign policy. Across the country, progressive primary challengers have trounced establishment candidates by appealing to voters’ desire to end blank-check support for Israel. The relationship has become a litmus test for candidates’ willingness to break with destructive orthodoxies. As Sen. Chris Van Hollen (D-Md.) put it, “primary voters won’t trust any Democratic presidential candidate who does not have a record of moral and strategic clarity on these issues.” If the party is to meet the moment, restructuring U.S. ties with Israel is only a starting point. Candidates and elected officials alike need to put forward bold ideas covering a range of issues, from reasserting congressional war powers to crafting a reformed approach to global aid. Crucially, their proposals need to go beyond opposition to Trump. Rather than just calling out the stupidity of the Iran war, Democrats should pointedly reject the policy of U.S. military primacy in the Middle East that led to it and make the vigorous case for diplomacy that the conflict has so clearly validated. In addition to overturning Trump’s tariffs, the party should develop an agenda for positive-sum economic engagement with the world that does not treat economic prosperity as a scarce resource to be hoarded by some countries at the expense of others. Instead of attacking Trump for weakness in his apparent dovish turn on China, Democrats can advance a strategy that centers cooperation and conflict prevention alongside targeted pushback on Chinese policies where necessary. In the broadest terms, a new Democratic foreign policy should entail uniting behind a vision for U.S. global engagement that recognizes America cannot lead on every issue and in every instance. This does not mean abandoning the commitment to a world governed by rules and institutions; in fact, renewed investment in international cooperation stands the best chance of sustaining a genuine “rules-based order” at a time when the United States clearly lacks the will and ability to stand up such a system on its own. This approach would mesh well with proposals by allied leaders like Carney and Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez, who have each sketched out ideas for a more just, resilient global order upheld by multilateralism and flexible coalition-building. Democrats must build on these efforts and offer a compelling alternative both to Trumpism and to the exhausted status quo that helped produce it. Failure to do so would invite disappointment on the world stage — and provide a blessing to Trump’s would-be successors. --- ### Ex-Biden officials are desperate for a Gaza scapegoat **Published:** September 29, 2026 | **Author:** Connor Echols | **Section:** Washington Politics **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/biden-gaza-scapegoat/.md There’s something profoundly human about the scapegoat. From the ancient Israelites and Greeks to the Aztecs, global cultures have long sought to concentrate society’s ills in a single vessel, cleansing the rest of us in the process. Today, the Democratic foreign-policy establishment is looking for a scapegoat of its own. Tainted by the sins of enabling Israeli conduct in Gaza and beyond, many national-security mandarins are seeking absolution by proxy, perhaps in hopes of returning to the halls of power in 2029. Joe Biden has emerged as the bearer of these iniquities. As numerous former Biden administration officials have asked me over the past year, can you really blame the bureaucrats for implementing the whims of an obstinate president? In his new book, “Crossing the Red Line,” journalist Akbar Shahid Ahmed offers the first comprehensive opportunity to evaluate this scapegoating exercise. Across more than 300 pages of excruciating detail, Ahmed narrates the many small decisions that allowed Israel to pursue a campaign numerous scholars and human rights organizations have since deemed a genocide. What emerges is a portrait of fecklessness — a story of an ever-shrinking group of officials who consistently refused to restrain Israel, ignoring the advice of their own experts and the fury of their own party’s voters. As the next presidential election cycle looms, Ahmed’s extraordinary work allows us to ask a thorny question — one that many progressive Democrats are already grappling with: Should anyone who served at the highest levels of the Biden administration ever enter government again? --- ### Israel wants US-led force to disarm Lebanon's Hezbollah **Published:** September 28, 2026 | **Author:** Anchal Vohra | **Section:** Middle East **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/israel-peacekeeping-force-lebanon/.md Fearing a security vacuum if UN peacekeepers leave southern Lebanon when their mandate expires December 31, the Lebanese government is desperately seeking an extension of the United Nations Interim Force (UNIFIL) or the creation of a European-led multinational force to take its place. Israel, which has occupied dozens of villages south of the Litani River since its latest invasion of the country earlier this year can't wait for the Blue Helmets to leave. It has long lobbied against UNIFIL’s extension, deeming it ineffective in taming and disarming Hezbollah, the Iran-backed militia. But Tel Aviv hasn't opposed an international force once UNIFIL leaves; it just doesn’t want one tied to the UN. Israel is lobbying for a U.S.-led force, while the Lebanese government prefers a European-led mission to aid the Lebanese army if UNIFIL’s mandate is not renewed or extended. An even bigger question is how exactly any such force can subdue battle-hardened Hezbollah, the country’s most powerful armed force. The group has long enjoyed widespread support in the Shiite community, which makes up about a third of the country’s total population. Days before the UN General Assembly meeting in New York this week, Lebanese President Joseph Aoun visited Paris where he met with French President Emmanuel Macron and Jordan's King Abdullah. They discussed the need for the continued presence of foreign troops and the importance of making that clear to President Donald Trump. Israel occupied five key points in Southern Lebanon after Hezbollah joined the war between Israel and Hamas in 2023. Israel rained bombs on a region inhabited mostly by Shiite Lebanese and forced them to flee to other parts of the country. A ceasefire was inked first in November last year although Israel never fully stopped bombing. Clashes broke out again in March after U.S. and Iran assassinated Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei and Hezbollah attacked Israel, offering it an excuse it needed to keep the war going and a justification to hold the occupied territory. The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) are ill-equipped to push back against the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) in the south. Residents there fear that UNIFIL's withdrawal could leave them vulnerable to a prolonged or even permanent Israeli presence. UNIFIL's exit would also mean losing a neutral party and "the world's eyes and ears" in a region where misunderstandings can quickly escalate into armed conflict. Roughly 7,500 troops from 46 countries have monitored airspace violations and land incursions, offering a vital de-escalation liaison since the 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah war. Moreover, UNIFIL troops have served as a lifeline for people in Lebanese villages who refused to leave their homes after the Israelis arrived and established their “security zone.” For instance, UN troops navigate Israeli checkpoints to deliver humanitarian aid, medicine, and food convoys to the residents of a Christian town called Rmeich. Their departure could halt the delivery of supplies and sever the link between these villages and the rest of the country. Considering the circumstances, an extension of six months to a year appears to be a reasonable ask. But Israel is preoccupied with disarming Hezbollah and seemingly unconcerned about Lebanon’s internal political dynamics. It has long derided UNIFIL as ineffective and has been waiting for it to leave. It got its wish last year, when, under U.S. pressure, the UN Security Council extended UNIFIL's mandate only until the end of this year. Since it was created in 1978 after the first Israeli invasion of Lebanon, UNIFIL has always been an irritant for Israel. It was reinforced after the 2006 war under UN Security Council Resolution 1701, which called for the area between the Blue Line — the de facto Israel-Lebanon border — and the Litani River to be completely demilitarized apart from deployments there by the LAF and UNIFIL. Israel, which was supposed to withdraw its forces from the area as the LAF and UNIFIL deployed there insists that the peacekeepers never fully enforced the resolution, while UNIFIL argues it was never tasked with forcibly disarming Hezbollah. This has been a source of major tension between Israel and the UN, and, by extension, with Lebanon. Now, Israel wants a force empowered to disarm Hezbollah, militarily if necessary, and prefers a U.S.-led mechanism to carry that out. A problem with that plan, however, lies in Washington’s unwillingness to deploy its own troops. Europeans, on the other hand, are willing to provide troops, as they have in the past, but prefer to deploy them under a UN mandate. However, if Israel manages to convince Washington to keep the UN out – which Washington can do by virtue of its veto power on the Security Council – the Europeans will likely resort to a “coalition of the willing” model – mustering a group of countries willing to deploy troops and aid the LAF on a multilateral basis. Several European countries have already established an Italian-led technical military support group to aid the LAF and enhance its capacity. The European Union (EU) has said that more than 10 countries are ready to contribute troops to a post-UNIFIL international force. The UN itself has tabled three options with varying numbers of uniformed soldiers constituting the actual force who would also be accompanied by armed soldiers for force protection. It has also listed requirements for monitoring equipment such as radars, helicopters, and satellite imagery. The proposal calls for a deployment that ranges from 2000 to 5000 troops, depending on the plan. Under the first option, UN troops could potentially conduct joint operations with the LAF even north of the Litani River, closer to Beirut. The second option proposes "some" joint operational activities with the LAF, only south of the Litani, although it also offers verification of any violations of UNSCR Resolution 1701 north of the river "on a limited basis." The third would have more limited means, and limited capacity to coordinate between the IDF and the LAF. The key question, however, remains unanswered: What kind of joint operations are European nations willing to carry out alongside the LAF? Israel does not trust the LAF’s willingness or ability to disarm Hezbollah and wants an international force capable of carrying out a door-to-door search and seizure of Hezbollah's weapons. That is a risky undertaking for any international forces, however. EU Foreign Policy Chief Kaja Kallas said the objective of such a force is to "strengthen the Lebanese armed forces and the ability of the Lebanese state to provide security across its territory." That presumably covers less dangerous tasks, such as training and providing key equipment. There is no clarity on what an international post-UNIFIL force would eventually look like. But several plans could potentially merge: the U.S. could join a UN-led mission composed of European forces. Israel hopes that Washington will at least provide its state-of-the-art satellite surveillance systems to ensure Hezbollah’s adherence to UNSCR 1701. And it demands that any post-UNIFIL force operate with a much stronger mandate and more teeth than either the EU or the UN have so far proposed. But the kind of force Israel wants – one that will go door to door to disarm Hezbollah – is a nightmare for the Lebanese government which is worried. A large number of Shiites in the country support Hezbollah. Any such force may have to confront Hezbollah’s supporters and that may lead to civilian casualties, even a civil war. Moreover, Shiites are a part of the LAF, a coercive disarmament could lead to mutiny. And if Israel’s plan is to occupy southern Lebanon indefinitely, as some top Israeli officials have suggested, Tel Aviv risks strengthening Hezbollah and its calls for resistance, while weakening the state authorities. Improving ties with Beirut is Tel Aviv's best shot at achieving a mutually acceptable arrangement that ushers in a functioning peace. Disarming Hezbollah is not solely a military endeavor; it will require a painstaking intra-Lebanese political process that eases concerns among the Shiites about their standing in a deeply sectarian society. Regional actors, such as Turkey and Saudi Arabia, will also want a say. And the elephant in the room will have to be addressed at some point. Iran will not just walk away and abandon Hezbollah, an ally, especially not when it appears to be winning the war started by the US and Israel. --- ### He lobbied for Saudis after 9/11. Now he's repping them on Yemen **Published:** September 28, 2026 | **Author:** Julian Cooper | **Section:** Washington Politics **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/lobby-saudi-arabia-yemen/.md Michael Petruzzello, a lobbyist known for helping to rehabilitate Saudi Arabia’s image in the wake of 9/11, the murder of Jamal Khashoggi, and famine in Yemen, is now registered as a foreign agent of the Saudi-backed government in Yemen. According to new filings disclosed under the Foreign Agent Registration Act (FARA), Petruzzello and a team of five other lobbyists will provide “strategic communications counsel” and “media and stakeholder relations” services to the Republic of Yemen. In exchange for lobbying services, Petruzzello’s firm Geopolitical Solutions LLC will receive $110,000 per month from the government of one of the world’s poorest countries, ranked dead last in GDP per capita. Specifically, Petruzzello is representing Yemen’s Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), a Saudi-aligned executive committee formed in Riyadh. In 2022, Yemeni President Abd-Rabbo Mansour Hadi delegated power away to the PLC, a group partially based in Riyadh. Unsurprisingly, this move was welcomed by Saudi Arabia, and the PLC remains the kingdom’s primary surrogate in Yemen today. Before becoming a lobbyist for the Saudi-backed government of Yemen last week, Petruzzello was a lobbyist for Saudi Arabia itself since at least 2002. When the Saudi government faced scrutiny in the aftermath of 9/11 over connections between Saudi intelligence and the hijackers, Petruzzello was hired to handle U.S. press relations and to “promote the Kingdom, its commitment to the war against terrorism, peace in the Middle East.” Petruzzello’s work rehabilitating the U.S.-Saudi relationship in the post-9/11 era cemented him as the top Saudi agent in Washington, and although three of the partners at his public relations firm quit in protest of representing Saudi Arabia, Petruzzello kept the kingdom as a client. Petruzzello continued representing the Saudi Arabian government following the murder in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul of Saudi journalist and Washington Post columnist Jamal Khashoggi in 2018. MSL, the parent company of Petruzzello’s public relations firm Qorvis, received over $18 million from Saudi Arabia in the year after the murder. When Saudi Arabia began launching airstrikes on Yemen in 2015 as part of its military intervention, Petruzzello was leading their “go-to PR firm.” Saudi Arabia’s air and sea blockade of Yemen, which has been in place since the intervention began in 2015, has been described by Human Rights Watch as “using starvation as a method of warfare.” Petruzzello remained the kingdom’s top lobbyist throughout the blockade, the resulting famine, and the civil war in Yemen that continues today. As of this month, he also represents Saudi Arabia’s greatest ally in Yemen. In total, Petruzzello’s firms have been paid over $140,000,000 in lobbying fees by the Saudi government since 9/11. According to Democracy for the Arab World Now (DAWN), the advocacy organization founded by Khashoggi, this makes him Saudi Arabia’s highest paid U.S. spokesperson. Raed Jarrar, DAWN’s advocacy director, says that whether Petruzello is lobbying on behalf of the Saudi-backed government in Yemen or Saudi Arabia itself, he is working towards the same goal: Goading the U.S. into deeper involvement in Yemen’s civil war. “Michael Petruzzello spent two decades selling the Saudi war on Yemen to Washington. His firm built the website that put a positive spin on the bombing campaign while the bombs were falling on Yemeni civilians. He ran the messaging that helped Riyadh cover up the murder of Jamal Khashoggi, the man who founded our organization,” Jarrar told Responsible Statecraft in a statement. DAWN has previously called on Petruzzello to drop his firm’s contracts with Saudi Arabia. Petruzzello’s new lobbying contract with the Saudi-aligned PLC became effective on September 14. It comes at a crucial time for both Yemen and Saudi Arabia. Yemen’s Houthi rebels made significant advances against the Saudi-backed government earlier this month. The PLC, through its patron Saudi Arabia, may look to lean on the U.S. to provide arms and aid at this pivotal moment in the civil war. Petruzzello will be a critical intermediary in this dynamic. At the ongoing UN General Assembly in New York, Petruzzello’s lobbying firm hosted “an on-the-record roundtable discussion with senior representatives of the Government of Yemen,” FARA filings reveal. The invite-only event was attended by the Saudi-backed government’s Foreign Minister as well as the Vice President of the Presidential Leadership Council. Topics of discussion include “latest developments in Yemen, Red Sea and maritime security, regional stability, and the broader implications for international commerce and security.” Geopolitical Solutions LLC, the lobbying firm Petruzzello is working for under the new agreement with the Republic of Yemen, did not respond to a request for comment. Saudi Arabia’s latest lobbying push may already be paying off. Last week, the Trump administration approved a $24.3 million sale of F-35s to Saudi Arabia. While this sale is made to Saudi Arabia itself and not to the Saudi-backed government in Yemen, U.S.-manufactured weapons sold to Saudi Arabia historically have made their way to the Kingdom’s allies in Yemen through unofficial channels. Historically, Saudi Arabia has used such equipment to “buy the loyalties” of local militias in the civil war against the Houthis, and U.S.-made armored vehicles have even ended up in the hands of Al Qaeda militias in Yemen. Jarrar reiterates that although the attention of Petruzzello and other lobbyists has shifted from Saudi Arabia to Yemen, they are still pushing the same forever war. “Now the Saudi-backed government in Yemen, a government that survives on Riyadh's subsidies, is paying him $110,000 a month to make the case for a new round of the same war. Nothing about this is new. The client name on the FARA form changed. The paymaster did not. The product did not. Petruzzello is being paid to justify another round of the failed Saudi war on Yemen.” --- ### The Pentagon gets flocked in a no-bid contract. What could go wrong? **Published:** September 25, 2026 | **Author:** Brett Heinz | **Section:** Military Industrial Complex **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/flock-cameras/.md As the headquarters to the U.S. military, the Pentagon is surrounded by billions of dollars worth of surveillance and security technology. These systems provide multiple layers of protection for the building but they also carry a risk of backfiring: any surveillance system that is vulnerable to intruders could potentially provide unauthorized users with details about the activities of the Defense Department (DOD) and its employees. This risk is higher than usual right now because of the decision to install a controversial piece of equipment all over the Pentagon grounds: Flock cameras. There are at least nine Flock automated license plate readers (ALPRs) currently monitoring the traffic lanes used by drivers entering the Pentagon’s parking lots, including many of the DOD’s own employees. The purpose of these cameras is to give the Pentagon’s security forces the ability to automatically record information about incoming vehicles that may pose a security risk. But if the alleged vulnerabilities of Flock cameras are as serious as the company’s critics allege, then this equipment could be exploited to obtain a detailed list of the national security officials seen entering the Pentagon each day. In this way, the Pentagon’s rush to obtain security equipment from private contractors may pose a national security risk of its own. Concerns about the ability of Flock products to track people alongside cars has produced backlash from privacy-minded citizens, resulting in both protests and contract cancellations. Others have criticized Flock’s devices for security vulnerabilities that expose them to unauthorized users, flaws which could be especially dangerous in the context of military facilities. Flock Safety has sought to downplay these issues, insisting that they have “never been hacked.” Critics dispute this claim, pointing to multiple different ways that Flock’s devices can be accessed by unauthorized users. These concerns prompted two members of Congress’ Intelligence committees — Senator Ron Wyden (D-Ore.) and Rep. Raja Krishnamoorthi (D-Ill.) — to write a letter last year asking for an investigation into Flock’s “negligent cybersecurity practices.” The duo alleged that the company “needlessly exposes Americans to the threat of hackers and foreign spies tapping this data.” When asked about the Pentagon’s Flock cameras, Sen. Wyden said that “Installing internet-connected cameras in the Pentagon parking lot is obviously a dumb idea. In particular, given Flock's troubling cybersecurity track record, the Pentagon might as well send the data from those cameras directly to China, Russia and Iran.” --- ### Why South Korea won’t send military to Strait of Hormuz **Published:** September 25, 2026 | **Author:** James Park | **Section:** Asia-Pacific **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/south-korea-iran-war/.md Since the U.S. war against Iran started earlier this year, Washington has pressed its allies in Europe and Asia to “step up” with military aid to help the United States reopen the Strait of Hormuz. Despite persistent pressure from both Trump administration officials and President Donald Trump himself, most U.S. allies have remained reluctant. Those who have chosen to provide support have done so largely in an indirect capacity, such as by permitting limited base access. South Korea has been a major target of that pressure. In August, Trump abruptly announced on social media that Washington will “substantially reduce” U.S.-South Korea joint military exercises, linking the decision to Seoul’s continued refusal to support his war efforts against Iran. Trump’s apparent retaliation alarmed Seoul and sparked a serious debate over whether to deploy its navy to the Strait of Hormuz. At a September 18 press conference, South Korean President Lee Jae-myung answered the question, ruling out sending troops or military assets to the Strait of Hormuz in a way that would involve South Korea in the U.S. war against Iran — while leaving open the possibility of expanding the role of its existing anti-piracy unit in the Middle East to protect South Korean shipping, oil shipments, and citizens. This is a sensible choice for Seoul. Military deployments to the Strait of Hormuz would entail clear, high risks while promising nothing positive in return. Some observers have argued that Seoul should send military assets to protect freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz — it is not simply someone else’s problem but an important economic interest for South Korea. However, the reality is that South Korea sending assistance is unlikely to change the course of the war in Iran or the underlying strategic balance in the Strait of Hormuz. Even if South Korea deploys assets supposedly strictly focused on non-combat missions, once South Korean forces enter an active war zone, the boundary between “support” and “participation” will become difficult to maintain. What begins as a mission to support “freedom of navigation” can prove much harder to control once deployed personnel are exposed to attacks and the risks of deeper entanglement. South Korean public opinion reflects these concerns. A recent survey showed that 52% of South Koreans — and 69% of the ruling Minjoo Party base — oppose deployments to the Strait of Hormuz. This popular sentiment is difficult for Seoul to ignore, especially as Lee’s approval rating has declined in recent months due to economic problems, controversies over new cabinet appointments, and other domestic challenges. Domestic opposition, however, does not always discourage Seoul from accommodating controversial, high-risk strategic demands by Washington. Seoul has done so many times in the past, including sending troops to support the United States in an active war. In 2004, the Roh Moo-hyun administration deployed troops — focused on medical and engineering support — to aid the U.S. war in Iraq, despite considerable public opposition. It was a tough decision for Roh, whose approval rating fell to 25% at one point during the saga. But in the end, Seoul saw an opportunity to advance its core strategic interest: to deepen trust in the alliance and leverage it to influence Washington’s approach toward North Korea. The George W. Bush administration then initially adopted a hawkish policy toward North Korea, including exploring military strikes to set back the North’s nuclear weapons program. But Washington eventually came around to a more diplomatic approach favored by Roh — pursuing dialogue with Pyongyang through Six-Party Talks, rather than relying solely on pressure and coercion. At a glance, today’s situation regarding Iran resembles 2004. There is an active war far from the Korean Peninsula that Washington started unilaterally, and Washington is seeking Seoul’s assistance. And there is a South Korean administration pursuing diplomacy with North Korea and hoping to move Washington in that direction. However, there are clear differences between the two cases that further disincentivize Seoul from making the same choice as in 2004. Obviously, Iran is not Iraq. While Iraq was in no position to seriously resist U.S. military forces, Iran actually has a serious ability to impose costs in the Strait of Hormuz and beyond. South Korea also has long-term economic, energy security, and diplomatic interests in avoiding an adversarial relationship with Iran. Moreover, unlike Roh, Lee is not dealing with a White House that formally designated North Korea as “evil” and was inherently pessimistic about diplomacy. Trump has already met with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un three times and has shown through words and deeds that he considers Kim a genuine diplomatic counterpart. What Seoul needs from Washington now is not a mere interest in dialogue with Pyongyang. It is serious rethinking of U.S. policy toward North Korea. As Lee underscored in a recent New York Times interview, Pyongyang will likely continue to reject dialogue unless it sees fundamental reductions of hostility in the U.S. approach to North Korea through concrete policy changes — including easing sanctions and prioritizing coexistence with a nuclear North Korea over denuclearization. The dilemma for Seoul is whether it can count on Trump to undertake such a major policy reform through careful alliance coordination. If Seoul had enough confidence in Trump as an alliance manager, the scenario of leveraging a South Korean military deployment to the Strait of Hormuz to influence Trump on North Korea might be more worth considering. However, Trump is far from a trustworthy alliance manager, and that makes it harder for Seoul to be as risk-accepting as it was in 2004. In 2004, Seoul had a relatively predictable, conventional U.S. administration as a counterpart. Seasoned policy professionals were in charge of alliance coordination. Today, Seoul is dealing with Trump, who views allies predominantly as free riders — to whom Washington has sacrificed far too much without receiving anything meaningful in return — rather than key partners pursuing shared objectives. For Trump, alliance coordination is largely meaningless; he routinely makes unilateral “surprise” announcements about key alliance issues on social media without consultation, and can change his mind overnight on any policy decisions or diplomatic agreements. In sum, South Korea deploying its military to support the U.S. war against Iran is simply too dangerous a gamble. The risks of becoming more deeply entangled in a war whose geographical scope has expanded over the past seven months are high and very real, and the upsides are uncertain at best, perhaps even non-existent. From a rational strategic standpoint, it is more than understandable that Seoul has decided to rule out such a deployment. --- ### The US kill count in Iran makes the phrase ‘precision strikes’ absurd **Published:** September 25, 2026 | **Author:** Martin Di Caro | **Section:** Middle East **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/precision-strikes-iran-civilians/.md When the U.S.-Israeli war on Iran ultimately ends, it will be remembered for its bloody onset. On the same day airstrikes killed the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in Tehran, a U.S. missile incinerated an elementary school in Minab, killing 123 children and dozens of others. Some 250 miles away, U.S. missiles fell on a residential area of Lamerd, killing 21 civilians, including five children. Neither the White House nor Pentagon has publicly admitted responsibility in either incident, although an internal review reportedly determined Minab was hit by a U.S. missile. An independent, international fact-finding mission found “reasonable grounds to believe that the United States committed a war crime by launching indiscriminate attacks that killed or injured civilians or damaged civilian objects.” Mistaken attacks and official denials have become a norm in the “global war on terrorism,” fought with “precision weapons” by remote military personnel often using faulty intelligence. In Iran, the Trump administration also conducted “dual-use” targeting and “double-tap” airstrikes, further endangering civilians and wrecking civilian infrastructure. Although there are no official totals, the Human Rights Activists News Agency said in April that it had documented 1,701 civilian fatalities due to "airstrikes and impact damage on hospitals, emergency medical facilities, primary schools, universities, water desalination plants, power plants, civilian airports, places of worship, UNESCO World Heritage Sites, and countless densely populated residential areas." To understand why the innocent continue to die under U.S. bombs, I spoke to The New York Times journalist Azmat Khan, whose Pulitzer Prize-winning work revealed deadly patterns of failure and a system of opacity and impunity in America’s air wars. Our conversation has been edited for length and clarity. Martin Di Caro: During the most intense period of the U.S. bombing of Iran, did you notice the same problems that you uncovered in your past investigative work? Azmat Khan: Yes, I saw the same problems over and over. One of the biggest was the misidentification of civilians. The distinction between civilians and combatants is supposed to be one of the pillars of targeting. On the very first day, the United States hit the girls’ school in Iran. Early reports suggested the military used poor or outdated intelligence, didn’t bother to look at open-source evidence, and failed to detect the presence of civilians. These are all things that I saw over and over again which the military was unaware of. So, for example, in their own data, they found that misidentification occurred in about 4 percent of civilian casualty cases. When I analyzed them, I found that misidentification caused about one-third of the civilian casualties. Just this month, on September 1, the U.S. hit a wedding gathering when the intended target may have been something nearby. I’ve seen that happen again and again, and often it was the result of confirmation bias, being predisposed to believing that everything is a target, even an ordinary action. For example, someone opening a gate will be seen as an ISIS tactic. In my previous reporting I found that didn't have enough drone surveillance video because they were working at such an intense pace. The Iran war exceeded previous bombing campaigns in its pace, scale, and intensity. So, of course you’re going to have the same problems endemic to the targeting system, but at a greater rate with far less accountability. Di Caro: What about an overreliance on AI? Khan: To use AI in any form of targeting means utilizing an already flawed data set, even if you have a human vetting it. The result is a system of impunity with a lack of accountability. And unless you're on the ground and investigating the target sites yourself, unless you're putting in the resources, time, and effort to understand what went wrong and why, you're never going to catch these kinds of mistakes. And can you really call these “mistakes” when they are repeated over and over, and go unaddressed? Can they be war crimes? This is something Oona Hathaway and I question in a law review article called “‘Mistakes’ in War.” Di Caro: On the subject of transparency and accountability, what do you make of Secretary of Defense Hegseth’s decision to eliminate the Pentagon’s Civilian Harm Mitigation office? Khan: Of course it’s contributing to the problem. That office was helping review civilian casualty assessments, largely because the rest of the Pentagon was so understaffed. So even after it had been gutted, the office was still helping with this. Even before the Iran war, during the bombing of Yemen in 2025, the U.S. stopped releasing strike-tracking data that is normally disseminated to the public. So there is less transparency, along with fewer people qualified and trained in assessing civilian harm. Di Caro: Let’s talk about the use of new weapons. For instance, on the same day the Minab school girls were killed, PrSM missiles killed 21 civilians in Lamerd, Iran, according to a report you co-wrote in The New York Times. That weapon had never been used in combat. The Pentagon always says it does not target civilians. But a missile that explodes above the target and sprays 1,800 tungsten pellets in all directions seems to be designed to kill as many people as possible. Khan: Precision Strike Missile (PrSM) is an ironic name, because it pushes out the tungsten pellets. Sometimes weapons are given intentionally misleading names, things designed to give you certainty, clarity, or comfort when using them. This missile is new to combat. We know because there happened to be CCTV footage from the top of one of the buildings that showed the missile landing, which is rare. What were they trying to target and what went wrong? We don't have those answers. The Pentagon has not released its investigation. In fact, when The Times’ visual investigations team identified it as a U.S. missile, the military tried to suggest Iran was responsible. That was not true. It was a deliberate lie. And there is no transparency about using an untested weapon that, according to my sources, has a high fail rate. The U.S. Army just awarded Lockheed Martin a $1.2 billion contract that includes more Precision Strike Missiles. Di Caro: The Pentagon has admitted to targeting civilian infrastructure in Iran, but under the rubric of “dual use,” meaning the facility might also have some military function. Khan: Under the laws of war and civilian protection, civilian objects like hospitals or critical infrastructure are off limits. Dual-use targeting emerged during the Gulf War. It was invented by the United States and propagated by Israel. Both countries have really advanced dual-use targeting, and in a densely-populated urban environment the dual-use doctrine can be used against almost anything because non-state actors are known to embed themselves in civilian populations. This is a real crisis. If it were applied against the United States the way the United States applies it in the world, a tower that houses businesses that do work for the U.S. government would be targetable — not with all the people in it, but the structure itself. So there are questions about the evidence used to prove that a target is used by the enemy’s military. You know, to what extent does the enemy need to use it? Di Caro: It seems like an excuse to destroy as much civilian infrastructure as possible. Khan: Well, the president of the United States openly said the intent was to destroy Iran, which is not even meeting the pretense of the dual-use doctrine. Di Caro: An investigation by New Lines Magazine found that the United States also conducted “double-tap strikes” in Iran. They also seemed designed to harm civilians. Khan: Double-tap strikes often happen when rescuers are trying to get to the wounded from the initial airstrike. I've seen them in every war I've investigated. You will hear two main justifications for them. did not consider the people running toward the bombing site rescuers. They were militants coming to aid their brethren. the military claims the target was obscured — that there was a cloud of smoke — so they hit it twice because it didn't appear that the target was damaged the first time. They couldn’t see rescuers or relatives rushing to the scene. There are so many cases in which classified people attempting to make their way to the scene to rescue others as combatants. If the Pentagon has already misidentified the target, then the military won’t suddenly realize that those people are locals who live nearby. It got to the point where locals would tell others not to try to rescue the wounded. I know a young man who wanted to reach his father and was held back. He watched his father burn to death because he would have been killed too. Di Caro: Where was that? Khan: In Mosul, Iraq. There’ve been many cases where the official claim that someone was a member of ISIS or belonged to Hamas felt quite disingenuous after I looked at the surveillance footage. I’ve seen videos of double-tap strikes in Gaza, for example, where you can clearly see a child who's been injured, people coming to help that child, and then another airstrike. Di Caro: As you’ve reported, a supposed benefit of relying on so-called precision air strikes is that the U.S. can eliminate its enemies without deploying boots on the ground. But the promise of fighting clean, sanitized wars was a lie, wasn’t it? It’s not clean and sanitized for the people on the receiving end of U.S. airstrikes. Khan: It's a good thing when fewer American soldiers are dying but the U.S. has shifted the costs, the human costs of its wars, to either partner forces on the ground or to the local population. For some in the United States, especially policymakers, they might view that as convenient because the political costs of war have gone down. Historically speaking, American soldier deaths are one of the driving forces of anti-war movements and accountability… But I would argue that things are changing especially among the younger generations in the United States. Younger people that see foreign civilians being killed, maimed, murdered, slaughtered, and child amputees at the highest rates in the world — they don't think of them as just some foreign other. They think of them as humans just like you and me. That's different, and it’s a political constraint. It has resulted in organizing, activism, and broad discontent among the American public about not just the wars the U.S. wages, but the countries to which the U.S. sells weapons and enables to wage these wars. The cost to foreign civilians is not something you can hide. --- ### ‘The Dragon’ defined: How three capitals reimagined China **Published:** September 24, 2026 | **Author:** Joseph Solis-Mullen | **Section:** Asia-Pacific **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/us-china-competition-book/.md Few things better illustrate how charged the American debate over China has become than the reaction to Jennifer Kavanagh’s recent proposal for a radically different U.S. military posture in Asia. Kavanagh, a senior fellow at Defense Priorities, has argued that Washington should pull most of its forces back from the “first island chain,” which includes Taiwan and the Philippines, toward the more defensible “second island chain,” while narrowing its defense commitments to regional allies and eschewing any commitment to defend Taiwan. The proposal prompted a sharp backlash from analysts and commentators, with some flinging accusations that Kavanagh and her colleagues are “fifth columnists.” The episode raises a larger question: how did the American debate over China become so intensely focused on strategic competition – and so resistant to arguments for restraint? David M. McCourt’s "The Dragon Defined: How Washington, Canberra, and London Reimagined China" is an unusually illuminating account of how China came to be understood as a strategic competitor in the United States, Australia, and the United Kingdom. A professor of sociology at the University of California, Davis, McCourt draws on more than 250 interviews with diplomats, strategists, academics, and other participants in the foreign-policy communities of the three countries to provide a rich, transnational account of great help to those seeking to understand the debate surrounding the rise of China. As McCourt puts it in the preface, “There is no single, real China, only numerous aspects – some inviting, others threatening. What leaders and elites see is largely a reflection of themselves: their hopes and fears for their countries domestically and on the world stage.” It is an apt summary of a sociologist’s perspective – and an especially useful one given the book’s subject: the production and circulation of elite knowledge. China, in McCourt’s telling, is both an empirical object and a kind of mirror. Its actual behavior matters, but so too do the institutions, professional incentives, domestic political struggles, and national self-conceptions through which that behavior is interpreted. This helps explain the striking transformation McCourt documents. In the 1990s, Washington approached China with considerable confidence that American power and engagement could shape the direction of its rise. By the mid-2010s, that confidence had given way to what McCourt describes as “an insecure, anxious, even fearful US hegemon facing a risen China that has become a near-peer challenger.” The shift from engagement to strategic competition was consequently not simply a response to an objective change in China. It was also a change in the way American elites understood the United States and its place in the world. ⁠ McCourt focuses on the institutions where foreign-policy knowledge is made – government agencies, think tanks, universities, journalism, and the business community – and, crucially, the individuals who inhabit them. American readers will recognize many of the names: AEI, CSIS, government agencies, prominent China scholars, journalists, and the revolving door connecting all of them. But McCourt’s comparative approach makes the equivalent institutions in Britain and Australia equally familiar and their relationships intelligible, including Chatham House, the Lowy Institute, the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, the SOAS China Institute, and the Australian Institute of International Affairs. For an American reader, the most revealing story is what happened inside Washington. The shift away from engagement did not begin with a single administration, nor did it happen because everyone suddenly reached the same conclusion about China. For decades, American policy had rested in part on an expectation that economic development, integration into international institutions, and the growth of a Chinese middle class would produce some degree of political liberalization and convergence. McCourt shows that this expectation was never universally shared. The U.S. military, in particular, had long maintained a more skeptical view of China. As one military analyst told McCourt, his organization had “stayed in the same place” while the rest of the China field had “recently ‘come to us.’” The rise of strategic competition was therefore not simply the triumph of a new idea; in important respects, it was the movement of one longstanding interpretation of China from the margins of the policy community toward its center. A look at the beginning of the George W. Bush administration illustrates the point nicely. Before September 11, 2001, Bush described China as a “strategic competitor.” Of course, the terrorist attacks and the wars that followed redirected American strategic attention elsewhere for years. China did not disappear as a concern, but the question of how to manage its rise drew less attention. When great-power competition returned to the center of U.S. strategy, some of this skepticism reemerged. The assumptions underpinning engagement became increasingly difficult to sustain. Economic growth had produced a much more powerful China, but not the political transformation many American policymakers had anticipated. President Xi Jinping’s consolidation of power, Beijing’s more assertive foreign policy, concerns about technology and economic dependence, human-rights abuses, and fears about the balance of power in East Asia all contributed to a growing sense that the old approach had failed. McCourt is especially interested in what happened to the people whose professional identities had been built around the older paradigm. One former Engager describes the pressure bluntly: in Washington, “You’re here because you want to influence policy,” which means asking, “how do I stay credible?” The choice, as he put it, was whether to “adjust myself to the metanarrative” or become “a voice in the wilderness.” McCourt’s interviews suggest careerism was not incidental to the production of China knowledge. Scholars, analysts, journalists, and think-tank experts had to connect their work to the concerns of policymakers – and the definition of what counted as relevant policy expertise was itself changing. At the same time, institutions with reasons to oppose engagement were becoming more influential. The military was hardly alone: hawkish think tanks and national-security officials had long challenged the assumptions of engagement, while parts of the business community became disillusioned with the expectation of an endlessly expanding “China market.” Politicians and strategists from across the political spectrum increasingly emphasized different aspects of the same emerging problem: China’s challenge to American power, its political system, its economic practices, or the security of the U.S.-led order in Asia. Figures such as Kurt Campbell, Ely Ratner, Robert Blackwill, Robert Work, Matthew Pottinger, and Elbridge Colby occupied different positions in this evolving debate, but the larger shift was institutional. By the early 2020s, the proposition that engagement had failed had hardened into a premise of Washington discourse, even as scholars and former Engagers, such as Michael Swaine and J. Stapleton Roy, continued to dispute the historical record. This is where McCourt’s comparative cases become particularly instructive. Australia, for example, complicates the assumption that ideas about China simply flow from Washington outward. McCourt shows how Australian analysts and officials helped strengthen arguments that subsequently gained traction among American skeptics of engagement, while initiatives such as the Indo-Pacific concept and AUKUS demonstrate that allies can also shape American strategic thinking. The point is not that any one of these actors “caused” America to become hawkish on China. It is that the American understanding of China emerged from a field of institutions and individuals whose interests, experiences, and assumptions were changing at the same time. McCourt’s field theory provides a useful way of understanding these developments without requiring either conspiracy or simplistic material determinism. Individuals occupying similar institutional positions, exposed to similar incentives and professional networks, can come to remarkably similar conclusions. Conversely, individuals situated differently can interpret the same Chinese actions in radically different ways. That is perhaps the greatest contribution of "The Dragon Defined." It does not require the reader to accept any particular interpretation of China in order to appreciate the importance of understanding how interpretations of China are made. For anyone interested in the origins of the contemporary turn from engagement toward strategic competition, McCourt has produced an exceptionally rich account. Its many individual case studies and interviews resist easy summary, and the comparative perspective makes the book considerably more illuminating than a study focused exclusively on Washington. Whatever position one takes on China, American grand strategy, or the wisdom of strategic competition, "The Dragon Defined" offers an important reminder: before asking what China is, it is worth asking who is doing the defining – and why. --- ### Desperate Republicans are jumping Trump's war ship of doom **Published:** September 24, 2026 | **Author:** Jack Hunter | **Section:** Washington Politics **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/republicans-midterms-war/.md “The war with Iran needs to end and end quickly.” These were the unexpected words spoken Monday by former congressman and current Michigan Republican Senate candidate Mike Rogers, who The Nation’s Jeet Heer has described as “not just an ardent supporter of this particular war but, more generally, a mega-hawk who has pushed for war with Iran for more than 20 years.” Why the sudden change? Rogers said that if the war ends, “energy costs will plummet…but Michigan families can’t afford to wait for that to happen. We need to do something now.” Rogers’ sudden economic concern and antiwar stance might have something to do with the fact that he is currently trailing his Democratic opponent Abdul El-Sayed by seven points in a new Suffolk University Poll. El-Sayed has called Rogers “the worst of the neocon version” of Republicans. “When inveterate war hawk Mike Rogers suddenly declares, ‘The war in Iran needs to end—and end quickly,’ you know he’s losing—and losing badly,” former Republican Michigan congressman Justin Amash wrote Monday on X. Rogers is not the only Republican now running from the war – and Trump — amid a tumultuous midterm season for the GOP. The generic ballot polling average at Real Clear Politics has Democrats ahead by 8.5 points. “Iowans are being squeezed and shouldn’t have to foot the bill at the pump or the checkout line for the war in Iran,” Republican congresswoman and Iowa Senate candidate Ashley Hinson (R-Iowa) wrote Monday. “We need to use every option at our disposal to provide some relief from high prices.” Hinson is behind her Democratic opponent Josh Turek by eight points in a recent Marist poll. Turek responded that “it's easy to send a tweet but when you had the chance to vote to end this war, you chose not to. You voted seven times to continue it, including just last week.” “It's time to actually end the forever wars and put Iowa and Iowans first,” Turek said. Community notes found that Hinson had at least four opportunities to vote to end the war but did not. “Ashley Hinson out with a statement whining and crying about the consequences of the war she supported,” observed Drop Site News’ Ryan Grim. “If you read far enough in, you find she’s calling for an end to it. But just last week the House voted on a war powers resolution to end the war and she voted against it.” “Polls have her losing her senate race in Iowa,” he added. According to The Hill on Thursday morning, Sen. Thom Tillis (R-N.C.) "now says he will vote for the war powers resolution directing Trump to end the conflict." This is a stunning reversal. The vote is scheduled for Thursday. The Senate has passed War Powers resolutions this year but without Tillis and Senate leadership on board. “We’re reaching a point to where we just need answers. We got to know what success looks like,” Tillis said told the newspaper. “We don’t know how long it’s going to go. So we’re afraid it could be a forever war. It’s a war that’s obviously hurting people economically. Why are we doing this? What is the goal?” Republican Congressman and current Florida gubernatorial candidate Byron Donalds (R-Fla.) has been a loyal Trump supporter and said previously that the U.S. war on Iran means “fighting for America.” On Tuesday, the Miami Herald reported that Donalds’ campaign website has scrubbed several references to President Donald Trump, who had endorsed him. A button to “Chip in to Support Trump Endorsed Byron Donalds” at the top of the Republican candidate’s homepage was removed, as was text reading, “TRUMP-ENDORSED Proven Conservative Fighter BYRON DONALDS” and some other Trump messaging. A photo of Donalds with Trump remains on the donation page as do donate boxes that reference the Trump endorsement. Recent polls have shown Donalds in a dead heat with Democratic opponent David Jolly. Another pro-Trump Republican gubernatorial candidate, Wisconsin’s Tom Tiffany (R-Wis.), told reporters on Tuesday that he believes "we should be exiting Iran, that it's time to move on...time to come home, take care of business here in America." The latest poll showed Democratic rival David Crowley slightly ahead of Tiffany. “No matter how hard he tries to run from it, Tom Tiffany voted five times to continue Trump’s war in Iran,” Crowley said in a reply to his opponent’s call to end the war. A new CNN poll published Tuesday showed that almost two-thirds of Americans don’t believe the US is winning in Iran and also don’t believe the president is doing much to end it. The poll also revealed that much of this continuing decline is coming from Republicans. While Democrats and independents have been negative throughout the war, a 73% Republican approval rating of Trump’s handling of the Iran conflict in March has now dropped to 60%. For Republicans under 45, 53% disapprove. An Economist/YouGov poll released Tuesday also showed that a majority of Americans favor impeaching Secretary of War Pete Hegseth “for starting a war with Iran without authorization by Congress.” Donald Trump’s approval ratings continue to sink to record lows, particularly on the economy. This president, this war, and his economy could be a losing combination for Republicans facing tough races and many seem to know it. Trump said earlier this month that the midterm election results will not affect how he conducts the U.S. conflict in Iran, and insists that the results will not be an indictment of him or the war because he’s “not running.” Sure, Mr. President. But it appears that for many voters, and some of your own party’s candidates, you might be the only one running. This story has been updated --- ### Lifestyles of the rich & famous ‘Lords of War’ **Published:** September 24, 2026 | **Author:** Ben Freeman | **Section:** Military Industrial Complex **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/lords-of-war/.md This article is co-published in partnership with The Intercept For the first time, the Pentagon budget topped $1 trillion and private contractors now receive more than half of all the tax dollars flowing to the Pentagon. Few have profited from this privatization of the U.S. military more than the CEOs of Pentagon contractors. While these companies often advertise their work as supporting the troops, the fact is that many servicemembers live in appalling housing conditions, while military-industrial contractors’ profits soar and their CEOs live in luxury. The lavish lifestyles of these CEOs is laid bare in the new mockumentary “Lords of War,” co-produced by the Quincy Institute and The Intercept. The short film pulls no punches as it lampoons an industry held aloft by hundreds of billions of public funds every year. “Lords of War” connects exorbitant Pentagon spending to the luxury enjoyed by the CEOs of its top contractors. As the film notes, Lockheed Martin is regularly the largest recipient of Pentagon contracts, raking in $75 billion in revenue in 2025 — more than 72% of which came from the U.S. government. As Lords of War’s faux real estate aficionado explains, Lockheed’s CEOs have used their $20-plus-million-dollar compensation packages to buy luxury real estate from the D.C. suburbs to the shores of Miami. Despite its care-free tone, the film highlights very real problems within the military-industrial complex. As research by William Hartung and Stephen Semler for Brown’s Costs of War Project showed, 54% of the Pentagon’s annual spending now goes to private contractors — up from 41% in the 1990s. The top Pentagon contractors’ revenues and stock prices also skyrocketed as they’ve begun to devour an ever-larger share of the military budget. They converted their revenue from the military into line-items on their own budgets that do nothing to improve U.S. national security. They hired armies of lobbyists that now outnumber all members of Congress by a nearly two-to-one margin; billions of dollars in stock buybacks; and, of-course, CEO compensation packages on par with those of NFL quarterbacks. The contrast of these CEOs’ rock-star lifestyles — Lords of War reveals that one chief executive bought pop star Lenny Kravitz’s Miami mansion — with those of the military servicemembers they purport to serve is striking. As the film notes, Lockheed Martin’s CEO, Marilyn Hewson, received $33.7 million in compensation in 2015, which is more than 150 times as much as the average compensation package for an enlisted servicemember. While Hewson and other Pentagon contractor CEOs have been buying-up mansions, the basic pay of servicemembers has been relatively stagnant for the past 20 years when controlling for inflation. Worse, the conditions servicemembers have been living in are deteriorating. A 2024 report from the Government Accountability Office found that two-thirds of servicemembers think their housing is unaffordable. And servicemembers often face “long commutes, leave families behind in other states, and work 2 jobs to afford housing,” according to the GAO report. A July 2026 Senate investigation, meanwhile, revealed dangerous living conditions at military bases in Georgia, including “reports of lead exposure affecting newborn health, severe mold contamination leading to emergency room visits, flooding in living areas, and more.” Wartime environments have been no better, as evidenced by the deplorable conditions — including food shortages and inoperable plumbing — during the U.S.S. Abraham Lincoln’s extended deployment near Iran, which ultimately led multiple sailors to attempt to jump overboard. Unfortunately, it’s your tax dollars that are paying for this gaping chasm between the lives of contractor CEOs and the troops. As one of the stars of Lords of War notes in a quick cut that seamlessly blends the rabid patriotism of a Top Gun montage with the horrors inflicted in Gaza, “It’s thanks to your generosity in the form of tax dollars that these illustrious executives are on the case.” “Lords of War” is one of the few films about the military-industrial complex that you find hilarious, but its subject is no laughing matter. The private firms we’re entrusting with U.S. national security are doing more to defend their own share prices than they are to defend the nation. If we keep trusting this broken system to keep us safe, then, ultimately, the joke is on us. --- ### In Red Sea crisis, Somaliland seizes leverage for US recognition **Published:** September 23, 2026 | **Author:** Dan M. Ford | **Section:** Africa **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/somaliland-us-recognition-iran-war/.md The president of Somaliland took advantage of the geopolitical and global economic turmoil caused by the Iran War to visit Washington this week in an effort to advocate for American recognition of Somaliland and for the deepening of economic ties between the two. President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi, known as Irro, made a public appearance at the Hudson Institute on September 14, where he argued that his country’s three-and-a-half decade run as a secure, self-governing actor warranted recognition from the United States. Irro also said that, although he’s “not a geologist,” experts tell him his country has “everything” the U.S. could want in terms of critical minerals, which he’d be happy to provide the U.S. in exchange for deeper relations. A self-proclaimed sovereign country widely considered to be part of Somalia by the international community, Somaliland has for decades struggled to gain recognition on the international stage. But Israel’s unexpected decision in December 2025 to be the first government in the world to recognize Somaliland as an independent state has raised questions about which other countries might follow suit. Somaliland denies that recognition came as part of a quid-pro-quo arrangement, but, shortly after the recognition, it was reported that Somaliland will be forming a security partnership with Israel, potentially including offering the Israelis military access to its territory. If there was ever a moment for Somaliland officials to make the case for recognition, now is indeed the time. Somaliland sits in one of the world’s most geostrategically significant locations. With roughly 530 miles of coastline along the Gulf of Aden — which connects to the Red Sea through the vitally important Bab el-Mandeb Strait — Somaliland is at the heart of a crucial shipping route and on the edge of the expansive battlefield of the Iran War. Somaliland’s major port city of Berbera is located just across the Gulf from the Yemeni coast, putting Somaliland’s major economic engine within striking distance of potential Houthi attacks. The Houthi rebels — an Iran-aligned militant group fighting the Yemeni government and its Saudi backers in Yemen’s devastating civil war — have played a major role in expanding the footprint of the ongoing Iran War. The Houthis have repeatedly targeted ships traversing the Red Sea as well as energy and logistics infrastructure in Saudi Arabia. Their stunning gains along Yemen’s southwest coast in recent weeks — including the capture of the major port city of Mocha, near Bab el-Mandeb — mean the Houthis are increasingly in control of the Yemeni coastline along the strait, which gives the group added leverage. Indeed, if a lasting peace deal remains elusive, Iran could aim to use the Houthis’ position to effectively shut down shipping through Bab el-Mandeb, which is only about 18 miles wide at its narrowest point. This would essentially mirror the Iranian strategy on the Strait of Hormuz, which sits on the other side of the Arabian Peninsula. By shutting down shipping through both Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb, the Iranians and their allies would essentially bring to a halt nearly all sea trade connecting the Middle East to the Indian Ocean, worsening the ongoing global supply shock, especially as it relates to energy. The greater the pain on the world’s pocketbook, the greater the likelihood, the Iranians believe, that pressure will mount to a point where the United States and Israel have no choice but to negotiate an honest end to the war. Irro’s argument for recognition is straightforward. Somaliland has been operating as a functional and relatively secure country since claiming independence from Somalia in 1991. It has its own military and police force, and has a coast guard that patrols its waters along the Gulf of Aden, defending against potential threats from pirates and other nefarious actors on the seas. In an appeal to traditional Western appreciation for democracy, Irro argues that Somaliland’s ability to hold consistent (though often delayed) elections is another indicator of its ability to govern well. But the Hudson Institute appearance was unsteady. Irro, aged 70, giggled seemingly uncontrollably throughout, and struggled to articulate a vision for the broader region. At one point, he compared neighboring Sudan to Venezuela, saying — like the Latin American country — Sudan is “too far away” from Somaliland for him to provide an opinion on its civil war, despite the fact that the two are only about 460 miles apart. Cameron Hudson, a former U.S. intelligence official specializing in Africa, said on X that Irro “did himself and his country a major disservice by being unprepared or incapable of being able to respond convincingly to serious topics that will determine his country’s future. It was like watching an African Biden.” Last Tuesday, Irro held a breakfast with a bipartisan group of members of Congress from both chambers as well as a group of ambassadors. The president also met individually with several members of Congress, including Sen. Ted Cruz (R-Tex.), Rep. John Rose (R-Tenn.) and Rep. John Moolenaar (R-Mich.), with whom he reportedly discussed a wide variety of issues pertaining to security, trade, and investment. In addition to meeting with American officials, Irro met with members of the Israeli embassy in Washington, including the country’s ambassador. Ever since Trump took office, Somaliland has seen an opportunity to push for American recognition. Last year, the breakaway state offered the United States the opportunity to open up a military base along its Gulf coast in exchange for recognition, which the Trump administration reportedly seriously considered. Ultimately, though, concern over how such recognition would complicate U.S. relations with nearby governments in the region ultimately dissuaded the American president from agreeing to the arrangement. Such recognition would also hurt American relations with Somalia, which remains a major counterterrorism partner in the fight against the al-Qaeda affiliate al-Shabaab. Nevertheless, American military presence in the region appears to be growing. Recent reporting suggests the U.S. has sent military personnel to Somaliland’s eastern neighbor Puntland, another region claiming independence from Somalia. Despite a fraying federal system and deep insecurity, Somalia is still a member of both the African Union and Arab League, allowing it to maintain close ties with its regional neighbors. U.S. recognition of Somaliland would risk hurting American relations with this broad base of countries across the Middle East and Africa. In terms of what Somaliland is willing to provide the U.S. for recognition (or at least for enhanced relations), Irro told Semafor he would consider offering greater military access — including potentially building a military base (as he has offered before) — as well as access to the country’s deep resources. In an appeal directed right at Trump, Irro also suggested the possibility of naming the airport in the major port city of Berbera, which has one of the longest runways on the continent, after the American president. Still, it’ll be a challenge for Somaliland’s leadership to persuade the United States to recognize it while Somalia remains an American partner in counterterrorism activity, and while the wider regional community opposes Somaliland’s independence. But if either of these factors change, and if the Gulf region remains a hotbed for conflict, global geopolitical and military positioning will, at the very least, keep the conversation going. --- ### More money for Iran war? This rigmarole won't wash **Published:** September 23, 2026 | **Author:** Mark Thompson | **Section:** Military Industrial Complex **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/military-spending-iran-war/.md The Bunker appears originally at the Project on Government Oversight and is republished here with permission. You shouldn’t go to war without the backing of the U.S. Congress. President Donald Trump is learning that the hard way, as his — not our — six-month-and-counting “little excursion” and “small potatoes” Iranian quagmire drags on. And you don’t build weapons for tomorrow’s wars — especially the ones you say are critical to future victories (remember them?) — using the parliamentary peek-a-boo prestidigitation known as reconciliation. In both instances, Trump is seeking big changes in U.S. national security as unilaterally as possible, with minimal congressional backing. Reconciliation is a controversial process to fund programs. It doesn’t have to follow the standard congressional appropriation rules. Most critically, reconciliation bills aren’t subject to a Senate filibuster. That means they can pass the so-called upper house with a simple majority vote, instead of the 60 votes needed to overcome a filibuster. Predictably, that too often leads to rickety resourcing and reversed reckonings when the other political party takes over. “Unfortunately, reconciliation is becoming a hallmark of the slow but steady degradation of Congress,” Dylan Hedtler-Gaudette, Director of Advocacy here at the Project On Government Oversight, says. “It has also become a tantalizing tool for the Pentagon in its never-ending quest to throw good money after bad, to the tune of hundreds of billions above and beyond what a complicit Congress already showers them with each year.” And while you can begin a war with a surprise attack, you can’t build weapons that way. Yet Trump is trying to employ this reconciliation rigmarole in his proposed 2027 defense budget for arguably his two top military priorities — his “Golden Dome” aerial shield, and his wholesale push to develop sky-darkening fleets of drones: — The Pentagon is seeking $17.9 billion for Golden Dome next year, but only $400 million (2.2%) is in its official budget request. — The Pentagon’s drone-centric Defense Autonomous Working Group (DAWG) is asking for $54.6 billion in 2027, but only $1 billion (1.8%) is in the Defense Department’s official base budget request. While it looks like Congress will eventually approve Trump’s bloatacious $1.1 trillion defense budget, the separate $350 billion reconciliation proposal appears to be going down in flames (the combined $1.45 trillion top line represents an incredible 44% boost over this year’s budget). Yet it’s that threat to the $350 billion that’s got the generals in charge of those two programs sounding the alarm. “If they don’t figure it out, there is no Golden Dome because there is no funding,” Space Force General Michael Guetlein, chief of the space-shield effort, said flatly last month. Army Lieutenant General Steven Marks (PDF) told a defense-industry confab September 9 that his DAWG drone programs will lose their “momentum” if they don’t get at least some of the $53.6 billion plus-up requested. Marks warned that potential U.S. foes “can take a $100,000 drone and conduct an attack against a $2 billion vessel,” but declined to elaborate on potential funding cuts. “Unfortunately, all of our systems are all classified,” he said, “and so I will not be talking in detail about those.” Well, here’s a safe bet that’s not secret. The Pentagon will not get much, if any, of its $350 billion reconciliation bonus. That will force it to cut key operations and maintenance accounts, assuming it wants to keep Golden Dome and its drone programs humming. And those cuts in O&M — training, fuel, parts, and all the other humdrum items that hone a force’s fighting edge — will dull the readiness of the U.S. military. Bottom line: U.S. national security needs to be built on solid bipartisan bedrock, and not the ever-shifting sands of fleeting political advantage. --- ### A Trump-Zelensky meeting and another exercise in futility **Published:** September 23, 2026 | **Author:** Ian Proud | **Section:** Europe **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/zelensky-trump-un-meeting/.md President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine met President Donald Trump for a brief 40 minutes on the sidelines of the U.N. General Assembly meeting in New York on Tuesday. According to reports, both looked optimistic and shared comments to that end. “I hope we will end this war, and President Trump will help us end this war,” Zelensky said during the meeting. “I think we need to do this as quick as possible — before winter.” According to the New York Times, “the U.S. president nodded and repeated his words with approval.” But a closer look reveals that there was no breakthrough, just more suggestions that a face-to-face meeting between Zelensky and Russian President Vladimir Putin might be on the horizon. Although both expressed a desire to see the war end, there is little evidence that it will. Right now, all the big foreign policy tickets in town make Trump look like a failure. If he wants to roll into the midterms with a fighting chance of avoiding the loss of both chambers, then something has got to give. While I believe his intentions to be sincere, he has failed to bring peace to Ukraine, despite saying he would do so within 24 hours. His war of choice in Iran has made the U.S. military look weak and left the global economy staggering towards a depression. Moreover, the late Lindsey Graham bequeathed to him the hot potato of risking another tariff war against China and India just weeks before the midterms. In the face of resistance from Zelensky and his European sponsors,Trump has been flailing when it comes to muscling through a peace deal for Ukraine. Indeed, in the teeth of rising diesel prices, he has begged Zelensky not to bomb Russian oil refineries. His entreaties have fallen on deaf ears. At the presser after their meeting, Zelensky suggested that the issue wasn’t discussed. The Ukraine war is stuck in a retaliation loop in which Russia will always respond in kind to Ukraine’s attacks on its infrastructure.The only difference is that Russia has the strategic capabilities, specifically the economic weight, readily available energy, deep industrial base, and population size to continue slugging away for much longer than Ukraine. Because of this, Ukraine’s energy infrastructure will once more get battered by massive strikes over the winter months. Hot on the heels of the September Yalta Economic Security Conference in Kyiv, Zelensky wants one thing: continued Western support – weapons and money — to keep fighting at least through to April 2026. That is foolhardy in the extreme. Trump cannot will the U.S. defense industrial sector to produce more interceptors overnight. America has burned through 80% of its THAAD stock since the Iran war started, as well as two-thirds of its own Patriots. While Trump touched on the idea of an energy ceasefire in his meeting with Zelensky, it is unlikely that Russia will get on board. Disrupting Muscovites’ access to gasoline is far less damaging politically than starving people in Ukrainian cities of heat and light. Why would Russia agree to give Zelensky some winter respite only for Ukraine to come out swinging again in the spring? Pause and reload has become predictable. Moreover, Trump seems unable to extricate himself from the war against Iran. No matter the positive spin he puts on it, like in his remarks at the U.N. on Tuesday, the conflict in the Middle East is taking a new and more dangerous turn with the Houthis now occupying the east bank of the Bab al Mandeb. The U.S. Navy has a base on the opposing shore in Djibouti, but then so does China, its only foreign military outpost. With the new sanctions bill, Trump can choose to sign a national security or he can re-impose tariffs of up to 100% on China and India, which would no more likely to succeed than in 2025. Such tariffs would, however, de facto impose an additional tax on ordinary Americans who have seen gasoline prices shoot up. This, on the basis of analysis from 2025 that up to 90% of the cost of tariffs imposed on Chinese exporters was passed on to U.S. consumers. That leaves Trump with no good options, staring down the barrel of becoming a lame duck President in early November. The cold truth is that Trump is deeply tied up in all of the foreign policies which have failed and he can no longer distance himself from them. For as much as he talks peace in Ukraine, the U.S. is still selling billions of dollars worth of weapons to the Ukrainians with European money to keep the fight going. For his part, Zelensky has proven remarkably effective in shuttling around the world cajoling, brow beating, and occasionally shaming his interlocutors into providing the money and military materiel that Ukraine needs. Yet the truth is that no amount of support for Ukraine, four and a half years into this terrible war, will ever be enough. I align myself with John Mearsheimer’s assessment that the Ukraine war will be settled by Russia on the battlefield. Zelensky seems incapable of accepting that Ukraine will eventually lose Donetsk, come what may. For him, the end of the war likely means the end of his political career in Ukraine, at least for the foreseeable future. He is expected to lose a future Presidential election. The next Ukrainian president in peacetime will face different, though no less formidable challenges than Zelensky has faced in wartime. Their country will be bankrupt and European sponsors may feel more coy about providing the level of financial assistance that they provide now. The demographic picture looks terrible in a country where around half of the adult population still in the country is a pensioner. The Canadian move to explore Associate Membership of the EU in the future may offer a troubling harbinger of what may lay in store for Ukraine. Subsidy rich states like Poland and France will not be willing to share the European budget with new members, however much they suffered in war. But these are Ukraine’s problems, not America’s. Zelensky showing up again and insisting that Ukraine really can win, with a few more weapons and a bit more money, is the last thing that Trump needs right now. The U.S. president needs a diplomatic success if he holds any hope of avoiding a shredding in the midterms. The Greenland deal won’t be enough. And Zelensky isn’t budging, perhaps because he sees that Trump may have even less leverage over him from November. --- ### Trump and 14 Lat Am leaders ignite new drug-terror war at UN **Published:** September 22, 2026 | **Author:** Lee Schlenker | **Section:** QiOSK **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/latin-america-trump-narcoterrorism/.md On the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in New York on Tuesday, 14 Latin American and Caribbean countries followed the Trump administration’s lead by designating 24 cartels, prison gangs, and drug trafficking groups as foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs), laying the groundwork for potential U.S. military involvement in operations across the Western Hemisphere. The announcement came from the majority of the member-states of the Shield of the Americas, a loosely-formed coalition of 19 right-leaning regional governments — including Colombia, Argentina, Chile and Peru — which in March committed to use lethal military force against criminal groups alleged of drug trafficking to the United States. The Shield members that — for reasons not immediately clear — did not sign Tuesday’s statement include Guatemala, Jamaica, Belize and Bahamas. Other hemispheric governments led by nominally left-of-center leaders, such as Mexico, Brazil, Canada, Venezuela, Uruguay, Nicaragua, Cuba and several Caribbean nations — some of which are regional epicenters for organized crime — have not been invited to join the ad-hoc coalition. The joint declaration, which invoked the 1947 mutual defense pact known as the Rio Treaty, came just hours after President Trump told world leaders that “the cartels are the ISIS of the Western Hemisphere.” As such he was previewing what many believe may signal the acceleration of open-ended, ill-defined, and unauthorized U.S. military deployments across wide swaths of Latin America and Caribbean in a fusion of the war on drugs with the war on terror. “For years, the cartels have waged war against the people of this hemisphere. Now, we’re waging war on them,” Trump told several heads of state, including Ecuadorean President Daniel Noboa, Honduran President Nasry Asfura, and Bolivian President Rodrigo Paz, at the gathering of the consortium being led by ousted Homeland Security Secretary Kristi Noem. Tuesday’s announcement followed statements last month by Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth at a Panama gathering of the Americas Counter-Cartel Coalition (AC3), the Shield's operational wing, that five countries — Ecuador, Colombia, Honduras, Jamaica and Guatemala — had authorized U.S. forces to conduct joint military operations against armed groups in their national territory. Since March, Ecuador has been hosting U.S. special forces in joint operations near the border with Colombia, which has agreed to host the organization’s regional headquarters in Medellín. Colombia also plans to borrow three U.S. MQ-9A reaper drones to carry-out precision strikes against high-value targets and is slated to receive $1 billion in fresh U.S. security assistance over an undefined period of time. While Tuesday’s joint declaration also highlighted plans to boost economic cooperation and multilateral coordination, the coalition’s principal objective is “to do bad things to bad people,” Hegseth told the senior military leaders assembled in Panama, warning them of the alleged threats also posed by irregular migration and extrahemispheric actors like China. Tuesday’s meeting came a week after U.S. officials announced that $52 million in foreign military financing would be redirected from African and European countries to Ecuador, Colombia, Peru and Panama. More recently, defense officials speaking with CNN said that “most” of the Pentagon’s high-powered drones operating in Africa will likely be transferred to South America in anticipation of escalating, land-based counternarcotics and counter-terrorism operations. While most, if not all, of the region’s leaders understand the acute challenges to their societies posed by organized crime, experts and former officials say that coercive pressure must act in concert with law enforcement-led solutions and economic development, as well strengthening the rule of law, combatting public corruption, and disrupting illicit financial flows, if security strategies are to prove durable over time. “Criminal organizations are not terrorist organizations,” Todd Robinson, a top Biden administration official for international narcotics and law enforcement, told the New York Times. Weakening these groups requires bolstering a “civilian security apparatus that is trained to go after these organizations — to go after their money, to collect evidence, to indict and prosecute and to, under the rule of law, bring these people to justice.” --- ### Banning US diesel exports will likely backfire on Americans **Published:** September 22, 2026 | **Author:** Karthik Sankaran | **Section:** QiOSK **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/ban-diesel-exports/.md With diesel prices hitting all-time highs above $6.50 a gallon, there is a growing demand from farm states that the White House ban diesel exports from the United States.Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said today that the administration is considering whether such a step would be feasible. Sen. Chuck Grassley, R-Iowa, has endorsed the idea. The persistent jump in diesel prices comes despite oil prices dropping to $90 per barrel from their highs above $105 per barrel last week amid signs of more oil transits through the Strait of Hormuz and hopes of renewed diplomacy in the region. But global diesel prices are being driven not just by conflicts in the Gulf but also by refinery attacks in the Russia-Ukraine war. And U.S. diesel prices are determined by global markets, not just national ones, which is one reason behind the calls for an export ban. U.S. diesel exports hit 1.9 million barrels daily last month, and the idea is a ban would force American refineries to make that fuel available to domestic consumers instead. However, the idea also has its detractors, including within the administration. Energy secretary Doug Burgum said last week that an export ban could lead to other countries retaliating with their own export bans, which could hurt states like California, which depend on diesel imports after local refinery closures. Meanwhile, energy industry experts like Institute for Energy Research President Tom Pyle, have pointed out that an export ban would be more likely to cause refineries on the Gulf Coast (where much of U.S. refining capacity is located) to pare back their activity than to redirect that diesel fuel within the United States, thus reducing the aggregate supply of all fuels including gasoline. Others like “Gas Buddy Guy” (a widely followed industry commentator on X) point out that an export ban motivated by domestic politics is not only unlikely to result in more available diesel in the U.S, but could also hit the credibility of the U.S. as a backstop diesel supplier to other countries, hurting the industry over the long term. Thus diesel prices look like yet another set of issues where the old adage might apply – it’s a lot easier to get the toothpaste out of the tube than to put it back in. --- ### In UN speech, Trump threatens to 'annihilate' Iran if no deal reached **Published:** September 22, 2026 | **Author:** Blaise Malley | **Section:** QiOSK **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/trump-unga-speech/.md U.S. President Donald Trump threatened Tuesday to “annihilate” Iran if diplomatic efforts to end his nearly seven-month-old war do not succeed. Speaking to the United Nations General Assembly, he also touted both his peacemaking record and an increasingly belligerent U.S. foreign policy stretching from the Middle East to Venezuela to Greenland. Trump presented the past year as proof that military force and economic pressure could resolve conflicts that diplomacy had failed to settle. “As president of the most extraordinary nation in history, I have no interest in leaving dangers to grow for another day,” he declared. “I do not believe in letting problems fester; they only become harder to solve. So while others have talked, I have acted.” The leading example of this approach, Trump said, was Iran, which, in his telling, has rejected Washington’s diplomatic overtures that had pushed Trump to take military action with Israel in June 2025 and then launch a much larger-scale war beginning at the end of February. “I have a big decision to make,” Trump said of the current status of the war. “Will a deal be made with Iran that lets them rebuild and create a far greater country than it ever was before (...) Or do I annihilate the Islamic Republic and do it quickly?” Trump has made several similarly dark threats against Iran during the conflict, but they have done little to alter Tehran’s negotiating position, and the two sides appear stuck in a standoff, with some fearing that the operation is doomed to become another American “forever war”. The president, however, predicted that the two sides will reach an agreement after November’s midterm elections, because “it doesn't make sense for” Iran not to. “They're waiting to see how I do in the midterm election, what they don't realize is that I'm not running,” he added, saying that national security questions, not political considerations will drive his calculus. But the war does seem to be affecting the president’s popularity. A recent poll by CNN shows that opposition to Trump’s approach to the war continues to grow, with only 26% saying that they support the president’s approach, and nearly 80% saying he is not doing enough to bring the war to an end. Trump blasted the “cowards and traitors” who say that U.S. munitions stockpiles are dwindling to a dangerous extent. The Congressional Budget Office recently found that it could take five years to replenish them. Elsewhere, Trump said he would “continue to seek and end the disastrous war between Russia and Ukraine,” while threatening to use the “enormous” new tariff authorities granted to him by the Russia sanctions package that passed Congress last week. He also said that he would sign the recently announced deal with Denmark and Greenland that would increase the U.S. military presence in Greenland later Tuesday. Trump closed his remarks by downplaying the growing worries over artificial intelligence’s threat to humanity, instead presenting the race to “superintelligence” as part of a competition with China. “Whoever wins superintelligent wins,” he said. “That's the group that wins, and we're leading now over China by a lot, and everyone else, and we're going to keep it that way.” --- ### China is outfoxing the US in the battle for Mideast influence **Published:** September 22, 2026 | **Author:** Matthew Mackenzie | **Section:** Middle East **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/china-middle-east-military/.md Washington talks about “influence” as though it were a mystical vapor that leaks out of every military base closure. But Beijing’s rapidly growing clout in the Middle East shows that influence can come in many forms. While the Pentagon debates whether and where to rebuild U.S. bases battered by Iran during Operation Epic Fury, China has spent the last decade expanding its influence in the Middle East without stationing a single soldier there. China’s experience in the region makes clear that influence can be cultivated far more cheaply than Washington assumes, and without maintaining a sprawling network of vulnerable military installations. As Operation Epic Fury demonstrated, Washington’s constellation of fixed bases across the Middle East is vulnerable and expensive to defend. Before the war, the United States maintained at least 19 military facilities across the region, eight of them considered permanent. Iranian attacks left both the headquarters of the U.S. Fifth Fleet in Bahrain and the Qatar command center, from which the United States had coordinated regional air operations for more than two decades, effectively inoperable. Defenders of the status quo claim this cost is worth it, arguing that permanent presence keeps Washington politically relevant. Winding it down, they contend, would create a power vacuum to be filled by Beijing, eroding American influence and leaving China as the region’s dominant outside power. China’s own experience in the region invalidates that fear, showing how thoroughly Washington has conflated military power with influence itself. The Middle East is less strategically important to the United States than it was during the Cold War, and America’s regional interests are correspondingly limited. Washington needs Gulf oil to continue reaching global markets and to prevent any single power from dominating the region and its resources. It also must disrupt terrorist groups capable of striking the homeland. China’s interests are actually quite similar to America’s. It depends even more heavily on Middle Eastern energy, benefits from a stable balance of power, and has its own concerns about terrorism. Despite these overlapping interests, the two countries have pursued them through starkly different means. Aside from a single overseas Chinese base in Djibouti, a country where the United States also maintains a base that is roughly six times larger, China has nothing resembling America’s military architecture in the Middle East. Yet Beijing has rapidly expanded its influence in a region where Washington has devoted trillions of dollars and decades of military commitment to the same end. China enjoys near-universal diplomatic acceptance across the region’s competing camps, while Washington’s history and military entanglements undermine its ability to serve as a neutral mediator. China is the Arab states’ largest trading partner, and the Middle East is one of the largest recipients of its Belt and Road investment. Beijing’s regional diplomatic role has only grown more institutionalized, with the first China-Arab States Summit launched in 2022. Amid the current conflict between the U.S. and Iran, Gulf governments have repeatedly turned to Beijing to pressure Tehran, first over the Strait of Hormuz and Iranian retaliation, and more recently to rein in the Houthis. Washington remains the region’s preponderant military power, but even that status has not afforded it the ability to dictate the region’s geopolitical alignment. The Gulf monarchies have consistently resisted American efforts to organize the region around great-power competition, instead maintaining close security ties with Washington while deepening relations with China. While military strength will never be irrelevant, portions of Washington have become so accustomed to exercising power through the military that they often mistake it for power itself. China’s influence has risen alongside its rapid economic growth, technological advances, and growing military capability — the same combination that has built great-power status for centuries. Gulf states sell China the energy its economy depends on while courting Chinese investment because Chinese firms have capital to deploy. The United States should be great at this game. The Gulf states do not need tens of thousands of American troops on their soil to understand the value of doing business with the world’s largest economy. Nor would America’s decades-old relationships simply evaporate when the last helicopter leaves Saudi Arabia. When Washington is not trying to remake the Middle East in its image, it still has more to offer than Beijing. Winding down America’s bases in the region would inevitably cost Washington some influence with the countries that host these installations. But influence alone does not make a military presence valuable, especially where the interests at stake are limited. The United States could preserve other forms of security leverage, such as arm sales, capacity building, and intelligence sharing.If anything, some Gulf governments may be more eager to cooperate with the United States knowing they will not be part of a future target set in a regional conflict. The China-mediated Saudi-Iranian normalization deal in 2023 makes the distinction between military and diplomatic influence clear. Beijing managed to place itself at the center of one of the region’s most bitter rivalries despite lacking anything remotely resembling America’s regional military footprint. It relied instead on diplomacy and the political weight accumulated through its broader relationship with both countries. Influence in the Middle East does not require a military presence, and certainly not one as large as America’s. There is an even stranger irony in invoking China to justify America’s existing military posture in the region. China depends more heavily than the United States on Middle Eastern energy, yet Washington has effectively appointed itself guardian of the regional order on which China’s economy relies. If Gulf oil flows were ever seriously threatened, Beijing would have every incentive to help restore them. Instead, Washington has saved it the trouble, absorbing all the costs and risks of regional security while China has enjoyed the remarkably convenient arrangement of having its chief geopolitical rival protect its energy lifeline. As the Pentagon considers what comes next, it should prioritize maintaining regional access rather than regional dominance. It does not need to rebuild every cratered runway or shattered command center simply because those facilities existed before the war. It should close the most exposed bases, reduce the overall American military footprint, and consolidate what remains around, at most, a few strategic outposts farther from Iran. Jordan, Western Saudi Arabia, the Horn of Africa, or even parts of Europe could still provide the access needed to protect America’s limited regional interests without replicating the sprawling prewar architecture. Military postures this large are almost impossible to unwind in ordinary times. Operation Epic Fury created a rare chance to break the inertia that keeps outdated deployments alive long after their strategic rationale. The Pentagon should seize it. China is supposed to be the reason America cannot leave; in reality, it provides a clear example of how the United States can protect its interests and preserve its influence at a far lower cost. --- ### Is all this AI doomsaying distracting us from the real threat? **Published:** September 22, 2026 | **Author:** Courtney Rawlings, Alex Jordan | **Section:** Video Section **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/ai-apocalypse/.md News items heralding the AI apocalypse are ubiquitous. The panic started shortly after the ex-Anthropic, ex-OpenAI researcher-turned-whistleblower, Jacob Coxon sounded the alarm on X, writing that AI companies are "racing straight to self-improving superintelligence and gambling with our lives.” Coxon’s diagnosis is startling. AI, he wrote, “could kill us all by the end of the decade.” In a shocking turn, Anthropic’s own Evan Hubinger confirmed growing fears when he wrote, “We really do earnestly believe AI could kill all humans! I personally think it is >10% within the next decade." It’s no surprise that dire remarks like this from AI experts have turned every news headline or cable news segment this week into a freak-out over the coming doomsday. But is all of this panic really warranted? In the latest episode of Always at War, we attempt to parse what’s actually dangerous about AI from cynical industry hype. We focus aspects of the story often overlooked by Washington’s op-ed class: namely, that in the same breath that AI CEOs predict their own technology will end humanity, they’re also working closely with the Pentagon to build deadly weapons, expanding the surveillance state, and asking lawmakers to remove guardrails — like antitrust laws — that would limit their companies’ power. And, in a linguistic minefield that would entrap the Bard himself, CEOs like Sam Altman, Elon Musk, and Dario Amodei claim that the only way to prevent AI Armageddon is to free AI companies from the rule of law so that they can – stick with me – use AI to help us win a war with China. If this sounds insane, you’re not alone. Join us as we try to understand why AI CEOs are so eager to push the "end of humanity” narrative. Are these guys defending working at the proverbial “boiling people alive factory?” Or is this just a convenient ploy to distract from AI’s immediate harms, like its use to target and kill civilians in Gaza and Iran and the massive build-up of AI surveillance technologies here at home? As we discuss in the episode, whatever its upsides, we also know this technology is already being used sloppily and at the expense of people's lives. The dangers of AI are not simply hypothetical. So why not focus on the real and present dangers that are already affecting us? --- ### When Saudi Arabia realizes it's backed the wrong horse **Published:** September 22, 2026 | **Author:** Jean-Francois Seznec | **Section:** Middle East **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/saudi-arabia-trump-relations/.md The United States went to war with Iran in the belief that American power could quickly overwhelm Tehran’s ability to threaten the Middle East. For Saudi Arabia, the war is producing nearly the opposite result. Iran has been badly hit, but it and its regional allies have demonstrated that they can still threaten Saudi cities, oil installations, pipelines and export routes. At the same time, Washington has shown that even overwhelming offensive power does not necessarily translate into effective protection for its Gulf partners. The consequence is likely to be a historic Saudi reassessment: less confidence in the United States, more reliance on regional partners and a much closer strategic relationship with China. Saudi Arabia’s geographical problem is not new. In an article published in LobeLog in September 2019, I described the “encirclement” of Saudi oil production by Iran and Iran-aligned forces. That year, the attack on the Abqaiq processing complex displayed the accuracy and reach of the weapons available to Tehran or its allies. An earlier Houthi strike on pumping stations serving the East-West Pipeline showed that the kingdom’s alternative export route to the Red Sea was also vulnerable. Attacks around Fujairah similarly cast doubt on the idea that tankers and pipelines outside the Strait of Hormuz would remain safe in a crisis. The strategic message was straightforward. Saudi Arabia could not protect its petroleum system simply by building routes that bypassed one chokepoint. Its fields and processing plants lie near the Gulf; the East-West Pipeline crosses a vast, exposed territory; and the Red Sea outlet can be threatened from Yemen. Iran’s influence in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen gave it the ability to apply pressure around much of the kingdom’s perimeter. In 2019, Saudi leaders were deeply disappointed when the United States did not retaliate against Iran for the attack on Abqaiq. They had invested heavily in their relationship with the first Trump administration. Later, the Saudi Public Investment Fund’s $2 billion commitment to Jared Kushner’s private-equity firm reinforced the impression that Riyadh expected its close connections to the Trump family to bring privileged access and dependable support. Whatever the Saudis expected, Abqaiq had already demonstrated the limits of the American security guarantee. The present war makes that problem much greater. The United States can destroy targets across Iran, but it has not been able to prevent Tehran and its partners from striking back across the region. Saudi Arabia is now paying for a conflict it did not start and cannot control. Missile and drone defenses can intercept many threats, but no shield is perfect, particularly against repeated, low-cost attacks on sprawling infrastructure. Recent strikes on the East-West Pipeline underline the point made in 2019: the route intended to insure Saudi exports against the closure of Hormuz is itself a target. The kingdom is surrounded not by conventional Iranian armies but by a network of missiles, drones, militias and maritime threats. For Riyadh, therefore, the issue is not simply the strength of the U.S. military. It is the mismatch between American power and Saudi security. Washington may be able to punish Iran severely without being able to stop attacks on Abqaiq, Ras Tanura, Yanbu or the pipeline between them. Indeed, a prolonged war can increase those attacks by giving Iran an incentive to raise the cost to America’s partners. Saudi Arabia is likely to be even more angered by the ineffectiveness of American protection now than it was by American restraint in 2019. The deterioration extends beyond immediate defense. The U.S.–Saudi civil nuclear agreement once appeared to be the centerpiece of a broader strategic bargain. Yet after supporting the agreement, President Trump publicly made its political future dependent on Saudi participation in the Abraham Accords. That demand is extraordinarily difficult for Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman to meet while Israel continues its operations in Gaza, expands pressure in the West Bank and wages war in southern Lebanon. The agreement has been submitted to Congress and is not formally dead but tying it to normalization has placed it in severe political jeopardy. From Riyadh’s perspective, Washington has again turned a promised strategic benefit into a conditional instrument of American and Israeli policy. Saudi leaders must now ask whether they have been backing the wrong horse. Their answer is not likely to be a complete break with Washington. The United States will remain an important arms supplier, investor and military partner. But the kingdom is already building alternatives. The Mecca Joint Defence Agreement signed in August by Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Turkey commits the three countries to treat an attack on one as an attack on all. Its practical obligations remain to be tested, yet its political meaning is clear. Saudi Arabia no longer wants its survival to depend on a single outside protector. Pakistan offers nuclear prestige and a long military relationship; Turkey brings a capable defense industry, armed forces and NATO experience. Together, they provide Riyadh with an additional layer of deterrence and strategic autonomy. China is the more consequential alternative. It is the largest buyer of Gulf oil, an indispensable economic partner for Saudi development and one of the few powers with real leverage in Tehran. Beijing also brokered the 2023 restoration of Saudi-Iranian diplomatic relations. Unlike Washington, China does not ask Riyadh to normalize relations with Israel or align itself publicly with a divisive regional war. Saudi leaders may increasingly conclude that China, precisely because it maintains relations with both sides, is better placed to restrain Iran and protect the commercial stability on which the kingdom depends. That does not mean China will replace the United States as Saudi Arabia’s military protector. Beijing has neither America’s regional force structure nor an evident desire to inherit its security burdens. But influence does not require exact replacement. China can supply digital and nuclear technology, investment, diplomatic access and eventually more defense cooperation, while Saudi Arabia assembles a diversified security system involving Washington, Beijing, Islamabad and Ankara. Each disappointment with the United States accelerates that process. The great irony is that an American war intended to reassert U.S. power may instead reduce U.S. primacy in the Gulf. President George W. Bush’s invasion of Iraq removed Iran’s principal Arab counterweight and handed Tehran enormous influence in Baghdad. President Trump’s war with Iran risks a comparable strategic reversal. By exposing Saudi Arabia to retaliation, demonstrating the limits of American protection and attaching unacceptable political conditions to cooperation, Washington is encouraging Riyadh to seek security elsewhere. Bush’s war helped hand Iraq to Iran. Trump’s war may help hand the Gulf—and above all Saudi Arabia—to China. --- ### Trump and Xi meet on a 'rotting' diplomatic foundation **Published:** September 22, 2026 | **Author:** Jake Werner | **Section:** Asia-Pacific **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/trump-and-xi-meeting-dc/.md As Chinese President Xi Jinping arrives in Washington for his third meeting in less than a year with U.S. President Donald Trump, calm seems to prevail in the relationship. This is a dangerous illusion. The sense of stability is breeding complacency on both sides even as pressure builds up under the surface. We may be throwing away our last opening to put the world’s most important bilateral relationship on a solid foundation. In keeping with the slogan on which the two sides agreed at their May meeting in Beijing, the U.S. and China are supposedly building a relationship of “constructive strategic stability.” Indeed, compared to the confrontational posture of both sides during the first Trump and Biden administrations, we seem to have stepped back from the brink of conflict. Even the seemingly explosive issue of the ongoing U.S. assault against Iran and its damaging consequences for the global economy, or China’s continued dealings with Iran that are frustrating the U.S. strategy of economic strangulation, do not seem to be major grievances for either side. At first glance, there are strong reasons for rethinking a confrontational approach. In sharp contrast to Biden, Trump does not frame his dealings with Xi Jinping as an ideological crusade. He does not seek to organize the world’s richest and most powerful countries against China or to block its technological development. Trump’s erratic and uninhibited conduct must be deeply disturbing to Xi Jinping, whose dominant psychological trait is an obsession with control. But because Trump wants to strike deals with China rather than geopolitically subordinate it, he has opened a wider range of possibilities in the relationship. Even more significantly, the U.S. and China find themselves in a balance of economic terror. Last year the relationship nearly spiraled into uncontrollable economic warfare when Trump raised tariffs to 145% in a furious response to China’s retaliation against his “liberation day” tariffs. China then brought to bear its most formidable economic weapon, cutting off U.S. access to the rare earth elements crucial to high tech civilian and military production. Trump returned to the table in short order, and the two sides deescalated to where they had started. The trade ceasefire was tested five months later when the U.S. Commerce Department imposed a sweeping expansion of its existing blacklist of Chinese companies and China responded by hastily rolling out a much wider version of extraterritorial controls on rare earths. Again furious, Trump threatened to call off the upcoming face-to-face meeting between the two leaders. But when he found out what his administration had done to provoke the Chinese response, he reversed himself. The economic truce was formalized at the Trump–Xi meeting in Busan, South Korea. Modest progress then followed from Trump’s trip to Beijing in May, with China agreeing to US purchases and both sides promising to talk through ongoing tensions in implementing the truce. On the surface, then, the relationship seems sound. But underneath, the entire foundation is rotting. Since 2018, when the US foreign policy establishment abruptly redefined China as alien and hostile to the US-dominated “rules-based international order”, bipartisan hostility toward China has become the single unifying theme in the otherwise floridly dysfunctional US political system. That this unanimity within the political establishment has survived Trump’s second-term reorientation of China policy was on display last week, when multiple congressional hearings were held to denounce China ahead of Xi’s visit. The members of both parties took turns raising antagonistic measures before witnesses chosen to offer only antagonistic approaches to the full range of challenges posed by China. At a hearing of the House Select Committee on China, for example, Rep. Tom Suozzi (D-NY) asked: “Should we be viewing this as a hawkish relationship between us and China? … Or should we be doing more of a cooperative relationship with them—because we tried that for like 50 years ever since Nixon went to China, and that didn't turn out very well for us.” The Republican and Democratic witnesses alike agreed that the key task is to slow down China’s economic and technological development and speed up that of the United States. In the words of witness Oren Cass, “it should be extremely obvious to us that there is no path to partnership, collaboration, mutually beneficial arrangements with China.” To the limited extent that Trump’s administration is making China policy, it is guided by the same sort of hostility. Although Trump’s desire for friendly meetings with Xi Jinping has starkly limited public anti-China rhetoric and has hamstrung the Commerce Department after its actions nearly derailed the Busan summit, other U.S. agencies are continuing the Biden practice of steadily expanding restrictions on China: — The Federal Communications Commission has banned the import of humanoid robots and power inverters from China and expanded the ban on imports from Huawei and ZTE. — Transportation Secretary Sean Duffy recently sent a letter to Ford denouncing the automaker’s agreements with Chinese companies for creating “reliance on technologies of foreign adversaries”. — Under a proposed rule set to take effect in December, the Office of Management and Budget would prohibit federally funded US research collaboration with Chinese researchers. — The Pentagon keeps expanding its own blacklist of Chinese entities, and has now included most of China’s leading private technology companies. — Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, commenting recently on the artificial intelligence “race” that US leaders imagine themselves to be running against China, said: “There is no day after tomorrow if China wins at this.” Trump himself holds the same view. (After talks on Sunday with his Chinese counterpart He Lifeng, Bessent said the two sides had agreed to establish an AI dialogue mechanism. This is an encouraging sign, but the atmosphere of deep distrust over technology will make real progress on the issue difficult.) Washington may be split, then, on how to talk about China. But on the substance of the relationship, overwhelming agreement prevails: U.S. and Chinese interests are inalterably opposed, the U.S. must dominate China or lose itself, excluding China’s presence in American society is an urgent priority. Because China is expanding its own capacity to counter U.S. attacks, and because neither side seems to understand what the other has promised in their truce, the two countries are headed for turmoil if not outright conflict. U.S. policymakers could still step back from such a mutually destructive future. The American people are communicating quite clearly that they do not want the single-mindedly adversarial approach that Washington has embraced. A clear majority now favor cooperation with China rather than seeking to limit its power. Recognizing the many shared interests that do unite the U.S. and China could open possibilities for cooperation on urgently needed global reforms. Appreciating the deep economic changes on both sides over the last decade would allow the two countries to explore different possibilities for mutual gain in trade and investment and research collaboration. New thinking on AI would make both countries safer and more prosperous. Taking seriously the idea of “constructive strategic stability” could inspire a new approach to regional security. Policy ideas for repairing the relationship are available. What is in short supply are U.S. leaders with the political courage to stand against the latest ill-fated bipartisan demand for international conflict. --- ### Police hugging AI so tight, soon we'll all be pre-crime suspects **Published:** September 21, 2026 | **Author:** Harrison Berger | **Section:** Military Industrial Complex **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/pentagon-artificial-intelligence/.md Earlier this month, an announcement by an Anthropic researcher that so-called “Superintelligent AI” has a greater than 10% chance of destroying humanity over the next decade triggered widespread alarm. “We really do earnestly believe AI could kill all humans,” wrote Evan Hubinger, Anthropic’s Alignment Science Lead. Those risks are, of course, real and terrifying. But perhaps of more immediate concern are the ways in which humans are already using AI, not how AI will potentially escape human control. Though it has been mostly ignored by corporate media, the U.S. security state is now seeking out and collaborating with AI firms on “offensive cyber ops”; AI targeting systems; and efforts to sift through and interpret vast troves of data on American citizens and foreigners collected by the U.S. government. --- ### Does Mecca Pact demand Pakistan enter Yemen conflict? **Published:** September 21, 2026 | **Author:** Qamar Cheema, Mir Ahmad Murtiza | **Section:** Middle East **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/pakistan-yemen-intervention/.md In August, the leaders of Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Turkey signed the Mecca Joint Defense Alliance, heralding a new chapter in regional security cooperation between the three nations. In early September, the Houthis launched a new offensive aimed at expanding their control over Yemeni territory and tightening their grip around the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, which connects the Suez Canal and Red Sea to the Indian Ocean. They subsequently launched drones and missiles at Saudi Arabia’s military and energy infrastructure on multiple occasions. As the situation deteriorated, attention increasingly turned to the Mecca Pact and to the question of whether Pakistan would enter the conflict on Saudi Arabia’s side. Some questioned the pact’s credibility, while others argued it was not yet operational. Both interpretations, however, misconstrue the nature of the agreement. The Mecca Pact establishes the principle that an attack against one member constitutes an attack against all. Yet this does not mean that every drone or missile launched against Saudi Arabia would automatically prompt Pakistan or Turkey to enter the conflict. NATO offers an instructive parallel. Although Article 5 stipulates that an armed attack against one member is considered an attack against all, it requires members to provide “assistance,” not necessarily engaging in an automatic direct military action. Repeated Russian drone incursions into NATO territory, for example, have not automatically triggered Article 5. Saudi Arabia has not, so far, publicly invoked the Mecca Pact. This reflects an understanding that the pact is intended to provide collective security without outsourcing their primary defense responsibilities to one another. A member that is unable or unwilling to respond to relatively limited attacks on its own could risk creating the free-riding scenario, in which one country relies excessively on allies for its defense. The member states have an interest in avoiding a situation in which limited attacks become a mechanism for automatically drawing the alliance into a wider conflict. The Middle East already contains multiple overlapping conflicts. If every limited attack produced immediate military intervention by all members, the alliance could rapidly become overstretched. The institutional logic of the Mecca Pact, therefore, favors graduated involvement, with the scale of assistance increasing alongside the severity of the threat. Pakistan has, nevertheless, made clear that it remains committed to the Mecca Pact. Referring specifically to the conflict in Yemen, Pakistan’s defense minister stated: “We are bound by the terms and conditions of this pact, and we will honor them in case there is a need.” What many observers overlook is that collective-defense arrangements contain thresholds that determine the form and degree of assistance required at different stages of escalation. Pakistan’s response should, therefore, not be understood in binary terms of intervention or no-intervention. The more pertinent question is what form of assistance a particular level of escalation would necessitate. The answer could encompass a broad spectrum of military, logistical, intelligence, and diplomatic support. Diplomacy remains the first instrument for thwarting escalation. Pakistan holds a unique position in this regard. While many states may conduct operations against the Houthis, Pakistan is among the few capable of pressuring Iran to “rein in” the Houthis. On the military operational side, Pakistan will keep its commitments deliberately ambiguous. There is a strategic rationale for such restraint. Publicly disclosing the circumstances under which members would respond, and the kinds of responses they would make, would allow potential adversaries to tailor their own strategy accordingly. Ambiguity, by contrast, preserves uncertainty over escalation thresholds and can strengthen deterrence. The less an adversary knows about how the alliance would respond, the more difficult it becomes to design a strategy around a predictable reaction map. Pakistan already has a multi-role military presence in Saudi Arabia, consisting of at least 8,000 troops and 16 aircraft, and “Pakistan will go ‘to any extent’ to defend Saudi Arabia,” as a Pakistani military spokesperson said recently. Operationally, Pakistan can assist and may already be assisting Saudi Arabia in logistics, intelligence sharing and operational management, air defense, and air combat support roles without directly piloting strikes against Houthi sites inside Yemen. Here, Pakistan’s role is, to a certain extent, complementary to Saudi Arabia’s other defense partnerships. There is a straightforward operational rationale for Pakistan’s current approach. The Mecca Defense Alliance is a defensive arrangement, not an expeditionary force designed to enable its members to expand their influence beyond their borders. Therefore, Pakistan has little reason to assume a direct strike role in Saudi Arabia’s aerial campaign to thwart Houthi advances inside Yemen, even though those advances are manifestly harmful to Saudi Arabia’s regional interests. Moreover, the Houthis have not so far generated sufficient operational momentum in their attacks on Saudi Arabia to create an obvious requirement for Pakistani counterforce operations inside Yemen. Saudi Arabia possesses a sizable air force equipped with advanced platforms, including F-15s, to conduct operations inside all of Yemen as it did in its last anti-Houthi campaign from 2015 to 2022. Riyadh, consequently, has the means to conduct precision strikes against the Houthi missile and drone launch positions without requiring a direct combat role for Pakistan. Pakistan believes this operational dynamic will persist for the foreseeable future. The situation would change considerably if the Houthis were to launch a large-scale ground offensive into Saudi territory. Such an operation would represent a qualitatively different level of escalation and could trigger a more substantial and direct Pakistani response. However, in Pakistan’s view, there is currently little military logic for the Houthis to take such an escalatory step. A major ground incursion into Saudi territory would expose Houthi forces to the considerably greater military capacity of Saudi Arabia and potentially of the Mecca Defense Alliance. Rather than improving their strategic position, such an operation could place the Houthis under severe military pressure. While the operational details and escalation thresholds remain shrouded in ambiguity, there is one thing on which Pakistan’s strategic community agrees: the Houthis should not test the Mecca Defense Alliance. The strategic importance of Bab el-Mandeb presents a more complicated question. The passage is critical to global trade and energy flows. Saudi Arabia has an especially strong interest in maintaining freedom of navigation in the Red Sea, particularly amid the Hormuz disruption. Pakistan, too, has an interest in securing this critical artery. Nonetheless, interest in maritime security falls short of justifying an independent Pakistani freedom of navigation operation. Pakistan does not possess the naval capacity to undertake such a mission alone at the scale required to reliably secure Bab al-Mandeb. Any sustained effort to control the passage would also require operations around key coastal areas, including Mokha. Such an undertaking would move well beyond the defensive purpose of the Mecca Pact. Pakistan’s participation in securing freedom of navigation would, therefore, be more likely if undertaken as part of a broader international coalition. This would provide the operation with a wider legal and political framework, allowing Pakistan to contribute to the protection of a vital international waterway without transforming the Mecca Pact into an instrument for conducting an open-ended military campaign in Yemen. Of course, the possibility of escalation remains real. Saudi Arabia claims to have shot down a Houthi drone near the holy city of Mecca, a claim that the Houthis deny. Pakistan is deeply committed to countering any threat to the holy sites. As Defense Minister Khawaja Asif said Wednesday, any attack on Mecca or Medina is a “red line” that would draw a Pakistani response even without a mutual-defense agreement. Any Houthi threat in this regard would, therefore, push the conflict several rungs higher on the escalation ladder, giving Islamabad a stronger rationale to intervene directly. --- ### Why Trump won't 'blow the sh*t out of' Oman today **Published:** September 21, 2026 | **Author:** Giorgio Cafiero | **Section:** Middle East **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/houthis-oman-iran/.md The Sultanate of Oman’s willingness to engage all actors in the Middle East and beyond has long been a pillar of Muscat’s foreign policy. Yet with the war raging in the region, Oman’s efforts to maintain a pragmatic and normal relationship with Iran has fueled friction with the White House. This was notably underscored by President Donald J. Trump’s earlier threats to “blow up” and “bomb the shit out of” Oman in response to Muscat’s talks with Tehran about the future status of the Strait of Hormuz. Despite these threats, it is clear that Washington recognizes Oman’s value as a bridge to Iran and other regional actors. With the struggle for control over Yemen’s Red Sea coast and the Bab el-Mandab becoming the “Western Front” in the wider U.S.-Iran crisis, the Trump administration has turned to Oman for help with de-escalation efforts and direct talks between Washington and the Ansar Allah movement, better known as the Houthis. On September 15, Secretary of State Marco Rubio spoke by phone with his Omani counterpart, Sayyid Badr al-Busaidi, and “expressed support for deepening ties between Oman and the United States,” according to a State Department press release. “The significance of the Rubio–al-Busaidi call is best understood here in Oman not as an isolated diplomatic courtesy, but as a strong indication that Washington still sees Oman as a necessary diplomatic and strategic interlocutor,” explained a former Omani diplomat who spoke to RS on the condition of anonymity. “It can be also read as a form of ‘strategic correction’. Whatever the political rhetoric, the U.S. administration needs a functioning relationship with Muscat,” he added. Several days before Rubio and al-Busaidi spoke by phone, U.S. officials and senior Ansar Allah representatives met at the U.S. embassy in Muscat with support from Omani mediators. During this meeting, which came several days after the Houthis carried out their successful offensive against the forces of the Saudi-backed internationally recognized Yemeni government on the country’s west coast, the Houthis reportedly relayed to U.S. officials that their group has no intention of targeting American vessels. Meanwhile on September 12, Trump stated that Ansar Allah phoned his administration and asked for Washington to refrain from entering the conflict in Yemen. Two days later, Vice President JD Vance confirmed that Washington was in direct contact with the Houthi movement. This U.S.-Houthi meeting illustrates how “Muscat is not simply a diplomatic partner in the abstract,” noted the former Omani diplomat. “It is functioning as one of the few places where multiple actors in the regional confrontation can potentially communicate.” As officials in Muscat see it, instability in Yemen will always threaten Oman’s vital security and economic interests. Conflict in or around the Bab el-Mandab will inevitably disrupt commerce and energy flows. This stands to harm the broader maritime environment, undermining Oman’s ambitions for its ports and logistics hubs, which are key to the country’s Vision 2040 economic development and diversification agenda. Therefore, preventing an arc of maritime insecurity stretching from Yemen to the Persian Gulf is very much in Oman’s own national interests. With a relatively neutral foreign policy, Omani officials like to remain somewhat distant from problems plaguing the wider region. “But they realize these problems affect them and when there is something really important in Washington, Oman is willing to help and play a role,” explained David Des Roches, a professor at the Thayer Marshall Institute, in an RS interview. Hawkish, neo-conservative organizations, such as Foundation for Defense of Democracies, like to portray Oman as an untrustworthy and problematic actor aligned with the Iran-led camp. But, a U.S. foreign policy that treats Muscat as a threat to Washington’s interests would make it more difficult for the U.S. to pursue its interests vis-à-vis Yemen, the Red Sea, and the Strait of Hormuz. Rubio’s call with his Omani counterpart “suggests that Washington does not want the U.S.-Oman relationship to become collateral damage in the Iran conflict,” said the former Omani diplomat, who believes that the Trump administration has “realized that a breakdown in U.S.–Oman relations would therefore damage an established American security relationship and potentially eliminate an important diplomatic channel at exactly the moment Washington needs one.” There is a paradoxical dynamic in play: The ongoing U.S.-Iran crisis makes Muscat’s diplomatic role more valuable at the same time it becomes more potentially dangerous. “The more Washington needs Oman as an intermediary, the greater Oman’s diplomatic relevance becomes,” said the former Omani diplomat. “But the more Oman becomes involved in U.S.-Iran or U.S.-Houthi diplomacy, the greater the risk that one side interprets Oman’s role as alignment with the other.” --- ### Trump's 'me' monument to serve as domestic military staging ground **Published:** September 20, 2026 | **Author:** Kelley Beaucar Vlahos | **Section:** QiOSK **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/triumphal-arch-trump-snipers/.md A "Triumphal Arch" to be built at the entrance of sacred ground — Arlington Memorial Cemetery, where generations of U.S. military servicemen, women and veterans are buried — is going to serve the dual purpose of staging snipers and drones for "national security," according to President Donald Trump. At the strong request of the United States Military, and for National Security purposes, I have agreed to convert the magnificent Triumphal Arch, planned since the Civil War Era many years ago, at the Receptive Circle adjoining the Arlington Memorial Bridge, into a top grade Military Complex/Triumphal Arch, to house, store, and have the rapid ability to use large numbers of drones, plus Snipers, on both the roof and plaza areas, and additionally have and hold large quantities of sniper ammunition in storage. There will be no facility like this anywhere in the World. The arch was already controversial. The renderings and name conjure the ill-fated “Arch of Triumph” in Hitler’s Welthauptstadt (“World Capital”) Germania, which was never built. Its construction would adversely affect the cemetery and historic preservation. Vietnam veterans who say it flouts the law have sued to stop it. When asked by a reporter who the arch is supposed to honor, Trump said “me.” The idea that a command center filled with snipers, drones and stored ammunition might be unleashed on Washington for domestic security purposes is already landing like a bunker buster bomb. Is he trolling? What is he signaling now? Is this a joke? He already tore down the East Wing of the White House to start construction on the ballroom. After removing a massive outdoor sculpture from the premises, he closed the Kennedy Center (and is fueling rumors he is set to demolish the entire landmark), so it is not entirely unreasonable to think he is not telling “Truth” about the Triumphal Arch. “The Arch itself, even before making it a weaponized military outpost in one of the most secure areas of the country, disrupts the initial intent of the view between the Lincoln Memorial and Lee Mansion, that being peace and reconciliation following America's bloodiest war,” Iraq War veteran and podcaster Jim Webb told RS, noting the planned location of the arch is literally a mile from the Pentagon. For a president who has already hinted he might seek a third term and declare the elections a national security emergency, his latest announcement about militarizing a national monument is sure to stir an already boiling pot. Add that to an increasingly desperate tone when it comes to Americans' support (or lack thereof) for Trump's war in the Middle East. (Seb Gorka, senior director for counterterrorism on the National Security Council, claimed yesterday that it is un-American not to accept higher gas prices in exchange for defeating Iran). “(Trump's) placing his ego in the middle of the country's most important symbols, and shows me how he truly feels about Americans, generally,” Webb added. “At best it's a waste of money and resources for a project to promote the ego of one man, at worst, it's an attempt to visibly intimidate an American public whose opinion of his presidency has sunk to a historic low.” --- ### This isn't sci-fi, AI is already killing people **Published:** September 18, 2026 | **Author:** Nick Cleveland-Stout | **Section:** QiOSK **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/ai-palantir-weapons/.md Palantir CEO Alex Karp proclaimed on a panel in 2024 that “technology should be able to reduce drastically the amount of collateral damage, civilian deaths.” Former Google CEO Eric Schmidt and former Deputy Director of the CIA David Cohen agreed. Proponents of artificial intelligence use in the military have long made some version of this argument — that the military’s adoption of AI will lead to a reduction in civilian harm. Rep. Jim McGovern (D-Mass.) summarized the pitch during a congressional hearing about AI use in the military on Wednesday. “Our government has argued that AI could improve assessments of the likely effects of military operations and reduce the risk of civilian casualties,” McGovern said. “That’s the pitch that we’re getting. I mean, does everybody agree with that?” The question is no longer theoretical, as the U.S. military is already deploying AI. The Pentagon struck 13,000 targets in just the first 38 days of war, aided by Palantir’s Maven Smart System to identify targets and choose weapons used for attacks. But experts at the hearing, hosted by the Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission, said the argument that AI reduces civilian harm simply isn’t supported by the facts on the ground, pointing to Iran, Ukraine, Yemen, and Gaza as evidence. “I disagree with that,” said Steven Feldstein, a senior fellow in the Democracy, Conflict, and Governance Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. While some tout targeting accuracy within AI systems being up to 90%, Feldstein says the real number may be closer to 50%. Deborah Brown, deputy director of technology, rights & investigations at Human Rights Watch wasn’t convinced by the argument either. “Whether it's Israel in Gaza, whether it's Iran, the evidence doesn't suggest that this is limiting the harm because of the high level of civilians dead.” Lawmakers have raised questions over whether AI played a role in the February 28 attack on a girls’ elementary school in Minab, Iran, which killed over 170 people. Palantir’s Shyam Sankar made the compassionate case for the military using Maven when asked about his company’s alleged role in the attack. "It's a tragedy for those girls for sure,” Sankar said. “The thing I would say is that in the history of warfare, technology has always reduced collateral damage.” But Feldstein explained that “even if there is more accuracy, because the number of targets is so much vaster, the ultimate number of civilians harmed is likely far higher as well.” For instance, the Israel Defense Forces claims to have a 90% accuracy rate with Lavender, its AI-targeting system used in Gaza. But Amanda Klasing, national director of government relations and advocacy at Amnesty International USA, pointed out that accuracy doesn’t matter when proportionality is “blown out of the water,” such as when a 2,000-pound bomb is dropped on a residential building. AI systems are also carrying out instructions based on rules of engagement determined by humans, which could be based on instructions that do not prioritize civilian harm reduction. If a military decides “that it’s acceptable to have five civilians die for every suspect who is targeted… you’re telling the machine what’s acceptable,” said Feldstein. Lavender has been used to identify 37,000 Palestinian men as targets. But an intelligence source told the Guardian that they were constantly being pressured to bring more targets. “The numbers changed all the time, because it depends on where you set the bar of what a Hamas operative is,” they said. The IDF also approved these attacks on low-level targets, even if it meant killing 15 to 20 civilians as collateral damage. Even as proponents promise that AI will create a more humane approach to warfare, training for civilian harm reduction has been hollowed out. The Pentagon’s Civilian Protection Center of Excellence, established in 2023 to train combatant commands on civilian harm reduction methods, is reducing its staff from 40 in January 2025 to just nine by the end of this year. Witnesses pointed out that part of the issue is that the Pentagon has not shared evidence that AI systems mitigate civilian harm. "If this is the case that it's actually limiting civilian harm and being more precise and effective, then let's see the evidence,” said Brown. --- ### Chinese missile tests cast long shadow over Pacific Islands **Published:** September 18, 2026 | **Author:** Catherine Wilson | **Section:** Asia-Pacific **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/china-missile-test-pacific/.md This year’s annual summit of Pacific Island Forum (PIF) leaders, occurring less than two months after China fired a long-range nuclear-capable ballistic missile into the South Pacific, was an opportunity for the region to speak collectively about its security and sovereignty concerns. At the end of the summit, 16 of 18 Pacific states endorsed a joint statement registering “concern on the recent intercontinental ballistic missile test which overflew a number of members without adequate notice.” Of the 18, only Nauru and Kiribati, both of which enjoy close ties to Beijing, declined to sign the statement. The pushback likely came as little surprise to China, which on July 6 conducted a rare missile test in the region, launching from one of its nuclear-powered submarines in the South China Sea an intercontinental ballistic missile that traveled more than 4,300 miles and landed in international waters in the South Pacific. Many PIF nations have signed a treaty that defines the region as a nuclear-free zone. The missile test was also criticized by other Pacific countries at the time. Australia, New Zealand, Palau and Republic of the Marshall Islands supported a statement with the U.S. and more than 30 other nations in mid-August stressing that “conducting nuclear-capable ballistic missile tests without sufficient advance notice and detail is dangerous and disrupts the peace and security of relevant nations in proximity to these tests.” At the summit, leaders from across the region expressed their frustration with China. “A unified Pacific voice is critical in getting Beijing to respect sovereignty, to respect transparency and to be a responsible partner,” Palau’s President Surangel Whipps Jr., who also hosted this year’s summit, told reporters. “I think that’s the message that we should be sending to Beijing.” This unhappiness was not limited to the missile test. The 18 Forum member states, from Papua New Guinea to Samoa and Solomon Islands to the Federated States of Micronesia, have been the focus of the ongoing diplomatic tussle between China, an official PIF “dialogue partner,” and Taiwan, a PIF “development partner,” a lesser and more functional status. Still, it took no one by surprise that Chinese officials expressed their displeasure that this year’s summit took place in Palau, one of only three Pacific Island states that still recognize Taiwan, and where Taiwanese aid and cooperation were prominently displayed. Qian Bo, the Chinese Special Envoy for Pacific Islands Affairs told journalists that “there will always be consequences” when Taiwan is perceived as receiving favorable treatment. “Our partners are welcome to sail with us, but they do not choose our destination,” Whipps stressed during the opening ceremony on August 31, while Prime Minister Anthony Albanese of Australia, a full member of the PIF, backed him up. “The Pacific Islands Forum determines what happens here, not any other country,” Albanese told reporters the following day in response to the Chinese position that Taiwan’s representatives should not have been invited to the summit. China claimed that its missile test was part of routine military training, and the missile test is known to have occurred at the time of a joint naval exercise between China and Russia, though it is unclear whether the test was part of the exercise. The separate notices issued to foreign nations, in numerous cases less than 24 hours, fell short of accepted international procedures. Still the Chinese Foreign Ministry rejected the PIF’s criticism, claiming that “Palau’s repeated hype and attempts to manipulate the positions of other Pacific Island Forum member states are malicious and will not succeed.” Despite the July test, as well as another in September 2024 that also drew protests after it landed in the South Pacific, and specifically the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone, Beijing insisted that it promotes peace and stability in the Pacific. “China likely sought to use the missile test to showcase resolve and frustration at U.S. allies and partners,” according to an analysis by the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), which noted that the test occurred on the same day as Australia and Fiji signed a landmark “Ocean of Peace Alliance” mutual defense treaty in Suva. Subsequently, China’s Foreign Ministry issued a public challenge to Australia to “respect the independence of Pacific Island nations…and avoid targeting any third party or harming the interest of any third party.” Indeed, that Australia-Fiji accord was only the latest in a series of setbacks to Beijing in the region. Other recent developments that could have contributed to China’s “frustrations” include the Nakamal Agreement that Australia signed with Vanuatu on June 29, which seeks “to deepen, expand and advance” security cooperation and prohibits any foreign military base or infrastructure in the Pacific Island state. Two weeks earlier, the newly elected Solomon Islands’ prime minister, Matthew Wale, proposed the creation of a regional Pacific-led security treaty, which would exclude China, during his visit to Australia on June 15. Meanwhile, the AUKUS Agreement between Australia, the U.S. and the United Kingdom, which will facilitate the construction of new nuclear-powered submarines for Australia, remains in effect, but it has done little to reduce geostrategic tensions between Washington and its regional allies and Beijing. A sense that China is asserting itself more forcefully into the region, in part by displaying the build-up of its military prowess, is hard to miss. Last February, Chinese naval vessels voyaged far south and carried out provocative “live-fire” military exercises in the Tasman Sea, which separates Australia and New Zealand, and close to Australia’s east coast. The three warships involved then embarked on a partial circumnavigation of the Australian coastline, a route that, according to Australian Defense Minister Richard Marles, was “not unprecedented, but an unusual event.” That incident coincided in part with the high-level visit to Australia by Admiral Samuel J. Paparo, who was then head of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (now Pacific Command). The U.S. was also a significant presence at the PIF meet in Palau. Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau used the occasion to announce a major economic assistance package for the Pacific Islands worth more than $150 million that will support energy security, infrastructure and digital development, law enforcement, and scientific cooperation. According to the U.S. Department of State, “our commitment to the security and prosperity of the Pacific Islands is steadfast, enduring and a key pillar of our America First Foreign Policy.” Western powers are clearly concerned about the recent weapons test in the context of broader shifts in the defense landscape in the western Pacific, as China sustains high investments in its military modernization program and seeks parity in armed forces and nuclear capabilities. Although it has a significantly smaller defense budget than the U.S., China has increased its defense spending 13-fold in 30 years, from $25.1 billion in constant 2023 dollars in 1995 to an estimated $247 billion in 2025, and doubled its possession of nuclear warheads in the past six years, according to the CSIS. As China has declined thus far to engage on arms control negotiations with the West, the recent missile tests and uptick in its military operations in the Pacific suggest to some that it could be testing the reactions and resolve of its geopolitical competitors. --- ### After Macklemore sacking, Ed Sheeran enters his 'Sun City' moment **Published:** September 18, 2026 | **Author:** Jack Hunter | **Section:** Media **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/macklemore-ed-sheeran-israel/.md In recent years pro-Israel advocates have aggressively sought to censor and control speech surrounding the ongoing Israel-Palestine conflict, particularly in the United States, and often with considerable success. This month, Zionist censors might have finally met their match — in the world of pop music. When British megastar Ed Sheeran kicked off a two-night New Jersey show on September 4 at MetLife Stadium before 80,000 plus fans, hip-hop star Macklemore opened the night with a message: "A big part of the reason why I wanted to do this tour in the first place is so I could stand up in stadiums like this and say two words that are very near and dear to my heart: Free Palestine." On night two, Macklemore made similar pro-Palestinian remarks but also clarified that his criticisms of Israel’s government were not criticisms of "my Jewish brothers and sisters.” This prompted the circulation of a petition from the Israeli-American Council demanding that Sheeran kick Macklemore off the tour. Pop singer Pink condemned Macklemore and said his comments made her feel “scared” as a Jewish person. NFL Patriots owner and billionaire AIPAC donor Robert Kraft pressured Sheeran to ditch Macklemore, telling the singer that his upcoming sold-out show at Massachusetts' Gillette Stadium might be canceled if he refused, and that he had rallied other stadium owners to cancel Sheeran’s scheduled concerts if the singer did not comply. “We do not provide a platform for hate speech,” Kraft said. On Monday, Macklemore was removed from the rest of the tour. Sheeran blamed his US tour promoter. This seemed like a win for pro-Israel advocates — until it didn’t. Other supporting acts for upcoming Sheeran shows began dropping out immediately. American singer Finneas, the brother of pop star Billie Eilish, announced that he would not perform and instead showed solidarity with Macklemore. “I stand with Palestine and its people,” he declared. Irish singer Aaron Rowe did the same, saying, “I can’t allow billionaires to silence rightful voices.” Danish pop artist Lukas Graham abandoned the tour, explaining on Instagram, “It’s hard to watch families in other parts of the world burying the people they love. We should be able to speak about war, about civilians being killed, about children who deserve to grow up. Wherever they live. Whatever flag flies over them.” Then, Sheeran’s own touring band, Beoga, also announced they would not be performing for similar reasons. As of this writing, all of Sheeran’s openers have quit, many fans have demanded their money back, and Sheeran began losing a significant number of social media followers while his former support acts gained about 1.6 million new ones. There are now reports that the entire American tour, which was set to resume this weekend in Philadelphia, could now be in jeopardy. Sheeran’s overarching defense throughout this ordeal has been that he is not a political act (an understandable, if perhaps dubious, claim). On a business level, this could be considered practical and even an admirable stance for entertainers. It should also be noted that most of the acts now refusing to participate in the tour, and also Macklemore, each made a point to call Sheeran a friend and thanked him for the opportunities he allowed them. But even apolitical music acts can get caught up in politics. In 1984, English rock legends Queen made the decision to play at the "Sun City" casino in South Africa, which at the time was a global focus over that government’s controversial apartheid policies, becoming a protest cause taken up by many musical artists. Queen, and particularly its singer, the late Freddie Mercury, defended their choice by claiming they were not a political band. Perhaps not, but that decision ultimately hurt Queen, getting it blacklisted for breaking the cultural boycott of South Africa and turning off many fans (their historic performance at 1985’s Live Aid not long after would do wonders in washing away so much bad PR). In 2021, Queen drummer Roger Taylor admitted they had made a mistake. “Oh sh*t, did we get grief for that,” Taylor lamented. Today, few people, musicians or otherwise, would want to be remembered as being on the side that gave any kind of support to South African apartheid. Sheeran could now be caught in a similar situation. He might be trying to remain non-political on this issue, but it could also be an unavoidable one for him at this point, as it has become unavoidable in general. To be clear, the pro-Israel forces who attempted to pressure Ed Sheeran, his opening acts, and subsequently, their fans, were definitely being political in trying to force all of them to submit to their will. But maybe this week they finally found out that, for all the power of pro-Israel voices, not everyone is always going to be bullied into singing their tune. --- ### The Houthis could tip the Iran war in Tehran's favor **Published:** September 18, 2026 | **Author:** Paul R. Pillar | **Section:** Middle East **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/iran-war-houthis/.md The conflict between the United States and Iran has become a contest in enduring economic pain and the political consequences that may flow from that pain. This has characterized the conflict since the breakdown of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in June that had raised brief hopes that the war would end. Each side appears confident that it can outlast the other in the pain-endurance contest. Fundamental change of this situation is unlikely anytime soon despite some indications Iran is considering military escalation as a possible way to break the stalemate. The Trump administration, after the failure of other options, appears to be hoping that the Iranian regime either will be toppled by an economically strained Iranian public or will somehow give up and make concessions. One of the more significant recent developments with potential for changing this stalemate, however, is renewed military action by the Houthi regime in Yemen, which includes interdicting shipping traversing the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb Strait. The Houthis constitute a regime and not just a militia or opposition group. They captured the Yemeni capital of Sanaa in 2014, and for years have been the governing authority over territory that includes about two-thirds of the Yemeni population. Their principal domestic opponent, although commonly labeled the “internationally recognized Yemeni government,” is a weak client of Saudi Arabia, where its leaders spend most of their time. Earlier Houthi interference with Red Sea shipping was aimed at Israel and intended as a gesture of solidarity with the mauled Palestinian population of the Gaza Strip. This time, the Houthis’ grievance is with Saudi Arabia, and they have declared a blockade on Saudi shipping. The background to current Yemeni-Saudi strife is a multi-year Saudi aerial assault on Yemen that turned the country into a humanitarian disaster zone before ending with a truce in 2022. The truce mostly held until this year. But the past month has seen rapidly escalating exchanges of fire. Among other recent attacks across the Saudi-Yemeni border, the Saudis say the Houthis sent a drone over Mecca, and the Houthis claim to have shot down a Saudi fighter jet over Yemeni territory. The Houthis began attacking Saudi ships in the Red Sea last month, and in the past two weeks their gains on the ground against their opponents within Yemen have increased their ability to conduct more such maritime attacks. They captured the port of Mokha (origin of the coffee-and-chocolate drink) and Perim Island, which is in the middle of Bab el-Mandeb. These conquests provide bases for further interdiction of shipping in, and just north of, the strait. Meanwhile, an attack, evidently by militia in Iraq, on the oil pipeline spanning the Saudi peninsula has forced the Saudis to shut the line down for now. The main direct effect of these recent events is a further reduction in Saudi oil exports. The Saudis had been the world’s biggest oil exporter before the U.S.-Israeli war against Iran suddenly dropped Saudi exports to a 13-year low of 3.2 million barrels per day (bpd). The Saudis have relied heavily on the pipeline to the Red Sea as an alternative to its interrupted exports through the Strait of Hormuz. About 4 million bpd—representing four percent of total worldwide oil consumption—was going through the pipeline at one point during the war, and the Saudi oil company Aramco says improvements had increased its capacity to 7 million bpd. The Saudis hope to repair the damage and put the pipeline back in operation soon, but the prospect of the Houthis gunning for tankers carrying Saudi oil through Bab el-Mandeb means their problem of finding a secure export route will persist. The Saudis could send tankers north toward the Mediterranean Sea, with the oil traversing either the Suez Canal or a pipeline in Egypt, but this is the wrong direction to reach most of Saudi Arabia’s customers, which are in Asia. Markets have taken note of this predicament. Brent crude oil futures contracts surged over $100 per barrel and have lingered there. A major indirect effect of these events is to tip the balance in the U.S-Iranian endurance contest more in favor of Iran and against the United States. The principal pain mechanism affecting the Trump administration is the higher oil price, which means higher gasoline and diesel fuel prices, more overall inflation, and more dissatisfaction among American voters. Iranians certainly have been suffering more pain, economic and physical, than Americans have, but for Iran the stakes also are higher. For the regime in Tehran, the stakes involve survival, whereas the United States and Trump administration have nothing remotely comparable at stake. Further damage to the global economy—with effects felt within the United States—from the Houthis’ activity may involve disruption of shipping other than oil. Nine percent of worldwide maritime shipping traverses the Suez Canal, Red Sea, and Bab-el-Mandeb. Even though the Houthis say they are aiming their fire only at Saudi Arabia, the nervousness of shipping companies and insurers about sailing through a war zone may curtail this activity, as it has with the Strait of Hormuz. With the prospect of Tehran crying “uncle” still as dim as ever, any end to the U.S.-Iran war would require a negotiated agreement. Like the earlier MoU, it would almost certainly have to be a ceasefire and skeletal framework that would punt difficult issues to later negotiations. Just as navigation through the Strait of Hormuz was part of the MoU—with disagreement over interpretation of that clause being central to the later breakdown of the ceasefire—navigation through Bab el-Mandeb would likely need to be addressed in any new ceasefire agreement. Although Bab el-Mandeb and the Red Sea are outside the main theater of the war in the Persian Gulf, presumably the U.S. side would insist that this subject be addressed, just as Iran insisted that the earlier ceasefire extend to Israel’s attacks in Lebanon. This parallel goes farther, in ways that underscore a difficulty in negotiating a future ceasefire. The United States does not control Israel’s actions, and Iran does not control the Houthi regime’s actions. The label of “Iranian proxy” that usually is applied to that regime is a misnomer. The Houthis have acted against Iranian advice—most significantly in their capture of Sanaa—and development of their ability to make their own weapons makes them less dependent on Iran’s support. The Houthis sympathize with their Iranian allies, but their chief concerns are closer to home and mostly involve their confrontation with the Saudis. The United States does not control Saudi actions, either, and the kingdom, like Israel, could become a spoiler of any U.S.-Iranian peace. The parallel ends regarding motivation, however. Although the Israeli government opposes any peace agreement with Iran, the Saudis presumably would welcome an end to the war that has been the source of so many of their current economic and security problems. But with no such end in sight, with a financial crisis looming from the sharp curtailment of Saudi oil exports, and with the Trump administration declining so far to take new action against the Houthis, the Saudis may decide they need to escalate further against the Houthis, making Bab el-Mandeb and the Red Sea even more of war zone than before. This scenario, besides complicating any diplomacy aimed at ending the U.S.-Iranian war, would further demonstrate the prescience of those who warned that a U.S. military attack on Iran would spread into a wider Middle East conflagration. The Iran war has triggered new violent phases of old conflicts such as Israel-Lebanon and Yemen-Saudi Arabia, which then escalate further according to their own destructive logic. --- ### New Russia sanctions amid war risk even higher gas prices **Published:** September 17, 2026 | **Author:** Blaise Malley | **Section:** QiOSK **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/sanctions-bill-russia/.md The House voted Thursday to pass legislation that would place a new set of sanctions on Russia, drawing significant Democratic support despite opposition from party leadership. The bill, first introduced by the late Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.) in 2025, was previously approved by the Senate in an overwhelming vote, meaning that the legislation now awaits President Donald Trump’s signature. The bill also extends sanctions against Iran. Democratic leaders raised concerns about the bill, specifically the provision that would allow Trump to impose tariffs of up to 100% on any country that is among the top five purchasers of Russian oil and natural gas, or on the vaguely-defined top five countries “facilitating” Russian sanctions evasion. Minority Leader Hakeem Jeffries (D-N.Y.) spoke out against the bill, but in the end, 58 Democrats supported it. Some Republican lawmakers were also reportedly concerned about these increased powers. Reacting to an earlier version of the bill that would have imposed an even harsher 500% tariff on countries that traded with Russia, Sen. Rand Paul, (R-Ky.), one of 11 Senators (and the only Republican) to vote against the bill, wrote in Responsible Statecraft that it “would cause an economic calamity on a scale never before seen in our country.” Seven Republicans eventually voted against the bill. Democrats opponents of the bill, who said they still support weakening Russia and backing Ukraine, called the legislation a “Trojan horse.” “The president will not impose tough new sanctions on Russia,” Rep. Gregory Meeks (D-N.Y.) said during the rules committee mark-up. “But he will gain broad authority to tariff products and raise prices on goods from countries around the world, far beyond Russia and its energy clients. American families will pay the cost of this bill. Vladimir Putin will not.” These opponents of the bill added that Trump already has the necessary authority to effectively sanction Moscow. “The Russia sanctions bill does nothing to truly punish Russia. Instead, it would give Trump more power to put tariffs in place unilaterally,” Rep. Suzan DelBene (D-Wash.) wrote on X. “Trump already has the authority to put more sanctions on Russia but refuses to. This bill won’t change that.” Congressional supporters of the legislation called it “our chance to stand on the right side of history” and “critical to the support and defense of Ukraine as it fights on the front lines of the free world.” Writing in Responsible Statecraft last month, Jennifer Kavanagh argued that beyond the potential global economic pain that could arrive as a result of increased tariff authority, the underlying assumptions of its effects are flawed. After four and a half years of war, economic punishment has done little to change Putin’s calculus. “He views the war as existential, for Russia and for himself personally, and has been largely insensitive to economic levers since the conflict began,” she wrote. “This is unlikely to change. In fact, the new legislation is much more likely to strengthen Russia’s resolve and work against peace.” Kavanagh argued that the sanctions bills risk both reinforcing Moscow’s claim that the Ukraine war is fundamentally a proxy conflict with the West and strengthening the Kremlin’s belief that Washington remains more interested in crippling Russia than brokering peace. Though the road to a peace agreement in Ukraine remains long, Trump did dispatch his envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner to Moscow and Kyiv in an effort to kickstart negotiations. Last year, the president acknowledged he was reluctant to impose a new round of sanctions on Russia out of concern that it could hinder his administration's diplomatic efforts. --- ### How Saudi Arabia's anti-Houthi strategy crashed and burned **Published:** September 17, 2026 | **Author:** Elfadil Ibrahim | **Section:** Middle East **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/saudi-arabia-houthi/.md For a decade, Saudi Arabia’s Yemen policy has rested on the assumption that time, money and coercive force, patiently and strategically applied, would eventually produce enough leverage to subdue the Houthis, or at least force them into a settlement on Riyadh’s terms. Over the last two weeks, that assumption has been tested more severely than at any point since 2015, when Saudi Arabia initially launched its military intervention to roll back Houthi control of the Yemeni capital Sanaa. It has not held. Having seized strategically significant swathes of Yemen’s west coast on the Red Sea, the Houthis are now pressing towards Marib, the last major stronghold of forces loyal to the internationally-recognized government of Yemen, and the site of some of the country’s most important oil and gas facilities. If losing the Red Sea coast was a blow to the government, losing Marib would be a decisive defeat. It would represent a loss of its last major population and revenue center in the north, and sever its remaining foothold near the capital. It would also open, for the Houthis, the road toward Shabwa and Hadhramawt — two energy-rich eastern provinces that have long been eyed by the Houthis, whose core demands include a slice of the oil and gas wealth these regions produce. While the headlines tell the story of overwhelming Houthi strength, government forces have also managed some gains. They recaptured positions northwest of Marib and pushed back two major Houthi assaults last week. Advances were also made in western Taiz on Sunday. Whether government forces can more consistently counterattack and hold ground, instead of collapsing in the face of pressure, is among the most important open questions in the war right now. The evidence, however, points to structural problems in the anti-Houthi coalition. A detailed reconstruction of the Mokha battle, penned by Yemen analyst Ibrahim Jalal, highlights a Houthi–fabricated withdrawal order, spread by radio and SMS, using an AI-cloned commander’s voice. Those messages tore through a coalition force that lacked, in his account, a joint operations room actually linking the five formations defending the coast. That detail lines up precisely with what Yemen’s own defense minister, Taher al-Aqili, had already conceded in an interview weeks earlier. As al-Aqili noted, the military “unification” effort since the United Arab Emirates’ withdrawal from Yemen last year has produced a common payroll and biometric ID system, but not the shared training or command structure that would enable the various factions fighting under the government’s umbrella to effectively fight as one force. Riyadh consolidated the org chart by forcing Emirati forces out of Yemen late last year, reacting to a bold offensive by UAE-backed southern separatists who had seized key territory in the south and were preparing to declare independence. However, forcing out the UAE did nothing to consolidate the military itself, nor did it reconcile the clashing interests of the power brokers who comprise Yemen’s executive Presidential Leadership Council. Riyadh’s setbacks in Yemen are followed by additional problems to the north. On Friday, Saudi Arabia’s own foreign ministry confirmed that the drones that knocked out its East-West pipeline — the artery carrying up to four percent of global supply away to the Red Sea — had launched from Iraq. The timing, arriving in the same 72-hour window as the coastal collapse and a fresh wave of Houthi strikes on the Khamis Mushait airbase in the kingdom’s south, suggests coordination. The Associated Press reported in early September, citing Saudi and Iraqi officials, that Houthi emissaries had worked inside an operations room run by Iraqi militias to help plan and execute an earlier swarm attack on Saudi oil infrastructure in July. That level of coordination was close enough that a Houthi fighter was reportedly among the casualties when the U.S. and Saudi Arabia struck back at the militias later that month. As Iran-aligned groups around the region increase pressure on Riyadh, diplomacy between the Arab gulf states and Iran has hit its own wall. The Monday meeting in Oman between Tehran and the Gulf Arab states, which was meant to hash out a framework for shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, was called off after Riyadh objected to language implying the strait isn’t an international waterway, leaving Saudi Arabia negotiating on two chokepoints with no resolution on either. Washington, meanwhile, has not been of much help. Roughly 200 U.S. military personnel are already in Saudi Arabia under a newly formed joint command, providing intelligence and targeting support rather than combat power. When President Donald Trump was asked directly on Saturday whether the U.S. would strike the Houthis on the kingdom’s behalf, he effectively said no. “The Houthis called us, and they let us know they don’t want to fight with us,” he said. “They don’t want me to go after them.” It must be frustrating for Riyadh that Washington sees so little threat to its own core interests in Yemen, even though Houthi control of the Red Sea is itself now a driver of the very oil price spike that threatens the Republican party’s political fortunes in the upcoming midterm elections. Riyadh’s other partners have offered even less support. Turkey and Pakistan, bound to Riyadh by the Mecca defense pact signed in August, have stayed out of the fight entirely. A senior Turkish official, briefing the Middle East Eye, argued that the alliance simply hasn’t had time to become operational; its members still need to ratify the treaty domestically then build interoperability and joint-planning mechanisms to support it. All of this could take a “few years,” according to the official. Ominously, even a resolution to the wider U.S.-Iran war, which still appears far off, may not deliver Saudi Arabia much relief. U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio has called the Houthis “agents and proxies of the Iranians.” Iran’s foreign ministry spokesman, Esmaeil Baghaei, rejected the characterization, insisting that Ansar Allah, the group’s formal name, “takes orders from no one.” The two statements can’t both be fully true, but the evidence increasingly supports the Iranian framing. The Houthis’ antagonism toward Saudi Arabia did not begin with Iranian support. The movement's founders saw Riyadh as an adversary from the moment they organized in the 1990s as a Zaydi Shia revivalist response to Saudi-funded Wahhabi Sunni proselytizing in Yemen’s northern highlands. After the Houthis took Sanaa in 2014 — prompting Riyadh to assemble a military coalition to reverse the takeover in 2015 — the hostility only sharpened. A 2022 truce reduced direct fighting but did little to address the underlying drivers of conflict. Since that truce, the Houthis have only grown more emboldened. And the reality is that the Houthis have not been weakened militarily by any of the punitive campaigns launched against it — not Israel’s decapitation strikes, which killed the group’s prime minister and military chief of staff, nor Operation Rough Rider, the two-month, billion-dollar U.S. bombing campaign last year. If military pressure at that scale couldn’t do it, it stands to reason that negotiation, in the short-term, is the only viable alternative. The Houthis have already made their terms public. Ansar Allah’s leader, Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, put a figure on it in March: over $57 billion in compensation for oil-sector losses attributed to the Saudi-led war, on top of standing demands to lift what the group calls a blockade of its airports and seaports, and a share of Yemen’s oil and gas revenues — the same revenues the group is now positioning to seize by force. There is no clean way out of this for Riyadh. Even a deal bought at that steep price, and on such difficult terms, would not end the threat. It would simply bankroll the next phase of it by shoring up a movement that would retain, indefinitely, the capacity to threaten Saudi energy infrastructure whenever it chooses. --- ### With Mideast on fire, oil prices are poised to explode **Published:** September 17, 2026 | **Author:** Karthik Sankaran | **Section:** Middle East **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/oil-pipeline-saudi-arabia/.md News reports this week indicated Saudi Arabia was cancelling or delaying multiple shipments of crude to European refiners for the month of September, pushing them into October or even November. So, after a seeming reprieve, global oil markets are once again showing increasing signs of stress from fresh disruptions to oil infrastructure in the Middle East. The Saudi move followed an attack last week on its East-West pipeline that Riyadh blamed on drones from Iraq. Recent reports indicate the Saudis hope to have roughly half the capacity of the pipeline in a “few days,” while the restoration of full capacity could take up to six weeks, assuming no further attacks. Compounding the perils of transit, Houthi rebels have taken control of the port of Mokha in Yemen and offshore islands in the Bab al-Mandeb, giving them a platform to harass shipping in the Red Sea. This shift, combined with the damage to a pipeline that was transporting an estimated 4-5 million barrels daily, has once again spooked markets that had been somewhat reassured by a partial restoration of flows through the Strait of Hormuz, through which roughly 20% of global oil supplies traveled before the war. The escalation of hostilities in a new theater has led market-traded oil prices back most of the way toward the highs reached at the outbreak of the war more than six months ago. As of this writing, benchmark Brent crude is trading above $105 per barrel, up from $80 as recently as August 4. As the market grapples with new shocks to oil supply, it has less robust buffers than it did in the early days of the war. Seaborne storage on tankers has been depleted, the U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve has released about 130 million barrels, and the world’s largest importer, China, is increasing imports to 7.2 million barrels per day, up from a low of 6 million barrels in June (and against prewar daily imports of almost 12 million barrels). The impact on the prices of refined petroleum products has been particularly stark. The price of diesel in America has hit all time highs above $6 per gallon, reflecting not just the conflicts in the Middle East but also the war in Europe, where Russia and Ukraine have been exchanging strikes on each other’s energy infrastructure, hitting Russian refining capacity. Ben Cahill, a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council, estimated recently that seaborne refined product exports from Russia and the Middle East had fallen from roughly 8 million to 4 million barrels daily since February 2026. The spike in diesel prices (particularly this close to the midterm election) has sparked some disagreements in Washington. Senate Majority Leader John Thune (R-S.D.) has suggested that he would be open to a ban on diesel exports, but critics have noted that such a step could just lead to lower refinery usage in the U.S., and thus potentially push up gasoline prices. Meanwhile, Energy Secretary Chris Wright appears more focused on measures that might increase supply, though it is unclear how quickly these could take effect, given that U.S. refineries are now running at 98% capacity. Meanwhile, American farmers are complaining bitterly about the increase in diesel prices, with some experiencing increased costs of up to $1,000 a day. Still, for all the agitation in Washington over the economic and political consequences of the war, the brunt of the impact will be felt in the Global South, particularly among its poorest citizens. And some leaders there are not shy about pinning the war and its consequences squarely on Washington. Speaking at the BRICS summit, Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim blamed the “initial aggression of the United States, initially of course with Israel,” for the conflict. Disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz have meant that countries in Asia now receive more of their fuel from Red Sea ports in Saudi Arabia; India reportedly receives 51% of its oil from that coast, with the Philippines now at 37% and Pakistan at 36%. The spike in diesel prices is likely to hit countries in the Global South especially hard. The higher energy density of diesel means that it is used to power trucks, buses, and agricultural equipment, making it the most important fuel in poorer countries where individual ownership of automobiles is much less widespread. India, the world’s third-largest oil importer, consumes twice as much diesel as gasoline. Similarly, South Africa has seen diesel usage overtake gasoline usage as a byproduct of gaps or failures in public infrastructure. Road transportation has increased as railways have become less reliable, and frequent power failures have meant increasing dependence on private diesel-fueled generators. These factors are present across much of the Global South. At the level of individual households, the collapse in the price of solar panels has helped reduce the dependence on diesel generators as a backup for the vagaries of power generation, and cushioned some of the blow of higher fuel prices, most famously in Pakistan. Even so, distributed solar cannot power buses and agricultural equipment or run machinery in small and medium-sized enterprises. The resurgence of conflict in the Gulf also has implications for fertilizer prices, impacting farmers around the world. In the U.S., the administration has been arguing that higher fertilizer prices reflect insufficient competition, but economists argue that the primary cause is a global supply shock resulting from the war in the Persian Gulf. While the disruption of urea supplies was offset by increased production in Egypt and Nigeria, the price of phosphate (the production of which depends on sulfur from the Gulf) remains high, as noted by Michael Werz of the Council on Foreign Relations. Werz points out that prices could lead to farmers skimping on phosphate for a second straight season, potentially exacerbating food shortages in 2027. And all this is happening ahead of what could be the strongest El Nino phenomenon ever, threatening farmers across the Global South. The World Food Program projected in early August that almost 50 million more people could be pushed into acute hunger as a result of the weather pattern. The consequences of this renewed escalation are another sign that this war of choice in the Middle East has had immense economic and human costs in the United States and overseas. The absence of a clear exit strategy — and indeed, even of coherent aims — has raised questions about America’s global preeminence as the waves of destabilization emanating from Washington are blowing back home. --- ### What NATO leaves behind as it pulls back from Kosovo **Published:** September 16, 2026 | **Author:** Sandra Davidovic | **Section:** Europe **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/kosovo-nato/.md This summer, tensions in Kosovo have spiked even as a NATO-led peacekeeping mission began to withdraw from the country. In July, police detained 37 Serbs at a commemoration in Gazimestan, and days later searched worshippers at a monastery near Prizren. Later that month, a Serb farmer from the village of Dren was pulled from his home by Kosovo Police, tied to a tree and beaten badly enough to require intensive care in Belgrade. Then, in August, a state-owned excavator demolished seventeen Serb-owned houses, claiming they were illegal. The European Union called the conduct of the Kosovo state in all of these cases concerning, but it did nothing to stop them. It was against this background that the KFOR mission — the NATO-led peacekeeping mission created in the wake of the Western intervention in Kosovo in 1999 — announced its gradual withdrawal from the bridge in Mitrovica, which has become a symbol of the division between ethnic Serbs in the country’s north and ethnic Albanians in the south. Justifying the move, KFOR cited an improved security situation in the country. Serbs protested, while Belgrade called the move premature. After nearly three decades of international administration, why should KFOR’s stepping back cause such fear? Kosovo has been the site of one of the most ambitious international state-building projects undertaken by the United Nations, with more than $2 billion spent in the first decade alone; per capita, it has received 25 times more money and 50 times more troops than Afghanistan did. NATO held the security framework in place, and the United States stood behind the effort, having pushed its allies to bomb Yugoslavia in 1999 and later backed Kosovo’s independence. After 27 years, what is it leaving behind? --- ### Trump's govt makes 'treasonous' claim of weapons shortages **Published:** September 16, 2026 | **Author:** Ben Freeman | **Section:** Military Industrial Complex **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/cost-of-iran-war/.md In the last two days, a pair of government reports confirmed what many outside analysts have claimed: the Iran war has been extraordinarily costly for the U.S. military and for the American public. A Congressional Budget Office (CBO) analysis released Tuesday afternoon found that the Iran war has already cost the Department of Defense (DoD) $38 billion. While this is significantly lower than the $100-billion-plus price tag independent experts have calculated, CBO notes that its estimates were limited because “DoD did not respond to CBO’s requests for information.” Without help from the DoD, CBO could not include a number of known war costs in its analysis, including repairing damage to U.S. military bases in the region. Those costs alone could top $200 billion, according to experts. What CBO could confirm was that the war has been a disaster for the U.S. economy and military readiness. The CBO analysis estimates that the inflation rate is now expected to be a full half-point higher in 2027 than it was before the war began, almost entirely because of higher global energy costs resulting from the war. “Because the price of almost every product reflects shipping costs, increases in petroleum prices — a significant input in transporting goods — indirectly affect the prices of most goods and services,” CBO writes. The story for military readiness is just as bleak. According to CBO’s analysis, the U.S. used between one-half and two-thirds of its missile interceptor inventory throughout the war with Iran, which presents an enormous opportunity cost. “The shortfall would become especially problematic if a conflict arose with an opponent whose arsenal included large numbers of ballistic and cruise missiles,” according to the report, which notes that China maintains such an arsenal. A separate report released by the DoD Inspector General (IG) Monday afternoon offers even more details about the costs of the war in terms of military readiness. The report provides the first public confirmation from within DoD that the war has produced critical shortages of some weapons. According to the report, it has “resulted in strategic inventory shortfalls and revealed industrial base bottlenecks for munitions resupply.” While numerous outside experts had warned of the DoD’s munitions shortages, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth and President Donald Trump have repeatedly rejected the notion that the U.S. military is running low on key weapons. In June, Hegseth told Face the Nation that the munitions shortage was “a manufactured story that the media wants to peddle and ultimately our stockpiles are great, and they're only getting stronger.” Earlier this month, Trump claimed on Truth Social that the military has “virtually unlimited amounts of Mid to High Grade Ammunition.” He called those who reported there were shortfalls "treasonous." The president remained unmoved even after the IG report’s release on Monday, posting on Truth Social that the U.S. military is producing "more Exquisite and Elite Weapons than at any time in our History." The IG report, however, paints a radically different story of the Iran war than the one portrayed by Trump and Hegseth. In addition to highlighting the munitions shortfalls — which it sourced directly from the Office of the Under Secretary for Acquisition and Sustainment, the office responsible for purchasing weapons for the U.S. military — the report notes that the Iran war has resulted in more than 50 U.S. military aircraft being damaged or destroyed. In addition, “USCENTCOM reported that Iranian strikes damaged and destroyed hundreds of buildings and structures at U.S. bases in Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, UAE, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Oman, and Jordan,” according to the report. As the IG report notes, the greatest costs have been borne by the 18 service members who lost their lives in the conflict, as well as the more than 400 service members who were wounded in action in just the first four months of the conflict. The Defense Casualty Analysis System now shows more than 800 servicemembers have been injured in the Iran war. Back in the U.S., the war continues to prove extraordinarily costly to the American economy. The jump in inflation that CBO identified has translated to gas prices soaring more than 40% since the war began. Last week, the chief economist at Moody's Analytics, Mark Zandi, put the total economic costs of the war to American consumers — including higher gas prices and the resulting rise in the price of just about everything that Americans buy — at $115 billion, or about $860 per household. In short, whether you’re a service member or an average American just trying to pay for gas and groceries, Trump’s war of choice in Iran has already been immensely costly, and those costs will only continue to grow the longer the war drags on. --- ### As US stockpiles dwindle, Trump rushes weapons to Israel, Saudi **Published:** September 16, 2026 | **Author:** Blaise Malley | **Section:** QiOSK **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/trump-israel-arms-sale/.md As government watchdogs warn about dwindling U.S. stockpiles of major weapons systems, the Trump administration is moving ahead with billions of dollars in new arms sales to Saudi Arabia and Israel, adding further demand to U.S. weapons production lines. Earlier this month, the State Department approved a $5 billion military sale to Saudi Arabia, including five thousand 2,000-pound bombs. Then on Tuesday, the Washington Post’s John Hudson reported that the administration was also readying a $2.8 billion package of weapons for Israel, which will also reportedly include some 40,000 2,000-pound bombs, which can spread shrapnel in an area up to 400 yards. Experts have found Israel used such weapons repeatedly during their brutal campaign in Gaza, including for some of the worst attacks on Palestinian civilians. “The size of the package eclipses previous sales of 2,000-pound munitions to Israel during the Biden administration and the Trump administration, including a controversial $2.04 billion sale in 2025 that bypassed the normal congressional review process,” according to the Post. The deal will also reportedly be funded using U.S. taxpayer dollars. Congress will have 30 days from the date of notification to review the Saudi sale, and, once the body is formally notified, 15 days to look over the Israel agreement. During that timeframe, any senator can force a vote on either deal via a joint resolution of disapproval. “I would be surprised if there isn't something introduced on both fronts,” a senior Democratic Senate staffer told RS. The announced sale to Israel comes as U.S. weapons transfers to Israel have become increasingly contentious among congressional Democrats and overwhelmingly unpopular among the party’s voters. Earlier this year, 36 Democratic senators backed a resolution aimed at blocking a $150 million sale of 1,000-pound bombs to Israel, a number that has steadily increased since the start of the Israeli war on Gaza in 2023. There is evidence of growing bipartisan dissatisfaction with the U.S.-Israel relationship. Minutes before the Post report, right-wing commentator Tucker Carlson posted on X that “an informed federal official” had told him the administration was preparing to announce a massive arms deal, saying there was “no precedent” for the size of the transfer. “The 40,000 new bombs the Trump administration is sending will be used to do the same in Lebanon , and likely in other countries in the region,” Carlson wrote “If you wanted to extend the Iran war into the indefinite future, this is exactly what you’d do. “ But the Trump administration has shown little willingness to oppose Israel or rein in the country’s prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu. And from the Israeli leader’s perspective, sources say, the timing of the announcement is logical. “I think the timing makes a lot of sense when you consider that the elections in Israel are a month away,” the Senate staffer told RS. “What better scalp for Netanyahu to come show than ‘look at what I got the Americans to do, they gave us another almost $3 billion.’” Scrutiny on the sale to Riyadh is also likely to increase given the recent acceleration of the conflict in Yemen and on the Red Sea. The Houthis, known formally as Ansar Allah, have made rapid gains across the country. “More establishment folks might push back because of the Ansar Allah advancements and say that the Saudis need our help on this,” the Senate source said. But the new campaign follows years of unsuccessful Saudi-led military intervention in Yemen. From 2015 until the two sides reached a truce in 2022, the Saudi-led, U.S.-backed coalition carried out more than 24,000 air attacks in Yemen, killing almost 9,000 civilians. Washington has been in a ceasefire with the Houthis since May 2025 after a monthslong military campaign proved ineffective. Both sides have so far appeared to abide by the agreement even as the conflict has intensified, though a major new U.S. weapons package for Saudi Arabia that deepens Washington’s support for Riyadh’s renewed campaign could test that arrangement. --- ### Massie tells RS why he went after Hegseth and not Trump **Published:** September 15, 2026 | **Author:** Kelley Beaucar Vlahos | **Section:** Washington Politics **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/massie-impeachment-hegseth/.md Rep. Thomas Massie (R-Ky.) tells Responsible Statecraft that he is initiating eight articles of impeachment against Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth because Congress has “exhausted every other remedy to make things right.” After a speech on the floor Tuesday, Massie said is forcing a vote on the articles in the House, which would likely happen on Thursday before the chamber recesses for the midterms. The resolution is quite a brief against Hegseth, covering U.S. military actions in Iran, Yemen, and Venezuela, as well as accusing Hegseth of minimizing civilian deaths and abridging freedom of speech. Impeachment votes are privileged in the House, which means the measure can bypass the rules and go straight to a floor vote after debate. The articles would have to get a motion, however, which would require a majority vote. It is not clear how many Democrats would vote for it. Democrats just killed a resolution to impeach President Donald Trump by one of their own, Rep. Al Green (D-Texas). We spoke to Massie on Tuesday. Responsible Statecraft: Why are you bringing this about right now? Rep. Thomas Massie: Because we have exhausted every other legislative remedy to make things right. We are at the point now where Hegseth is just ignoring the law. He's ignored the concurrent (War Powers) resolution. He ignored the 60-day limit. They never reached the threshold required under section 2-C under the War Powers resolution of 1973. He's severely degraded the DoD's ability to winnow out civilian targets from their target list. There is an active and ongoing war that should be stopped immediately, and I think this is an effective way to do it. It's literally the only legislative remedy that I could think of that might work. RS: I would imagine the timing is important because the House is leaving until after the midterm elections in November. Massie: Yeah, and the Speaker has to schedule a vote within 48 hours. I suspect there will be a motion to table; that's usually what these resolve to, if they're not supported. RS: So what happens then? Massie: Well, I would encourage people who are even unsure about the bill to vote against the motion to table, and hear the debate. RS: Let’s get back to the merits of the case here. This is pretty wide-ranging, so you hit the constitutionality of the war, the civilian deaths, the kidnapping of (former Venezuelan President Nicolas) Maduro, the airstrikes on so-called narco boats, even your freedom of speech where Senator Mark Kelly is concerned. You're really going at him with both barrels here. Massie: There's two categories of articles here. One category, which covers six of the articles, is that he basically followed illegal orders from the president. And these are illegal orders that were issued by the president, but Hegseth is under obligation not to follow them since they were illegal. And there's a category of impeachment articles here that are solely attributable to Hegseth himself where he degraded the infrastructure of the DoD which is supposed to minimize the civilian casualties. That's his. I don't think Trump was involved in that. And then the attack on Mark Kelly, where he weaponized the DoD to squelch the speech of a senator and a veteran. That's solely Secretary Hegseth's doing. So there are things in here which are top-level issues with the administration all the way to Trump, but then there are some that are uniquely Peter Hegseth’s high crimes or misdemeanors. Peter Hegseth wins the award for most crimes committed. And he just committed one too many; I couldn't take it anymore. RS: That begs a question, why didn't you just go after Trump? Massie: Well, I kind of already answered that question. Some of these things, like the civilian targeting, are Hegseth’s alone, and some of it, Trump would probably ascribe to Hegseth and not himself to save his own skin. I just don't think it's politically feasible or viable or even advisable to try to impeach Trump. RS: A reporter just asked newly confirmed Attorney General Todd Blanche about your articles of impeachment and you. Aside from him saying he thinks Hegseth is doing “a phenomenal job,” he said he disagreed with the characterization that we are in a war, and that a majority of Congress would disagree as well. What do you make of these continuing assertions by the White House, the administration, even members of Congress, that we can't call it a war? Massie: Well, somebody better give the president that memo. He calls it a war every week. It's beyond playing with semantics. It's beyond trying to be cute legally. There's no way you can say this is not a war. Even the raid in Venezuela was an act of war. We overturned the government and put boots on the ground. But at least it seems to be over with now that we have their oil and control of their government. He's wrong about a majority of Congress not thinking it's a war. A majority of Congress passed a concurrent resolution in the House and in the Senate telling them to stop under the War Powers Act. So with semantics or not, they've been told to stop. They've claimed to stop the war by day 60, and now they say that every time they strike Iran it’s an unconnected military action to the others. If you want a little something in the weeds here, I read every communication from the White House to Congress. They are sending us notices every time they do a strike pursuant to the War Powers Resolution of 1973. Now they're obligated to do that, and I noticed at least three of these they said were motivated by a strike on a neutrally-flagged vessel. They're claiming the authority to engage in hostilities on behalf of neutrally flagged vessels. And the War Powers Resolution says that it has to be an attack on U.S. soil or soldiers or infrastructure. They're admitting right there in three of these communications to Congress that their predicate was an attack on something that wasn't American. RS: Did those (War Powers) communications end when they declared the so-called ceasefire, or do they keep coming? Massie: They keep coming. In fact they refer to the ceasefire in two of these communications after the ceasefire. RS: That flies in the face of what they're saying publicly Massie: Yeah, if it's not a war, how is Trump gonna end it after the election like he told everybody in Texas last week? --- ### Vance claims US 'on top' of Red Sea crisis. Houthis say otherwise. **Published:** September 15, 2026 | **Author:** Blaise Malley | **Section:** QiOSK **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/jd-vance-yemen-houthis/.md Vice President JD Vance said Monday that Washington was in direct contact with the Houthis as the group solidified its gains across Yemen’s Red Sea coast, arguing that the U.S. is “on top of” the rapidly deteriorating situation in the country. “We’ve been in constant contact with the Emiratis, the Saudis, and others who are affected in the region,” Vance told reporters. “We’ve also been engaged in direct conversations with the Houthis themselves,” he added, describing the situation as “fluid” and “dynamic.” However, the Houthi political bureau has denied the White House’s claims that the two sides are in direct contact. The Houthis, a group also known as Ansar Allah, have made a series of rapid gains in recent days, seizing the Red Sea port of Mokha and several strategic islands near the Bab el-Mandeb strait, one of the world’s most important shipping chokepoints. The advance has renewed large-scale fighting in Yemen and triggered Saudi airstrikes, while the Houthis have also launched missiles and drones at targets inside Saudi Arabia. On Tuesday, a Saudi military spokesperson said attacks had injured 13 people across three cities in the Kingdom, while the Houthis say Riyadh launched more than 50 strikes during a 24-hour period Monday. More than 100,000 people have been displaced as the conflict has intensified. The U.S. has been in a ceasefire with the Houthis since May 2025, when President Donald Trump announced the end of its daily bombing campaign in Yemen, which killed 208 civilians. Trump suggested recently that Washington would remain committed to the ceasefire and refrain from direct attacks in Yemen. He added that “most ships go through” the Red Sea, with the exception of Saudi vessels. However, maritime shipping experts say that while non-Saudi ships are getting through the Bab el-Mandeb strait, insurance prices are expected to spike after the Houthi takeover. Regular traffic through the strait was already depressed, and is expected to be impacted even further. Twenty-one commodity ships traveled through the Bab-el-Mandeb strait on Monday, according to Kpler, down from 28 on Sunday, and an average of 70 before the most recent crisis in the Red Sea. Trump reportedly recently declined to directly intervene in the conflict despite urging from Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. “So far, Trump demurred when MBS asked him to reinitiate military action against Houthi positions,” Annelle Sheline, Middle East research fellow at the Quincy Institute, told Responsible Statecraft. “Even if Trump eventually feels pressured by rising oil prices to attack Yemen in hopes of getting Ansar Allah to allow Saudi Arabia to export oil through the Bab al-Mandeb, such military operations are likely to be ineffective, as they were under Biden in 2024 and under Trump in 2025.” Instead of repeating a failed strategy, Sheline added, Washington should push Riyadh to “to try a new approach: listen to the Houthis. Lift the blockade. Stop pouring resources into the anti-Houthi militias. Develop a working relationship with Ansar Allah, and use that to reduce their relationship with Tehran.” --- ### How the US tried (and failed) to learn from 'The Battle of Algiers' **Published:** September 15, 2026 | **Author:** Martin Di Caro | **Section:** Media **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/battle-of-algiers-pentagon-screening/.md The stern Colonel Mathieu, in shades and camouflage, stands cross-armed as flashbulbs pop a few feet away. The photographers’ lenses and newsreel cameras are focused on a handcuffed resistance leader standing next to him. An officer barks, “No more photographs,” as one of the journalists packed into the military command room rises from his seat. “Mr. Ben M’hidi, isn’t it cowardly to use your women’s baskets to carry bombs, which have taken so many innocent lives?” A bespectacled Larbi Ben M’hidi coolly responds, “Isn't it even more cowardly to attack defenseless villages with napalm bombs that kill many thousands of times more? Obviously planes would make things easier for us. Give us your bombers, sir, and you can have our baskets.” A second reporter asks, “Does the FLN still have some chance of defeating the French army?” “The FLN has more of a chance of defeating the French army than the French have of changing the course of history,” Ben M’hidi answered. If the offended French delegates to the Venice Film Festival had gotten their way 60 Septembers ago, this important scene in a remarkable film may not have entered cinematic history. But festival management did not succumb to their pressure, and on Sept. 10, 1966, “The Battle of Algiers,” directed by the Italian neorealist Gillo Pontecorvo, won the prestigious Golden Lion award. The film was banned in France. Long after the height of decolonization, “The Battle of Algiers” still scintillates in grainy black and white. With only one professional actor among the cast, Pontecorvo enlisted hundreds of ordinary Algerians, their memories fresh, to recreate the Front de Libération Nationale’s (FLN) existential battle against their colonizers. Saadi Yacef’s role must have come naturally. He was the FLN’s military chief in Algiers. The struggle — both in real life and as depicted in Pontecorvo’s masterpiece, shot in the narrow passageways of the Casbah — inspired national liberation movements, such as the Palestine Liberation Organization, while raising questions that continue to confront our modern world. When is armed resistance legitimate? When does resistance become terrorism? Can torture ever be justified? Why do colonial or imperial powers wage asymmetrical “forever wars” against weaker yet stubborn foes? As soon as the film debuted in the summer of ‘66, French critics attacked Pontecorvo for romanticizing the FLN’s heroes who had much innocent blood on their hands. The elite paratroopers under the fictional Colonel Mathieu (a composite character based on two real commanders) ruthlessly crushed the FLN’s terror network in the Casbah in 1957. But les colons did not change the course of history. The colonizers eventually gave way to the decolonizers, ending 132 years of French rule when they departed Algeria in 1962. Their defeat flowed from the methods they used to put down the revolt, namely torture and disproportionate retaliation. They could not, in the end, impose a political solution through violence against insurgents committed to expelling them from their country. As Americans reflect on the failures of the “global war on terrorism,” it is worth remembering that U.S. military leadership once tried to learn from Pontecorvo’s film. As Iraq disintegrated into chaos in late 2003, the Pentagon held a screening of “The Battle of Algiers” to “discuss the implicit issues at the core of the film – the problematic but alluring efficacy of brutal and repressive means in fighting clandestine terrorists in places like Algeria and Iraq,” according to the New York Times. The officers in attendance would have seen Pontecorvo’s searing depiction of torture. They must have noted the French commanders, utterly inured to civilian deaths, congratulating themselves upon the apparent success of their counter-insurgency campaign: “The FLN is decapitated in Algiers. We’ll hear no more of it.” Then the dramatic finale: mass independence demonstrations suddenly broke three years of relative calm. Hundreds of women making “frightening rhythmic cries” confronting French riot police. A narrator intones, “Two more years of struggle still lay ahead. Then… the Algerian nation was born.” Did the U.S. military brass absorb the moral of Pontecorvo’s story: the impossibility of imposing your will on a foreign people, even with overwhelming firepower at your disposal? If they did, U.S. military conduct showed otherwise, undermining President George W. Bush’s claim that the United States was helping Iraq become a free society. The battle for Iraqis’ hearts and minds was lost almost as soon as it began. U.S. tactics catalyzed, rather than squelched, a gathering Sunni insurgency. “Clearing out villages and towns involved house-to-house searches that frequently violated Iraqis’ social norms of privacy (especially of women and girls) and honor (especially men). Many thousands of Iraqi men and boys were arrested in front of their families and sent to detention camps or prisons like Abu Ghraib without any evidence of wrongdoing,”the late historian John Tirman wrote in his 2011 study, “The Deaths of Others.” “Some 120,000 Iraqis were detained. In the house-to-house searches, if Iraqis resisted in any way, violence could readily follow,” Tirman continued. “The procedure itself was violent.” Photos of detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib, which had been a torture and execution center under Saddam, sparked international outrage in April 2004, while further strengthening the insurgency. Foreign jihadists flocked to Iraq to commit suicide bombings while the new Shia-dominated government in Baghdad did its part in fomenting civil war. “The Ministry of the Interior, which controlled the country’s internal security, was populated by Shia death squads who were killing Sunnis,” notes Peter Bergen in “All the Presidents’ Wars.” It took years for the Pentagon to change course. With the help of the Sunni “Awakening” movement that turned against al-Qaeda in Iraq, the Pentagon’s troop “surge” combined with the construction of concrete walls separating Sunni and Shia neighborhoods to dramatically reduce violence. Yet Bergen concludes, “the surge didn’t heal the political wounds in Iraq… you couldn’t just kill your way to peace.” The French, too, believed they had won the battle. In reality, they corrupted themselves, humiliated their nation, and lost the war. When reports of abuses in Algeria — torture, disappearances, rogue police bombings — reached France, public opinion spiraled down. “In the Algerian War what led — probably more than any other single factor — to the ultimate defeat of France was the realization, in France and the world at large, that methods of interrogation were being used that had been condemned under the Nazi Occupation,” said historian Alistair Horne in the preface to the 2006 edition of his classic book, “A Savage War of Peace.” The author sent a copy to then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld to warn him of the evils of torture — to no avail. No analogy is perfect. The French spilled blood intending to stay in Algeria forever. The United States envisioned eventually going home while leaving a stable, democratic Iraq in its wake. It didn’t work. Washington continues to overlook the lessons “The Battle of Algiers” so effectively conveys, whether by enabling Israel’s brutality in Gaza or trying to bomb Iran into submission. Meanwhile, at this year’s Venice Film Festival, Israeli documentarians — in the tradition of Gillo Pontecorvo — are receiving 25-minute standing ovations as they try to shock their countrymen’s consciences. Where is the American Pontecorvo? --- ### Ukraine war spreads to Arctic as nuclear tensions escalate **Published:** September 15, 2026 | **Author:** Pavel Devyatkin | **Section:** Europe **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/russia-ukraine-arctic/.md Last week, the war in Ukraine reached deep inside the Russian Arctic. On September 9, Ukrainian drones struck two gas processing plants in the Yamalo-Nenets region, located about 1,900 miles from the Ukrainian border. This is Ukraine’s deepest strike on Russia since the war began. Arctic energy infrastructure in the Yamal region produces around 80% of Russia's natural gas. Russian military analysts believe the Ukrainian drones were launched from Sumy, northern Ukraine, and reached all the way into Yamal with the help of Starlink. Ukraine’s Special Operations Forces announced, “Until today, this was considered an absolutely safe rear.” The attack also shook European energy markets, as Europe buys large volumes of gas from the Yamal region. President Donald Trump later told Ukraine to stop attacking Russia’s diesel infrastructure, saying fuel shortages due to the strikes were “hurting the world,” without explicitly acknowledging the fact that the spike in global energy prices is largely driven by the Iran war. This is the second time the Arctic has been drawn into the Ukraine war. Back in June 2025, Ukrainian drones, smuggled into Russia by truck, hit the Olenya air base on the Kola Peninsula, targeting Russia’s long-range strategic bombers that Moscow had considered safe because of their remote Arctic location. --- ### Unchecked, Joe Wilson's Serbia crusade may blow up in our faces **Published:** September 14, 2026 | **Author:** Giorgio Cafiero | **Section:** Europe **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/us-serbia-relations/.md On August 27, Reps. Joe Wilson (R-S.C.) and Bill Keating (D-Mass.) introduced the SRBIJA Act, which would impose sanctions and visa restrictions on “malign actors” accused of undermining democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and stability in the Western Balkans. The proposed legislation also threatens sanctions on Serbia if Belgrade maintains its relationships with Russia, China, and Iran. The initiative comes as Serbia prepares for snap parliamentary elections next month, following nearly two years of anti-government protests and shortly after Washington and Belgrade launched a new Strategic Dialogue. In Serbia’s polarized political environment, supporters of President Aleksandar Vučić portray Wilson and Keating as hostile foreign actors seeking to dictate Belgrade’s foreign policy, while opponents of the government largely see the SRBIJA Act positively and hope it will “ultimately lead to downfall,” said Nikola Mikovic, a Serbian geopolitical analyst. The SRBIJA Act’s sponsors hope their legislative push will pressure Belgrade to abandon its delicate balancing act between the West, Moscow, and Beijing. But the bill could instead give Vučić an opportunity to strengthen the geopolitical narrative that he has shrewdly navigated a multipolar world, which resonates with many Serbian voters and has helped keep him at the helm. --- ### How to prevent another disastrous war in the 'in-between' states **Published:** September 14, 2026 | **Author:** Artin DerSimonian, Mark Episkopos | **Section:** Europe **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/us-policy-russia-neighbors/.md Only a few days ago, Moldova’s ambassador to the U.S. said it was likely “not an accident” that a Russian jet-powered drone flew across his country’s territory while Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s plane was preparing to depart from Chișinău’s airport. Armenia, meanwhile, continues to face Russian pressure over its increasing pro-Western orientation. And tensions continue to linger on Belarus’ western and southern borders following Ukrainian allegations this summer that the country is being used to advance Russia’s war effort. Far from a disconnected smattering of events, these tensions stem from a larger regional crisis that predates — but was accelerated by — the Ukraine war. Bad U.S. policy played a crucial role in worsening this predicament. In the decades following the end of the Cold War, the U.S. pursued a dual-track approach toward former Soviet states. On the one hand, the West sought to integrate Russia — the strongest of all the new states and the USSR’s natural successor — as a junior partner into the U.S.-led liberal, capitalist world order. On the other, the U.S. and its European allies pursued a hedging policy across central and eastern Europe that included enlarging NATO up to Russia’s western borders, out of fear that Moscow’s historical autocratic and expansionist impulses would resurrect once more. That dual policy “ultimately failed,” and the hedging “proved counterproductive,” as noted by Thomas Graham, one of America’s leading Russia scholars and practitioners. The Kremlin became convinced that America’s “true goal” was “eroding and containing Russian power,” a perception that drove Russia’s leaders to be “more determined to restore their might, push back against US initiatives in the former Soviet space, and drive wedges between NATO allies.” Now that the post-Cold War unipolar era is definitively over, the U.S. must formulate a new policy toward the states stuck between NATO and Russia. This will be the key task — alongside preventing an escalation of the Ukraine war and rebalancing the trans-Atlantic relationship — for American policymakers focusing on Eurasia in the years ahead. The sum of these efforts will weigh upon two critical U.S. objectives: U.S. conventional retrenchment from Europe and the establishment of the conditions for long-term strategic stability between Russia and the West. It was with these considerations in mind that we launched a Quincy Institute initiative focused on shaping U.S. policy toward Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, and Moldova — the so-called “in-between states.” In our newly-published inaugural report, we lay out a blueprint to help guide Washington’s policy toward this region in ways that will help advance America’s interests, support peace and prosperity, and avoid repeating the mistakes of the past. A better approach to the in-between states would rely on a few key principles. One is that the U.S. has no vital interest at stake that necessitates it take on the risks of becoming a security guarantor for these countries. Another is that Washington should promote economic connectivity projects and political normalization efforts to strengthen Eurasian regional stability — and encourage in-between states to pursue multi-vector foreign policies that seek positive relations with all neighboring states. Equally important here is the U.S. relationship with Russia. U.S. engagement in Eurasia must be accompanied by broader confidence-building measures with Russia, aimed at mitigating the risk of security spirals and misunderstandings. This will require sustained dialogue with Moscow about what Washington is and is not doing, and the extent of its involvement in the in-between states. The Russians have demonstrated in both Georgia and Ukraine that they are willing to resort to the use of force to defend their interests in the in-between states, whereas NATO is not. The Kremlin has repeatedly made clear that it views the enlargement of the Western alliance into the in-between states as a red line. It is, therefore, eminently sensible to take off the table the future expansion of NATO into former Soviet republics. Not only does it harm the foundations of Russia-West stability, but it also leads to greater instability for transatlantic partners and the in-between states themselves. When it comes to political and economic matters, however, the U.S. and the in-between states likely have greater room for maneuver. In the context of the current security landscape, negotiating a compromise settlement to the Ukraine war will go a long way in assisting the U.S. with its other priorities across Eurasia and in the in-between states. Washington’s greatest success to date in the in-between states is the August 8, 2025, announcement of the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) at a White House ceremony with Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, and President Donald Trump. Across Central Asia, the Caspian Basin, and the South Caucasus, American and European investments are increasing and political engagement is deepening. An important opportunity exists for TRIPP to become a key supply chain along the Middle Corridor, contributing to American efforts to strengthen U.S. access to the critical minerals essential to a modern economy and armed forces. To ensure that this deepening engagement brings economic development and security to the South Caucasus, Washington must help Yerevan and Baku implement their peace agreement and facilitate normalization of Armenia-Turkey relations. The Trump administration has achieved important successes through its engagement with Belarus, a country the U.S. had previously all but cast aside as an appendage to Russia. Pragmatic and consistent diplomatic work led to the release of several hundred political prisoners in exchange for sanctions relief. There remains much additional space for the development of political, diplomatic, and commercial ties between Washington and Minsk. A deliverable from a future potential meeting between Presidents Trump and Aleksandr Lukashenko may be full diplomatic normalization, which would open the door to increased trade and investment opportunities. Final resolution of the remaining political-territorial disputes across the region — Transnistria in Moldova and Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia — remains elusive. Nevertheless, a negotiated end to the Ukraine war alongside broader dialogue with Russia on European security matters would set the right conditions for progress in these other areas. It’s high time for a new paradigm in the U.S. approach to the in-between states. Incorporating the strategic principles we lay out above into a new policy is vital to advancing American interests, fostering regional prosperity, and mitigating the risk of future crises in the Ukrainian mold. --- ### How Trump's Iran operation turned into a forever war **Published:** September 14, 2026 | **Author:** Harrison Berger | **Section:** Middle East **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/iran-forever-war/.md As the United States has struggled to secure its four primary objectives in the Iran War — achieving regime change, dismantling long-range ballistic missiles, eliminating nuclear enrichment, and halting Tehran’s support for regional proxies — U.S. officials have rolled out a series of tried-and-failed theories for how to achieve those goals. In the past four weeks, Americans have watched their government attempt to inflict an economic victory against Iran through Operation Economic Outcast, tightening a sanctions regime which for decades has strangled Iran’s economy without resolving the underlying dispute. Now, as that strategy flags, we have seen the Trump administration return to its older strategy of kinetic strikes against Iran. Those strikes, too, have failed to achieve their desired objectives. Facing the prospect of a self-inflicted defeat, the U.S. has now proposed two new paths forward. The first, reported by the Wall Street Journal last Wednesday, is an option to extend and formalize the current series of on-and-off strikes U.S. officials call this “mowing the lawn,” or a strategy of using periodic bouts of disproportionate force, as Israel did in Gaza prior to launching its full-scale, seemingly endless campaign after the Oct. 7 attacks of 2023. To support that option, the Pentagon has extended troop deployments in the Middle East through 2027. The second option reportedly considered by the White House is for the U.S. to declare victory and walk away, with the Wall Street Journal reporting that Trump favors the idea. Among the supporters of the second option is Joe Kent, the former Director of the National Counterterrorism Center, who resigned in protest of the Iran War, and who has argued on X that the U.S. should “reset the terms of the deal” with Iran “by removing our troops & ships from the region.” The argument that the U.S should walk away and “declare victory” is growing increasingly popular even in establishment circles. But given the historic limitations of sanctions to achieve political outcomes, coupled with Iran’s current demands, that strategy too appears unlikely to re-open the Strait of Hormuz and avert the economic consequences Iran’s leverage over the waterway will have on the global economy. Political scientists have long doubted whether U.S. economic pressure and sanctions can shape political outcomes, particularly when the targeted state has little reason to believe these measures will be reversed in exchange for good behavior; researchers like David Siegel are quick to acknowledge that they “don’t work,” while U.S. officials like Janet Yellen have conceded the same point, noting that, while sanctions against Iran had caused a “real economic crisis,” they produced political outcomes “much less than we would ideally like.” As Siegel — who most recently studied the failure of U.S. sanctions on Russia to redirect their state behavior toward U.S. and NATO interests — explains, “target states have strong incentives not to give in and sometimes even benefit from heightened levels of political support at home because they can now credibly blame their economic woes on a foreign imperial power.” Siegel argues that it's “probably more true today than ever before due to the fact that sanctioned states can turn to China.” The low likelihood of economic pressure opening up the Strait of Hormuz is depressed even further by the fact that one of Iran’s preconditions for opening the Strait of Hormuz is the removal of sanctions, which would require a vote from Congress, where the proposal would face an uphill battle. But perhaps the main reason walking away and declaring victory would fail to re-open the Strait and mitigate impending economic disaster is because Iran has tied freedom of navigation in the waterway to the U.S. reining in Israel, and the U.S. has long demonstrated it is unwilling to do so. The June 17 agreement between the U.S. and Iran only required the U.S. force an Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, and Washington failed to follow through. Now, subsequent provocations by the U.S. and Israel have led Iran to expand its ceasefire demands to other campaigns: in Iraq, in Yemen, and in Palestine. Securing a deal to re-open the Strait and end the war is further complicated by the growing view around the world that the “Art of The Deal” author is simply incapable of making deals. Results of a 2025 Politico survey of diplomats from 15 countries show foreign officials describing Trump’s deal-making process as “reactive, with no clear direction,” while Trump has so far failed to resolve a proxy war in Ukraine that he promised to end “within 24 hours” of taking office. The White House has similarly failed to reach a peace deal in Gaza. Under these conditions, the broader Iran War appears to be rapidly approaching what a chief executive of a Danish shipping firm described to the Financial Times as a “Ukraine-style stalemate.” Speaking to the outlet in August, the CEO of Torn explained how “the Gulf leadership has realised they need to prepare themselves for a prolonged situation that lasts not days or weeks but months or years,” adding that “with the U.S. acting the way it is, I think it is a dream world to imagine the world returns to the way it was 10 years ago in the foreseeable future.” The consequences of that “prolonged situation” will soon be felt even more by American consumers, as Iran’s control over the Strait of Hormuz has pushed diesel prices to their highest ever levels. Averting economic catastrophe will therefore require the U.S. to meet conditions it has so far been unwilling to accept; merely declaring victory and walking away won’t do the trick. --- ### Against the odds, BRICS overcomes sharp divisions in New Delhi **Published:** September 13, 2026 | **Author:** Sarang Shidore | **Section:** Global Crises **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2026-brics-summit/.md The 18th summit of BRICS, a grouping with ten members including Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Russia, and South Africa, concluded in New Delhi with a leaders declaration — a clear success for an event that brought together a deeply divided group of countries, including some currently fighting on either side of a war in the Middle East. Key world leaders attended, including Chinese President Xi Jinping, Russian President Vladimir Putin, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, and Egyptian leader Abdel Fattah el-Sisi. There was, of course, the expected pageantry. Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim even belted out a 1960s Bollywood hit at the leaders’ dinner party to the admiration of his Indian hosts. This success was not guaranteed. Just a few months previously, BRICS foreign ministers had failed to agree to a joint statement amid acrimonious exchanges between Iran and the United Arab Emirates, which have exchanged missile barrages amid the ongoing war in the Middle East. Despite these serious rifts, host India managed to pull off a declaration that everyone signed on to. The price of this success, however, was much-watered down language on the Middle East war. The summit declaration in Rio de Janeiro last year had come out swinging, stating that “we condemn the military strikes against the Islamic Republic of Iran since 13 June 2025, which constitute a violation of international law and the Charter of the United Nations.” In New Delhi this past weekend, the grouping merely expressed “deep concern over the continued escalation of tensions in Middle East/West Asia.” It recalled “our respective national positions” and called for “exercising maximum restraint, as well as avoiding actions that could further aggravate the situation.” Admittedly, India’s task was tougher than Brazil’s had been, with the war having escalated since late February 2026 to include the UAE as a combatant. It is extremely difficult for a club to reach any sort of consensus if two of its members are physically brawling. From this perspective, the New Delhi declaration was a win for India. But it was more a relief than a victory for BRICS as a whole. The grouping did not need the distraction at this critical juncture in its journey. Beyond the Iran-U.S. war, there were other notable aspects to the declaration. Mysteriously, all references to the Ukraine conflict were dropped. The European war had been consistently mentioned in BRICS declarations since Russia invaded in 2022. Last year, the text had even included language that largely reflected the Russian position on Ukrainian attacks on three sites. One welcome new feature of the text was a paragraph on Cuba, expressing "deep concern" on the "tightening of unilateral blockade measures (and) their adverse effects on the Cuban economy...and the worrying humanitarian impact on the Cuban people.” U.S. pressure on Cuba has grown manifold since last year. Havana is now a “partner country” within BRICS, a lower tier of membership. The text was clearly a nod to its concerns. But feelings against the embargo and blockade against Cuba run high in the United Nations. Practically all member states have repeatedly gone on record opposing them. Like last year, Israel was mentioned by name and criticized for its actions in Lebanon. The text also maintained the strong language on Gaza from earlier years. Concern was expressed at "arrangements that may prejudice the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people and legitimize or prolong occupation." There were no references to the U.S.-initiated "Board of Peace" in the text, even though BRICS states Egypt, Indonesia, and UAE are among its members, as are partner countries Kazakhstan and Vietnam. Finally, the text expressed strong criticism of the “imposition of unilateral coercive measures that are contrary to international law,” emphasizing that “unilateral economic sanctions and secondary sanctions, have far-reaching negative implications for the human rights, including the rights to development, health and food security, of the general population of targeted states.” It further characterized such measures as “undermin(ing) international law and the principles and purposes of the UN Charter.” This language was a clear dig at the United States and its European allies. Many Global South states feel highly vulnerable to the U.S.-led global sanctions regime. Having launched some successful initiatives like the New Development Bank, and with its major expansion phase now behind it, BRICS finds itself at a crossroads. The growing pains of expansion are manifest, and the outbreak of multiple wars in the world couldn’t have come at a worse time. It will take some time for new members to be adequately socialized in the grouping. Over the next year or two, BRICS will need to take a deep breath and find its footing again if it is not to lose its mojo. --- ### Will Houthis' rapid advance drag US, Saudi Arabia back into Yemen? **Published:** September 12, 2026 | **Author:** Mohammed Nail Abdulqader | **Section:** Middle East **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/houthis-red-sea-iran/.md This week, after launching an unprecedented series of strikes on Saudi Arabia, the Houthis embarked on a sweeping offensive in Yemen, seizing large swathes of territory along the Red Sea coast. These rapid changes have pushed Yemen’s war back into the regional arena, threatening Red Sea shipping and placing the country’s Saudi-backed, internationally-recognized government on the back foot. The rapid reversal came only days after the government declared a campaign to retake Sanaa, Yemen’s capital, amid a broader escalation in fighting across the country. A 2022 truce had reduced large-scale combat and allowed Saudi Arabia to distance itself from the conflict, but it left the capital under Houthi control and did nothing to establish centralized control over the country and its heavy weapons. Now, as the Houthis advance rapidly toward government strongholds in the south, Yemen’s military is scrambling to regroup and make progress on its planned offensive in the north. The question now is whether Saudi Arabia, the U.S., and other powers will now intervene to help blunt the Houthis’ rapid advances. --- ### Will 'America First' survive Trump's war-first presidency? **Published:** September 11, 2026 | **Author:** Blaise Malley | **Section:** QiOSK **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/america-first-jd-vance/.md In a Thursday address at the GOP midterm convention that exalted President Donald Trump and demeaned his opponents as “extremists who openly hate our nation,” Vice President JD Vance hardly spoke about foreign policy. He did not mention the war in Iran directly, and he only brought up foreign policy as an example of an issue that divides the party’s base. He urged voters not to “throw the baby out with the bathwater” because “you happen to disagree with us on a policy issue here or there.” The acknowledgement of foreign policy as a divisive issue in the MAGA coalition is a stark retreat for Vance, who staked his 2023 endorsement of Trump on the fact that “he started no wars despite enormous pressure from his own party and even members of his own administration,” framing the president’s America First record as a much-needed deviation from decades of bipartisan hawkishness. A few wars later, Vance appears to have backed down from the anti-war aspects of the America First movement. Meanwhile, in response to the Iran war and the administration’s supposed betrayal of its campaign promises, the Institute for Peace & Diplomacy has launched “Reclaiming America First,” an initiative meant to take back that mantle from what it describes as Trump's hawkish drift, and to articulate an alternative vision for American foreign policy. Arta Moeini, director of research at the Institute for Peace & Diplomacy and one of the project leads, laid out the parameters he believes should guide an “America First” approach during a Thursday panel marking the launch of the event: it should be neither ideological nor partisan, nor tied to any one individual; it should be grounded in realism; and it should prioritize core U.S. security interests and domestic renewal while rejecting unilateralism and nativism. “Trump has shown himself to be at least disingenuous about using the term ‘America First,’” Moeini said during the panel, adding that part of the inspiration for the discussion was to combat “the taint of that association of ‘America First’ with this version of Trump.” That question of who actually carries the tradition forward inevitably turned to Vance, long seen as its standard-bearer within the administration, but whose own words offer a measure of how far the movement’s foreign policy rhetoric has shifted since Trump’s return to office. While panelists mostly agreed that an “America First” foreign policy was likely only to come from a conservative U.S. president, the group's read on Vance as the steward of that vision was more measured. Moeini said Vance would have been “smart enough not to go to war" with Iran, even if he might not be the right person to fix U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. Michael Brendan Dougherty, a senior writer for the National Review, offered a grimly ironic assessment of how a more realist foreign policy could take hold in a hypothetical Vance administration. “If Vance is elected president after Donald Trump, he’s going to be looking at a munitions stockpile that is very depleted, and will be discouraging of him taking on unpredictable gambles. That’s not the way you want restraint to , but it is the way it’s going now,” he said. “The Iran war is bringing about a humiliation of America, and that will bring along at least some restraint.” Dougherty also pointed to the constraining effect of public opinion, saying that American opposition to war may have prevented Trump from taking even more dramatic steps in Iran, such as an invasion of Kharg Island. There is evidence that elements of Trump’s base have turned against him as a result of this war. A recent survey from Navigator Research found that roughly 20% of Trump 2024 voters regret their decision. Among that group, almost half cited the war with Iran as the primary reason for their regret. There were real policy disagreements over what "America First" meant. Daniel McCarthy, editor of Modern Age, warned that talk of a "multinodal" world echoes liberal internationalism and misreads an American public that is still proud of the country, while the panel also split over whether to encourage or deter a Polish or Japanese nuclear program. But all the panelists agreed that America First is a foreign policy movement that both predates and will outlive Trump. “America First as an ordering principle of American statecraft will long outlive MAGA and the current coalitional dynamics at play surrounding the president,” Reid Smith, Vice President for Foreign Policy at Stand Together, said. --- ### Milei has staked it all on Trump. Will he follow through? **Published:** September 11, 2026 | **Author:** Antonio De Loera-Brust | **Section:** Latin America **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/milei-trump-falklands/.md The territorial dispute between Argentina and the United Kingdom over the Falkland Islands (or Islas Malvinas in Spanish) continues to escalate. Last week, Argentine President Javier Milei, a close ally of U.S. President Donald Trump, announced a series of new measures aimed at pressuring Britain over the future of the islands. The most significant announcement was of new sanctions on companies involved in oil extraction in the waters around the Falklands, which Argentina has long claimed as its own. Argentina’s attempt to prevent the exploitation of the Falklands’ natural resources is a reminder that beneath the often farcical relitigating of sovereignty claims dating back to the 18th century is a very modern geopolitical conflict with real stakes for energy and maritime resources. Yet what was most remarkable about Milei’s announcement was what Milei did not announce — namely, a shift in U.S. policy regarding the Falklands. Given the hype that Milei built up ahead of his announcement, many observers speculated he would announce U.S. support for Argentina’s claim. Those expectations had been further raised by a steady trickle of reporting going back to April that the Trump administration has been considering recognizing Argentina’s claim to the Falklands, bolstered by Trump’s recent comment that the U.S. position on the islands was “one of many” under review. The Falklands question, though easily dismissed as a curiosity in the United States, has long presented a genuine dilemma for U.S. policymakers torn between its transatlantic alliance and the Western Hemisphere. Despite being officially neutral in the territorial dispute, the U.S. decided to side with Britain over Argentina in the 1982 conflict, providing significant material support to the British war effort. This support caused lasting damage to U.S. standing in Latin America. Now, geopolitical shifts in the United States, Europe and Latin America have all converged to Argentina’s advantage, and help explain why Milei sees an opportunity to push Britain over the Falklands without risking broader diplomatic isolation. It’s time to ask: what would it take to get Donald Trump to give Milei what he so clearly wants? Milei’s self-proclaimed ability to obtain U.S. support for Argentina’s claim has become a major part of Milei’s domestic pitch. As is often noted in Argentina, Milei’s recent focus on the Falklands is a new development. Milei had risen to power with bitter and divisive attacks on left-wing domestic opponents, whom the president blamed for Argentina’s economic problems. Milei’s belated embrace of the Falklands issue comes as his economic reforms have largely failed to deliver the widespread prosperity he promised. Milei’s bet is that close alignment with the U.S. will translate to U.S. support for Argentina’s territorial claim, reversing the recent pattern of Argentine diplomacy, which searched for allies in the Global South. In this effort, Milei may well be repeating the error of the Argentine military junta, which believed the U.S. would stay neutral or even support Argentina in the 1982 war over the islands. Milei is betting this time will be different. For the United States, however, most of the recent consideration about whether to back Argentina over Britain in the South Atlantic has not revolved around the Falklands at all. For Trump, the Falklands question is clearly about Iran, with reports pointing to his notable frustration with Britain for its perceived failure to support the U.S.-Israeli war. Yet regardless of Trump’s frustration, Britain remains a far more useful ally in the current Middle Eastern conflict than Argentina could ever hope to be. British bases on Cyprus and Diego Garcia have served as logistical hubs for U.S. operations, and even briefly came under fire from Iran and its allies. While Trump no doubt wants Britain to do more, he also wouldn’t want Britain to do less. Milei’s government has acted in lockstep with the United States on the diplomatic front, designating Iran’s IRGC a terrorist organization. Washington is clearly interested in such support, as indicated by the State Department’s trumpeting of Peru’s recent decision to break off diplomatic relations with Iran. Yet these diplomatic “wins” are more about recognizing U.S. dominance over the Western Hemisphere than anything else; neither Peru or Argentina can make any real military contribution to the actual armed conflict. Undersecretary of Defense Elbridge Colby effectively acknowledged as much in his recent Americas Quarterly essay, writing “we will not ask neighbors to project power out of this region.” This gives Britain the upper hand for now. Closer to home, though, the case for U.S. recognition of the Argentine claim is far more straightforward: the U.S. has a clear and permanent interest in close ties with Latin America. The Trump administration has embraced the Monroe Doctrine, the original purpose of which was to defend the newly independent states of Latin America from exactly the sort of European imperial predations that Britain accomplished by seizing the Malvinas from Argentina by threat of force in 1833. If the United States truly means to prioritize the Western Hemisphere over Europe or the Middle East, then trading Britain for Argentina makes much more sense. The Falklands also occupy another strategic waterway — the approaches to the Strait of Magellan and Cape Horn. Before the construction of the Panama Canal (another Trump obsession), the Falklands commanded the only maritime corridor between the Pacific and Atlantic oceans. Indeed, this is why Britain seized them in the first place, as part of its global network of maritime bases from Singapore to Suez to Cape Town to Gibraltar. The Falklands’ strategic importance was proved by the 1914 Battle of the Falklands, when the Royal Navy annihilated the German East Asia Squadron as it attempted to enter the Atlantic. More recently, U.S. aircraft carriers have traveled through the Strait of Magellan, a useful practice in case the Panama Canal becomes unavailable for any reason. Milei’s pitch to Donald Trump then seems to be this: in exchange for U.S. support against Britain, Argentina would offer unprecedented access to its South Atlantic territories to both the U.S. military and U.S. business interests. Yet there are good reasons to doubt that Milei, already increasingly unpopular domestically, can keep that promise. Many prominent leaders on the Argentine left who vocally support confrontation with Britain nevertheless see the U.S. as a similar threat to Argentine sovereignty, specifically warning against U.S. control of Argentine naval bases in Tierra del Fuego. Argentines are undoubtedly united on the Falklands across ideological lines, but they also envision the islands and the crucial sea lanes and natural resources around them returning to Argentine sovereignty, not U.S. control. The divisive and partisan governance style of both Milei and Trump makes any long-term U.S.-Argentine partnership fragile, particularly when, as seems likely, the Argentine left returns to power. For now, Milei seems to be waiting in vain for U.S. support. Trump has already done extraordinary political favors for Milei. From facilitating a $20 billion U.S. Treasury bailout to importing Argentine beef, Trump has done more for Milei’s political fortunes than any prior U.S. leader has for any Argentine counterpart. It is also clear that the calculus of 1982 no longer holds: Britain is militarily weaker, more diplomatically isolated, and less geopolitically relevant to U.S. security needs in 2026 than in 1982. Yet Milei still needs Trump far more than Trump needs Milei. Milei has increasingly staked his presidency on proving that his subordination to the United States will allow him to win the Falklands, the White Whale of Argentine foreign policy. Yet Milei’s needs are not Washington’s. The U.S. has no real reason to change position as long as it can string both of its nominal allies along. That is likely what Donald Trump, who is much better at talking about deals than closing them, will do. --- ### Britain banned settlement imports. Will Europe finally follow suit? **Published:** September 11, 2026 | **Author:** Anchal Vohra | **Section:** Europe **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/eu-sanctions-israel/.md Britain's decision this week to ban all imports from illegal Israeli settlements carries huge moral resonance, but the real test comes next: Will the European Union (EU) – the single largest market in the world and Israel's biggest trading partner – follow suit? The EU conducts trade worth tens of billions with Israel every year, but it has long hidden behind the need for consensus or the lack of a majority required to use its massive economic leverage to influence Israel's policies. The key question is whether the UK's decision will act as a catalyst and sway a sufficient number of European governments to act. The timing is critical. Last month, the Israeli government called for tenders to build more than 1,200 housing units in E1 – a 4.6 square mile area in the occupied West Bank that lies between Jerusalem and the large Israeli settlement of Ma’ale Adumim. Any such expansion would make a “contiguous Palestinian state virtually impossible,” as CNN reported last month. The EU has two options. It could find the unity needed to exert influence now, before Israel starts the construction and changes facts on the ground that later become difficult to reverse. Or it could squander the possibility of a two-state solution. In a speech at the House of Commons, British Foreign Secretary Ed Miliband delivered a scathing admonishment of the Israeli government, accusing it of turning a blind eye to the "ethnic cleansing of Palestinians" perpetrated by "settler terrorists" in the West Bank. Miliband cited United Nations reporting of an "average of six violent settler attacks against Palestinians per day this year, the highest on record." Settlement trade mostly consists of agricultural products and, as Reuters reported, represents only a fraction of the total bilateral trade between the UK and Israel. The UK's sanctions on companies and individuals that facilitate settlement expansion – including financial institutions – could prove to be more impactful. Israel’s banks and insurance companies that back construction projects in illegal settlements may think twice before risking their business interests in the UK. Yet, despite a scathing denouncement and a seemingly sweeping sanctions package, there is only so much the UK can do alone. The EU – a 27-member bloc of some of the most prosperous nations in the world – has much greater leverage. Last year, the EU and Israel traded more than €43 billion in goods. The popular debate has been about reducing arms sales to Israel, but Europe's real power is economic; using trade as leverage would offer a genuine chance of making the Israeli establishment rethink its settlement expansion and policies in occupied territories at large. Miliband said the UK coordinated with 11 other countries, including France and Canada, and shortly after, Paris announced that it will impose a ban on all imports from illegal settlements. Canada's foreign minister, Anita Anand, promised the introduction of "restrictions" in the coming months. Nine other states – Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Ireland, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden – expressed their intention to introduce national restrictions, support European restrictions, or at least "actively consider" a ban on trade in goods with settlements and other measures. The extent to which these countries will go against Israel remains unclear, but they need more countries to come on board for it to be a pan-European ban. There is no doubt that European countries have disapproved of Israeli methods and mass killings in Gaza and, lately, the exacerbation of settler violence in the West Bank. But the bloc as a whole has failed to turn its concern into a coherent policy that has an effect on the ground. Over the last three years, the EU and its member states have discussed several proposals about how they can persuade Israel to rein in its military campaign, send more aid to Gaza, and control the violent settlers unleashing havoc in the West Bank. Last year, the EU conducted a review of the EU-Israel Association Agreement, which provides the legal framework for economic and political relations. It later found Israel in breach of Article 2 of the treaty, which identifies respect for human rights and democratic principles as "essential elements." The EU leaders then discussed a slew of options, including fully suspending the agreement, but this required unanimity to push through and was never seriously considered. Under Viktor Orbán, Hungary was one of the principal opponents of suspending the EU–Israel Association Agreement, effectively blocking the unanimity required. (Hungary's new leader, Peter Magyar, has not joined the new national initiative but has been more willing to support EU action against Israel. This May, Hungary backed EU sanctions against some extremist settlers and entities.) The other option was a partial suspension of trade-related provisions, which required a qualified majority vote (QMV) – at least 15 affirmative votes representing 65% of the bloc's population. While Hungary was a convenient scapegoat, Germany's support for Israel, alongside Italy's, held back the bloc from moving forward. Suspending Israel's participation in the Erasmus+ student exchange programme or the Horizon academic research programme was also tabled. At the time, a senior EU official told me these were the "low-hanging fruit" and doable, but nothing moved forward. Some options were outside the scope of the association agreement – including halting visa-free travel for Israelis to the EU and banning imports from illegal Israeli settlements. According to an EU spokesperson, as of last week, the bloc had sanctioned a dozen individuals and nine entities related to illegal settlements, but there was no "clear outcome" to the discussions about other options on the table. He presumably meant a ban on imports from the settlements. This week, in a candid conversation, a senior EU official told me that the European Commission had later tabled a new proposal, specifically laying out options to deter Israel from expanding illegal settlements, including the ban on imports, but not even 15 member states are on board. In short, the EU has long discussed a hierarchy of possible measures, from the least to the most consequential, but has dithered on moving forward. It has a chance now, if it wants to stop Israel from expanding E1. If consensus and QMV cripple the EU from moving ahead as a bloc, the least European nations can do is take national measures. Will they? Trade in goods between the EU and Israel favored Europeans last year. Moreover, Europeans are likely to factor in a growing dependence on Israel's defense industry as relations with the U.S. decline and the U.S. itself runs short on critical munitions. Germany, Greece, Cyprus, Finland, and many others import Israeli defense equipment. For now, therefore, the chances of a pan-EU ban on imports from West Bank settlements remain low, and the odds of a suspension of trade with Israel are lower yet. --- ### Rubio's LatAm pep rally shows the limits of the Donroe Doctrine **Published:** September 11, 2026 | **Author:** Lee Schlenker | **Section:** Latin America **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/rubio-latin-america-trip/.md This week, Secretary of State Marco Rubio traveled to Colombia, Ecuador and Peru, where he pledged increased security assistance, signed critical minerals deals and warned the three countries’ recently-elected, ideologically-aligned leaders — two of them U.S. citizens — about China’s presence in the region. The tour, Rubio’s fourth to Latin America and the Caribbean since becoming secretary of state last year, comes as the Trump administration increasingly pivots U.S. foreign policy toward the Western Hemisphere, where it has expanded military operations on land and at sea to degrade “narco-terrorist” groups, including the ten designated foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs) operating in the three Andean countries Rubio visited. Rubio’s trip, however, transpired amid increased scrutiny, including from his traditional base of support in South Florida, over a controversial oil deal in nearby Venezuela, where Trump officials have touted Washington’s newfound leverage over interim Venezuelan President Delcy Rodríguez through its control over the country’s oil revenues following the bombing of the country and abduction of its embattled leader, Nicolas Maduro, in January. For America’s top diplomat, whose potential run for president in 2028 is caught between defending his boss’ “historic” deal and reassuring supporters of his commitment to democracy in Venezuela, the South American tour with like-minded conservative leaders offered an opportunity to shore up his image across the hemisphere as other administration officials tout the deal in Dallas and say the country is “not yet ready” for elections. Rubio met on Tuesday with newly-inaugurated Colombian President Abelardo de la Espriella in his coastal stronghold of Barranquilla, where the U.S. and Colombia signed a deal to “jointly identify and finance mining and processing projects within six months” — the country boasts large reserves of gold, nickel, coltan, platinum, tungsten and other rare earths — as well as to “establish a bilateral for strategic civil nuclear cooperation.” Rubio’s visit came on the heels of a devastating 7.4 magnitude earthquake last month that killed at least 330 and injured thousands more. The State Department responded by delivering nearly $27 million in aid. De la Espriella, who was endorsed by Trump before winning a razor-thin runoff election against the leftwing candidate backed by outgoing President Gustavo Petro, has, in turn, sought U.S. relief from 12.5% tariffs affecting the country’s flower industry and other U.S. exports, yet no announcement was made Tuesday. Answering questions from the press about much-anticipated joint military operations, Rubio stated that the new Colombian administration had not formally requested the deployment of U.S. troops to fight the country's crime syndicates, adding that it has, in the interim, agreed to launch in Medellín the regional headquarters of the administration’s counter-cartel coalition known as the Shield of Americas. Leading up to Rubio’s visit, the Colombian president has come under fire for holding press conferences surrounded by body bags of supposed “narco-terrorists,” loosening the country’s gun laws, justifying the death of minors in bombing campaigns against irregular armed actors, and eliminating nearly a dozen regulations on mining, which stands to benefit gold companies like the one formerly led by Colombia’s new ambassador to Washington, Maria Consuelo Araújo. On Wednesday, Rubio met with President Daniel Noboa in Ecuador, which in recent years has become one of the world’s most violent countries and has emerged as a major trafficking hub for the world’s cocaine, produced mostly in neighboring Colombia and Peru. While in Quito, Rubio announced Washington was placing terrorist designations on Los Tiguerones, an Ecuadorian gang that infamously took over a live TV broadcast in 2024; sanctioned seven former public officials over alleged ties to criminal groups; hailed Ecuador as an “aggressive partner” in the administration’s counterdrug push; and said he would seek $45 million in U.S. funding toward these ends. He was, in turn, awarded Ecuador's National Order of Merit, the Grand Cross. The secretary’s second visit to Quito coincided with joint U.S. military operations targeting armed groups along Ecuador’s border with Colombia, launched earlier this year, even as U.S. lawmakers and experts continue to raise concerns about democratic backsliding, growing insecurity, deteriorating rule of law and alleged official ties to drug trafficking in the country. Since Noboa won a special election in 2023 before getting re-elected early last year, his government has lobbied the Biden and Trump administrations for increased weapons sales, an elusive free-trade deal and the return of a U.S. air base in Manta that was closed down by former leftwing President Rafael Correa in 2009. Some of these requests have materialized, aided by Noboa’s eager support for Trump’s aggressive counternarcotics and immigration objectives in the hemisphere. Others have been constrained by a popular referendum last year rejecting the presence of foreign military bases. Sweeping changes to U.S. trade policy have also pushed one of Trump’s closest South American allies to deepen commercial ties with China. A similar dynamic has transpired in Peru, where on Thursday Rubio met with recently-inaugurated president Keiko Fujimori, the daughter of former authoritarian dictator Alberto Fujimori, who clinched a razor-thin victory in the country’s June runoff elections after three previous failed attempts at the presidency. While Rubio was there, Peru formalized its membership in the Shield of Americas, through which it seeks to bolster joint actions against transnational criminal groups, and requested U.S. support in the face of the weather phenomenon known as El Niño, expected to affect over a million Peruvians in the coming months. Rubio, whose visit triggered sizable protests in the capital, Lima, was awarded with the country’s highest civilian honor, the Order of the Sun. Named a non-NATO ally earlier this year, Peru purchased $3.5 billion in Lockheed Martin F-16s just months later in part due to pressure from U.S. Ambassador Bernie Navarro, a longtime Rubio confidant. But its conservative government has nonetheless withstood U.S. calls to decouple economically from China, which buys the country’s copper and iron and is heavily invested in its mining, energy and infrastructure sectors, most notably the multibillion mega-port of Chancay. Last year, the Peruvian government hired Rubio-aligned D.C. lobbying firm Continental Strategy in part to reverse 50% tariffs on its U.S. copper exports and to boost bilateral ties amid the bicentennial of the countries’ diplomatic relationship. Sources told Reuters that Fujimori is now, like De la Espriella, seeking relief from the more recent 12.5% U.S. tariffs affecting its agricultural trade with the U.S. Despite its relative economic prosperity and fiscal stability for the region, Peru has faced growing insecurity in ports and prisons, extortion of business owners by criminal groups, and high levels of coca production in rural areas. To these ends, the country’s foreign minister, a longtime employee of the U.S. Embassy in Lima, said before Rubio’s arrival that he hopes to strengthen cooperation on issues of “security and defense and the fight against transnational organized crime, which is so damaging to our country.” For an administration wielding all the coercive tools it has in its playbook to secure cooperation with its militarized anti-drug agenda in South America, striking security agreements with like-minded regional leaders is a walk in the park for Rubio. But receiving symbolic accolades in Quito and Lima and offering lofty platitudes about China’s threat ignore the even greater challenges the region faces — from authoritarian drift to low productivity, steep inequality and state capture. On these points, the administration’s “Donroe Doctrine” has thus far provided relatively little. --- ### By shunning the Taliban, the world is hurting normal Afghans **Published:** September 10, 2026 | **Author:** Ali Latifi | **Section:** Middle East **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/taliban-diplomacy-aisha-wahab/.md Kabul — Last month, when Aisha Wahab of California became the first Afghan-American elected to Congress, her victory was heralded as a sign that Afghans had truly made their mark in American society. Afghan social media was inundated with messages of pride and celebration, Western-funded diaspora media outlets rushed out “who is Aisha Wahab” pieces, and even former President Hamid Karzai congratulated the 38-year-old on her victory. But that celebration was short-lived. During an appearance on Democracy Now after her election, Wahab said the United States “should pursue diplomacy” with Afghanistan, “regardless of which group is in power.” Wahab acknowledged the severe limitations placed on women and girls under Taliban rule but said that, by exercising diplomacy with the Islamic Emirate government, the U.S. could possibly steer the Taliban “in the right direction when it comes to human rights, women’s rights and just civil rights across the board.” That interview led to immediate condemnation. A week after her victory, many of the same Afghans who were cheering her on turned against Wahab, labeling her a Taliban apologist and even leaking private photos of her and her family to social media. But here’s the thing: as much as the rest of the diaspora may hate to admit it, Wahab is correct. As an Afghan-American who has been living in Kabul since 2013, I have seen firsthand that the West’s efforts to punish the Taliban — seizing billions in Central Bank reserves, slashing foreign aid, closing embassies, cutting the nation’s banks off from the global financial system through financial restrictions — have greatly hurt the people, not the government. It’s not just me who says this, though. In 2023, Karen Decker, then chargé d'affaires of the U.S. mission to Afghanistan, told me Washington needed to pursue a policy of “pragmatic engagement” with the Taliban. As she put it, “isolation is ruinous. It's ruinous for the Afghan people. It's ruinous for the region.” The signs of that ruin are clear. At least 22 million Afghans, including 10.7 million women and girls, remain in need of humanitarian access. Since the Taliban returned to power in August 2021, that number has never been below 20 million, nearly half the population. And the unwillingness to engage with the Taliban authorities has only added to the pressures faced by the organizations trying to address the malnutrition, poverty, and displacement affecting tens of millions of Afghans. “Humanitarian actors have spent the last five years being the middlemen between the international community and the Taliban,” Samira Sayed-Rahman, an Afghan-Canadian humanitarian worker, told me last month in the lead-up to the fifth anniversary of the U.S. withdrawal. International organizations, she said, have been left with the onus of negotiating access, exemptions to edicts and bans, and the space to implement programs. Under normal circumstances, she said, all of that would fall to the donors themselves. This was most clearly borne out in late 2022, when the Islamic Emirate banned Afghan women from working for NGOs, including the United Nations. It quickly became clear that negotiations were unavoidable, especially for smaller local organizations. Heads of local female-run organizations went to work to secure workarounds and exemptions while international organizations were in the middle of a shut down in protest. Eventually, even the international organizations were left with no choice but to talk. In the summer of 2023, Norwegian Refugee Council Secretary General Jan Egeland, confirmed his organization had “resumed most of our humanitarian operations in Kandahar as well as a number of other regions in Afghanistan.” Every other NGO leader I spoke to at the time, including Afghan women who ran smaller local organizations, said they chose to keep their workarounds quiet, worried the publicity would get the exemptions pulled. Those exemptions, along with the continued operation of unofficial schools for girls beyond the sixth grade, prove that though their leader may be stubborn and unmoving, there are more moderate forces within the Taliban. Pushing organizations to negotiate directly with the government, rather than leaving that to the donors, Sayed-Rahman added, isn’t a mere inconvenience. It can be dangerous, especially for Afghan nationals. It also asks apolitical organizations that were meant to hand out food, build schools, and run clinics to take on issues like girls’ access to education, women’s right to work, and educational curricula. The recent global aid cuts, including the 2025 gutting of USAID, have only made the situation more dire in Afghanistan, Flora Alexander, Executive Director of IRC UK, said after a week-long visit to the country. “There are currently multiple converging and overlapping crises” in Afghanistan, Alexander said, citing issues around climate change, the return of five million Afghans from Iran and Pakistan, and the continued challenges to education for women and girls. Alexander said a visit to a medical center in the eastern province of Nangarhar illustrated how important it is for Western countries to find ways to provide assistance to Afghanistan. “This used to be a full-service primary health facility covering malnutrition, mental health, communicable and non-communicable diseases. Today, it’s just reproductive health and family planning,” she said of the Khogyani district clinic. Most jarring for Alexander was the fact that it would only cost about $5,000 a month to restore the clinic to its former status. Alexander said there is an ongoing debate over how to address humanitarian needs without formally recognizing the government. This philosophical debate “is used as justification by some countries to not engage in humanitarian aid,” she said. However, she added, what these countries must realize is that providing assistance to health programs, for instance, is “a proven way of meeting health needs and ensuring that women can work and girls can continue to develop,” despite the Islamic Emirate’s restrictions. Further, the Taliban does want a relationship with the United States. This was made clear by both George W. Bush’s ambassador to Afghanistan and the Islamic Emirate’s own Minister of Foreign Affairs, Amir Khan Muttaqi, who told the Financial Times that Washington is welcome to invest in Afghanistan $1 trillion in mineral assets. Most importantly, Muttaqi said sanctions and other restrictions on the Taliban leadership “did not achieve their intended objectives.” The biggest objection to engagement with the Islamic Emirate remains the serious human rights concerns in the country. Washington cited these, along with the charge that the Islamic Emirate is “a global terrorist organization” in their rebuke of Muttaqi’s offer, saying investment in mining would only enable the Taliban’s “horrific treatment” of the Afghan people. But the reality is that sanctions and diplomatic shunning have done little to disempower or dissuade the Taliban. Having seen the effects of international isolation with my own eyes, one thing has become clear: punishing the government has not worked. It has punished everyone but the government. --- ### Symposium: What I miss most about pre-9/11 America **Published:** September 10, 2026 | **Author:** Responsible Statecraft | **Section:** Washington Politics **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/america-before-911/.md While it is somewhat cliche to say that the “whole world changed” after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks on the United States, it does not detract from the reality of the statement. In numerous tangible ways, the culture, security, and politics of the nation were never the same after al-Qaida hijackers in passenger planes left nearly 3,000 people dead in smoldering ruins across lower Manhattan, the Pentagon, and a field in Shanksville, Pennsylvania. For many of us who lived through it all, a quarter century has passed in a blink, while at the same time the pre-9/11 Washington era paradoxically seems so far away, and perhaps softened a bit by wistfulness and nostalgia. Conversely, the “post” era is pockmarked by wars, and an expansion of the national security state that was unimaginable a generation ago. Those born too early to witness the events of that day know nothing other than the current atmosphere of hyper-securitization and political polarization. It wouldn’t be an exaggeration to say 9/11 and the “Global War on Terror” that followed are somewhere at the root of these woes. RS asked nearly two dozen foreign and national security experts — journalists, scholars, activists — what they miss most about the America that existed before the attacks on September 11, 2001. Their answers range from the personal to the philosophical, but all emphasize the sense of lament, for innocence and opportunities lost. ### Andrew Bacevich; Linda Bilmes; Christopher Coyne; Carolyn Eisenberg; John Feffer; Chas Freeman; Jacob Heilbrunn; William Hartung; Stephen Kinzer; Peter Kuznick; Lora Lumpe; Catherine Lutz; Scott McConnell; Jefferson Morley; Paul Pillar; Peter Van Buren; Katrina vanden Heuvel; Jim Webb ### Andrew Bacevich, co-founder of the Quincy Institute, author of “After the Apocalypse: America's Role in a World Transformed” I miss the "post-Cold War Era." During that brief interval between the Fall of the Berlin Wall and 9/11, it was still possible to believe that the United States might somehow salvage the ideals that informed the founding of the Republic. This was an illusion, of course, as events since have definitively demonstrated. Linda Bilmes, Harvard Kennedy School, author of “The Three Trillion Dollar War” On September 11, 2001, President George W. Bush was reading “The Pet Goat” to a group of elementary school children in Sarasota, Florida. At that exact moment, 50 million Americans watched live footage of airplanes being flown into the twin towers in Manhattan. The attacks killed 2973 civilians and wounded some 6000 others. Television and cable stations broadcast the aftermath for 93 continuous hours, the longest coverage for any event in U.S. history. The juxtaposition of this serene book-reading with the carnage unfolding in New York City epitomized a loss of innocence in America. There had not been a foreign attack on U.S. soil since Pearl Harbor in 1941. The 9/11 attacks had a profound impact on the American psyche. My childhood had taken place in a country that felt safe. I knew instantly that my three young sons would grow up in an atmosphere of uncertainty, facing a more dangerous world. I miss the era in which the U.S. felt gentler, and less vulnerable. Christopher Coyne, George Mason University, author of “Tyranny Comes Home: The Domestic Fate of U.S. Militarism” Violence has long been a part of the U.S. government’s foreign policy. But something shifted in the wake of September 11. The “war on terror” normalized repugnant practices of controlling and harming people. Torture, kill lists, drone strikes, global surveillance, and the militarization of police became routine government functions. Even when made public, there was little shame — real or feigned — associated with these actions. The killing of Abdulrahman al-Awlaki, a 16-year-old American, in a drone strike in Yemen, and the airstrikes on civilian wedding parties in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Yemen are but a few examples. Shame regarding U.S. foreign policies that violated laws and basic moral precepts was in short supply prior to 9/11. What I miss most about pre-9/11 America is that it existed at all. Carolyn Eisenberg, Historian, Hofstra University, author of "Fire and Rain: Nixon, Kissinger and the Wars in Southeast Asia" On this day, I especially miss a former student Peter Vega — a New York City fireman — who had joined the department because he wanted "to save people." He had served in the first Iraq War and wanted to do something helpful for humanity. On September 11, his firetruck crossed the Brooklyn Bridge, and Peter entered the tower — where he died trying to save people. His was a voice for peace. John Feffer, author and director of Foreign Policy In Focus at the Institute for Policy Studies Before 9/11, “democracy promotion” had not been successfully co-opted by neoconservatives as part of their campaign to topple the foreign governments they disliked and establish America-friendly regimes. I came of political age in the human rights movements in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. I was part of progressive movements on both sides of the Atlantic that quite deliberately promoted democracy. We did so only in solidarity with pro-democracy movements, and the democratic principles we embraced were homegrown, not manufactured in DC thinktanks. We promoted democracy against not only authoritarian regimes of the right but also neo-Stalinist tendencies on the left. Vestiges of those movements can still be found in efforts to oppose Putinism, Trumpism, LePenism, and “campist” movements on the left. What is missing is the belief, in the 1980s and 1990s, that we were part of a historic transformation. Osama bin Laden and the neoconservatives destroyed that illusion. Chas Freeman, former U.S. diplomat, U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia I miss the Constitution, the Bill of Rights, and the rule of law. These were the things that made the United States great. They have been steadily eroded to create a warfare state in which the executive exercises unbridled power, the legislature defers to the executive, and the courts are politicized. I also miss the interagency policy process in Washington. It has been replaced with ignorant, strategically illiterate decision making that produces forever wars — misadventures with no clear or fixed objectives, dishonest reports on their progress, and no war termination strategies. I miss diplomacy, which is MIA (possibly KIA) in foreign relations that rely exclusively on coercion, including military measures. I miss civility, tolerance, and friendship despite political differences, as well as governance guided by empiricism rather than a priori reasoning and ideological presuppositions. I miss the unflagging aspirations for self-improvement of the country I loved and served for three decades. Jacob Heilbrunn, editor of the National Interest, author of “They Knew They Were Right: the Rise of the Neocons” Once upon a time you could stroll to Dupont Circle or Farragut Square in Washington and frequent an establishment that carried not only newspapers from around the globe but also magazines. It was known as a newsstand. To visit it was to receive a shot of mental adrenaline, a bracing stimulant for what PG Wodehouse referred to as the old pineapple. There, arrayed in serried row after row, was a veritable cornucopia of magazines, from left to right, each promising their very own special induction into the world of ideas. The web, by contrast, cannot spin as enchanting a net to enfold its visitors. In the post-9/11 world, time has sped up and attention spans dwindled. If, like me, you are something of a dawdler, or even a luftmensch, then the vanished era of the newsstand was bliss indeed. William Hartung, co-author of "The Trillion Dollar War Machine" American foreign policy has always included a heavy dose of war and military intervention. But after 9/11 and the passage of the PATRIOT Act, during what was then called the Global War on Terror (GWOT), the urge to intervene accelerated, sparking a period of intensive war making — either through boots on the ground or drone strikes and special forces deployments — in Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia. The Costs of War Project at Brown University estimates that America’s post-9/11 wars have cost over $8 trillion, and over 4.5 million lives have been lost directly or indirectly on all sides, including a large cohort of civilians. In addition, hundreds of thousands of veterans of those conflicts have suffered severe physical or psychological injuries. Unfortunately, presidents and the majority of the Congress have still not learned from these disastrous examples, as the current war on Iran makes clear. Stephen Kinzer, author of "Overthrow: America's Century of Regime Change from Hawaii to Iraq" Americans used to admire themselves for creating a country that was a force for good in the world. That self-image has been largely shattered. The reality of American power did not change after 9/11, but our fantasy faded. We were rampaging around the world long before 2001. The difference is that today, it is no longer possible to ignore this fact. Denial is an important psychological tool. It allows us to reject unpleasant truths and shield ourselves from guilt and anxiety. Until 9/11, many Americans happily followed what Freud called the “ostrich policy.” That is no longer possible. The nature of American behavior has not fundamentally changed — it just seems that way. What has really changed is that today, our leaders no longer try to hide what they do. The last quarter-century has seen the veil drop from the face of American power. The denial option is no longer available. Peter Kuznick, American University, co-author (with Oliver Stone), “The Untold History of the United States” What I miss most about pre-9/11 America is that nuclear war felt remote — that it had been relegated to the dustbin of history. While neither peace nor the promised post-Cold War "peace dividend" ever actually arrived, the fear of nuclear war that had been so pronounced in the early-to-mid 1980s had largely abated. Nuclear activism, which had been so visible on campuses and beyond, had effectively disappeared. Even Russia and China seemed remote threats. Vladimir Putin was the first foreign leader to offer support after 9/11. Now the threat of nuclear war looms large with the U.S. and Israel losing in Iran, Russia bogged down in Ukraine, and tensions high across Asia. Talk of nuclear war is more pervasive than it's been in decades and a school of nuclear planners has emerged who, according to the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, believe that a nuclear war can be fought and won. What I miss most about pre-9/11 America is that it existed at all. Lora Lumpe, CEO of the Quincy Institute I miss my innocence. I had thought terrorism was not really a threat to the United States. Even after Oklahoma City, the first World Trade Center attack, and the U.S. embassy bombings in Africa, I believed that terrorism was the next in a series of trumped up, post-Cold War threats that the national security establishment conjured to fill the threat gap and keep the money flowing. The war on drugs had not worked, “instability” and humanitarian intervention had not worked. Engagement and enlargement was the best the Clinton administration could do, and the national security budget was flagging. Realizing on 9/12 that I was wrong to have dismissed a real threat and understanding that the response was going to be profoundly bad left me temporarily depressed, but it also made me want to grab life. My daughter was born a tidy 10 months after the attack. She grew up in Washington, DC, blocks from the Capitol and then later a little further out. She went to high school near the State Department. Every day of her childhood – during all of the U.S. military and economic twists and turns that blithely impacted or wrecked lives abroad – I wished that I could once again be dismissive of the very real threat she faced. Catherine Lutz, co-founder of the Costs of War Project, Brown University I miss the America of the 1990s. We hoped that the end of the nuclear-tipped Cold War between the Soviet Union and the United States would mean the transfer of America’s wealth and work to more productive and humane fields of endeavor, at home and abroad. I miss that decade for the opportunity it gave us to begin to imagine what an America at peace could accomplish, how many military bases could be turned into economic opportunity zones, how many military jet and nuclear weapon dollars could be transferred to healthcare, education, home construction, and science. But the military budget dipped a tepid 18% and began to grow again in the last years of the Clinton administration, and to then mushroom to what were once unimaginable levels with the militarism, Islamophobia, federal budget distortions, and other ills that the U.S. government response to 9/11 helped foster. And I miss my WWII and Korean War veteran father who mercifully died a few months before 9/11. He was spared the horror of that day — and of the U.S. response in the years since. Scott McConnell, co-founder of The American Conservative magazine Watching a movie from 1995 (for instance, “Party Girl” filmed in NYC, in the last pre-9/11 moments and before the internet commenced its doleful takeover), brings to mind Talleyrand’s “douceur de vivre” phrase about life before the French Revolution, roughly translated: "Anyone who has not lived in the years around 1789 does not know the sweetness of life." I worked for Pat Buchanan’s 2000 campaign; Pat was brilliant, accessible, terrifyingly prescient. We worked together on a speech about U.S. sanctions on Iraq, all the children they killed, the sheer hatred of America they (and our Israel policies more broadly) were generating throughout the Mideast, and the resulting dangers to us. The speech was delivered at a respectable Washington venue. Alongside Pat’s other warnings against our quest for global hegemony, it was sedulously ignored by the mainstream press, the only press that mattered to most voters at the time. In our post-9/11 social media age, there is less douceur de vivre, but I don’t miss the passing of the unchallenged America-promoting democracy-can-do-no-wrong narrative. Jefferson Morley, editor of “JFK Facts” and author of “The Ghost: The Secret Life of CIA Spymaster James Jesus Angleton” The ten years from 1991 to 2001 were a time when you could something you cannot do now: imagine an America at peace with the world without a cell phone in hand. The Cold War was over, though the habit of conflict persisted in an incipient war on terrorism which after 9/11 became another global conflict in which America cast itself disastrously as moral savior. Now the warfare state is the norm inside the surveillance culture. Thinking our way out of this bind begins with remembering when there was an alternative. Paul Pillar, Georgetown University, author of “Intelligence and U.S. Foreign Policy: Iraq, 9/11, and Misguided Reform” Although I miss some of the same pre-9/11 liberties that many fellow citizens do, I will identify a subject related to my work on counterterrorism in the 1990s as a public official and author. I was deputy chief of the Counterterrorist Center at CIA and subsequently wrote a book about counterterrorism and its relation to U.S. foreign policy. I miss well-reasoned discourse about terrorism and how to combat it — discourse that 9/11 badly distorted and emotionalized. The widespread tendency to treat America’s terrorism problem as if it suddenly began in September 2001 overlooks numerous lessons from the past about the variety of perpetrators and their motivations, terrorist techniques not just imagined but used, and the pros and cons of counterterrorist measures. I have missed being able to apply these lessons, calmly and rationally, and to put terrorism into proper perspective without being dismissed as insufficiently committed to a national crusade. Peter Van Buren, former State Department foreign service, author of “We Meant Well. How I Helped Lose the Battle for the Hearts and Minds of the Iraqi People” There is surveillance in my condo’s hallways. The city's facial-recognition cameras are on every corner, tied to license-plate readers, tied to our digital lives. Vast databases assure us no detail — no one — is too small to monitor. I learn to follow orders at the airport. After becoming an Iraq War whistleblower, I was placed on the SSSS list and sent to secondary screening every time I flew. I never knew who put me there or why. The agents searching me didn’t know either. They were following orders. An algorithm tagged me for something I had no idea I’d done. People once said, “If you have nothing to hide, you have nothing to fear.” Older people still joke about it. My kids don’t know the joke. They grew up assuming this way of life is simply part of life. That’s what we’ve lost, and what I miss most about pre-9/11 America. Katrina vanden Heuvel, publisher of The Nation magazine What do I miss about America pre-9/11? No Department of Homeland Security, no ICE, no Patriot Act, no AI. Advocating for peace didn’t seem as tough. We spent more time living, less on our smartphones and social media platforms. There was more time to think, read, converse about news and ideas. Public life was not mediated by toxic, isolating algorithms. I miss Christopher Hitchens as a Nation columnist, pre-Iraq War. Donald Trump was a bankrupt realtor, not the fictitious mogul of “The Apprentice,” nor the president. Jim Webb, former U.S. Senator and Secretary of the Navy What do I miss about pre-9/11 America? Real leadership. I served in the Reagan administration for four years as an assistant secretary of defense and secretary of the Navy. Of the presidents in office during my years in government, none surpassed Reagan’s inspirational leadership and experience. When he died on June 5, 2004, nearly three years after 9/11, more than 200,000 ordinary citizens visited his casket at the Reagan Library and at the Capitol Rotunda to pay their respects. The heightened security on Capitol Hill reflected the new normal. But the lines never slowed, often at a rate of 5,000 visits an hour. Setting aside political differences, something truly rare today, people came almost close enough to touch the leader who convinced us that we could be honorable and good. There was no provocation in the lines. For a moment, 9/11 and the Iraq invasion that Washington politicians used to justify it were far away, while America recalled an era fading fast into the mist of history. Watching the line, I thought of novelist Gore Vidal’s words: “you never really know when you’re happy; you can only know when you were happy.” Reagan may or may not have known. But we knew. --- ### The Iran war looms large as BRICS leaders gather in New Delhi **Published:** September 10, 2026 | **Author:** Michael Corbin | **Section:** Global Crises **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/brics-summit-2026/.md As diplomats prepare for the BRICS Summit in New Delhi this weekend, the Iran war is looming large. India, which assumed the BRICS chairmanship in January, was already facing the difficult responsibility of securing consensus to achieve concrete movement on a variety of trade, economic, and financial objectives. Now, the U.S.-Israeli campaign against Iran has dramatically complicated this effort, throwing the global economy into uncertainty and dividing BRICS countries, including some that are actively participating on either side of the conflict. The tensions within the bloc are far more significant than they were leading into last year’s summit in Brazil, which took place shortly after the 12-Day War against Iran. At that meeting, leaders condemned “the military strikes against the Islamic Republic of Iran since 13 June 2025, which constitute a violation of international law.” In addition, they called for an “immediate, permanent and unconditional ceasefire, and the full withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Gaza Strip.” The situation in 2026 is more complicated. India — one of the five original BRICS members, alongside Brazil, Russia, China and South Africa — continues to strengthen its relationship with Israel just as the war in Iran exacerbates other BRICS members’ relationships with Tel Aviv. Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu just a few days before Israel and the United States attacked Iran in February 2026. As the Guardian notes, the visit marked a continuation of “India’s evolving relationship with Israel, and it has deepened as conflict swept across the Middle East.” Given such overtures to Israel, one may understand if the majority of BRICS countries are uncomfortable with India’s chairmanship during this year’s summit. This was not the case last year in Brazil. Another aggravating factor is the fact that several BRICS members are now rival combatants. Iran, which joined the grouping in 2024, has damaged relations with many of its neighbors by attacking infrastructure and U.S. bases located on their territory. This includes the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, both of which are also BRICS members. According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, “the UAE has been attacked by more Iranian projectiles than all other states combined and incurred by far the greatest and most varied damage within the group.” As a result, the United Arab Emirates announced an indefinite trade embargo on Iran, saying “all trade, commercial exchanges and financial transactions with Iran have been halted until further notice.” At the BRICS Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in May, the bloc released a comparatively weaker outcome document than that of the previous year, encouraging the international community “to continue supporting the Palestinian people in their pursuit of independence and sovereignty.” Moreover, the ministers were unable to produce a unified statement supporting Iran’s calls for “nations to condemn the U.S. and Israel over what they described as their unlawful aggression.” Therefore, we should expect that any final BRICS declaration will steer clear of any mention of the war in Iran. Given these and other pre-existing divisions among BRICS members, the summit’s success will largely depend on whether India can achieve consensus on the economic agenda. Therefore, according to Asia One, it is important that India has centered its BRICS agenda on “institutional reforms that improve coordination while ensuring the bloc’s focus on development and cooperation rather than geopolitical rivalry.” According to the BRICS 2026 website, Modi defines Delhi's objective for the summit as to redefine “BRICS as Building Resilience and Innovation for Cooperation and Sustainability.” The BRICS “Namaste” logo for India 2026 importantly symbolizes “collective strength and unity.” This important message is graphically reinforced through the petal colors which represent all BRICS member countries. An example of BRICS cooperation and unity occurred during the BRICS Trade Ministers Meeting in Jaipur in August. As reported by India’s Nation Press, the ministers successfully finalized work on the BRICS Strategy for Economic Partnership 2030. This marks a significant achievement and now the plan will be referred for formal endorsement by the BRICS Leaders at next week’s summit. The strategy covers such issues as trade, investment, digital economy, and sustainable development. More specifically, BRICS Pay will receive a tremendous amount of attention during the summit as a result of threats to global payments and supply chains sparked by the wars in Ukraine and Iran. The cross-border settlement platform, which launched earlier this year, is designed to complement rather than replace SWIFT and reduce dollar dependency. BRICS Pay continues to integrate sovereign payment systems, including China's CIPS, India's UPI, Brazil's Pix, and Russia's SPFS. In addition, Reuters reported earlier this year that the Reserve Bank of India recommended to the government that a proposal to connect Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDCs) be included in the agenda for the 2026 BRICS summit. If the recommendation is adopted BRICS will move forward with a proposal to link the digital currencies of BRICS members for the first time. Trump has been sharply critical of any BRICS efforts to get around the U.S.-led financial system, which gives the U.S. extraordinary leverage over other countries through sanctions and other similar measures. "Any country aligning themselves with the Anti-American policies of BRICS, will be charged an ADDITIONAL 10% tariff,” he wrote on Truth Social last July, adding that there “will be no exceptions to this policy.” More recently, Trump's Treasury Secretary, Scott Bessent, has increased the aggressive trade stance of the U.S. by issuing “Operation Economic Outcast.” The purpose of the sanctions plan is to escalate the economic pressure on Iran, while also alerting countries that cooperate with Iran that the U.S. could restrict access to the U.S. financial system if they continue doing business with Tehran. Bessent’s policy reflects Washington’s frustration that the war in Iran has not achieved its aims. Instead, it has strengthened ties between some BRICS members and Iran, including Russia and China, which continue to provide crucial economic and political support to Iran’s efforts to withstand U.S. pressure. Subsequently, China and Russia now support a greater profile for Iran in BRICS institutions at the upcoming summit, which Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian will attend. Abdolnasser Hemmati, governor of the Central Bank of Iran, had indicated Iran would seek membership to BRICS Bank during the meeting in Delhi, according to CNBC. It is clear India will have a difficult task as this year’s BRICS Summit host, presiding over a growing and increasingly divided group. One would expect India, contrary to other BRICS members, to make a concerted effort to assure any final declaration underscores that BRICS does not exist as an anti-Western bloc or seek to accelerate de-dollarization. However, as a champion of multipolarity, economic sovereignty, and the Global South, India is positioned to overcome existing geopolitical divisions to successfully build a consensus among like-minded BRICS members. Ultimately, its success will require achieving cooperation on core BRICS initiatives related to the building of alternative structures for global economic growth, innovation, sustainability, and governance. --- ### How Congress gave up its power over war and peace **Published:** September 9, 2026 | **Author:** Courtney Rawlings, Alex Jordan | **Section:** QiOSK **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/congress-iran-war/.md In 1973, after it was discovered that the U.S. had secretly bombed Cambodia, Congress took action. In an effort to assert its power over matters of war and peace, Congress pushed through the War Powers Resolution despite then-President Richard Nixon’s veto, and it has been law ever since. Unfortunately, congressional enforcement of the War Powers Resolution has been mixed. In 2026 alone, Congress has put forward some 19 war powers resolutions in an attempt to rein in hostilities in Iran, Venezuela, Cuba, and Lebanon. So far, none of these resolutions has stopped a conflict. Take Iran, for example. There have been eight votes to end the war, seven of which failed. Just one of these passed and only because Sen. Bill Cassidy (R-La.) changed course after losing his primary to a challenger endorsed by President Donald Trump, giving him leeway to vote against the bulk of the Republican Party. Cassidy’s move highlights one of the main problems with the War Powers Resolution: too many of our elected officials cast votes for political gain, not American interests. In case you haven’t noticed, the war with Iran is still going strong. To understand why, we welcomed Tori Bateman to Always at War. She’s the Quincy Institute’s Director of Advocacy and spends her hours talking with constituents and lawmakers, while working to educate members of Congress on the importance of diplomacy and how they can use their power to protect the American people without needless force. As Bateman explains, even when a war powers resolution passes, the president can still veto it, meaning a two-thirds majority in both the House and Senate would be required to override that veto. As you may imagine, this has never happened. So the resolutions keep the wars top of mind on the Hill, but they rarely stop anything on the ground. Still, constituents aren’t powerless. Many of those calls Americans make to voice their concerns aren’t falling on deaf ears. Bateman relays a powerful story of how one member of Congress’s staff became familiar with Section 219 – the U.S.-Israel Defense Technology Cooperation Initiative buried inside this year's NDAA – after more than 50 constituents called the senator’s office about it. The lesson: there’s still hope our members of Congress can begin to reflect the needs and desires of their constituents on matters of war and peace. --- ### Norway's seizure of a Russian vessel is a dangerous escalation **Published:** September 9, 2026 | **Author:** Pavel Devyatkin | **Section:** Europe **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/barentsburg-russian-svalbard-norway/.md Last week, Norwegian authorities seized the Russian ship Professor Molchanov in Svalbard at the request of Ukrainian state energy company Naftogaz. The vessel now sits immobilized in the port of Barentsburg, a settlement of Russian citizens on the Svalbard archipelago, which is part of Norway. The seizure is an attempt by Naftogaz to implement a 2023 ruling from an arbitration court in The Hague, which ordered Russia to pay the company $4.22 billion for assets seized in Crimea. Naftogaz won the right to seize the ship in a 2025 case in a Norwegian court, which recognized the arbitration award as a legal basis for the move. Naftogaz aims to eventually force a sale of the vessel to recover part of its Crimea claim. This isn’t the company’s first move on this front: Finland seized $4.3 million in Russian funds this year and more than $46 million in assets since 2024, and there have been freezes or recognitions in other jurisdictions such as the U.S., UK, and France. The Svalbard seizure, however, is unique; it targets a state-owned vessel in a territory governed by a nearly century-old treaty that grants Russia special rights, making it a legally and diplomatically significant target. Moscow has summoned the Norwegian ambassador, demanded the ship’s immediate release, and called the seizure “piracy” and a “politically motivated violation of international law.” Naftogaz’s chief Serhiy Fedorenko called it “another important step toward restoring justice.” Under international law, state-owned ships used for non-commercial purposes, like transferring researchers, are immune from the jurisdiction of other states. Russia insists the Professor Molchanov is a scientific vessel operated by the Russian Hydrometeorological Service, but Norway alleges otherwise. Days before the seizure, a Norwegian court classified the ship as a commercial enterprise running expedition cruises, giving the go-ahead to enforce the arbitration order. Benedikte Moltumyr Høgberg, professor of law at the University of Oslo, points out a flaw in this process: the decision was made confidentially, without Russia being present to argue its case. Høgberg warns that “the district court’s inadequate handling (and lack of adversarial proceedings) gives Russia more legal ammunition against Norway than Russia has had previously.” The Svalbard Treaty of 1920 adds a layer of complexity. Svalbard is Norwegian sovereign territory, but signatories to the treaty (including Russia) have equal rights to economic activities on the archipelago. Russian state-owned coal company Arktikugol has had a mine in Barentsburg since 1932. By seizing the Professor Molchanov, Norway has effectively cut the only supply line to the settlement and its 300 Russian residents. Moscow argues that the arrest violates Russia’s rights under the 1920 treaty. Oslo has meanwhile promised to assist the stranded crew and passengers. --- ### Trump denials can't hide billions in US weapons sent to Ukraine **Published:** September 9, 2026 | **Author:** Jennifer Kavanagh | **Section:** Europe **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/ukraine-weapons-aid/.md Trying to pin the blame for the depletion of U.S. military stockpiles on something other than the war in Iran, President Donald Trump fell back on a usual scapegoat last week: Ukraine. “The Biden administration gave far more munitions away to Ukraine, at no cost to them whatsoever, than we have used in Iran,” Trump wrote on Truth Social. This is a familiar refrain. Trump loves to remind his audience that because of him, Americans are “not spending on Ukraine anymore” and instead, Europe is footing the bill. In truth, most people in the United States don’t think about Ukraine much these days. But since Trump himself brought it up, it’s worth asking: What exactly is going on with U.S. military support to Ukraine? The answer might surprise you. Despite Trump’s rhetoric, the United States remains deeply embroiled in Ukraine’s ongoing conflict with Russia in ways that create national security risks and run counter to Trump’s own foreign policy goals. It is true that Trump has reduced U.S. support to Ukraine compared to its high mark under his predecessor, Joe Biden. First, his administration has stopped the use of Presidential Drawdown Authority to transfer weapons from U.S. stocks directly to Ukraine. The Biden administration used this mechanism to give Ukraine almost $35 billion in weapons free of charge. Second, the Trump administration has not requested additional funds for the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI), which uses U.S. financing to purchase new weapons for Ukraine. But Trump has not cut off all assistance to Ukraine. Several important channels remain. First, there are about $13 billion in outstanding USAI contracts as of June 2026, down from $20 billion in January 2025. These contracts, signed by Biden and now implemented by Trump, will procure weapons for Ukraine through about 2028. Weapons in the pipeline include longer-lead time systems like NASAMs, Patriot missiles and components (Ukraine is reportedly receiving at 10-20 PAC-3s per month under these contracts), counter-drone systems, artillery rockets, and ammunition. These continuing deliveries are not new awards, but they are still taxpayer-funded military aid to Ukraine that will add up to about $20 billion in aid over the 4 years of Trump’s term. Weapons produced under these contracts come off overburdened U.S. production lines. This has a high opportunity cost given the limits of U.S. defense industrial capacity. Without obligations to Ukraine, industrial resources could shift to different weapons or systems that the United States needs more. If the Trump administration were serious about ending U.S. spending on the Ukraine war, it could still recoup these funds and reallocate the money to support U.S. defense production needs. It has instead allowed the aid to continue. There has also been some new funding approved since Biden left office. Congress included about $800 million of USAI funding in the 2026 and 2027 NDAAs. We can expect more in future bills as well. And the State Department has continued to send military aid of its own. A portion of this aid goes through the Ukraine’s Ministry of Interior, including drones, armored vehicles, guns, grenade launchers, and similar equipment. Since this equipment ends up with Ukraine’s National Guard and border police it is often counted as non-military and intended for things like counterdrug operations, but today these personnel serve as combat units. The State Department has also approved $3 billion of new arms sales to Ukraine in 2025 and 2026 that will be at least partially funded from foreign military financing (FMF), which means U.S. dollars supporting foreign government purchases of U.S. weapons. Some of these funds may come from money allocated but not spent under President Biden, but much of the funding will be new, coming from the State Department’s budget. The bottom line is that U.S. weapons transfers to Ukraine continue under Trump, amounting to, on average, as much at $5 billion per year. But this is no longer the most important, or expensive, type of support that the United States gives to Ukraine. What Ukraine needs much more than weapons, and what the United States continues to provide in increasing amounts, is intelligence, logistics, and operational support. The details of this support are classified, but public reporting offers some insight. For example, the United States gives Ukraine real-time targeting information, including on the movement of Russian troops and the location of key command centers. This information has been important to Ukraine’s mid-range strike campaign on Russian logistics as well as its deep strikes against military and energy targets inside of Russia. In addition, U.S. reconnaissance and surveillance assets in countries on the NATO border (including routine E-3 flights) are integrated with Ukraine’s air defense network, improving the accuracy and speed of Ukraine’s response. Beyond intelligence, the United States also provides logistical and maintenance support, including forward and remote assistance to repair American-made equipment, necessary spare parts to keep older systems running, and training. It also facilitates the expensive transfer of European purchases of U.S. weapons. The cost of the intelligence, logistics, and other operational support the United States provides to Ukraine does not show up anywhere as an itemized bill, even as U.S. assistance increases. But we can use available public information to draw some conclusions about the expenses incurred. The 2024 defense supplemental bill, for instance, allocated about $15 billion to “military training, intelligence sharing, increased presence, and other support activities.” In theory, these funds are intended to cover activities conducted in support of Ukraine that would not occur if the United States remained uninvolved in that conflict. Some portion of this money will go to the salaries of military personnel who would be paid no matter where they work. Since about a third of each military service’s budget is personnel costs, we could estimate the cost of extra activities conducted for Ukraine, excluding baseline manpower, at about $10 billion over the course of a year or so. If Trump has truly expanded intelligence sharing with Ukraine, this price tag may have increased over time. The money included in the bill is likely only a portion of the actual burden the U.S. military and intelligence community have shouldered to support Ukraine’s war. Many intelligence activities, like tasking and analyzing satellite data and collecting signals intelligence, might be covered in classified national security budgets. Starting in 2023, in fact, the classified intelligence budget increased by 10%, a large jump over the 2022 total. The increase was justified by intelligence community leaders as resulting from shifts in the national security landscape, including especially concern about China’s rise and spillover from conflict in Ukraine. Since the total increase in funding was about $10 billion, we can guess that Ukraine-related expenditures might amount to $3-$5 billion per year, or about one-third to one-half of the total increase. All told, then, U.S. taxpayers are still spending roughly $20 billion per year on Ukraine. Today, assistance to Ukraine comes primarily in the form of direct operational support, not weapons. But the shift in type of aid increases the risk of U.S. support to Ukraine to average Americans. First, assisting Ukraine in striking energy targets inside of Russia has a perverse effect on the Trump administration’s efforts to keep gas prices low. As Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent acknowledged, Ukraine’s strikes inside Russia push global oil prices up, imposing higher costs of living on Americans. Second, U.S. intelligence support deepens U.S. involvement in Ukraine’s war, making it an all-but-direct combatant. Russian assistance to Iran, both in terms of weapons and intelligence sharing, is a reaction to the comparable U.S. role in Ukraine, and it leaves U.S. servicemembers in the Middle East and elsewhere less safe. Growing U.S. participation in Ukraine also increases the risk that miscalculation leads to a direct U.S.-Russia confrontation, a nightmarish possibility given the degraded state of U.S. military readiness. Trump promised to end the war in Ukraine in 24 hours. He has instead deepened U.S. entanglement in ways that create real risks and new fiscal costs for the United States. American interests would be best served if the United States were to walk away entirely, but if Trump instead opts for the status quo, he should at least be honest about it. --- ### Hegseth has been a disaster. It's time for Trump to fire him. **Published:** September 8, 2026 | **Author:** Daniel L. Davis | **Section:** Washington Politics **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/trump-hegseth/.md It’s hard to determine who is more under siege today – the mullahs of Iran or the U.S. secretary of defense who is prosecuting the war against them. For months, negative stories about Secretary of War Pete Hegseth have peppered major newspapers. These include everything from his seeming “war on DEI” within the department, to combative engagements with members of Congress, to shade being thrown even by President Donald Trump himself on the lack of success in the (second) Iran War. As the midterms loom, one wonders if the president is ready to pull the plug on Hegseth in an attempt to distance himself from the failure of the Iran war. President Trump should have pulled the plug long ago. On November 12, 2024, I went on NBC News when Hegseth had been announced as Trump’s nominee for secretary of defense and argued that Hegseth might be just what we need, instead of another standard military-industrial-complex "veteran" who never met a war he didn’t like. But I included two key caveats in my support. First, I argued that he had to be different from his predecessors and not just be a yes-man who prosecutes wars even if a sober analysis reveals we could not win them. Second, I warned that if we continued to support other wars and saw our stocks of key weapons systems plummet – especially missiles – he had to tell the president we could not go down that path (as it would put our own national security in unnecessary peril). Hegseth violated both of those warnings. On the first point, when the president said he wanted to launch an air and missile-only war against Iran, the Hegseth should have been the first person to tell the Commander-in-Chief that it doesn’t matter what policies he wants to accomplish, there was no viable air-only military strategy that could bring the Iranian regime to its knees. To try anyway would be to set the country into certain failure. On the second point, to make the attempt would be to drain the stocks of our key offensive and defensive missiles (JASSM Long Range Cruise Missiles, Tomahawk missiles, PAC3 interceptors, and THAAD interceptors) to alarmingly low levels, which would put our global security requirements into danger. Hegseth failed on both of these points, and in doing so, helped set the president up for failure. In fact, Trump himself threw Hegseth under the bus in late March, claiming that far from arguing against the war, Hegseth was its chief cheerleader. “Pete, I think you were the first one to speak up,” Trump said. “And you said, ‘Let’s do it.’” On March 4, just days into the war, Hegseth went to the Pentagon podium and declared, “I stand before you today with one unmistakable message about Operation Epic Fury: America is winning decisively, devastatingly and without mercy.” Any objective assessment showed that we were not, in fact, winning. Now more than six months later, it is painfully clear there is no path to winning this war short of a full-scale ground invasion. The regime change effort has badly depleted our most vital offensive and defensive missile stockpiles. Has the secretary of defense acknowledged this depletion and done something to reverse it? To the contrary, he ignores the problem and pretends it doesn’t exist. Just days ago he said, “We've got no shortage of munitions," adding “our stockpiles of defensive and offensive weapons allow us to sustain this campaign as long as we need to." That’s not even fooling the president; Trump reportedly blasted Hegseth at a Camp David meeting for running low on ammunition. The secretary also is unwilling to acknowledge that the war is having a devastating impact on deployed troops, including those aboard the USS Abraham Lincoln. Like he did when he downplayed the dwindling ammunition stockpiles, Hegseth also accused troops’ and their families of ‘fake news’ and declared that morale aboard the aircraft carrier was good and that the media had “completely misrepresented” conditions. Sailors and their family members disagree. Whether it was failing to advise his boss about the genuine capabilities and limitations of the U.S. Armed Forces, not knowing whether a war was winnable, or failing to provide leadership to the deployed troops, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth is clearly unqualified for the task. President Trump is now deep in a war we cannot win. The last thing he needs is a defense secretary who doesn’t know how to do his job. Whether politically expedient or not, it’s time for Hegseth to go. --- ### Peace in Ukraine remains far off despite Witkoff-Kushner effort **Published:** September 8, 2026 | **Author:** Ian Proud | **Section:** Europe **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/kushner-witkoff-ukraine/.md In a renewed diplomatic drive, Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner travelled to Moscow this weekend to meet Russian President Vladimir Putin. They then traveled to Kyiv for talks with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, who said the pair presented him with some "worthwhile ideas." Yet, as the war drags closer to five full years of fighting, chances of success at the negotiating table appear slim. Don’t hold your breath for an end to the Ukraine war before the midterms in November. More likely, Putin will continue to shift the goalposts until he achieves his core goals: Ukrainian neutrality and the political decapitation of Zelensky. More than a year has passed since President Donald Trump met with Putin in Anchorage. The Trump Administration has been unable to deliver upon the compromises offered at that summit. The most notable proposed compromise was that Russia might agree not to conquer the remaining unoccupied fortress towns in Donetsk but rather enter into an arrangement in which control was shared. Offering this was a significant risk to Putin, who had laid claim to the whole of the Donbas. There has been palpable disappointment on the Russian side that the ‘spirit of Anchorage’ was a mirage. Putin had barely taken off from Alaska when it became clear that Trump lacked the leverage either to get the Europeans or Zelensky on board with the idea of compromise to secure peace. There is scant evidence of any change of mindset in Britain and Europe. Britain’s former head of MI6, John Sawers, recently said that peace talks with Russia appear inconceivable while Putin remains in power. Polish Foreign Minister Radek Sikorski recently argued that there should not be renewed dialogue until Russia’s strategic position was weakened. The ‘Ukraine can win this’ mantra appears a psychosis that has gripped the European elite since the war began. With his image in Europe shredded by America’s ill-considered war against Iran, Trump will therefore not be able to shift European resistance to peace in Ukraine anytime soon. Putin can see this and appears to have refocused Russia’s military effort to the capture of the rest of Donetsk. After very little movement of the frontline during the first half of this year, gradual grinding progress is now being made towards the remaining fortress towns of Kramatorsk and Sloviansk. There are signs that improvements in Russian tank armor technology is starting gradually to blunt the effectiveness of Ukraine’s drone defense. Estimates vary about how long it will take to seize control of Donetsk, from the end of this year through the end of 2027. In the intervening period, Ukraine will suffer a harsh winter in which its electricity and heating infrastructure will be further decimated. Europe will need to figure out how to find the money for a continuation of the proxy war. Many more service personnel and some civilians will die. Meanwhile, Zelensky will come under mounting pressure to step aside amid ongoing corruption scandals and more vocal opposition from key figures inside Ukraine, including his former defense minister, Mykhailo Fedorov. Russia has undoubtedly suffered badly during this war too, not least through the hundreds of thousands of personnel killed or injured. Ukraine’s campaign of deep strikes against oil refineries caused gasoline shortages and shifted the dial downwards on Putin’s popularity at home. Russia can’t fight on forever. Yet Putin appears guided by the sense that Ukraine and its western backers will run out of the political and economic stamina to fight before Russia does. Russia has the manpower, the financial reserves, the energy supply and the industrial base to keep fighting. Ukraine and Europe do not. Putin’s core goal has always been Ukrainian neutrality and, given a history of broken tacit understandings since the collapse of the Soviet Union, it is likely he will want a treaty-based commitment not to expand NATO. He also undoubtedly wants to see the fall of Zelensky. Until, at the very minimum, he achieves both, Putin won’t hurry to commit to peace, whatever exhortations Trump makes. Rather, he will continue to increase the cost of any future peace deal. There is history for this going right back to 2014. Having armed the Donbas separatists in 2014, Putin finally went all-in with direct Russian military involvement to seize the transport hub of Debaltseve in fierce fighting in January 2015. This action leveraged the Europeans to negotiate the Minsk II peace deal. When Putin’s efforts to negotiate new security treaties with the West came to nought in late 2021, he committed to launching a war in Ukraine to force the issue. After Britain and the U.S. scuppered the proposed Istanbul peace deal in April 2022, he committed to the grinding attritional war that we see today. Having indicated that Russia might trade the small pockets of land occupied in Kharkiv and Sumy Oblasts, Putin now appears to have hardened his position; Russia’s military is now making further advances in these areas. Having been open to some form of shared occupation of Donetsk in Alaska, Putin now seems determined to take the lot. That doesn’t mean Putin is unwilling to settle. Speaking about the need for peace at his yearly Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok last week, he emphasized the role other countries, including China, might play. Indian Prime Minister Modi renewed his call for Putin to move from “an endless war to the end to the war” at the recent Shanghai Cooperation Meeting in Bishkek. It was revealed that 51 Indian nationals recruited into the Russian Armed Forces have been killed since fighting began. The White House wants and probably needs to resolve the Ukraine war, particularly with the Iran conflict raging. Peace in Ukraine before the midterms might be a boon for Trump’s flagging popularity. But it’s not going to happen. In Donald Trump’s book The Art of the Deal, he says, “The best thing you can do is deal from strength, and leverage is the biggest strength you can have. Leverage is having something the other guy wants. Or better yet, needs. Or best of all, simply can’t do without.” Right now, and despite the challenges that war has imposed on Russia, Putin probably feels that he holds the bigger lever. If Trump can’t get Ukraine and Europe on side to compromise over peace, then he’ll start to think about how to increase the cost of any deal after Donetsk has been conquered. The salient question is what that cost will be. --- ### Why 9/11 mastermind KSM still awaiting trial after a quarter century **Published:** September 8, 2026 | **Author:** John Ryan | **Section:** Washington Politics **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/9-11-trial-guantanamo-bay/.md This year’s anniversary of the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks should serve as another reminder that the criminal prosecution of the accused plotters remains in limbo. One of the biggest cases in U.S. history, and potentially one of its most consequential, has continued to unfold in something of a vacuum at the U.S. Navy base on Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, against five long-held detainees. Ten additional war-on-terror detainees remain on the base; two of them also have cases in the military commissions, a court system established under President George W. Bush and amended near the start of President Barack Obama’s first term. Quite often, only two reporters are on the base to cover pretrial proceedings in the prosecution of the alleged plot mastermind, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, and four co-defendants. The case either dates to 2008 – when the detainees were first charged by the Bush administration – or 2012, when more than 50 reporters from around the world attended their rearraignment at Guantanamo Bay. That second military commission began after a failed attempt by the Obama administration to move the case to federal court in Manhattan. At some point, journalists and other members of the public wait for a trial. This hasn’t happened. A trial is still not scheduled to begin until at least June 2028, a frustrating reality for family members of the victims, journalists, and other members of the public as the 25th anniversary of the attacks approaches. To be sure, not all of what’s happened in court over the past decade has been riveting. Holding a five-defendant death-penalty trial for the worst-ever attacks on American soil in a sleepy, remote naval base – and in a new and untested court – was bound to create a time-consuming mix of logistical hassles and legal disputes that have little to do with the defendants or their alleged crimes. For many would-be observers and other stakeholders, this mind-numbing legal mess has come to define the case. But a closer look reveals an important legal experiment, one that pits the demands of national security against American principles of due process. Perhaps more than any institution, the Guantanamo court continues to reckon with the Bush administration’s decision to rendition terror suspects, including the eventual 9/11 defendants, to CIA black sites, where they were subjected to intense periods of torture and then held in isolation for three to four years. In the wake of 9/11, the strategic priority was to gather intelligence from the highest-value detainees to prevent future attacks, rather than to prosecute them. Once this process ran its course, the Bush administration transferred the detainees (a total of 14 at the time) in September 2006 from CIA custody to the naval base at Guantanamo Bay. The Senate’s report on the CIA interrogation program stated that the agency maintained “operational control” of the detainees for an unspecified time after their arrival on the base. Nevertheless, the Army commander of the detention camp told the detainees that they were in military custody and entitled to the protections of the Geneva Conventions. Then the priorities changed. About four months after the transfer, the FBI arrived and reinterrogated the five 9/11 suspects (and other detainees) to elicit ostensibly “clean” confessions that could be introduced as evidence at trial in the new court system. Four administrations later, the case has remained mostly trapped in a perpetual debate over whether these confessions are valid or inadmissible due to the brutality that preceded them at the CIA’s black sites. (One of the five defendants has been severed from the case over a finding of mental incompetency – which his lawyers blame on his CIA torture – though the government still hopes to prosecute him.) The United States lost credibility around the world both with the creation of the detention facility on Guantanamo Bay – and its unsuccessful attempts to completely block detainees there from access to U.S. civilian courts – and with the many revelations of abuses from the CIA interrogation program. As witnesses in the 9/11 cases have testified, it’s difficult to reestablish the context of the immediate post-attack panic in the U.S. – the fear of an even worse attack and the imperative to stop it. Still, democracies should be judged on their commitment to the rule of law in times of conflict, when the temptation to skirt international conventions is strongest. The U.S. could have chosen a different path to better balance the demands of intelligence gathering with the need to pursue criminal accountability on behalf of the victims. Instead, the government chose a linear sequence – to first operate outside the law, then to return to the law when doing so suited its shifting priorities. These decisions have faced significant criticism for apparent hypocrisy. In court, the result has been one of incoherence: The initial steps the U.S. took to capture, torture, and disappear the alleged perpetrators have proved irreconcilable with later efforts to prosecute, convict, and execute. The attempts to make it work, over so many years, have been both fascinating and maddening as the national security state has hovered over the proceedings. Fights over certain tranches of witnesses and evidence consumed the cases, with the parties engaged in an endless struggle over what can transpire in open court or in classified sessions that are closed to both the public and the defendants. The CIA program, the FBI’s role in that program, the operations of the Guantanamo detention facility – these and other topics contain information the government wants to keep secret. In 2024, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin overruled plea agreements that prosecutors had reached after lengthy negotiations with Mohammed and two co-defendants. The deals would have removed the death penalty as a possible sentence in exchange for full confessions and their participation in a sentencing trial expected to last three months. The defense teams have asked the U.S. Supreme Court to review a decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit upholding the legality of Austin’s move. If that fails, Austin’s decision may prove to be a lost opportunity at finality for an otherwise unresolvable conflict between the desire for criminal accountability and past national security policies that put that desire on hold. However the proceedings move forward now, any fair assessment – even the criticisms – should recognize the case’s evolving relationship to America’s credibility and commitment to democratic norms. In one part of the Caribbean, the government has been summarily executing suspected drug traffickers without due process; in another, it continues to provide the accused 9/11 conspirators with stables of military and civilian legal professionals led by experienced capital defense lawyers nearly two decades after they were charged. So far, three military trial judges – the current judge and his immediate predecessor in the 9/11 case, the other in a separate commission against the accused plotter of the USS Cole bombing – have sided with defense claims that the CIA's past abuse should render subsequent confessions obtained by the FBI inadmissible. It would be a greater risk to America’s credibility to simply terminate these proceedings out of frustration – and to recategorize the 9/11 defendants as detainees who will neither be released or face trial – than to let the experiment play out. The passage of time cuts both ways. By almost any viewpoint – prosecution, defense, victim family member, taxpayer – the court system has failed for the purpose it was created. But there has been no rush to judgement in court. The American adversarial system has proven resilient in the most unlikely of places. --- ### Somali piracy was under control. Then came the Iran war. **Published:** September 8, 2026 | **Author:** Khaled Mahmoud | **Section:** Africa **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/iran-war-piracy/.md From the start, the U.S.-Israeli war on Iran has been a story of unintended consequences. Contrary to President Donald Trump’s hopes for a quick victory, the conflict has morphed into a sustained crisis, one that has driven up oil prices, driven down tourism in the Middle East, and reshaped the region’s geopolitical map. Now, a new unintended consequence has emerged: the return of piracy to Somalia’s coasts. This shift, which comes after a decade of quiet, threatens some of the world’s most important shipping lanes and the interests of the United States and its allies. Pirates have attacked at least 15 vessels in the region this year, a sharp uptick from the five attacks that occurred last year, according to data from the International Maritime Organization. The renewed criminal activity has led to extended hostage situations, including one ongoing seizure of an oil tanker and its crew. A controversial operation to free the MV LATUF, carried out by Somali forces and the Turkish navy late last month, raised questions about whether a ransom was paid. The government of Puntland, a semi-autonomous region of Somalia, says it has evidence of phone contacts between Somali government officials and the pirates, which undermines the official story from both Ankara and Mogadishu. The vessel was carrying Turkish weapons and satellite and communication equipment bound for a Turkish training facility in Mogadishu. Global piracy dropped in the first half of 2026 to its lowest level since 1992 — only 38 incidents, compared to 90 in the same period of 2025 and 60 in 2024. But data from the International Chamber of Commerce shows that, by the end of last month, six commercial ships were still being held, with more than 90 seafarers on board. --- ### 25 years after 9/11, the US still doesn't know 'why they hate us' **Published:** September 8, 2026 | **Author:** Scott Hibbard | **Section:** Washington Politics **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/911-25th-anniversary/.md Twenty-five years ago, 19 hijackers took control of four American airliners and crashed them into symbols of American power, killing upwards of 3000 people. The American population watched the events unfold in real time. It was an emotionally jarring event that changed the country. In some respects, the events of 9/11 needed no explanation. The destruction of the World Trade Center buildings and the massive, and random, loss of life were horrifying to all. The meaning of the attacks, however – and the motivations of the hijackers – were less clear. The effort to explain the motives behind the attack, and to understand “why they hate us,” brought a pre-existing debate over Islamist militancy to the center of American public life. In the decade leading up to 9/11, the Washington policy community had been divided over how to deal with the Islamist movement and particularly those extremists who sought to use violence to impose a narrow vision of religious orthodoxy upon reluctant societies. At the heart of the 1990s policy debate was a dispute over causation: are religion and ideology the sources of violent extremism, or are poverty, marginalization and authoritarian misrule to blame? Commentators and politicians on the political right viewed the issue in terms reminiscent of the Cold War. The conflict with Islamism (or “Islamic fundamentalism”) was ideological in nature and, like international communism, had to be confronted with force. Hence, American foreign policy should prioritize security and support our regional allies in their efforts to eradicate both the Islamist opposition and violent extremists. Those on the other side of the debate rejected this vision of a new “green peril” and saw the underlying claims as inaccurate and misleading. To operate from such flawed assumptions, it was argued, would result in a foreign policy that served neither American interests nor those of the Arab (and Muslim) populations most directly affected. The best strategy for dealing with both militant violence and the non-violent opposition was economic development and political reform. Both the George H.W. Bush and Clinton administrations sought to find a common ground between these two perspectives, one that addressed both security concerns and the need for reform. The terrorist attacks of 9/11, however, upended this balance. The shock and horror of that day provided the George W. Bush administration a free hand to reshape American foreign policy. In doing so, the second Bush administration embraced the security side of the argument and the corresponding policy prescriptions. What motivated the administration was a view that this new war on terror was – like WWII and the Cold War – an existential “conflict between freedom and tyranny.” In the face of such a dire threat, the “gloves come off.” Many experts now recognize that the militarized response to 9/11 was counter-productive. In the two decades that followed, the number of groups and fighters that claimed allegiance to the jihadist cause increased, as did their geographic areas of operation. Even as U.S. forces made gains against al-Qaida, new groups such as the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) emerged that were even more extreme and violent. The precipitous demise of the Afghan government in August 2021 – and the return of the Taliban to power – further illustrated the limits of American military power. All of this occurred despite the concerted effort by the U.S. government and others to rein in Islamist militancy and counter the ideology of violent extremism. The problem, in short, got worse, not better. --- ### A test of nationalist right, German AfD victory echoes across Europe **Published:** September 7, 2026 | **Author:** Molly O'Neal | **Section:** Europe **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/afd-elections-victory/.md Legislative elections in the eastern German state of Saxony-Anhalt have ended with a huge victory for the nationalist-populist Alternative for Germany (AfD). The final results have AfD with just under 44% percent of the vote and the incumbent Christian Democrats (CDU) at just over 17%, followed by the Social Democrats (SPD), Greens and the Left (Linke) at about 9% each. The left-populist Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW) received 5.3% and won five seats. The turnout was above 75%. Although the population of Saxony-Anhalt is just over two million, this election has been closely watched across Europe, since Germany’s mainstream parties have agreed not to allow right populists ever to have a role in governing at the national or state level. It may be difficult to impose a governing coalition that excludes the AfD after this decisive popular victory. The AfD will have 39 seats, three seats short of a majority in the 83-seat body, putting the so-called firewall stopping a AfD control under acute pressure. The BSW has offered to cooperate with AfD in Saxony Anhalt, but the terms of any such arrangement would be the subject of negotiation. In the former East Germany (GDR), the AfD polls strongly, as does the Linke party, which was formed in part from the ruling communist party after Germany’s reunification. Both parties respond to popular grievances in the East about how the region lags behind western Germany on social and economic indicators. There is also a lingering sense of being considered inferior or “other” by western compatriots. Instead of angry grievance, the AfD leader in Saxony Anhalt, the 35-year-old Ulrich Siegmund, led a campaign with the slogan “Everything in Possible,” projecting a friendly and non-threatening image. In mid-August, the cover of Der Spiegel magazine featured his photo with the caption “Germany’s most dangerous man.” Siegmund cheerfully signed copies of the magazine in good-natured and festive campaign appearances. Under Germany’s federal system, states have authority over education, cultural matters, and some aspects of economic management and law enforcement. They have virtually no authority in foreign and security policy. Siegmund has stated that schools will follow a more traditional curriculum and will display the national tricolor rather than the rainbow flag. He said the Russian language should be offered in schools and educational exchanges with Russia should be relaunched. Unsuccessful asylum seekers would be detained pending deportation, and his administration would consider limiting the reach of national public broadcasting in the state. --- ### On this Labor Day, Trump offers no sympathy to working Americans **Published:** September 7, 2026 | **Author:** Harrison Berger | **Section:** Washington Politics **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/labor-day-trump-war/.md A Truth Social post in which President Donald Trump declared that there are "too many non-working holidays in America” and demanded that “it must change,” went viral on X this week, with analysts — incorrectly — labeling the post Trump’s 2026 “Labor Day message” to Americans. The post was actually written on June 19, 2025, more than a year earlier, yet its content and the economic conditions it describes have changed little enough in the interim that the mis-dating is almost irrelevant. As the War against Iran (or as JD Vance and the White House insist we refer to it: the “operation” in Iran) has entered its sixth month with no end in sight, and as American families continue to bear the costs of the conflict both directly through their tax dollars and indirectly through inflation, the Trump administration has settled on a midterm message that is essentially: everything is fine, and in fact, it could be worse, so stop complaining. This was the spirit of JD Vance’s White House press conference on Thursday, where the Hillbilly Elegy author told Americans who are now paying a national average of $4.15 per gallon of regular gas that fuel prices “frankly, could have been much, much higher were it not for our efforts,” attributing the problem to Iran being “really, really crazy,” and suggesting that Americans should be grateful for the current prices. This is recognizably propaganda, of the weakest variety. On February 27, one day before the war began, AAA reported the national average price of regular gas was $2.98 per gallon. But after the U.S. and Israel launched the war by bombing a girls’ school and murdering the spiritual leader of Shia Islam, Iran did what analysts had long predicted it would in that situation and asserted control over the Strait of Hormuz, through which about a fifth of the world’s seaborne oil normally passes. Iran has said that in order to re-open that crucial waterway, the U.S. must lift its naval blockade, end its sanctions regime, release frozen Iranian assets, pay compensation for war damage, and end “war and aggression against Iran and its allies in Lebanon, Palestine, Yemen, and Iraq,” conditions that are hardly unexpected and perhaps unrealistic, but would be a straightforward starting point for negotiations for most governments, except apparently our own. It is the U.S. bombing civilians and serving Israeli interests — rather than the supposedly crazy behavior of Iran’s leaders — that explain why six months later, American households have absorbed roughly $640 in additional fuel costs, as calculated by the Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy. The chief economist at Moody’s Analytics recently told NBC News that the Iran War has cost the average American household at least $1,200 more than they would have paid if it had never started. This does not include the costs of sustaining military operations, which are also siphoned away from American families through their taxes, with internal Pentagon estimates of that cost reaching up to $100 billion. The tens and perhaps hundreds of billions of dollars foisted upon Americans comes as the nation suffers through a grueling affordability crisis, which has only been exacerbated by the record rise in diesel prices — the fuel necessary to transport and produce goods caused by Iran War disruptions to global transit. A May story from local Louisiana news channel KTAL reported that “meals that once cost under $10 are now pushing closer to $15 or $20” at fast food restaurants across the country and attributed the problem to “food prices, transportation expenses, and supply chain pressures,” each of which has risen significantly due to the Iran War. The response from MAGA influencers like Marc Thiessen and Ben Shapiro, whose leader ascended to power on a promise to lower prices, has been to shame Americans and tell them it’s their own fault. This is exactly what Rep. Dan Crenshaw did when he posted that ungrateful Americans should “stop whining, get a job, eat Ramen.” The demands for Americans to treat fast food slop as a luxury item comes as the total U.S. household debt reached a record $18.6 trillion in the first quarter of the year, according to the New York Federal Reserve, and buy-now-pay-later borrowing — largely invisible to the credit files regulators and lenders monitor — adds to that number. A Lending Tree poll cited by CBS News in early September shows that nearly 30% of BNPL customers use the financial services to pay for groceries, 23% of respondents use BNPL to pay for medical, dental or veterinary expenses, or rent, while “more than half of those borrowers — 54 percent — say they wouldn’t be able to make ends meet without the loans.” The dire straits of Americans — and the refusal of the U.S. federal government to intervene to resolve the national interest of mitigating debt peonage— have been identified by Israelis as ripe for exploitation, with a viral Jerusalem Post op-ed this week suggesting that the U.S. government should use the record indebtedness of today’s youth as leverage to compel them to join the U.S. military. The op-ed argued that this would be necessary for achieving the Israeli goal of “a ground invasion of Iran,” that would certainly kill hundreds if not thousands of young Americans. Absurd as it is, the proposal seems more realistic than expecting the federal government to intervene on behalf of a national interest it has already abandoned. Because on a holiday meant to honor American workers, the administration’s response to mass discontent around surging debt and affordability has been to demand they pay even more for a war they didn’t choose, and to stop complaining about it. --- ### Massie, Kent join ex-officials lighting up Ron Paul ‘revolution’ **Published:** September 7, 2026 | **Author:** Hekmat Aboukhater | **Section:** QiOSK **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/massie-speech-iran-war/.md In his first non-Congressional public speech since his Republican primary loss to Ed Gallrhein, Thomas Massie brought some of the loudest energy to the Ron Paul Institute’s Washington conference on Saturday. He was full of jokes and promise for the future. Massie said he was not interested in mourning the defeat and declared that he was, in a way, happy he had lost. When addressing what he planned to do next, he joked that “you could scan my head” for an answer and still come up empty because he had not yet decided himself. One possibility, however, was firmly off the table: another run for Congress. Massie said he once held out hope that Congress could fix itself. His years inside the institution had convinced him otherwise. The energy with which he was received was indicative of his standing at the conference and within the broader antiwar movement. His name was invoked repeatedly throughout the day. His May 19 defeat followed more than $32 million in campaign spending, making it the most expensive House primary in American history. Pro-Israel groups spent more than $15 million to oust the representative after years of clashes over his foreign aid and U.S. policy stances on Israel. Beyond Massie’s dissent in Congress, former National Counterterrorism Center director Joe Kent and former State Department official Josh Paul offered the conference two examples of dissent from inside the Executive Branch. Paul resigned as director of congressional and public affairs from Biden’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs in October 2023, saying he could no longer participate in the expedited transfer of American weapons to Israel without consideration of civilian harm. Kent made a similar break with the current admin this March. He resigned as President Trump’s counterterrorism chief, declaring that Iran posed no imminent threat to the United States and accused Israel and its American supporters of pushing Washington into this latest war. Together, the two offered the conference’s clearest illustration of the remarkable coalition taking shape around opposition to US Middle East policy. One resigned from a Democratic administration over Gaza and the other from a Republican administration over Iran. Israel, unsurprisingly, was one of the dominant subjects of the day, with speaker after speaker challenging one aspect of Washington’s relationship with the country or another. Former Ohio representative Dennis Kucinich accused “traitors” in Washington of having surrendered American sovereignty, proclaiming: “We cannot reclaim our nation unless we first reclaim our sovereignty.” He added a sober warning about the threat of blowback borne out of our nation’s actions in the Middle East: “We will pay for the violence we are abetting in the future.” The day before, during the scholar’s seminar, journalist Brian McGlinchey voiced a similar warning reminding the scholars of how Israel’s operation Grapes of Wrath motivated the fanaticism of 9/11 hijacker Mohammad Atta. Josh Paul offered a more optimistic note regarding AIPAC. He declared that the influential pro-Israel lobbying organization was once a name that could make “knees in Washington shake.” Today, that name is increasingly becoming politically toxic. Institute for Peace and Diplomacy scholar Michael Vlahos placed these developments inside a much broader diagnosis of American decline. Drawing connections with the Western Roman Empire’s fall, Vlahos linked permanent war abroad with institutional decay, elite enrichment, and the concentration of power at home. The analogy outlined another theme that surfaced repeatedly throughout the conference: foreign policy failure, in Iran and elsewhere, is inseparable from the domestic dysfunction many Americans feel in their homes and communities. Speakers pointed to the $40 trillion federal debt, inflation, military overstretch and executive overreach as consequences of a political system increasingly unable to impose limits on itself. Massie was especially blunt about a Congress that allowed the executive branch to dominate decisions over war and peace. He argued that lawmakers had effectively allowed two branches of government to collapse into one, making Congress a "vestigial order.” That diagnosis creates a harder question for the movement represented in the room: Where do we go from here? Opposition to intervention may be finding new constituencies and prominent figures from both Republican and Democratic administrations have broken with their parties over war. But there remains little agreement about what political vehicle can translate that dissent into power and a viable path forward. Ron Paul, now decades removed from the presidential campaigns that first brought many in the room into antiwar politics, ended the conference by sharing some wisdom in his characteristic happy warrior fashion. He discouraged hopes for a third-party effort, arguing that authoritarian institutional barriers made such a path exceedingly impossible. His broader message was more cheerful: keep fighting, but remember to have fun doing so. --- ### No war? 377 US forces injured since July, 36 in last 2 weeks **Published:** September 5, 2026 | **Author:** Kelley Beaucar Vlahos | **Section:** QiOSK **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/updated-us-casualties-iran/.md According to new data quietly added to the Pentagon's casualty base, there were 36 new injuries in the last two weeks, mostly Army, as fighting renewed between the United States and Iran in the Persian Gulf. This brings the total wounded count to 794 and 18 killed since the war began on Feb. 28. The White House, including Vice President JD Vance just this week, likes to say this isn't "a war" but an "operation" but for the soldiers, sailors, and airmen who have been killed and injured, these semantics are meaningless. Just like the Pentagon's insistence that casualties that occurred before the July "ceasefire" must be classified under "Operation Epic Fury" and those after under "Overseas Operations." This is distinction without a difference. Turns out the number of servicemen hurt in the latter — 377, with four dead — is almost as much as the former. In the pre-July period, there were 417 men and women injured and seven killed. It is a grave insult to those who serve, and to the American people who support them, for politicians to downplay what is clearly a war in order to try and avoid the political cost and implications. Iran had been targeting U.S. facilities in Bahrain, Jordan, Iraq, and Kuwait in retaliatory strikes over the last week. The fact the Pentagon is not saying where, when, or how these men and women were wounded is a pathetic attempt to deter reality and ultimately it will backfire. --- ### Why 'D-Day' was destined to be a dud **Published:** September 5, 2026 | **Author:** Daniel Brumberg | **Section:** Middle East **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/d-day-impact-iran/.md On August 19, 2026, President Donald Trump announced that “ANY country that allows its financial institutions, businesses, airports, or government entities to provide any type of lifeline to Iran will itself face TREMENDOUS Economic Consequences . . . It all needs to stop NOW. . . This will be an ECONOMIC D-DAY.” Far from crippling Iran’s “ability to project terror worldwide,” or ensuring that “Iran will never have a nuclear weapon,” the White House’s new measures will not force Iran’s capitulation. Instead, they will reinforce the resolve of the hardline security officials to entrench their power. But this process of regime securitization is hardly complete. Indeed, it is unfolding even as Iran’s generals allow President Masoud Pezeshkian and his allies in the beleaguered reformist camp some space to pursue diplomacy. Hardliners and their rivals keep their options open. Their tense partnership is sustained by the absence of Iran’s new Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei. D-Day will not change these calculations, nor the complex domestic political dance between factions that has long animated Iran’s politics. US pressure will help to sustain the one goal that all Iranian leaders share: regime survival. --- ### Witkoff & Kushner to spend Labor Day weekend in Russia, Ukraine **Published:** September 4, 2026 | **Author:** Blaise Malley | **Section:** QiOSK **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/witkoff-kushner-russia-ukraine/.md U.S. envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner will reportedly travel to Moscow and Kyiv this weekend in an effort to revive negotiations to end the war in Ukraine. It will mark the diplomatic duo’s first trip to Kyiv since President Donald Trump’s return to office, and follows CIA director John Ratcliffe’s visit to Moscow last week. “It is unclear whether the Americans are bringing new proposals to the two presidents, or are pushing them to close the gap on the remaining issues, which include who will ultimately control the Donbas, Ukrainian territory that is partly occupied by Russia,” according to a New York Times report. George Beebe, director of grand strategy at the Quincy Institute, called the development “most welcome” and said all parties had strong reasons to find a way to end the fighting. He cautioned, however, that “seizing this propitious moment will require overcoming deep mistrust between the two countries” and addressing doubt that the “Trump administration has the political clout and persistence to overcome opposition in Europe and inside the Washington establishment.” Diplomatic efforts have been on hold since the start of the U.S. war in Iran at the end of February. News of the trip was initially reported by Russian state media outlet TASS and Axios. Reuters later reported that it was not yet finalized due to security concerns from the American side. The attempt to resume diplomacy comes at a time of escalating violence on both sides. Just on Friday, a drone of unknown origin reportedly targeted the headquarters of the Ukrainian Security Service in the capital. Kyiv’s mayor said nine were injured in the attack. In July, civilian deaths in Ukraine hit their highest levels since the first year of the war. Ukraine has also ramped up its own deep strikes inside Russian territory. However, while Russian forces have moved closer to Ukraine’s two remaining “fortress cities” in Donetsk, their advance has been slow. In confirming the news of Witkoff and Kushner’s visit on X, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy pledged that there “will be no air strikes from our side, and Russia must do the same, ensuring there are no air strikes from its side for the time needed to hold these talks and handle the logistical matters related to this American visit.” Beebe says that both Kyiv and Moscow will seek certain assurances during negotiations. Ukraine will want to ensure that it will not be left without support in case of future Russian invasion, while Moscow will seek understandings about broader European security matters and will seek normalized diplomatic and economic relations with Washington. Accomplishing these goals, and others, will not be possible without American involvement. “Neither Russia nor Ukraine can get the assurances they each need to end the fighting without the United States’ playing a central role in negotiations,” Beebe said. --- ### This Trump-approved trade deal is no tariff, in fact, it's duty free **Published:** September 4, 2026 | **Author:** Dan M. Ford | **Section:** Africa **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/agoa-trade-agreement/.md Tucked away in the funding package passed by Congress this week is a provision that extends the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) through the end of 2028. The two-year extension of AGOA — a preferential trade deal that offers eligible sub-Saharan countries duty-free access to the U.S. market for thousands of goods — answers the White House’s request that the agreement be extended on a short-term basis while negotiations take place over its long-term future. Originally signed into law by President Bill Clinton in 2000 to improve U.S. trade relations with sub-Saharan Africa, AGOA has had a topsy-turvy past year. Trump’s strong disapproval of preferential trade agreements led many Africa watchers to assume that AGOA was going to lapse without any effort by the administration to extend it past its September 2025 expiration. But just a day before the agreement expired, Trump came out in support of a short-term extension and expressed a desire to begin negotiations over what a long-term AGOA should look like. Competing bills were presented in Congress late last year for AGOA’s extension, including one sponsored by Sen. John Kennedy (R-La.) which included a provision that would have called for the review of the bilateral U.S.-South Africa relationship. This came in the wake of Trump’s spat with South African President Cyril Ramaphosa over the country’s handling of what the American president called, without providing proof, a “genocide” against the country’s white population. In the end, an AGOA extension (which did not include a bilateral review for South Africa) was signed into law in February, keeping the act in force until the end of this year and providing retroactive AGOA benefits to goods that had been sold during the months between its expiration and renewal. Now, with this new two-year extension, negotiations over the act’s long-term future can finally take place. Trump’s support for a long-term AGOA stands in contrast to his general opposition to preferential trade deals, which he has criticized for their tendency to remove tariffs on foreign companies exporting to the United States without providing the same level of benefit to American exporters. This, Trump has complained, worsens the U.S. trade balance (by increasing imports without increasing exports), consequently making American companies less competitive with foreign sellers that can produce goods more cheaply and thus undercut the prices of American-produced goods. (Of course, lost in the hoopla over the trade balance is that these cheaper imports — and the wider range of options in a competitive market — benefit American consumers.) Trump’s team has been outspoken in its pursuit of a long-term AGOA that provides more reciprocal benefits to the United States. In practice, this most likely means that the administration will push for a long-term agreement where African countries reduce or eliminate tariffs facing U.S. exporters in a similar vein to the benefits offered by the United States to sub-Saharan exporters. But these negotiations require nuance and complexity. American demands for greater trade reciprocity need to take into consideration how AGOA actually benefits its African partners, or else African exporters will turn elsewhere. Although AGOA has quite noticeably benefited certain African sectors — such as textiles and apparel — its benefits aren’t substantial enough to offset the cost that African countries would incur if they were to remove tariffs on thousands of goods at the request of the Trump administration. The widespread removal of tariffs would decrease revenue for African governments struggling to repay high levels of sovereign debt and hurt local companies that can’t achieve economies of scale to the same extent that larger American companies can. Such a move would render many African companies unable to compete with a new slate of American exporters entering their countries duty-free. And although accessing the huge American market remains a major goal of African sellers, the truth is that they now have a much wider international consumer base than in years past, which decreases American leverage. The Chinese government has given all African countries, except Eswatini (which recognizes Taiwan as an independent country), duty-free access for all exports to China. Unlike the U.S. trade deal, these agreements apply to all exported goods without requiring African partners to meet governance and human rights standards, nor forcing them to remove tariffs facing Chinese exporters. And African countries are also beginning to trade with each other at a much higher clip, especially now that the African Continental Free Trade Area, which aims to create an Africa-wide customs union, is beginning to take shape. The schizophrenic nature of AGOA’s stop-start renewals over the past year has already hindered U.S.-Africa trade relations, with African exports to the U.S. dropping sharply during the months AGOA had lapsed. Talks about reciprocity alongside Trump’s heavy tariffs have increased pessimism among experts about what benefits a long-term agreement might actually provide Africans. Continuing to push heavy demands on sub-Saharan countries for reciprocity could backfire, as many would-be African partners might increasingly turn to China and alternative markets, where they can reach a wide base of consumers without being forced to jump through hoops put in place by Washington. --- ### After SDF dissolution, how will al-Sharaa treat Syria's Kurds? **Published:** September 4, 2026 | **Author:** Sirwan Kajjo | **Section:** Middle East **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/syria-kurds/.md This article, which originally appeared in Arab Digest, is republished with permission. Last week, Syria’s Kurds entered a new stage in their struggle for political recognition. The Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) formally announced their dissolution as part of a complicated process of integration into the Syrian state. Shortly after the announcement, interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa appointed SDF commander Mazlum Abdi as a presidential adviser. After more than a decade as a major military actor in the Syrian conflict, particularly in the fight against the Islamic State, the SDF’s dissolution marks a dramatic transition for Syria’s Kurds, shifting their struggle from the military arena to the political sphere. But in Syria’s complex and fragile post-conflict transition, the reality is not as simple as it may appear from Damascus. The integration process, which began in January 2026, has been marked by distrust, tensions and occasional violence. If anything, this suggests that the next stage will likely bring its own set of challenges. Integrating the SDF and granting its leaders a degree of political power, at least at the local level, will not therefore, by itself, resolve the Kurdish question. Measures taken by the Syrian government such as recognising Kurdish as a national language, though not an official one, and granting citizenship to those who were stripped of it in 1962 are commendable steps, but they are certainly not enough to make Syria’s Kurds feel that they have a meaningful stake in the country’s national politics. The deeper problem is that, despite Syria’s status as a transitional country, there is little evidence of a genuine political transition taking place. The developments surrounding the SDF should therefore not be viewed as part of a broader, inclusive political process. Rather, they are the product of several converging pressures: Damascus’ desire to recentralise power, Ankara’s insistence on the dissolution of the SDF and, most importantly, Washington’s preference to move away from its partnership with the SDF and redirect its support from northeastern Syria toward Damascus. For Syria’s Kurds, their demands can broadly be divided into two categories. The first concerns their longstanding struggle for basic ethnic, cultural rights, and political representation. Historically, successive governments in Damascus deprived Syrian Kurds of fundamental rights, including by restricting their language, confiscating their lands and suppressing their cultural expression. The second category emerged during the Syrian war, when the Kurds established de facto self-rule across nearly one-third of Syria’s territory. This period allowed them to exercise governance for more than a decade with little to no effective authority from Damascus. Before the Syrian conflict, Kurdish demands were largely centred on the first category. The experience of self-rule, however, has expanded those demands to include greater autonomy, self-government, and decentralisation. The SDF’s dissolution, and the resulting abandonment of its pursuit of a decentralised system, should therefore not be mistaken for an indication that Syrian Kurds no longer want these forms of governance. Nor should the SDF and its political affiliates be assumed to represent all segments of Kurdish society in Syria, estimated at roughly three million people. Part of the Kurdish call for decentralisation in Syria is aimed at guaranteeing a meaningful degree of self-governance in Kurdish-majority areas. But decentralisation is not solely about securing special arrangements for the Kurds. It is also about ensuring that Syria as a whole does not return to the heavily centralised system that allowed successive governments in Damascus to suppress political freedoms, marginalise minorities, and concentrate power in the hands of the central government. For Syrian Kurds, therefore, decentralisation is both a means of protecting their own political gains and a broader safeguard against the return of authoritarian centralism. This distinction is particularly important as Syria enters a new phase with the Kurds. Even if Damascus were to agree to address the Kurds’ domestic demands, including language rights, political representation, and cultural recognition, those gains would remain vulnerable if the broader political system continued to concentrate power in Damascus. Without meaningful political participation, institutional checks on executive power, and some form of decentralised governance, Kurdish rights could ultimately depend on the goodwill of the central government rather than being protected by durable political institutions. The situation of other communities in Syria reinforces this concern. Damascus is not remotely close to resolving the case of the Druze in the south, where tensions between the central government and local actors remain unresolved. The Druze-majority of Swaida is effectively under siege. The situation among the Alawites in the coastal region remains tense following the violence in March 2025. Meanwhile, Christians across the country continue to face occasional harassment and intimidation by armed groups affiliated with the government. The challenges facing other minorities demonstrate that the question of political inclusion and power-sharing extends well beyond the Kurdish issue. Syria’s transition will ultimately have to address how different communities can exercise meaningful political agency while remaining part of a unified state. In short, long-term security for the Kurds cannot be guaranteed solely through an agreement between Damascus and the SDF. Their gains will be sustainable only if Syria develops a political system in which power is dispersed, local communities have a meaningful voice in governance, and political rights are protected through a modern constitution, regardless of who controls the central government. --- ### House to universities: Don't you dare boycott Israel **Published:** September 3, 2026 | **Author:** Blaise Malley | **Section:** Washington Politics **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/house-passes-bill-israel-boycott/.md The House passed legislation Thursday that would put federal funding at risk for universities that participate in certain boycotts of Israel, despite warnings from critics that the measure could chill political expression and effectively extend anti-boycott protections to Israeli settlements in occupied territories. The Protect Economic and Academic Freedom Act, introduced by Reps. Virginia Foxx (R-N.C.) and Josh Gottheimer (D-N.J.), would bar colleges that receive federal funds from engaging in what it defines as a “nonexpressive commercial boycott” of Israel, including “refusals to deal” or terminating business relationships in order to limit commercial ties without a “valid business reason.” The law would require these institutions to submit annual certification that they were giving students and faculty access to academic programs in Israel on the same terms as programs in other countries. The legislation, which passed in a 237-169 vote, could put universities in a precarious position. “The goal here is to basically say every university not only cannot refuse cooperation with Israel but must actively seek every opportunity to cooperate with Israel,” Lara Friedman, the President of the Foundation for Middle East Peace, told RS ahead of the vote. “And if they're not doing that, they're pro-BDS and anti-Israel.” In an earlier analysis of the bill, Friedman noted that the bill could open the door for legal action against a school, because politically minded individuals or groups could “search for and point to the absence of some relations with Israel to allege that a university lied in that certification.” House Education and Workforce Committee Democrats urged members to vote against the measure late Wednesday evening, arguing that it threatens constitutionally protected speech and targets conduct that no American university has actually undertaken. Thirty-three Democrats voted against the party line, while Reps. Thomas Massie (R-Ky.) and Warren Davidson (R-Ohio) were the only two Republicans to oppose the measure. Among the Democratic “yea” votes was Rep. Jared Moskowitz of Florida, who was recently named ranking member of the subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa — a move that angered progressives who see him as too pro-Israel. “There is overwhelming Democratic opposition to undermining American rights and institutions to shield Israel from accountability,” Dylan Williams, VP of Government Affairs at Center for International Policy, told RS in an email. “A lawmaker put in a position of trust by the caucus on these issues can’t just ignore that without consequences.” The legislation does not explicitly mention the Boycott, Divest, and Sanction (BDS) movement, an international grassroots effort to isolate Israel that draws inspiration from the global initiative to boycott South Africa’s Apartheid government. But statements from sponsors of the law and the committee debate make clear that BDS is the target. The legislation appears modeled, in part, after state-level anti-BDS laws that restrict government contracting or investment involving entities that boycott Israel; such laws have passed in 38 states since 2015. Supporters of the bill in Congress frame the measure as a preventative response to the growth of the BDS movement on college campuses, which they say has contributed to rising antisemitism in American universities. “A significant amount of unrest on campuses has resulted from efforts by anti-Israel radicals to coerce institutions into divesting from and boycotting Israel,” Rep. Joe Wilson (R-S.C.) argued during the bill’s mark-up in front of the Rules Committee. Boycotts of Israel, he claimed, are “anti-Semitic in design and discriminatory in their effect,” and are used “to isolate Jewish students” and “silence Jewish faculty.” Democrats on the rules panel focused much of their opposition on the more basic objection that the legislation is aimed at conduct no American university has actually undertaken. “There has not been a single case of an American college or university administration adopting the BDS movement policies that are described in the bill. Not one,” Rep. Bobby Scott (D-Va.) said during the mark-up. The minority party’s committee report similarly concluded that the bill was a “solution in search of a problem” and lamented that ensuring students are able to engage with their Israeli counterparts could have been a “building block for a bipartisan unanimous bill, but the Majority decided to include in the bill a section on the BDS movement.” The committee report also raises First Amendment concerts over conditioning federal student-aid eligibility on universities’ boycott policies, saying that Congress cannot avoid the constitutional issue by labeling the conduct “nonexpressive” because the BDS movement is “clear and open about the ideas it hopes to express.” The wording of “nonexpressive boycotts” in the bill stems from a 2022 Eighth Circuit ruling upholding Arkansas’s anti-BDS law, which ruled that the act of boycotting is nonexpressive conduct, and therefore not protected by the First Amendment, and that only calling for a boycott remains protected speech. The Supreme Court has thus far refused to take up challenges to that ruling. Friedman told RS that this distinction goes much further than the immediate fight over Israel, calling it part of an effort to “not just erode but, for all practical purposes, erase any First Amendment protection for the right to boycott.” During the mark-up, Rep. Morgan Griffith (R-Va.) retorted that, if universities are not currently engaging in the conduct the bill would prohibit, opponents should have little reason to object. “Let’s take my colleagues on the other side of the aisle and their argument, and that is the bill does nothing, and there’s nothing to see here,” Griffith said. “Then there’s no harm in passing it.” Outside critics have focused more on the potential ramifications of the bill. The measure “seeks to chill free speech by penalizing universities for engaging in constitutionally protected political expression in support of Palestinian human rights,” according to a memo written by the lobbying group A New Policy when the bill was initially introduced last summer. Some Democratic members made this case forcefully ahead of the vote. “No matter how much I may disagree with BDS, and find it strategically stupid and morally repugnant, I will always fight to protect Americans’ right to speech with which I disagree. It is the only way to ensure speech I do agree with is equally protected,” Rep. Jerry Nadler (D-N.Y.) said in a statement, calling the bill a “gross violation of the First Amendment.” --- ### US universities get millions to do military research for Israel **Published:** September 3, 2026 | **Author:** Mila Halgren, Alex Rewegan | **Section:** Military Industrial Complex **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/israel-military-us-universities/.md See an insect crawling in the corner of the room? It might be a surveillance robot, thanks to research at Carnegie Mellon University to develop cockroach-like robots with, and for, the Israeli military. Robot cockroaches, “terror-network” mapping, and rapid missile guidance are just three examples of at least 70 research projects U.S. universities have conducted on behalf of the Israeli Ministry of Defense (IMoD). Over a thousand pages of internal university and U.S./Israeli military documents reveal a sweeping, decades-long program to sponsor military research collaborations with at least 30 U.S. universities, from Cornell to the University of California at San Diego, since at least 2009. Projects are conducted in collaboration with the Israeli military and sometimes explicitly incorporate environmental conditions in Palestine into the work. One project designed fuel cells for “distributed sensor networks” tailored to the temperature and soil conditions of an Israeli border that could monitor “potential terrorist activity” for “border security.” Recent reports from Dropsite News, The Nation, and the Anti-War Initiative found millions of Israeli military dollars flowing into U.S. schools. Public records obtained from 13 U.S. universities reveal this money was directed via a U.S. arms export program to fund collaborations with Israeli scientists and military officials. These projects are not funded by traditional academic grants. Instead, they are procured as “defense articles and services,” paid for with U.S. taxpayer dollars via the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program – the same mechanism Israel uses to purchase F-35 fighter jets and other U.S. defense exports. At least 11 contracts sent U.S. scientists to Israel to work face to face with their counterparts at an Israeli university and/or the IMoD, earmarking funds for U.S. professors to attend meetings and present their research to the IMoD. --- ### Pentagon puts $131 billion price tag on 1970s-era fighter **Published:** September 3, 2026 | **Author:** Mark Thompson | **Section:** Military Industrial Complex **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/f15-fighter-jet/.md The Bunker appears originally at the Project on Government Oversight and is republished here with permission. --- ### Want to save NATO? Ask its members to do less. **Published:** September 3, 2026 | **Author:** Johan Wennstrom | **Section:** Europe **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/nato-europe-trump/.md This summer the Pentagon handed NATO members a questionnaire asking whether they support in part, “U.S. foreign policy priorities.” Dubbed a “loyalty test” in the press, it was seen by many Europeans as the most recent sign that the alliance is coming apart because of American petulance. Yet what is actually happening is that the U.S. is putting stress on an inherently flawed and now exhausted form of alliance politics. The roots of the present discord were planted not in the 2024 reelection of President Donald Trump, but in the moment of NATO's Cold War triumph thirty years earlier. Indeed, one of the more puzzling developments after the dissolution of both the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact was the conviction of Western leaders that the time was ripe for new, grand projects of expansion and integration. In the absence of a genuine counter-power, NATO abandoned its former role as a heavily armed defensive alliance anchored in the Atlantic and instead embraced a normative mission, often described as an “alliance of values,” to which even states far outside the Atlantic sphere and without any meaningful defense capabilities were encouraged to accede. Its principal purpose became the accumulation of ever more members – Sweden being the latest, in 2024 – regardless of their suitability. For a time in the late 1990s, NATO effectively served as the waiting-room for Eastern European candidates to that other expanding supranational project: the European Union. As the late English philosopher Roger Scruton observed, drawing on his involvement in the underground intellectual scene in Eastern Europe, the liberated Soviet states wanted nothing more than to reclaim the national cultures that communism had tried to erase during more than forty years of occupation. Instead, they were incorporated into an EU that reduced the multifaceted European continent to a vast trade area, whose inner borders and local identities simply could – and should – be dissolved. It was assumed that a single community could be built on the particular ones, supported by, among other things, a "European anthem" and euro banknotes depicting imaginary architectural heritage. The EU and NATO took a bet on the virtue of breadth, disregarding that both institutions in their modern incarnations were political creatures that, to paraphrase historian Peter Apps, were in fact organized controversies, “attempting to resolve sometimes irreconcilable and enduring differences between its members.” The price of breadth was cohesion, with the secretary-general’s role in Nato evolving from what Javier Solana once called a “catalyst of consensus” into something closer to a frustrated chief whip, struggling to discipline increasingly disruptive members – much as Ursula von der Leyen does in the EU as president of the European Commission. This was always an unstable arrangement that now faces a reckoning, accelerated but not caused by Washington’s retreat under President Donald Trump from NATO’s post-Cold War design; ironically, much as the Soviet Union did in 1989, when Moscow under Mikhail Gorbachev abruptly withdrew its protection from satellite governments. The response from Secretary-General Mark Rutte and major European capitals has been to propose more of the same, a "NATO 3.0" that leaves the alliance’s underlying logic intact while merely shifting the financial burden to non-US. members. The Istanbul summit in July advanced precisely this vision. Yet NATO’s future depends less on spending than on distinguishing itself from the EU it gradually came to resemble. What if NATO were transformed into an alliance with a more nation-centered character in which the highest degree of military solidarity would only be expected in the event of a threat against all members? States would then explicitly be allowed to participate in NATO operations around the globe in accordance with how they saw them as aligning with their own national beliefs and interests. If such a rule had been in place during the military aid effort for Ukraine, Spain, for example, would not have been reprimanded for focusing on security challenges along its southern border rather than on what, from its perspective, is a distant regional war – only to be criticized later for not doing enough to anticipate and reverse the Ceuta migrant crisis. Under such an arrangement, members would not be required to adhere to a single, often Western-aligned analysis of world affairs, yet would remain entitled to collective protection in the event of a genuinely shared threat. Suppose Iran were to permanently close the Strait of Hormuz to maritime trading to strangle energy supply to large swathes of the world or build a nuclear weapon, or China were to seize Taiwan and, to paraphrase the Stanford historian Niall Ferguson, discover that its appetite grows with the eating. In those kinds of scenarios, it would be in the interest of each member to contribute to collective security according to its means. Sweden could, with its diminished army but highly advanced defense industry, become part of "NATO’s workshop," producing fighter jets and other assets. Such a loosening of NATO, and the relinquishing of its current supranational character, would likely foster greater harmony among its members while keeping Trump – and future U.S. presidents – engaged. It would also strengthen solidarity where it matters most: in the event of a major war. The lynchpin of a "NATO of nations" would be a rewording of the mutual defense clause of the North Atlantic Treaty to require explicit military support. As it stands, Article 5 obliges members to take “such action as deem necessary” if one of them is attacked. In theory, Britain met that requirement during the “Phoney War” of 1939 by dropping supportive leaflets as the German blitzkrieg overran its ally Poland. If NATO members could agree to that, it would surely be acceptable for some of them – even the U.S. – to sit out the latest campaign in defense of “values” rather than core interests. The EU’s Lisbon Treaty is, by contrast, more explicit, calling on members to use “all the means in their power” in support of mutual defense (although Sweden has, over the years, done its very best to argue that the formulation does not imply military support). If NATO is to shed its EU-like illusions, this is at least one lesson worth borrowing. President Trump has asked NATO members to do more to assuage his doubts about the value of the alliance and the U.S. commitment to it. What if he is making the wrong demand, and should instead be telling them to do a lot less? Paradoxically, that may be the best way to keep America in. --- ### Trump’s Saudi nuke agreement may prolong the Iran war **Published:** September 2, 2026 | **Author:** Trita Parsi | **Section:** QiOSK **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/trump-saudi-nuclear-deal/.md A final deal between the United States and Iran is slipping further out of reach. Since the Memorandum of Understanding collapsed in July, the prospects for reviving it have deteriorated by the day. While Tehran publicly demands a return to the MOU, Trump’s current position is that even if Iran reopened the Strait of Hormuz, he would neither return to the agreement nor lift the blockade on Iran. And even in the unlikely event that he did, the MOU could not come back into force as long as Israel continues to bombard Lebanon. Iran is unlikely to accept an MOU minus Lebanon: its demand for a regional ceasefire is non-negotiable. But even if these obstacles were resolved, profound differences over the nuclear issue would remain. And those differences have now grown dramatically more severe because of Trump’s nuclear agreement with Saudi Arabia. The details of the deal were just made public, and Kelsey Davenport at the Arms Control Association has published an excellent FAQ addressing its most important aspects. The bottom line is: Trump is granting Saudi Arabia access to the same uranium-enrichment technology the United States has sought to deny Iran for more than three decades, while imposing a far weaker inspection regime on Saudi nuclear activities. In effect, Washington is providing Riyadh a pathway to the bomb while insisting that Iran have no enrichment capability whatsoever—the infamous zero-enrichment objective. As ACA writes, “the Trump administration rejected key nonproliferation conditions for U.S. nuclear cooperation that have long-standing bipartisan support and are internationally recognized best practices. Most critically, the deal does not require Saudi Arabia to adhere to the more intrusive International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards agreement, known as the Additional Protocol.” As a point of comparison, Iran began voluntarily implementing the Additional Protocol (AP) under Obama’s nuclear deal in 2016 and was expected to ratify it once the United States formally lifted sanctions through Congress. That never happened, however, because Trump withdrew from the agreement in May 2018. Moreover, Trump’s agreement with Saudi Arabia gives the kingdom a pathway to develop a uranium-enrichment program reaching 20 percent. Again, the comparison with Iran is revealing. When Iran expanded its enrichment to 20 percent in 2010 to produce fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor—which, ironically, the United States had given Iran in the late 1960s as part of the Atoms for Peace program—Washington pointed to the move as further evidence of Iran’s alleged nuclear weapons ambitions. State Department spokesperson Philip Crowley said on February 11, 2010, that Iran’s decision to begin enriching to 20 percent “further solidifies ... our impression and that of the international community that Iran’s nuclear intentions are anything but peaceful.” At the UN Security Council, then-Ambassador Susan Rice argued that Iran’s decision moved it “closer to weapons-grade material,” as she made the case for new UN sanctions against Tehran. Now, Trump wants Congress to approve a deal with Saudi Arabia that gives the kingdom access to precisely that technology—but with far fewer inspections—while bombing Iran to prevent it from having any enrichment at all. The double standard could hardly be more stark: enrichment is intolerable in Iranian hands, yet acceptable— in fact, even worth giving to Riyadh — when in Saudi hands. This will undoubtedly complicate matters with Tehran. Will Iran still agree to some of the terms discussed before the war and in the run-up to the MOU? According to Oman’s Foreign Minister, who mediated the draft agreement in February 2026 that Trump rejected in favor of war, Iran had agreed to a needs-based enrichment arrangement that, in practice, would have created a five-to-seven-year pause in enrichment — well beyond Trump’s term in office. In later discussions, Iran hinted that it was open to extending it for another three to five years. It is very important to understand that if the conflicts over the Strait and Lebanon are resolved and a genuine opportunity to revive the MOU emerges, these understandings will nevertheless unravel unless a nuclear agreement is reached at the end of the MOU’s 60-day period. And that nuclear agreement looks all the more difficult to achieve given the blatant discrepancy between what the US demands of Iran and what it gifts Saudi Arabia. And if there is no nuclear deal at the end of the MOU, war will likely erupt again. As such, Trump’s controversial Saudi deal may just have made an end to the war with Iran more unlikely. --- ### Why are so many Vance allies leaving the administration? **Published:** September 2, 2026 | **Author:** Connor Echols, Kelley Beaucar Vlahos | **Section:** Washington Politics **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/vance-rubio-rivalry/.md Army Secretary Dan Driscoll resigned this week, raising a flurry of questions about whether his departure is part of a larger political reordering that has pushed skeptics of President Donald Trump’s war policies to the margins. A long-time friend of Vice President JD Vance, Driscoll drew widespread praise for his efforts to modernize the Army. But he has clashed with Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, particularly over the latter’s firing of numerous senior military officials, including Army and Air Force generals and the Secretary of the Navy. Driscoll brought his concerns about these firings directly to Trump last week, who said he was unaware of how many officers had been purged, according to the Atlantic. Driscoll’s departure is the latest in a string of recent high-profile exits by Vance’s allies and ideological fellow travelers, including Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard, Deputy National Security Adviser Andy Baker, White House Director of Legislative Affairs James Braid, and Director of the National Counterterrorism Center Joe Kent. All of this takes on heightened significance as the second Trump administration reaches its halfway point. In some ways, sources tell RS, it is because Trump is expected to increasingly become a “lame duck” after the midterms that this churn in personnel is taking place. With Vance and Secretary of State Marco Rubio winding up for a widely anticipated fight to secure the 2028 Republican presidential nomination, we are spotting tantalizing clues about how their battle for influence is playing out, both inside and outside the White House. For Vance supporters, the rosiest interpretation is that he’s simply setting up an outside shop. Several lower-level Vance allies have left government and moved into positions at the sort of K Street firms that could play a crucial role in fundraising for a future Vance campaign, as Politico reported earlier this year. Such a network would be particularly valuable for Vance, who only spent two years in the Senate before ascending to the vice presidency. As one source with knowledge of the administration’s internal dynamics said, the “deluge of Vance-aligned departures” could give the vice president’s allies “more freedom to basically do campaign work” if and when he gets his 2028 operation whirring. For people like Baker and Driscoll, the decision to leave may simply be practical, argued Justin Logan of the Cato Institute. “We tend to underestimate the demands made on these people, especially for those of them who have spouses and kids,” Logan said. In other words, these younger officials may simply want to make some extra money and spend more time with their families before diving into a likely 2028 campaign. Rubio, meanwhile, is a Beltway creature par excellence, having spent 14 years in the Senate before joining Trump’s team. Given his extensive network of allies in DC, there is little need for Rubio’s aides to leave the administration and start working from the outside. Another plausible interpretation is that a turf war is underway, and the vice president is losing out. Vance and his allies are broadly associated with foreign-policy restraint and generally skeptical of the wisdom of Trump’s decision to go to war with Iran. Some sources with knowledge of administration dynamics say sides are forming up, and Rubio’s hawks are ascendant, in many cases getting promoted while Vance’s allies and fellow travelers are leaving altogether. “I think Andy Baker leaving is a much bigger deal than Driscoll (leaving the Pentagon),” said one source with knowledge of the dynamics inside the government right now. As deputy national security adviser, “Andy’s portfolio was everything,” the source added. “He is a career foreign service officer, deployed overseas, and is aligned with how JD sees the world. His leaving is unfortunately ceding some ground.” These sources describe a “war” on realists and restrainers that, along with the political intent of supporting a Rubio faction ahead of 2028, aims to impose a pre-Trump neoconservative foreign policy on the Republican party, which means anyone not with the program has to go. While Gabbard and Kent ultimately resigned, reporting indicates that Gabbard, who made a career out of criticizing the neoconservative war policies of the past, was one of the few top officials to warn Trump against attacking Iran; she was likely squeezed out, according to reports. Kent said he left because there was no room for dissent, and he could not “support sending the next generation off to fight and die in a war that serves no benefit to the American people nor justifies the cost of American lives.” Several of Gabbard's realist hires were later caught up in a mass “downsizing” by acting DNI Bill Pulte in June. These shifts have not completely eliminated dissenting opinions inside the administration. Multiple four-star generals warned Hegseth recently that “prolonging large-scale operations against Iran is unsustainable,” according to the Washington Post. But there is little evidence that these voices are having an impact on Trump’s policy decisions; Hegseth, who is recently reported to harbor presidential ambitions of his own, has consolidated control of military decisions in his office, all but boxing out the uniformed brass over the last year. Regardless of why the departures are taking place, the upshot is that Rubio and his hawkish friends “have cemented influence and power within the administration,” a source with knowledge of the situation told RS, pointing in particular to Deputy National Security Adviser Mike Needham’s hold over the National Security Council as well as the dominance of Rubio allies in the State Department. For now, these trends are all playing to Rubio’s advantage. Yet, as one well-connected source pointed out, this could come back to bite him. Rubio has so far kept his distance from some of Trump’s most controversial policies, including the unpopular Iran war, which Vance and Hegseth have addressed far more publicly. But, now that Vance’s allies are washing out of the administration, it could become increasingly difficult for Rubio to maintain this politically advantageous position. “The upshot of having more neocons in the room and losing more restraint-minded voices is that this thing doesn't seem to be going away anytime soon, and it certainly doesn't seem to be getting better,” a source said. “At some point, people are going to start pointing fingers, and someone's going to have to take ownership.” --- ### What Huckabee is doing about dead Americans in the West Bank **Published:** September 2, 2026 | **Author:** Blaise Malley | **Section:** Middle East **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/mike-huckabee-israel-settlements/.md Israeli settlers attacked an NBC News crew in the village of Jalud over the weekend, injuring the network’s correspondent, Matt Bradley, as well as two other crew members and Aida Ahmed Abdullah, the Palestinian woman they were interviewing. “They jumped out, beat us, then jumped back in the car,” Bradley, who was treated at a clinic, said of the incident. Abdullah was hospitalized following the attack. This is the latest episode in a surge of settler violence throughout the occupied West Bank, where assaults on Palestinians and attacks on their homes and property have risen sharply in recent years. Among the victims have been a number of Americans and Palestinian Americans, at least 14 of whom have been killed since 2003. U.S. Ambassador to Israel Mike Huckabee, a staunch supporter of Israeli settlements who has even previously signaled support for an Israeli annexation of the West Bank, has nevertheless condemned some of those attacks in unusually strong terms. After 20-year-old Palestinian American Saifullah Kamel Musallet was beaten to death while visiting family in the West Bank last summer, Huckabee called his killing a “criminal and terrorist act.” More recently, he denounced settlers who laid siege to three homes in the village of Qusra, including one belonging to a Palestinian American family, as “Israeli terrorists,” saying there was “no excuse for such thuggish behavior.” But the persistence of such attacks has raised questions about whether Huckabee — and, by extension, Washington — is doing enough to protect its own citizens, and what pressure the Trump administration is prepared to exert against Israeli authorities and settlers to protect them, and curb violence it claims to oppose. “It's good to see Mike Huckabee using the word terrorism,” former State Department career diplomat Josh Paul told Responsible Statecraft. “It would be nice to see actual terrorism designations following through on that, because that's where you give the word actual meaning rather than simply throwing it around.” Todd Deatherage, a former State Department official under President George W. Bush and co-founder of the Telos Group, a nonprofit focused on Israeli-Palestinian peacebuilding, said Huckabee’s response reflects the basic responsibilities of an American ambassador. “At a minimum the U.S. ambassador’s job in any country is to promote U.S. values, defend U.S. interests, and protect U.S. citizens,” Deatherage told RS. With settler violence harming Americans and undermining U.S. interests, he added, “you can just say he’s doing his job.” Musallet’s death is one of nine killings of American citizens by Jewish settlers or Israeli security forces in the West Bank between January 2022 and August 2026. Trump’s response to these violent deaths is now drawing scrutiny from Congress. Sens. Chris Van Hollen (D-Md.), Tim Kaine (D-Va.) and Bernie Sanders (I-Vt.) recently introduced a resolution seeking information about those deaths, as well as a broader examination of the human rights implications of Israeli actions in the West Bank. “The violence committed by Israeli settlers in the West Bank is reaching an unprecedented level, and as a result more and more Americans and Palestinians are being killed and injured,” Kaine said in a press release announcing the legislation. “These actions – and the Israeli government’s lack of response to this violence – are unacceptable and threaten the long-term safety and security of the entire region.” The list of killings also includes Palestinian American journalist Shireen Abu Akleh, who was shot in the head while wearing a press vest in 2022. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) eventually acknowledged that there was “high possibility” that Abu Akleh was killed by IDF gunfire, though no criminal charges were ever pursued. Despite the added attention that American citizenship can bring to such cases, it has historically done little to ensure accountability, according to Mike Casey, a former U.S. diplomat who worked at the now-defunct Palestinian Affairs Unit (PAU), renamed the Office of Palestinian Affairs when President Joe Biden took office, at the U.S. embassy in Jerusalem from 2020 to 2024. “It didn't really make much of a difference, unfortunately. We would try to use that angle to get engagement on certain topics,” Casey, who resigned over Washington’s response to Israel’s war in Gaza, told RS. “When you look at the case of Shireen Abu Akleh, which was probably the most high-pressure, high-focus and investigation of any Palestinian who's been killed, it still didn't amount to anything.” Huckabee is known as one of Israel’s strongest advocates in the Trump administration. He recently described Israel as “the 436th congressional district of the U.S.” and once told right-wing commentator Tucker Carlson that it would be “fine” if Israel took control of nearly the entire Middle East. But inaction by American representatives in Israel stretches back to well before Huckabee’s tenure as ambassador, Casey said. During the first Trump term, then-Ambassador David Friedman — who recently tweeted that “Qusra is not under siege, and Palestinian attacks against Israelis living in Judea and Samaria far outweigh Israeli attacks against Palestinians” — showed no interest in reports of settler violence coming from the PAU. “Most things didn't even make it to him because his chief of staff would gatekeep things, but then if they did get to him, they just wouldn't go out” to Washington, Casey said. After the 2022 election of the current, far-right Israeli government headed by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, the Biden administration took a more punitive approach, imposing sanctions on violent settlers and organizations that were part of the settlement movement. But Casey says that effort, which he initially considered promising, was ultimately limited and short-lived because U.S. officials were not willing to go beyond sanctioning individual groups and follow the ties between the sanctioned entities and the Israeli businesses and government officials supporting them, nor were they a part of a broader strategy to address expanding settlements. Trump eliminated the sanctions program shortly after returning to office. Huckabee has drawn a clear distinction between what he sees as violent extremists and the settlement movement itself. He has described the perpetrators as “unsettlers” who are “hurting the very people they claim to be fighting for.” For critics of U.S. policy, that distinction gets at the limits of Washington’s approach. “I would say that violent settlers in the West Bank have been a low-hanging fruit” for Western governments seeking to criticize Israel, said Paul, who also quit his State Department post at the bureau responsible for overseeing arms transfers to foreign countries after more than a decade of service, because of U.S. policy during the war on Gaza. Because these settlers can be portrayed as individuals acting independently of the Israeli government, he told RS, officials can condemn their violence without confronting the broader issue. “I think that is a fundamental misunderstanding — and an intentional one — of what the settlement movement represents,” Paul said. “I think concerns are ultimately not some fundamental opposition to settlement expansion by Israel in the West Bank (...) but just that the settler violence attracts too much attention and is therefore unhelpful to the longer-term objective on Israeli annexation.” The line between private settler violence and state action has become increasingly difficult to draw. The Biden-era ban on sending rifles to Israeli extremist groups fell short in part because after the Oct 7, 2023, Hamas attack on southern Israel the Netanyahu government expanded regional defense units on the West Bank that are composed largely of settlers operating under the IDF’s authority, and are thus not subject to the ban. “They operate with large degrees of autonomy and are essentially just advancing settler objectives while wearing the uniform of the IDF,” Sarah Sanbar, acting Israel and Palestine researcher at Human Rights Watch, told RS. That broader context is part of what the Van Hollen-Kaine-Sanders resolution, one of a handful of legislative efforts to investigate violence in the West Bank, could require the State Department to examine. The statute under which the senators plan to introduce the privileged resolution is a rarely used but potentially potent tool. Section 502b(c) of the Foreign Assistance Act allows members of Congress to request a report from the State Department regarding the human rights practices of any recipient of U.S. security assistance. If successful, the secretary of state would be required to produce the report within 30 days, or further assistance to Israel would be suspended. The law, however, has not been successfully invoked to obtain a report since 1976. Sanders introduced a resolution under the law to get information on the use of U.S. weapons in Gaza in 2023, but the bill did not pass the Senate. Experts who spoke to RS also listed other steps the U.S. government could take if it is serious about curbing settler violence, including reinstating targeted sanctions against specific individuals or groups, restricting U.S. assistance, or sanctioning banks or companies that support or finance settlement building. “They're just tools that we use everywhere else” that get rejected when it comes to holding Israel accountable, Casey said. “ It's not anything outrageous to suggest.” --- ### Trump plan to control Venezuelan oil has more holes than Swiss cheese **Published:** September 1, 2026 | **Author:** Orlando Pérez | **Section:** Latin America **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/trump-oil-venezuela/.md President Donald Trump announced Friday that the United States “has just entered into an Agreement” with Venezuela covering more than 65 billion barrels of proven oil reserves, secured “at no cost to the American Taxpayer.” He then proceeded to name Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, and acting Venezuelan President Delcy Rodriguez as the chief negotiators. The White House then released a fact sheet late Monday evening, without the underlying legal text. It offers one of three accounts of the deal, one that clashes with both Rodriguez’s version and the Pentagon’s own prior statements. The number of oil barrels will get the most attention over the next weeks. However, the financing structure is the key element because it determines who bears the costs of this arrangement and under what authority. Rodriguez described her interpretation of the deal on Telegram and expanded on it Saturday night on state television. Hers is a 25-year, bilateral project across 17 strategic fields and eight greenfield blocks, targeting more than 1.5 million barrels a day, drawing $100 billion in investment and returning roughly $209 billion to the Venezuelan state at a benchmark price of $65 per barrel, which would give the government about $19 of revenue per barrel. She insisted it preserves Venezuelan sovereignty over natural resources. Trump, for his part, claimed there will be majority American ownership of the reserves, which would be illegal under Article 12 of Venezuela’s constitution. A U.S. official told the Associated Press that Washington would control 55% of the output of a new private company called North American Blue Energy Partners (NABEP), the second largest oil producer in Venezuela, with an ownership stake and the right to buy crude at cost for the Strategic Petroleum Reserve and the military. The White House fact sheet later broke that figure down: a 35% equity stake for the Pentagon's Office of Strategic Capital, plus the State Department gets the right to buy 20% of output at cost. This framing appears at odds with that of Rodriguez; it’s hard to imagine, after all, that Caracas will get $19 per barrel if the U.S. is buying large amounts of it at cost. The Pentagon's Office of Strategic Capital could oversee and help fund the oilfield licenses, according to the Washington Post. The Biden administration created the office in December 2022, and Congress codified it a year later, establishing a pilot program to extend loans, loan guarantees, and technical assistance to companies developing dual-use technologies across 34 categories listed in the statute. The office made its first direct loan in August 2025: $150 million to a rare earths processor in California. Its pilot authority expires on October 1, 2028. Lifting heavy crude from Venezuela’s Orinoco Belt is not one of the 34 categories, and nothing in the law contemplates financing foreign upstream oil development. Pentagon spokesman Sean Parnell said the office’s role is confined to loans and guarantees and that it cannot take an ownership stake in private companies, which means the instrument available to the Pentagon cannot deliver the 35% the administration just described in the fact sheet. Three consequences follow from that mismatch. First, a loan guarantee costs nothing on the day it is issued and costs whatever the default costs on the day it is called. That is how a phrase like “no cost to the American Taxpayer” survives contact with a structure whose stated purpose, in the Post’s account, is to absorb risk that private firms have already declined to take. Francisco Monaldi of Rice University told the Post that oil companies will ultimately be hesitant, and ExxonMobil's chief executive called the country “uninvestable” in January. The guarantee is only being contemplated because neither of those judgments has changed. Second, the fact sheet now puts the lease at 100 years, two days after Rodriguez said 25 years. Either way, the financing authority floated to support the arrangement could sunset in 2028, unless Congress acts to reauthorize it. Whatever gets signed would outlive the legal instrument used to underwrite it, and no one has explained what would replace that authority or who would appropriate funds for it. Third, as the Congressional Research Service notes, information about the Pentagon’s loans and guarantees need not be made public. So, the administration has selected the federal credit facility carrying the least mandatory transparency to underwrite the largest resource claim in the hemisphere, which puts the claim about taxpayer cost beyond anyone’s ability to scrutinize. Venezuelan law raises a separate set of problems that no announcement has addressed. Article 12 of the constitution makes hydrocarbon deposits property of the government — property that is inalienable and non-transferable. Article 302 reserves the petroleum industry to the state, and Article 303 requires the state to hold all shares of PDVSA, as the state oil company is known. January's hydrocarbons reform loosened rules about joint ventures but stopped well short of authorizing a 55% foreign ownership stake, and constitutional changes may be required before the agreement can be finalized. Ricardo Hausmann, who ran Venezuela’s planning ministry in the early 1990s, wrote that Rodriguez “has no legitimacy or constitutional power to commit Venezuela to any such deal,” and that no major American oil company will treat it seriously because it will not last. According to the White House the U.S. would have veto power over who sits on the NABEP board. It would include "reputable U.S. auditors, lawyers, and advisors and the U.S. government’s agreement with NABEP is governed by U.S. law and is subject to the jurisdiction of U.S. courts." Right now it is controlled by Alejandro Betancourt, whom Swiss prosecutors sought to arrest on suspicion of financial crimes and whom Washington has declined to surrender. He has not been formally charged, and his attorney denies the allegations. Betancourt has also been the administration’s principal intermediary in Caracas. So, just about every party to this deal carries an unresolved question about its authority to sign. Venezuela has already run a version of this experiment on itself, in these same fields. In 2007, when the government converted the Orinoco projects into joint ventures, with PDVSA holding 60%, ConocoPhillips and ExxonMobil rejected the terms and were expropriated. Both companies eventually won. Conoco secured awards totaling roughly $10.7 billion, including an $8.7 billion ruling by an international trade court in 2019, and Exxon collected a $907 million award from the International Chamber of Commerce. More than 20 claims from that wave of litigation remain largely unpaid because tribunals cannot seize assets within Venezuela, and enforcement abroad has been slow and mostly fruitless. Any company that ends up holding a repudiated contract in these same fields would win a judgment it could not collect; a federal guarantee would shift this risk onto the U.S. Treasury. Within a day of its announcement, opposition to the deal surfaced across the entire Venezuelan political spectrum. Venezuelans protested in Caracas on Saturday; opposition figures called the arrangement a betrayal of the country’s resources; and Chavista hardliners attacked Rodriguez for conceding what the movement had spent 25 years claiming to defend. Indeed, it was just two years ago that, as then-President Nicolas Maduro’s vice president, Rodriguez accused opposition leader Maria Corina Machado of taking orders from her “master,” referring to the United States, to “hand over the oil, gas, and gold.” Rodriguez might be calculating that a deal of this size reduces Washington’s appetite for early elections. Ratification requires a legislature, and the only chamber capable of acting is the 2025 National Assembly, led by Delcy’s brother Jorge Rodriguez; that body’s constitutional legitimacy remains unsettled. However the situation shakes out, the upshot for the U.S. is concerning. Any claim arising from that unsettled status would default to whoever actually holds the risk, and under the instrument the Trump administration has chosen, that is ultimately the U.S. Treasury. --- ### Trump's 'golden age of science' is not just another war to be won **Published:** September 1, 2026 | **Author:** Pavel Devyatkin, Denis Simon | **Section:** Asia-Pacific **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/us-china-scientific-competition/.md In July 2026, the White House released what it called the most ambitious rethinking of American science policy in decades. Michael Kratsios, President Trump’s science advisor, penned a report titled “Science: A New Golden Age,” with the goal of charting a course to revitalize American research and development. The report contains ideas worth taking seriously. Kratsios is right that the system needs reform. Researchers have long complained about grant writing taking far too much time and how peer review leaves little space for bold new ideas. Kratsios wants to shake that up, proposing “golden tickets” for unconventional proposals, fast-tracking grants, and greater funding flexibility. All of this makes sense. But the overall vision behind the report is troubling. It presents science almost entirely as a weapon in great-power competition. The main goal isn’t advancing knowledge for everyone. Rather, it’s dominance. You see this fact clearly in President Trump’s letter commissioning the report: “We are not just competing with other nations; we are seeking, striving, fighting to make America greater than ever before.” Throughout the report, there’s a drumbeat about how simply publishing great science isn’t enough. The report emphasizes that America must be “formidable at turning breakthroughs into national power, or we risk watching the fruits of American discovery harvested first by others.” Competition undoubtedly matters. It has driven many of America’s scientific breakthroughs. But competition can’t be the sole defining feature of American science policy. There are entire fields where cooperation is the only way forward. --- ### Gulf states struggle to recover economically after 6 months of war **Published:** September 1, 2026 | **Author:** Giorgio Cafiero | **Section:** Middle East **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/gulf-states-economy/.md The Persian Gulf’s extraordinary wealth has long rested on an assumption of stability. The past six months of war have shattered that certainty, exposing a fundamental weakness in Gulf economic models: producing oil and gas is only half the equation when infrastructure and access to global markets can be disrupted. Ports, airports, power grids, desalination plants, financial centers, and tourism hubs are all vulnerable to the same regional shocks. The energy sector is particularly exposed, with damaged oil and gas facilities potentially taking months or longer to repair. Yet restoring production may prove easier than restoring confidence that Gulf exports can reliably reach global markets. Each Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) state enters this new era from a different starting point. Qatar, Kuwait and Bahrain are particularly exposed because of their reliance on Gulf maritime routes, including the Strait of Hormuz. Saudi Arabia has greater flexibility thanks to its East-West pipeline, as does the United Arab Emirates because of its oil export hub at Fujairah, which lies on the safe side of the Strait. Oman is also well-insulated, with its key export infrastructure beyond the Strait. In search of resilience, these states are now building alternative export routes, expanding overseas production, strengthening strategic inventories, and dispersing critical infrastructure. “The war doesn’t change the fact that the Gulf’s huge low-cost oil and gas reserves are the world’s most profitable,” Jim Krane, the Wallace S. Wilson Fellow for Energy Studies at Rice University's Baker Institute for Public Policy, told RS. “But the war signals to investors, including local national oil companies, that they may be prevented from moving cargoes to market.” Iran’s ability to close Hormuz adds a new layer of political risk, increasing the attractiveness of producers such as Algeria, Brazil, Mozambique, and the United States, which don’t have constraints on access to open seas, Krane noted. --- ### Western hawks are pushing Ukraine to draft its women **Published:** August 31, 2026 | **Author:** Branko Marcetic | **Section:** Europe **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/ukraine-draft-women/.md Ukraine is already suffering a severe demographic crisis as a result of the decision to eschew peace talks and pursue military victory instead — a decision backed emphatically by U.S. and European leaders earlier in the war. The ensuing combination of large-scale casualties and a mass emigration of Ukrainians has left the country facing several factors that imperil its future as a viable state: not enough young and able-bodied citizens to fund its welfare state, a potential future labor shortage, and a mortality rate that outstrips its birth rate nearly four times over. Now, some Ukrainian officials and Western war hawks are discussing an idea that would make this already crisis-level situation catastrophically worse: drafting women to fight in the war. The proposal had already been discussed earlier this year, after a female drone commander wrote in favor of the idea and a dozen Ukrainian women received erroneous military summonses, sparking headlines around the country. The start of this month saw a petition filed urging the conscription of childless women, an idea backed by some military figures. That includes former Ukrainian Defense Minister Alexei Reznikov, who, pointing to the example of Israel, said “we can survive only if everyone accepts that they must defend Ukraine,” adding that it would “double our mobilization resource.” Some of those cheering Ukraine’s war effort from outside the country have also embraced the idea. Keith Kellogg, who until December 2025 served as President Donald Trump’s special envoy to Ukraine, recently endorsed the proposal, adding that it is “very important for women, as part of society, to serve.” The Telegraph recently published a piece framing Ukrainian women’s military service as a victory for feminism; the article quoted one female drone operator endorsing the drafting of women and describing the idea as “inspiring.” In spite of all this talk, the idea hasn’t gained real traction. A senior official on Ukraine’s National Security and Defense Council said it “won’t happen”; Zelensky’s chief of staff Kyrylo Budanov deemed it “not necessary” since there were still many men who were yet to be drafted; and the petition referenced above has received only a small fraction of the signatures it needs to receive an official response from the president. By contrast, a petition in 2022 opposing the Ukrainian government’s increasingly aggressive recruitment strategies quickly received well over the 25,000 signatures it needed. Nevertheless, the growing talk about drafting women, particularly from Ukraine’s Western backers, is an ominous development for several reasons. One is that, as Western pressure to scuttle peace talks early in the war reminds us, Ukrainian policy on both the war and other matters isn’t always wholly up to Ukraine. This idea is a sign of the bleak situation facing Ukraine because of the decision to prolong the war. The fact that conscripting women is being floated at all indicates that Ukraine has suffered enormous casualties and suggests that the manpower shortage and recruitment crisis that have plagued Kyiv’s military campaign and led to deep social divisions and popular resentment may be even worse than we realize. It’s also a reminder of the vast imbalance between Russia and Ukraine that continues to make outright military victory for the latter unlikely. Moscow has also thrown its people into the proverbial meat grinder of war, but, simply put, it has a lot more bodies to work with than Ukraine does. Most mainstream discourse tends to discuss Kyiv’s military success or failure as a matter of the quantity of military aid it receives. But, the damage inflicted on Russia by Ukraine’s drone campaign notwithstanding, even modern conflict still requires human beings to use those weapons, not to mention man the broader industrial infrastructure necessary for any war effort. That serious thought is being given to drafting women is yet another signal that Ukraine is faltering in this area, lending credence to ousted former Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov’s recent warning that Ukraine is “gradually, slowly losing” the war. In a reasonable political climate, this sorry situation would lead us to rethink our definition of being “pro-Ukraine.” The war’s most ardent cheerleaders charge that the worst thing that could happen to the country is to be forced to cede territory in negotiations that end the war. Such a result is, of course, profoundly unfair to Ukraine. But is it truly worse than a future of perpetual crisis and dysfunction brought on by the eradication of vast swaths of its able-bodied population? --- ### What do current US military ops in Latin America actually look like? **Published:** August 31, 2026 | **Author:** Andrew M. Leonard | **Section:** QiOSK **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/us-military-latin-america/.md On Thursday, U.S. SOUTHCOM Commander Gen. Francis L. Donovan met with the Colombian and Ecuadorian defense ministers in San Lorenzo, Ecuador. The trio agreed on a plan to significantly expand their military cooperation along the Ecuador-Colombia border, moving past episodic U.S.-partnered missions and toward sustained combined operations against groups Washington has designated as terrorist organizations. This development is significant because it occurs at the time U.S. military forces are already operating on the ground with Ecuadorian forces in Esmeraldas, with the precise manner of cooperation publicly unknown. Additionally, on Aug. 23, Colombian President Abelardo de la Espriella announced all illegal armed and criminal groups will be classified and treated strictly as “terrorists” under a new “Comprehensive Security and Public Order Strategy,” further laying the groundwork for expanded military cooperation with the U.S. and Ecuador. The new U.S.-Colombian-Ecuadorian tripartite framework and broader commitments made at the recent Americas Counter Cartel Coalition (A3C) in Panama raise an even larger question: what types of U.S. military cooperation will occur across the Americas, and under what authorities? The framework, in deepening the integration of U.S. military forces on land, may see those forces advising foreign military forces, participating in combined operational planning, and supporting or even participating in future combined patrols and lethal strikes inside Ecuadorian and Colombian territory, and potentially elsewhere in the region. The distinction is important because ‘security cooperation and security assistance’ can describe varying levels of activity, each governed by different authorities and with different levels of risk and consequences. U.S. military engagement with foreign security forces is best understood as four increasingly consequential forms of involvement, each with their own unique legal and political requirements and associated costs: training and equipping; advising and assisting; partner-enabled U.S. operations; and direct employment of U.S. forces. Training and equipping foreign security forces is the day-to-day practice of U.S. military security cooperation with foreign military forces. The purpose of the Global Train and Equip program is to conduct or support programs that provide training, services and equipment to the national security forces of foreign nations, with the goal of enhancing the capability of partner nations. The legislative authorities to provide such training include 10 U.S.C. 333 and require human rights vetting of foreign security forces under the Leahy Laws and inclusion of training components on the law of armed conflict, human rights, the rule of law, and civilian control of the military. The second, and deeper, level of partnership with foreign security forces is advise and assist. Such longer-term advisory teams were developed because shorter-duration Mobile Training Teams under traditional train-and-equip authorities “did not provide the continuity” nor customized solutions necessary to achieve strategic goals. The U.S. has previously created two such teams in Latin America: one in El Salvador in 1984 and one in Colombia in 2003. These activities are conducted under different authorities depending on the activity. Two examples are 10 U.S.C. 321 and 10 U.S.C. 322, if the primary purpose of the activity is training of U.S. Forces. The next level is partner-enabled U.S. operations. Under 10 U.S.C. 127e, the secretary of defense, with the concurrence of the U.S. ambassador or chief of mission in a given country, may provide support to foreign forces, irregular forces, groups, or individuals that support or facilitate authorized ongoing U.S. special operation forces to combat terrorism. At this level, the previously noted relationship is reversed, with foreign forces now supporting or facilitating a U.S. military operation. However, 10 U.S.C. 127e does not in itself provide the authority to introduce U.S. armed forces into hostilities; separate authorities, such as a specific Authorization for Use of Military Force, are required for that purpose. The highest, and most intense, level of interaction is direct U.S. force operational employment within a foreign country. Such operations may be conducted in accordance with Article II of the U.S. Constitution, which, under the War Powers Resolution of 1973, requires congressional notification within 48 hours after the employment of forces. A War Powers Resolution notification was made in September 2025 following the opening boat strike that preceded Operation Southern Spear, and in January 2026 for Operation Absolute Resolve in Venezuela. Beginning on March 3, 2026, U.S. and Ecuadorian military forces launched joint operations, named “Operation Total Extermination”, including a combined strike against Comandos de la Frontera inside Ecuadorian territory. On March 9th, the president notified Congress of the operation, “consistent with the War Powers Resolution.” The report was made under 50 U.S.C. §1543(a)(3) regarding substantial enlargement of U.S. forces already located in a foreign country, and not the §1543(a)(1) provision regarding introduction of U.S. forces into hostilities. On August 7, 2026, Ecuador’s Ministry of Defense announced, and posted photos from, Operation “Piraña del Norte,” in which Ecuadorian forces, with U.S. support, destroyed a clandestine facility in Esmeraldas; no War Powers Resolution notification specifically addressing that operation has yet been made public. With Colombia’s entry into the Shield of the Americas and plans to host a coalition intelligence and operational headquarters in Medellin, Ecuador’s expanding partnered military operations with U.S. forces, and the U.S. looking to operationalize its activities in the region, security cooperation relationships could span all four levels of categories and authorities, including combined military operations that may require additional War Powers Resolution notifications to Congress. The question remains: as the Trump administration seeks to expand U.S. joint military operations across Latin America, will it continue to rely on presidential war powers or seek congressional authorization? --- ### Trump designates protesters terrorists. How far will it go? **Published:** August 31, 2026 | **Author:** Elizabeth Beavers | **Section:** Washington Politics **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/palestine-action-terrorists/.md Protesting is terrorism. At least, that is the message that the Trump administration has communicated in a series of recent actions, culminating last week in its designation of the U.K.-based Palestine Action as a terrorist group. The Trump administration placed Palestine Action and two other European entities on the Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) list, a category created in the wake of the attacks of September 11, 2001. By designating Palestine Action as an SDGT, the administration has unlocked the authority to impose economic sanctions against the group and all people associated with it, including freezing any of their U.S.-held assets and prohibiting them from financial transactions with any U.S. actors. Separately from financial transactions, it also means that all U.S. persons are prohibited from vaguely-defined interactions with the group that amount to “material support” or “services.” Anyone violating this prohibition could be subjected to civil or criminal penalties, or could themselves be placed on the SDGT list. The question of exactly what illegal “support” for Palestine Action could now mean is a troubling one. The group, which carries out so-called “direct action” protests that often include vandalism, says it is working to end “global participation in Israel’s genocidal and apartheid regime.” The U.K. “proscribed” Palestine Action as a terrorist organization last year, citing in particular a 2024 incident in which members broke into a military base and sprayed red paint on a pair of aircraft. Since the ban came into effect, hundreds of people in the U.K. have been arrested simply for holding signs in support of the group. In theory, U.S. law has an important feature not found in the U.K. system: the First Amendment’s protection of free speech and association. In its announcement designating Palestine Action as “terrorist,” the Trump administration reiterated that “constitutionally protected activities” would not result in sanction. But this is cold comfort for anyone paying attention to how the U.S. government has long chipped away at the First Amendment’s reach in the name of countering “terrorism.” Our Supreme Court has held that assisting a designated group with peacefully resolving its grievances amounts to criminal “support” for terrorism; our Treasury Department once suggested that hosting leaders of a designated group for peaceful dialogue could amount to prohibited “support” for terrorism; and, under the Trump administration, noncitizen students and scholars like Mahmoud Khalil have faced detention and threats of deportation for peaceful protest and expressions of opinion that the administration described as bolstering terrorism. At this point, we must ask the question: what even is “terrorism”? The Trump administration describes Palestine Action as part of a “violent far-left terrorist network,” yet criminal charges against members of the group primarily pertain to vandalizing property, namely, that of weapons manufacturers complicit in Israel’s military campaign in Gaza, which rights groups like Amnesty International and B’Tselem have deemed a genocide. (One protester was convicted of injuring a law enforcement official.) The designation calls to mind the Department of Justice’s recent prosecution of a group of protestors in Texas for setting off fireworks and vandalizing cars outside the Prairieland ICE detention center. One protester also exchanged gunfire with and injured a law enforcement officer during the incident, but the DOJ pursued “material support for terrorism” charges against 15 protestors and secured prison sentences totaling hundreds of years between them. What makes the actions of Palestine Action or the Prairieland protestors “terrorism” as opposed to mere crimes? Federal prosecutors insisted that the Texas protestors were part of an “antifa cell” plotting terrorism, pointing to evidence like their black clothing and possession of anti-fascist reading material to justify decades of prison time, even for protestors who were not involved in any violence. This eye-popping “terrorism” prosecution is consistent with the Trump administration’s National Security Presidential Memorandum (NSPM-7), entitled “Countering Domestic Terrorism and Organized Political Violence.” The memo pledges a crackdown on the forces of “anti-fascism,” as well as supporters of “anti-Americanism” and various forms of “extremism” and “hostility toward those who hold traditional American views on family, religion, and morality.” The administration has also insisted a protestor killed by ICE was a “domestic terrorist”; deemed “antifa” a “domestic terrorist organization” (despite the fact that this designation does not exist); and issued a bizarre report alleging a vast Cuba-led conspiracy propping up “powerful leftist nonprofits, anti-ICE collectives, socialist groups, and Marxist militant organizations across the United States.” What will this all mean for those who express disagreement with the U.S. government’s foreign policy regarding Israel or Cuba? What about those who “support” Palestine Action by asserting they have been improperly designated? What about nonprofits that fund and organize activism? What about those peacefully attending a law-abiding protest where others take rogue actions? It all comes back to the core question: “what is terrorism?” The clear answer is that those in power get to decide. In the post-9/11 era, the public became accustomed to the president, prosecutors, immigration enforcement agents and other national security officials wielding unchecked powers to target those they deemed “terrorists.” The folly in this foundational premise is now clearer than ever, as the term continues to be weaponized and politicized against disfavored populations. But, of course, it has always been a faulty system. Treating “terrorism” as something different from mere crime, considering crimes to be acts of war, framing protest as treason, and accepting that “terrorism” requires extraordinary extra-legal mechanisms to counter it — these are the load-bearing columns that have supported the War on Terror for nearly 25 years. --- ### After Iran, US signals major security shift in the Middle East **Published:** August 31, 2026 | **Author:** Abdelrahim Shalaby | **Section:** Middle East **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/us-withdrawal-from-middle-east/.md When President Donald Trump congratulated Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan for signing the Mecca Pact, describing it as a “BIG, BOLD, IMPORTANT FIRST STEP,” he was not simply trafficking in diplomatic pleasantries. The Trump administration also tacitly endorsed a multilateral, Saudi-led maritime initiative to protect shipping in the Red Sea, sending senior U.S. military officials to the meeting where the arrangement was agreed to. The thread running through both initiatives is clear: regional states taking greater responsibility for their own security. Behind Trump’s flattery, something more important appears to be taking shape. According to Pentagon planning reported by the Washington Post, the Defense Department is exploring a broader reduction of its forces in the Persian Gulf, which would entail moving units, command centers and aerial capabilities west toward Jordan, Israel and Saudi Arabia’s Red Sea coast. This would mean abandoning large, fixed bases in favor of small, hardened positions. The Pentagon views the destruction caused by Iranian attacks on U.S. bases in the Persian Gulf as a “once-in-a-generation chance,” in the Post’s words, to rethink America’s force posture in the region instead of simply rebuilding it. After six months of war with Iran, the efforts suggest that the U.S. is considering a dramatic adjustment to its force posture in the Middle East — one that would put far more emphasis on regional self-sufficiency. But it’s a far cry from a U.S. withdrawal from the region. The logic for the potential adjustments is straightforward. Moving troops to Jordan, Israel and the west coast of Saudi Arabia places them behind better air defenses, giving them longer warning times in case of future Iranian attacks, while maintaining the ability to carry out strikes of their own in the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb. Such smaller, more dispersed bases would be a practical response to a genuine weakness exposed by Iran’s missile and drone attacks. There is an aspect of this that could easily be lost in the discussion: for years, Iran has demanded that the U.S. reduce its military presence in the Gulf as part of any efforts to de-escalate between the two countries. So any troop adjustments that Washington undertakes to protect its forces can also become a bargaining chip for talks with Tehran — one that wouldn’t involve any real concession. In one fell swoop, the U.S. could transfer some of the burden of protecting the Gulf, harden its forces, and open the door to diplomacy with Iran. There has yet to be a final decision on this issue. A Pentagon official described the military’s analysis to the Post as “prudent planning,” not a withdrawal order. Any serious change in the size of America’s military presence in the region, currently estimated at 40,000-50,000 troops, would require the approval of Trump and Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth. Still, the direction is clear. America wants to remain in the region but with forces that are smaller and harder to target. The Pentagon’s planning makes clear that Washington expects regional powers to take on a bigger part of the regional defense burden and financial burden even as the U.S. lightens its presence. Trump’s public comments are consistent with this interpretation. While the administration has offered a range of objectives for its operation against Iran, Trump made his priorities clear in a recent post on Truth Social: “The number one Goal is, and always will be, that Iran cannot have, in any way, shape, or form, a Nuclear Weapon.” This is a far more modest goal than regime change or even opening the Strait of Hormuz using military force, which would require a large, continued U.S. presence around the Persian Gulf. If stopping Iran from getting a nuclear weapon is the first priority, and that goal has largely already been secured, Trump can reduce the U.S. military footprint without it looking like a retreat. Of course, history suggests this proposed process of burden-shifting will not go smoothly. Arab states have tried and failed to shoulder the regional defense burden on numerous occasions, including through efforts like the Gulf Cooperation Council, the Damascus Declaration of 1991, and the abortive Middle East Strategic Alliance, which Trump attempted to create in his first term. But the key difference with today’s regional efforts is that they are taking place as Washington appears to be seriously considering reducing its troop presence. Such a drawdown would significantly increase the incentives for Middle Eastern states to take on a greater role in their own security. Such a shift does not mean abandoning Israel militarily. Some of the forces that would move away from the Gulf would move to Israel, in addition to Jordan and the west coast of Saudi Arabia. Yet it’s notable that Washington is openly supporting the creation of an Arab-led security architecture, including Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Pakistan, and possibly Egypt down the line, that would take on some of America’s prior responsibilities in the region. Trump appears to like these regional arrangements because they contain Iran without requiring the U.S. to shoulder the burden. The possibility that these groupings may one day restrict Israel’s freedom of action does not seem to be part of Trump’s concerns. Given Tel Aviv’s close ties to Washington, Israel’s reaction to these emerging arrangements could play an important role in their success or failure. For now at least, Israeli officials and politicians have avoided addressing them directly, even as they express growing concern about a growing “Sunni axis” backed by Turkish military power. Pro-Israel analysts in the U.S. have echoed these concerns, even as they’ve endorsed the potential movement of more American troops to Israel as beneficial for both countries. America is not leaving the Middle East. At most, it is fortifying its presence and shifting some of the burden for regional security to allies who are willing to shoulder it. A new regional order is taking shape, one not designed with Israel’s interests in the forefront, but also not one that is explicitly opposed to those interests. Whether this trend will remain comfortable, for the U.S. or for Israel, may be a more important question a year from now than whether America is withdrawing from the Middle East. --- ### New US strikes on Iran may restart war Trump wants to freeze **Published:** August 30, 2026 | **Author:** Trita Parsi | **Section:** Middle East **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/larak-island-iran-strikes/.md Despite the excitement around Donald Trump’s new sanctions and even the US strikes against the Iranian island of Larak just hours ago, much suggests that Trump is not seeking a dramatic ratcheting up of pressure on Iran. According to reports Sunday, the U.S. military hit Iranian launchers on the island to prevent Tehran from planting new mines in the Strait of Hormuz. This is the first known U.S. strike against the country since Trump announced a ceasefire in July. Details are forthcoming. Meanwhile, the much-touted “major financial institution” that Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent promised to sanction for dealings with Iran turned out to be nothing more than Egypt’s second-largest bank. Though Banque Misr ranks among the region’s major banks, it is a dwarf beside the multi-trillion-dollar giants of global finance. It should come as no surprise that there is more bark than bite in Trump’s latest sanctions moves. That is not to say Bessent’s economic warfare won’t hurt ordinary Iranians or squeeze the Iranian economy. It will. But there is little to suggest that the pain will compel Tehran to submit to Trump — or that the sanctions are even designed to inflict significant harm, despite his rhetoric. Rather, Trump appears to be pursuing a very different gamble: maintaining a low-level conflict until the midterms—neither securing a diplomatic deal nor allowing the situation to deteriorate into full-scale war. A period of relative tranquility that pushes Iran out of the headlines and, in the run-up to the elections, weakens the connection between rising inflation and gas prices, on the one hand, and Trump’s foolish war of choice, on the other. The D-Day sanctions help create the perception that the U.S. has the upper hand while increasing pressure on Iran. Together with increased traffic in the Strait of Hormuz, they make the status quo more costly for Tehran than for Washington — but not so costly that Iran is incentivized to counter-escalate in the short term. Rather, it is a slow strangulation designed to ensure that, for the next two months, there is neither headline-grabbing diplomacy nor military escalation. This gives Tehran little cause for immediate panic. Its response will largely depend on what Washington does next. I see three possible scenarios. Trump may overshoot, pushing Iran beyond what Tehran deems manageable in the short term. For instance, the strikes against Iranian positions on Larak island will very likely generate an Iranian response. Moreover, if Trump confiscates Iranian oil tankers bound for China, Tehran will almost certainly respond by intensifying attacks on ships using the southern corridor of the Strait, while potentially also targeting energy infrastructure in the GCC. China, too, would likely respond forcefully to such a move. The result would be precisely the kind of escalation Trump wants to avoid over the next two months. In the second scenario, the D-Day sanctions neither incentivize Iran to counter-escalate in the short term nor alter its medium-term calculations. Tehran reckons that, despite the hype, its closure of the Strait remains sufficient and that the mounting economic pressure on Trump will eventually compel him to return to the table with a more pragmatic posture. Though this is not the most likely outcome, it helps explain why Iran is investing heavily in regional diplomacy even as all signs point to Trump not wanting a deal at this juncture. Omani, Pakistani, and Qatari diplomats are engaged in intense diplomacy with Tehran over the Strait. According to my sources, Trump has signaled directly to Iran that he will not lift the blockade even if Tehran reopens the Strait, nor does he favor returning to the earlier Memorandum of Understanding. Again, keeping Iran out of the headlines in the run-up to the elections requires avoiding developments of either kind—military or diplomatic. By engaging with regional mediators, Tehran achieves three objectives. First, it demonstrates to its domestic public that the war’s prolongation is due to American intransigence, not Iranian inflexibility. As the war drags on and Iranian civilians grow weary, controlling the blame narrative becomes increasingly important to Tehran. Fortunately for Tehran, Trump’s categorical public rejection of diplomacy plays directly into Iran’s hands. Second, this diplomatic engagement is also crucial for the regional blame game. If the war resumes, who regional states blame matters considerably, particularly because the war will inflict a heavy price on them. Tehran needs to demonstrate to regional governments that Iran is willing to compromise while Trump refuses even to negotiate. Finally, the current diplomacy builds regional consensus around specific solutions and principles. If Trump returns to the table, an infrastructure of semi-completed agreements with regional buy-in will already be in place — built while Trump voluntarily absented himself. Trump will pay a price if he seeks to unravel the progress the region made while he sulked in the White House. But the most likely scenario is neither immediate escalation nor a post-midterm return to talks. Rather, in this scenario the Trump administration’s newfound confidence proves warranted: the combination of new sanctions and growing traffic through the southern corridor of the Strait has created a new reality in which Iran is hurting more than the U.S., and its trajectory is becoming increasingly — but not dramatically — negative. Iran will therefore be weaker in a few months, and in a less favorable diplomatic and military position. While this will incentivize Iran to counter-escalate, Tehran may choose to delay its response and wait for a more opportune moment. If Washington wants to keep things quiet until the midterms, Tehran may conclude that the optimal moment to strike back is two or three weeks before the Congressional elections, maximizing the political damage to Trump. But Iran may not limit its response to tankers in the Strait. Iranian officials say, both publicly and privately, that they expect the U.S. and Israel to resume the war after the midterms regardless of the impact of the D-Day sanctions. Regional diplomats have largely reached the same conclusion. If sanctions weaken Iran over time while the global economy recovers and adjusts to the new reality in the Strait, a prolonged pause will work against Tehran. Iran may therefore decide to escalate dramatically, taking full advantage of Trump’s perceived vulnerability in the run-up to the elections. Iran appears encouraged by its performance in the second round of the war and by how quickly Trump halted his attacks. The first round lasted 38 days; the second just 13. Yet more than half of the American casualties were inflicted during the second round, despite it lasting only a third as long. While only one out of a plethora of variables in this war, the impacts of the second round suggest that American force protection had weakened, interceptor shortages had become more acute, and Iran had learned more from the first round of fighting in February than America did. Tehran appears to have improved both the sophistication of its attacks and the intelligence behind them. Iran had spent decades studying how America fought in Iraq and Afghanistan. Now, for the first time, it had direct experience fighting the United States — and Tehran has learned faster than Washington had anticipated. Still, while Iran’s calculation about Trump’s electoral vulnerability may prove correct, its apparent belief that an election loss will restrain Trump in 2027 may be misplaced. A Trump humiliated at the polls and potentially facing a third impeachment attempt may be forced to play defense at home, but precisely because of his domestic troubles, he may also be incentivized to lash out abroad. Freed from electoral constraints, Trump may be willing to take risks he previously eschewed, including deploying ground troops. After all, it was in the period following his November 2020 defeat that Trump displayed an unprecedented appetite for risk. Then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark Milley feared Trump might either provoke a war with Iran after losing the election or manufacture a domestic crisis to justify using the military and potentially remain in power. Trump reportedly floated proposals for an attack on Iran, which Milley vehemently opposed. “You're gonna have a fucking war,” he prophetically told Trump. Will there be a General Milley in Trump’s inner circle after the midterms? --- ### Did Trump put a poison pill in his own Saudi nuclear deal? **Published:** August 28, 2026 | **Author:** Yazen Zarour, Annelle Sheline | **Section:** Middle East **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/us-saudi-arabia-nuclear/.md This week, President Donald Trump formally submitted the U.S.-Saudi civil nuclear agreement to Congress for review, moving the deal forward despite continuing to insist that Saudi Arabia normalize relations with Israel before it can take effect. This condition could stall the agreement indefinitely: Riyadh demands a clear pathway toward Palestinian statehood before normalization, and Israel is dead set against statehood. Israel had strongly opposed the deal as originally negotiated, while Netanyahu had privately expressed hopes of delivering “the next big thing” by securing Saudi normalization before Israel’s October elections. Former U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia Michael Ratney described Trump as inserting normalization “at the last minute,” throwing the agreement into uncertainty. Trump’s decision to submit the agreement for congressional review further adds to this uncertainty. The president appears to want it both ways: his latest move is signaling to Riyadh that the agreement is moving forward even as he assures Tel Aviv that the deal is contingent on normalization. Creating yet more confusion is the timing of the agreement. As four congressional Democrats pointed out last month, Trump launched war on Iran to prevent it from enriching uranium, yet is prepared to grant Saudi Arabia the means to do the same. “That contradiction,” they wrote, “makes American policy impossible to take seriously and undermines any chance of reaching a durable agreement with Iran.” --- ### This creepy Israeli spy tech is likely operating in a city near you **Published:** August 28, 2026 | **Author:** Hayden Long | **Section:** Military Industrial Complex **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/israel-surveillance-tech/.md Since the 2013 Edward Snowden leaks, surveillance and debates surrounding it have become part of the American experience. In recent years, Ring video doorbell users have successfully pushed back against the company’s policy of sharing data with police departments. A nationwide movement is demanding the discontinuation of Flock Cameras, a widely adopted automatic license plate reader that gathers data on anyone who drives past. However, another concerning surveillance trend has flown under the radar. Since 2023, local and state police departments across the country have purchased technology for real-time monitoring of smart devices from the Israeli firm Cognyte Solutions LP. Israel is a hub of spy technology, with more surveillance companies per capita than anywhere else in the world. This phenomenon is largely due to the elite Israeli Military Unit 8200, a signals intelligence unit that serves as a pipeline to private industry, with a reported 80% of founders in the domestic homeland security industry having served in the unit. Cognyte had a slightly different founding story stretching back to 2018. The company was originally the security and defense division of Verint Technologies, another Israeli firm. In October of that year, a Haaretz investigation accused Verint of allowing its technologies to be used by authoritarian governments to oppress their citizens. The company’s telecommunications monitoring equipment, called Cell-Site Simulators (CSSs), was, according to the report, used by Azerbaijan and Indonesia to hunt down LGBTQ+ citizens, by South Sudan to spy on enemies of the regime, by Bahrain to imprison a famous human rights activist in the country, and by the Bogota Police to surveil political demonstrators. A year after the Haaretz report broke, in December of 2019, Verint announced it would spin off a new, independent company from its security technologies division, named Cognyte. In 2020, Cognyte was found, according to documents published by a Burmese human rights group, to have sold its proprietary CSS software, known as “FalcoNet,” to Myanmar’s military just before its coup attempt. According to a U.S. State Department report released after the sale, the regime was regularly monitoring cellular and electronic communications of its citizens, surveillance that helped enable extrajudicial killings, arbitrary imprisonment, torture, and a host of other abuses. Although the State Department report made no specific mention of Cognyte, the firm was one of only two major surveillance-for-hire firms to be doing business with the Burmese armed forces. The offending technologies in all of these cases, CSSs, are radio frequency transmitters that retransmit a signal from an existing cell tower, amplify it, and dampen any background signals. This tricks a phone’s innate connection algorithm into connecting with a CSS, allowing access to all unencrypted calls and messages. This means a CSS operator can then peek at the usage of all connected devices in real time, regardless of the devices' intended target. The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), a leading anti-surveillance legal and advocacy group, has found that the software is used in over 80 U.S. police departments nationwide. According to the group, it has played a role in a wide array of covert, warrantless searches. Worse, these simulators continue to advance. In recent years, we have learned these devices now operate on 5G and Wi-Fi bands, meaning app usage and internet searches can also be monitored. They can also be installed in false ceilings in police cruisers, which can be activated like a built-in GPS, or even specially made backpacks, both of which Cognyte sells. This makes them highly portable, easily deployable, and extremely difficult to track. Starting in 2022, the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) purchased Cognyte hardware to monitor the cell phones of Haitian refugees, with a further contract being finalized in 2024. That same year, Albuquerque PD awarded Cognyte a contract to be its sole Cell-Site Simulator provider. Baltimore Police Department also has a documented Cognyte connection, but it is unclear if they are still contracting with the firm. Cognyte is listed as a technology vendor on BPD’s website, but the contract appears to have expired in 2023 and, per the Atlas of Surveillance, a new CSS provider was engaged. The last calendar year has been especially successful for Cognyte in the American state and local law enforcement sector. Since late 2025, it has won bids with three major law enforcement agencies in the U.S.: the Metropolitan Police Department of Washington, D.C., in November; the New York Police Department in December; and the Texas State Police in March of 2026. The Texas State Police told RS the technology is being used solely for search and rescue. None of the other departments responded to requests for comment, nor did Cognyte Solutions. The major question remains: should citizens be concerned by the adoption of this technology, especially considering the company and country of origin’s respective records on human rights? Civil liberties expert Chip Gibbons of Defending Rights and Dissent, an advocacy organization in Washington, D.C., said that these systems, on their face, are violating Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable searches based on their tendency to collect more data than those of their specific target. ”I can’t imagine why law enforcement would want to use this technology unless the goal is…. to create a dragnet under the mistaken belief that new technology is somehow exempt from existing protections,” Gibbons told RS. Cognyte and its predecessor Verint are not outliers in aiding human rights abuses. Israeli defense and security firms are known to test their technologies on Palestinian citizens in the West Bank or Gaza, raising concerns even before their products are widely distributed. And despite the Israeli government’s role in approving and licensing arms exports, many Israeli firms continue to face accusations of misconduct. Firms such as Cellebrite, which sells hardware to hack locked phones, and NSO Group, a purveyor of “zero-click” malware that assumes control of a smartphone without any user interaction, are facing international scrutiny, in part, because of sales to repressive governments. Most of the contracts noted above displaced incumbent vendors. So why are agencies switching to Cognyte? It is hard to say at the moment. Part of the trend may be due to a highly usable AI-enabled data dashboard, dubbed “NEXYTE”, that, according to the company’s website, “allows law enforcement to connect the dots faster.” Public demonstrations featured on the site show a data-fusion system that takes publicly available information, like social media posts, and combines it with police investigative files. These are used to create a “threat score” and link a subject to “known accomplices.” One demonstration classifies an individual as a “drug mule” based on an Instagram post about expensive perfume, a purchase deemed inconsistent with the individual's expected income level. It should be noted that, although this software appears to be Cognyte’s central offering according to their public webpage, contracts obtained by RS do not indicate if this system is included in its CSS offerings. Gibbons stated that although the technology itself concerns him, the source gives him further pause since Israel is a nation with “very permissive surveillance.” “There are many problems in the United States…however, we have something more of a system, at least on paper, for regulating the police and intelligence agencies. These technologies are being produced in a context that is fundamentally different from ours,” Gibbons said. --- ### Trump's war and tariffs are having a nasty effect on interest rates **Published:** August 27, 2026 | **Author:** Karthik Sankaran | **Section:** Washington Politics **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/trump-interest-rates-war/.md Over the last month, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent has engaged in two controversial and rare interventions in financial markets. The first came in early August when the U.S. Treasury joined the government of Japan in its efforts to strengthen the yen by buying the Japanese currency, taking a step it had last taken during the Asian Financial Crisis in 1998. And late last week, Bessent announced that the Treasury could double the amount of long-dated Treasuries that it will buy back from current holders. The theme that unites both interventions is a concern that the interest rates the U.S government is paying on its long-term debt (also known as bond yields) are rising too high and too fast, with 30-year U.S. Treasury bond yields reaching 5.3%, levels last seen in 2007. Last February, Bessent said the administration was focused on lowering bond yields. The reason is simple: the interest rate the U.S. government pays on its long-term debt feeds into every other part of the economy, including how much businesses pay to borrow; the monthly cost of a new mortgage; how fast the government’s debt burden grows; and how the stock market might perform. But this crucial metric appears to have escaped containment. The rise in interest rates is a global phenomenon. Market professionals have long noted that bond yields across the world’s developed economies tend to move together. Indeed, that is likely one of the reasons that the Treasury took the very rare step of helping Japan in its intervention efforts. It worried that a vicious circle connecting a weakening yen, worries about higher Japanese inflation, and higher Japanese bond yields could feed back into U.S. bond markets as well. These worrying trends are in no small part a result of the Trump administration’s approach to foreign policy. By driving up defense spending, imposing waves of tariffs, and launching a war that has closed the Strait of Hormuz, President Donald Trump is placing enormous pressure on markets that Bessent is now trying to tame. Of course, some key drivers of this bond yield trend are at best tangentially related to Trump’s foreign-policy shifts. One is the sheer size of debt and deficits across the world. U.S. government debt crossed the $40 trillion mark, and the Congressional Budget Office estimates a $2.1 trillion fiscal deficit this year or about 6% of U.S. GDP, a level unprecedented outside recessions. Even more striking is that the U.S. Federal government interest payments on its stock of debt have hit a percentage of GDP last seen in 1990. Another factor often mentioned by market professionals is concern about the credibility of the Federal Reserve (Fed) and its commitment to fighting inflation. The new chair of the Fed, Kevin Warsh, entered the position with a reputation as a hawk (i.e., central bankers whose concerns about inflation make them more likely to raise interest rates), but U.S. interest rates were left on hold at his first outing, even as the decision was accompanied by three dissenting votes that wanted to see higher interest rates. This has come alongside persistent White House criticism of the central bank and a seeming revival of the effort to oust Governor Lisa Cook in the face of a Supreme Court decision favoring her stay. All this has sparked worries that the administration wishes to engineer a more compliant Fed through appointments. Insofar as investors see central bank independence from political interference as an essential tool to hold inflation in check (an opinion backed by academic research), it would not be surprising if they react to perceived threats to such independence by demanding higher interest rates as compensation for higher risks. But beyond all these factors linked to the U.S. fiscal outlook and interactions between America’s monetary and fiscal authorities, there is another factor that has pushed inflation higher both in the U.S. and in much of the world: a series of shocks to the global supply of goods and commodities. And while these shocks began in 2020 with Covid-19 and accelerated with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, they have since been amplified by foreign policy shifts in Washington that have heated up trade wars and started a hot war. Soon after taking office last year, the administration embarked on two signature measures — broad-based increases in tariffs, and an insistence that other countries spend a larger portion of their GDP on defense. The latest estimates from Yale Budget Lab estimate that tariffs increase consumer prices by 0.7%. This might not seem like a lot, but when considered against a 2.0% target for inflation that will almost certainly be missed for the sixth straight year, tariff-driven inflation represents another important factor that has pushed up bond yields, threatening the broader economy through the channels described above. It is worth noting that one of the administration’s justifications for tariffs has been that they add to government revenues. However, tariffs may also be increasing government costs to some degree, and not just through the widely noted compensation to groups suffering tariff retaliation, like the $12 billion has been set aside for farmers. Interest payments are also a cost to the Treasury, and with a debt stock of $40 trillion, an increase of even 0.1% in interest rates on U.S. government liabilities adds $40 billion to the bill. Beyond this, U.S. actions last year had two other impacts on the quantity of global savings available to invest in America. Forcing allied countries to spend more on defense most likely means that they have less to lend the U.S. This might not be an issue if the U.S. concurrently reduced its defense expenditures to the same degree, but that is not the case. President Donald Trump asked for a $1.5 trillion military budget, even as he insisted that other countries “pull their weight.” It also appears that foreign sovereign governments have become less important as lenders to the U.S. (perhaps reflecting a combination of their own spending needs and political misgivings about certain aspects of U.S. policy). This has meant that price-sensitive private investors are playing a larger role, and these investors want to be protected from inflation by receiving higher interest payments, pushing up bond yields. The Iran war has made things even worse for the bond market on three separate fronts: it has increased U.S. defense spending further; led to substantial physical damages and massive reconstruction needs in the Persian Gulf (reducing those states’ ability to invest in U.S. bonds); and raised global inflation risks to an even greater degree. For example, while crude oil prices have retreated substantially from the highs reached in the early days of the war, diesel prices are near the highs of the decade, reflecting physical damage to refineries in two war zones – the Persian Gulf and in Russia. These costs are in turn likely to feed into trucking and agriculture, with downstream effects on those prices. This might seem to be an especially difficult situation for the Global South, but thus far at least, the response of financial markets has differentiated among them on the basis of region, economic endowments, and vulnerability. As in 2022 at the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine War, some Latin American currencies have been helped by distance from the conflict and the status of Brazil and Colombia as exporters of fossil fuel, while Mexico has been rewarded for a relatively untroubled trading relationship with the U.S. thus far (certainly compared to the U.S.-Canada relationship). Conversely, things have been more difficult in South and Southeast Asia, an oil-importing region that secures the bulk of its energy from the Persian Gulf, where India and Indonesia have both been hit hard, with India also suffering from growing concern that its service export model could be hit hard by the AI revolution. Looking ahead, a swift end to the war and a resumption of global energy flows seems essential to assuage worries about inflation and government fiscal trajectories around the world, including the U.S. --- ### The rise and fall of 'resistance' hero Alexander Vindman **Published:** August 27, 2026 | **Author:** Blaise Malley | **Section:** Washington Politics **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/alex-vindman-resistance-foreign-policy/.md On paper, Alexander Vindman’s loss in last week’s Florida Democratic Senate was a shocking upset. After all, Vindman had a 16-to-1 fundraising advantage and far more national name recognition than the winner — progressive state Rep. Angie Nixon. But the results reflect more than one poorly-run campaign. Vindman is one of the most prominent faces of a bygone political era known as "Russia-gate" — a period which Democratic voters appear ready to leave behind. Just a few years ago, the idea of Vindman losing a Democratic primary would have been hard to imagine. The former director for European affairs on the National Security Council had emerged from Donald Trump’s first term as one of the most celebrated stars of the anti-Trump “Resistance” due to his role in the 2019 impeachment hearings. As contemporary profiles in major media outlets noted, he became, in the eyes of his supporters, a “patriotic truth-teller,” who was unafraid to confront power. One Democratic lawmaker, Rep. Raja Krishnamoorthi (D-Ill.), told him during the hearings that he and his family represented “the very best of America.” During a 2020 Democratic primary debate in New Hampshire, future President Joe Biden interrupted the proceedings to ask the audience to “stand up and clap for Vindman.” Vindman’s rise and fall offers a window into a broader shift within the Democratic Party. During Trump’s first term, opposition to the president elevated officials (think Gen.Mark Milley, ex-CIA Director John Brennan, and Robert Mueller, the former FBI director the former FBI director tasked with investigating the links between Trump and Russia) and helped turn the foreign-policy establishment and elements of national security state into pillars of the liberal resistance. Meanwhile, Democratic-led investigations attempted to prove Trump colluded with Russia to win his 2016 election. That blossomed into ongoing narratives about his skullduggery and deference to President Vladimir Putin at the expense of Ukraine and democracy. "Russia-gate" helped to bridge two enemies — Trump and Putin — for a winning political tool. Now, as that strategy has lost its appeal, its decline is creating space for Democrats more willing to challenge the hawkish foreign-policy consensus that flourished alongside it. And Vindman is hardly the only Resistance-era figure to fall out of favor with Democratic voters. His loss followed those of Rep. Dan Goldman (D-N.Y.), the majority counsel in the impeachment inquiry that grew out of Vindman’s report, as well as other members closely linked to various efforts to remove Trump from office, including Krishnamoorthi — who ran for Senate — Al Green (D-Texas), and Shri Thanedar (D-Mich.) Republican-turned-anti-Trump activist George Conway, meanwhile, finished a distant fourth in a New York City Democratic House primary. A Ukrainian-born Army officer, Vindman was serving on the NSC when he listened in on a phone call in which Trump pressed Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to investigate Joe Biden and his son or face losing U.S. military aid. That call triggered Trump's first impeachment, and Vindman became one of the key witnesses during the House's inquiry. He parlayed that appearance into liberal political celebrity. His memoir, "Here, Right Matters," became a bestseller, and he appeared on "Curb Your Enthusiasm.” His brother, Eugene, also a former NSC staffer, was elected to the House of Representatives in 2024. "Vindman and others like him were characters in the early Trump 1.0 saga," in which "the national security state was the hero that was going to save the country from the corruption and the illegalities of the Trump presidency," Elizabeth Beavers, a professor at Delaware Law School and former national security public interest lobbyist, told Responsible Statecraft. "We see that idea not resonating with voters so much anymore." Vindman had slipped easily into the role on the Russia-gate stage, which was already lit and primed when he got there. It started with the 2016 election. Beavers points out that during Trump’s first term, Russia became less a discrete foreign-policy question than an all-purpose explanation for Trump himself. It was a way of understanding his rise without confronting it. Russia, she said, became "almost like a Disney villain." Turns out that the very reason Vindman succeeded in those heady days is likely — at least partly — to blame for why he and others lost their primaries. Their democracies vs. autocracies (read: Russia) foreign policy is not salient with the voters anymore. Another country is, however. On Israel, Vindman has previously described himself as a strong supporter of the U.S.-Israel alliance but said that no American ally should get a “free pass.” When the House voted on an amendment that would have cut $3.3 billion in aid to Israel, Vindman gave an unclear answer on how he would have voted, saying he was a believer in “the security of the state of Israel as a generational partner of the U.S.” but was opposed to a “Netanyahu administration that has undermined a two-state solution.” Nixon, his opponent, drew a clear contrast on this issue, saying she would have voted for the amendment and accused Vindman of avoiding answering questions about Israel. Vindman's entire political identity was largely built around the issue of Russia and Ukraine, however. In a 2025 interview, he declared that Israel’s success in degrading its regional adversaries, notably Iran, was “all a ripple effect off of Russia-Ukraine.” Shortly after he left the NSC, Vindman told The Atlantic’s Jeffrey Goldberg that the American president “should be considered to be a useful idiot,” and “an unwitting agent of Putin.” In a 2025 book, he criticized U.S. policy — and what he sees as foreign-policy realists in particular — for being too accommodating toward Moscow after the fall of the Soviet Union. “Vindman unfortunately displays a woefully inadequate grasp of that which he tries to impugn: at no point does he demonstrate anything more than a cursory understanding of realist approaches to the issues he tries to elucidate,” the Quincy Institute’s Mark Episkopos wrote in a review of the book in RS. “Vindman represents a post-Cold War neoconservative view of America’s role in the world that has never enjoyed a firm grip on reality, but is especially unmoored from the challenges America faces today,” Episkopos told RS after the primary. “He stands as one of the most prolific standard bearers of the Russia-gate era, a credential that may have once earned him a prominent place in politics. Yet the public debate has moved on from the ill-conceived notion that Moscow lurks behind every major problem the country faces.” Vindman’s trajectory illustrates how the politics of the Resistance intersected with foreign policy. The fight over Trump and Russia elevated a figure who championed a more confrontational approach toward Moscow. “Neocons secured a foothold in the liberal establishment which will be difficult, though not impossible, to excise,” Eoin Higgins recently wrote in the Intercept. “And the Democratic leadership was able to put off actually offering voters tangible policy that would improve their lives for a decade by focusing on delusional fantasies — a strategy that’s now coming back to bite them at the ballot box.” Though these views were not a leading cause of Vindman’s defeat, the consequences of his loss offer a window into whether the party’s future could offer a new kind of politics. Democrats tended to treat Trump as an aberration from an otherwise sound American order, and to see the officials and institutions he attacked as the country's best defense against him. "The resistance liberals argued that Trump is not normal, he's not American, we must restore normality," Stephen Wertheim, a historian of U.S. foreign policy and senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, told RS. "The other approach was: Trump is something that comes from this country ... judge him on the results." That second camp, Wertheim added, "does seem to be on the ascent." Much of the institutionalist case against Trump rested on the related premise that he was abandoning America's forward-leaning role in the world. His second term has undercut that argument. Trump has launched strikes on Iran, sent troops into Venezuela, and threatened military adventurism elsewhere. Those who said that Trump would retreat from the world stage now have a harder time explaining why the U.S. alone can be trusted to lead on it. Democratic voters have already demonstrated a willingness this cycle to challenge the party's status quo on certain foreign-policy issues, most notably U.S. support for Israel. A series of House candidates in New York and Colorado, as well as Senate nominee Abdul El-Sayed in Michigan, have won primaries this summer that centered their skepticism of the U.S.-Israel relationship. Whether this momentum extends to a broader reckoning on foreign policy is a bigger question. That opportunity comes after nearly a decade in which the party's central strategies and messaging for opposing Trump did not keep him from returning to office. Beavers argues that Democrats have a chance to campaign forcefully on a foreign policy that “completely turns away” from the militarism of both the party’s establishment and Trump. “The lane is wide open for them,” she said. --- ### Israel's Lobby 2.0: What Walt & Mearsheimer didn't anticipate **Published:** August 26, 2026 | **Author:** John B. Judis | **Section:** Media **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/israel-lobby-book/.md In March 2006, the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) denounced the essay by John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, "The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy," as a "a classical conspiratorial anti-Semitic analysis invoking the canards of Jewish power and Jewish control." In their essay, which was the basis of the book of the same name that appeared the next year, Mearsheimer and Walt had been careful to distinguish the Israel lobby from a lobby by and for Jews, but it was to no avail in the furor that the essay and book provoked. Two decades later, as the United States and Israel wage a senseless war against Iran, Mearsheimer and Walt's case for the inordinate influence of Israel and the Israel lobby over American foreign policy looks pretty good. So does their contention that the policies promoted by Israel and its lobby are not in America's interest. Eli Clifton, an investigative journalist who has documented the lobby's influence, and Ian Lustick, a retired political scientist and expert on the Middle East, have written a worthy sequel to Mearsheimer and Walt's book, entitled "Israel's Lobby: America in the Grip of a Foreign Power". Like Mearsheimer and Walt, they use the term "lobby" to refer to a "loose network" of groups, media outlets, and wealthy individuals. They do an excellent job of explaining how this lobby has grown and altered its approach over the last two decades. As Clifton and Lustick show, the lobby has changed the way it tries to influence election outcomes. Before the Supreme Court ruled on Citizens United v. FEC in 2010, which opened the door to super-PACs and unlimited contributions, AIPAC and affiliated groups tried to influence elections and elected officials through campaign contributions. But AIPAC itself did not contribute to candidates or officials. Instead, its leadership urged its members, which included the very wealthy, to back certain politicians and to oppose others based on whether they had backed or opposed measures that were in Israel's interest. Members of the House and Senate committees that oversaw foreign aid could expect generous contributions if they backed aid to Israel. Donors gave these contributions directly to candidates and to sympathetic local PACs like Badger PAC or Gold Coast PAC, which in turn doled them out to candidates. In the last decade, national groups that support Israel's government have established their own super PACs that wage independent expenditure campaigns either for or against candidates. In 2019, Mark Mellman founded Democratic Majority for Israel. In 2021, AIPAC founded the United Democracy Project. These committees have spent huge sums. According to Federal Election Commission records, the United Democracy Project has doled out $104 million between January 1, 2025, and July 31, 2026. In August, the UDP alone spent $2.5 million to oppose an Afghan-American candidate, Aisha Wahab, in a runoff for the northern California congressional seat vacated by Democratic Rep. Eric Swalwell. In the past, wealthy American supporters of Israel's government also exercised influence as individuals. Businessman Abraham Feinberg was a major funder of Harry Truman's 1948 campaign, which gained him access to Truman and allowed him to influence Truman's policy toward the new state of Israel. Feinberg was, however, small potatoes by current standards. During the last decade, what Clifton and Lustick describe as a "small set of megadonors" have backed unconditional support for Israel. Clifton and Lustick highlight nine donors, including Miriam and the late Sheldon Adelson, Jeff Yass, Larry Ellison, Haim Saban, the late Bernard Marcus, and Paul Singer, who have contributed over $1.7 billion in disclosed contributions since 2012. These contributions, they note, do not include undisclosed "dark money." Some of these contributions, like those from the Adelsons, directly affected policy. The Adelsons’ contributions to Donald Trump in 2016 were reportedly based on an understanding that he would recognize Jerusalem as Israel's capital and move the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem, which he did upon taking office. While AIPAC and the formal lobbies have influenced Congress, the megadonors have specialized in winning over the executive branch. The groups supportive of Israel's government have also changed how they have made their case for supporting Israel. When Mearsheimer and Walt were writing their book, the groups could still rely on widespread public support for Israel. If anything, the pro-Israel set in American politics had grown to include Republican evangelicals as well as Democratic liberals. Labeling politicians as "anti-Israel" or "pro-Palestinian" could discredit them. In AIPAC's successful 1984 campaign to unseat Sen. Charles Percy (R-Ill.), for instance, one of the groups sent around a mailer describing Percy as "Israel's worst adversary in Congress." But as Israel's popularity has plummeted in the wake of its disproportionate response to Hamas's October 7, 2023, massacre and to Israel's continuing expansion in the Palestinian West Bank, the groups have had to resort to deception and diversion against Israel's critics. Instead of engaging the arguments of Israel's critics, groups like the ADL, American Jewish Committee, the Adelson-backed Brandeis Center for Human Rights and Law, and watchdog groups like CAMERA and the Canary Mission began charging Israel's critics with antisemitism. "Their goal was not to win debates about Israel," Clifton and Lustick write, "but to prevent discussion about it." They successfully lobbied the Biden and Trump administrations to endorse an official definition of antisemitism that included criticisms of Israel. The Trump administration used charges of antisemitism to bludgeon liberal universities and law firms they disliked. It would be surprising if Clifton and Lustick escape being charged with antisemitism for exposing the machinations of the Israel lobby. The groups have also altered their campaign strategy. In their advertising, the UDP and allied PACs have eschewed mention of American policy toward Israel. Instead, they have attacked candidates they opposed by citing their stands on whatever issues might resonate with the relevant electorate. In their ads this year against Wahab, the groups advanced a spurious claim that she had made "teenage girls more vulnerable to predators" by opposing a sex trafficking bill in the state legislature. In Michigan's Democratic Senate primary, AIPAC ran ads claiming that Abdul El-Sayed "disrespected women." None of the ads mentioned Israel. This tactic seemed to work in 2024 campaigns AIPAC and the groups waged against then-Reps. Cori Bush (D-Mo.) and Jamaal Bowman (D-N.Y.), but as the Iran War has deepened discontent with the U.S.-Israel alliance, it failed against Wahab and El-Sayed. Mike Rogers, El-Sayed's Republican opponent in the general election, even requested that AIPAC drop its plans to support him with ads against El-Sayed. As Clifton and Lustick show, the groups composing the Lobby have seen a sharp growth in their staffs and revenues over the quarter century. AIPAC and its educational foundation enjoyed a "fivefold increase in revenue between 2000 and 2022.” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy (an AIPAC spinoff) increased its revenues from $5.2 million in 2001 to $21.9 million in 2023. The Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), which led the charge in 2015 against the Iran nuclear pact, increased its annual haul from $1.12 million in 2001 to $17.8 million in 2022. Along with the megadonors, the Israel groups enjoy the support of wealthy foundations, including the $256 million Koret Foundation and the $220 million Swartz Foundation. But the growth of revenue has not been matched by a growth in influence. If anything, the lobby's influence has declined, forcing it to resort to deceptive advertising and incendiary accusations. There are two parts of Clifton's and Lustick's argument about which I wanted to read more. The first has to do with situating the lobby in American politics. Clifton and Lustick accept Mearsheimer and Walt's definition of the Israel lobby as "the loose coalition of individuals and organizations that actively work to shape US foreign policy in a pro-Israel direction." That might have been OK in 2007, but in 2008, Jeremy Ben-Ami founded J Street, which billed itself as "pro-Israel," and which has attempted to move American foreign policy in a completely different direction from AIPAC and the other "pro-Israel" groups that Mearsheimer and Walt had assigned to the lobby. The lobby Clifton and Lustick describe represents one interpretation of what it means to be "pro-Israel." As Clifton and Lustick note, the lobby has gradually shifted rightward in American politics and in its view of Israel. AIPAC, which was initially run by liberal Democrats and had its base in the Democratic Congress, began moving toward the Republicans in 1982, when it made Robert Asher its president. In 1993, it replaced its executive director Thomas Dine, a former aide to Sen. Edward Kennedy (D-Mass.), with Howard Kohr, a Republican operative. In its early days, AIPAC was aligned with Israel's social-democratic Labor Party, but it has moved closer to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s Likud Party and its aim for a Greater Israel. It harried Barack Obama's attempts to achieve a two-state solution. Its PAC has not merely targeted harsh critics of Israel like El-Sayed, but liberal Zionists like former Reps. Andy Levin (D-Mich.) and Tom Malinowksi (D-N.J.). And it's not just AIPAC. The constellation of groups is now weighted toward Republican proponents of a greater Israel. It includes Christians United for Israel, which boasts a larger membership than AIPAC; a revived, Adelson-funded Zionist Organization of America; and the Republican Jewish Coalition, which dwarfs its Democratic counterpart. The funders have also tilted rightward. In the 1970s, AIPAC's president and major donor was real estate developer Larry Weinberg, a liberal Democrat close to Vice President Hubert Humphrey. Clifton and Lustick's lobby still includes major Democratic donors including Saban, but more of the money is coming from Trump supporters like Miriam Adelson, Yass, Singer, and Ellison. In short, the lobby is increasingly part of a conservative, pro-Trump Republican faction that backs the right wing of Israel's politics. It is opposed not only by the Democrats who support J Street — or beyond that, Jewish Voice for Peace and IfNotNow — but also by a growing group of Republican conservatives who believe that in his support for Israel, Trump has betrayed his commitment to "America First." I would have liked to know more about the political debates that took place inside AIPAC in the 1990s when it shifted most decisively rightward and in AIPAC and other groups during the Trump years. What I would have also liked to read more about is the precise relationship between the lobby and the Israeli government. AIPAC, the main group in question, grew out of the American Zionist Council, which was founded in 1949 and was funded by the Israeli government. In 1963, in response to demands that it register as a foreign agent, AZC changed its name to the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) and rewrote its charter to exclude foreign contributions. Since then, as far as is known, AIPAC has no financial or other legal ties to Israel's government or institutions. But Clifton and Lustick suggest that the lobby is "the agent of a foreign power." The title of their book is similarly provocative. They called it "Israel's Lobby" rather than "The Israel Lobby," and they subtitle the book, "America in the Grip of a Foreign Power." That implies that the lobby is subordinate to the Israeli government, even if it is not financed or staffed by it. They give one example of how that relationship has worked, citing a quote in a book about U.S.-Israel relations from an unnamed Israeli diplomat who served when George Shultz was Ronald Reagan's Secretary of State. They wrote that the Israeli diplomat: came up with the idea of "turning Israel into a Major Non-NATO Ally. We told AIPAC, which started rolling the idea up and down Capitol Hill corridors until it was accepted." They also cite what an Israel official, unaware that he was being recorded, said in 2015 to an American audience about the government's efforts to get the Senate to oppose the Iran nuclear arms deal. "We have the FDD. We have others working on ...data gathering, working on activist organizations, money trail." They summarize the relationship in this way: "Israeli government operatives do not control the organizations ... Israeli officials send signals that guide the behavior and the rhetoric of Lobby leaders and thousands of activists." But these two examples don't go far enough in making that case. The first is from a single source decades ago, and the second is ambiguous. What does "having FDD" mean? One wants to know whether the staff or the leadership in these groups have relationships with people in Israeli government ministries who send them signals. Are there examples of Israel's government persuading one of the groups to do something it had not thought of doing or was wary of undertaking? Answering these questions about the group's political evolution or its precise relationship to the Israeli government would have required trying to get people who have worked in these groups to talk candidly about what went on. That kind of journalism is, perhaps, beyond the call of duty for this book. What Clifton and Lustick have provided is a comprehensive and much-needed account of how the groups and individuals that make up the lobby have attempted to influence American politics and policy. That's quite an achievement, and anyone interested in America's relationship with Israel should pick up Clifton and Lustick's book. --- ### Trump wants to stabilize Libya. Militants have other plans. **Published:** August 26, 2026 | **Author:** Khaled Mahmoud | **Section:** Africa **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/libya-trump/.md A series of crises have roiled Libya over the last month, undermining a U.S.-led initiative to resolve the country’s profound political predicament and open its markets to American investment. Violent protests over deteriorating living conditions have surged in western cities under the control of Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh, just as a series of drone strikes have hit energy and oil facilities in the city of Zawia, west of Tripoli. In the east near Benghazi, which is under the authority of strongman Khalifa Haftar, unknown assailants assassinated Major General Fawzi al-Mansouri, Haftar’s head of military intelligence. This chaotic stretch of events prompted the U.S. to belatedly recognize that the deteriorating security situation could undermine its peace initiative. In a tone reflecting concern over the spiraling situation, Massad Boulos, President Donald Trump’s adviser for Arab and African affairs, said the attacks “underscore the need for unified, professional military and security institutions capable of providing security for the Libyan people.” So far, Boulos has succeeded in bringing together military commanders from eastern and western Libya in joint exercises as well as bilateral meetings. But these nascent efforts are a far cry from an actual unification of military institutions. Without progress on that front, there is little hope of achieving a lasting political solution. --- ### Lindsey Graham's sister wins. The War Party wins. We lose, again. **Published:** August 26, 2026 | **Author:** Jack Hunter | **Section:** Washington Politics **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/lindsey-graham-sister-wins/.md Darline Graham won the Republican primary Tuesday and will likely win a full-term to fill her late brother Lindsey Graham’s U.S. Senate seat in the ruby red state of South Carolina in the upcoming November election. According to the latest tallies Tuesday night, Graham, who was appointed to her brother’s seat after his death in July, beat her opponent Rep. Ralph Norman, 53% to 46%. It’s a curious turn of events in a modern era where there are very few displays of hereditary power, but she had the full backing of the Republican establishment and the fulsome endorsement of President Donald Trump days before today’s primary runoff. To be sure, her self-confessed lack of foreign policy experience or even knowledge won’t be a bad thing for Trump. Graham has all but said she will follow her brother’s career-long support of a militarized U.S. foreign policy, which means she is likely to be no critic of Trump’s failing war in the Middle East. A win for the War Party, but a loss for the rest of us. Graham was given a chance to display her merits last Thursday when she was asked in a debate with Norman if Taiwan and the South China Sea were national security issues for the United States. “I’m just going to be honest here. I’m … not that informed on national security,” Graham replied. “But I do support the military." Many thought this gaffe would sink her. Not a chance. This just wasn’t Norman’s time. He has a mixed foreign policy record, yet campaigned on “peace through strength” and now-dated MAGA “no more forever wars” sloganeering. In the same debate Graham flubbed, he said of the Iran War, that “(Trump’s) going to have to tell the American people what it’s going to take if the Straits of Hormuz are still dominated by a country that’s supposed to be decimated.” Despite having voted more with Trump’s agenda than any other South Carolina Republican, Norman could not compete with the idea that Lindsey Graham’s sister somehow deserved the president’s endorsement more. Don’t think her potential rubber stamp for the military didn’t have a lot to do with that. Trump told reporters at the Graham rally four days ago that “she’s going to do what the military wants, and really what the president wants.” What the “military wants”? What the “president wants”? Is that the role of a U.S. Senator representing South Carolina? (Graham’s) candidacy has been bolstered by support from at least three political action committees, coordination with a national Republican Party group, and donations from “large business executives”, while Norman has done more self-fundraising, The State newspaper in Columbia reported on August 19. Some of Graham’s big backers include the PAC raising funds on behalf of major aerospace manufacturer Boeing, the CEO of private equity firm Blackstone, the head of public policy for TikTok, and an executive at Palantir, one of the most influential defense and surveillance technology contractors in the world today. Super PAC "Security is Strength", which was created for her brother a decade ago, pledged $900,000 for Graham in July. Palmetto Action spent $1.26 million targeting Norman, according to Federal Election Commission records. There was something ironic in the Security is Strength support of Graham after she admitted national security wasn’t her strength. Still this Columbia-based “neocon PAC”, which says it “is dedicated to promoting a strong national defense, conservative judicial philosophy, and the protection of traditional values,” was created in 2015 to support Lindsey Graham's 2016 Republican presidential primary run — the key purpose of which was to kill any potential momentum for fellow candidate and restraint advocate, Sen. Rand Paul (R-KY). The late Graham was clear a decade ago about who was bankrolling this PAC. “If I were a defense contractor, I’d be big time for Lindsey Graham, because I’ve been forward-leaning on rebuilding our military," he said at the time. “It’s not surprising, then, that the same warmongers who subsidized Graham are now subsidizing his sister — fully aware of her unwavering allegiance to Trump’s escalating war in Iran,” wrote Will Folks of South Carolina-based FITS News in July. Having an unquestioning Iran war supporter in Lindsey Graham’s seat certainly seems important to Sean Hannity, who promptly hosted Darline Graham on his Fox News show the night after her disastrous debate gaffe. “I bet based on all your time with your brother, that you know probably everything about the Middle East,” Hannity said to her, as if she received this knowledge through osmosis. “Absolutely,” she replied. “I know national security is important. We have a wonderful commander in chief.” “I know that we need to stand with the Israel,” Graham also exclaimed (emphasis added). Next to Graham on screen was a "Darline's Graham's Policy Positions" scroll letting Fox News viewers know the totality of her ostensibly conservative positions. Graham attempted to clarify and divert, “I tripped up on one question last night, regarding Taiwan. I don't speak politician. I was just honest. Of course, Taiwan is our friend.” “But I think people in South Carolina are more worried about boys in girls sports,” she went on. On Monday, Hannity made clear that he was supporting Graham and also interviewed South Carolina’s other senator, Sen. Tim Scott (R-S.C.) to explain why he, too, was supporting her. The reliably hawkish Sen. Tom Cotton (R-Ark.) and neocon pundit Mark Levin had already endorsed Graham. “What I really want you to do is pretend, please, that I’m on the ballot,” Donald Trump told South Carolina voters at the Darline Graham rally on Friday. “Just come and vote. It’s so important,” Trump pleaded. No doubt for the president and others invested in America’s current and future wars, it was important to vote for the sister of Lindsey Graham. South Carolina did. --- ### After 6 months of war, why aren't oil prices even higher? **Published:** August 25, 2026 | **Author:** Sam Fraser | **Section:** Middle East **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/iran-war-oil-prices/.md For decades, the potential closure of the Strait of Hormuz has been considered the ultimate doomsday scenario for global oil markets. So, when Iran effectively closed the Strait earlier this year in response to the joint U.S.-Israeli assault, many analysts warned that oil prices could skyrocket to record highs. The logic was straightforward. Prior to the war, about 20% of the global oil supply transited the Strait. A loss of supply on this scale could easily have pushed oil prices to $150 or even $200 per barrel — but it didn’t. Instead, prices peaked around $120 per barrel in April and have largely stayed below $100 since June. To understand the dynamics that have so far prevented an even higher price spike, and to get a sense of where oil supply and prices may be headed as the conflict drags on, I spoke with Rory Johnston, a leading oil markets analyst and the author of the Commodity Context blog. Our conversation has been edited for length and clarity. Sam Fraser: Let’s talk about why we haven’t seen the $150-200 per barrel oil prices that you warned about early in the war. You’ve pointed to a few reasons, including China's massive import cuts. As we understand it, what has China done with their oil imports and how have they managed it? Rory Johnston: It’s a bit of a mystery. At this stage, what we know for sure is that China reduced its crude oil imports by over five million barrels a day, roughly 45% of their total pre-war import appetite. For China, there's two endpoints of that crude oil balance: into a refinery or into storage. We know that China had been building up a massive volume of strategic reserves prior to the war. Essentially half of the 5 million barrels a day reduction can be explained roughly by reductions in refining runs in China. The remainder is a question of balancing in and out of stockpiles. Some of it would've been likely a drawdown of less visible or underground stockpiles. And the other portion of it is the halting of that prior pace of stockpile building. The main debate is how much each of these factors is contributing. If, let's say, 80% of that remainder is a halt to prior purchases that were building strategic stocks, that is a bearish outcome for oil prices because it means that Beijing doesn't need to replace those volumes anytime soon. But if they are aggressively drawing down less visible strategic stocks right now, that's a much more bullish interpretation because it means they can't keep going on forever and they're going to need to replace those stockpiles. On the refined product side, they cut refining runs by about 2.5 to 3 million barrels a day. What are they doing with that prior flow of diesel, jet fuel, et cetera? And that's where we start to get even more speculative. Above-ground storage tanks for refined products don't have floating roofs. We can't independently verify their fill. It comes down to the apparent consumption and the apparent available supply of these fuels within China. For gasoline and diesel, each of those supplies have apparently fallen by about 20%, which is a stark reduction. There’s no evidence that people in China are just driving a fifth less. If they aren’t actually cutting back that much on consumption, where is the fuel coming from? Prior to the war, we suspected that China was also building strategic reserves of refined fuels. Again, we can’t verify that, but if they had built that up, they could be drawing it down. We’re then faced with that same question as in crude oil, how much of this is a cessation of prior stock building and how much of this is the drawdown of existing stock? For reference, the last moment we saw anything like this in terms of apparent consumption collapse was COVID zero in 2022 when the country was entirely locked down. Fraser: So we can say that stockpiles of refined products must exist, but we have no insight into their size or how much is being drawn down or how sustainable those drawdowns would be? Johnston: Correct. There are mixed estimates, but I think they are at best estimates. It's funny, I think in some ways the lack of verifiable data allows people to speak very confidently about what's happening in China, because there's no data to rebut virtually any argument. That's just allowing people to run with it without any kind of real pushback. Fraser: How have we seen the Chinese buying patterns change since the U.S.-Iran Memorandum of Understanding and since it collapsed? Johnston: What we saw following the MOU was a surge of exiting cargoes from Hormuz. The vast majority of that seems to have routed towards China. What we saw was that, at the very bottom, Chinese crude oil imports fell to around 6 million barrels a day in June. And then those spiked back up to more than 10 million barrels a day in July, or at least that was the high point in July. Roughly a month later, those imports are back down around six. You've seen a rollover back to where we stood pre-MOU. Fraser: Do we know how long this import suppression can continue? Johnston:. Let’s say this has been entirely a drawdown of stocks, which seems implausible. Even then, they have more than a billion barrels of crude oil stocks that we know about for sure. If they want to support the market to their maximum ability, they can do that for months further. But in doing so, they would deplete the entirety of the energy security blanket they've spent almost two decades constructing. Fraser: Let’s move on to the strategic petroleum reserve releases by the U.S. and other partners. To what degree have those been instrumental in keeping prices from going a lot higher? Johnston: It’s part of the suite that the world has kind of engaged in to blunt those effects. This is the largest release of strategic stocks on record. Depending on the exact month you're talking about, it has potentially been over 3 million barrels a day of incremental supply coming from OECD SPRs. Without that, the market would've been much tighter and we likely wouldn't have experienced the same relief even with China's import cut at the same time. Fraser: Last week the U.S. SPR dipped under 300 million barrels. There's a lot of discussion of what the physical limits on those stockpiles are given that they're stored in salt caverns. They need a certain amount of fill to maintain structural integrity. Are we anywhere close to pushing up against the U.S. ability to continue drawing down from those stockpiles? Johnston: I do not believe we are. I think that you have probably at least another 200 million barrels that can be readily drawn down. With the required fill level, absolutely it would be a massive issue if you just drew it down and left a vacuum in there. It would implode on itself. But they don't do that. They one-to-one replace a barrel of crude oil extracted with a barrel of saturated brine. So theoretically it should maintain the same fill. The issue for SPRs is not necessarily fill level, but number of refill and empty cycles. It's the actual up-and-down motion that disturbs and further erodes the walls and structural integrity. I think that the SPR caverns can get below 100 million barrels of fill before we run into any issues. Fraser: So if we continued the current rate of drawdown, that would take us well into next year. Johnston: Correct. Fraser: Over the course of the war, Trump or someone in his administration will make a statement about how diplomacy is progressing or about how much oil is coming out of the strait. And even if those are quickly disproven, there is a downward impact on prices. So why do these traders keep listening to Trump? Has there been a change in the reaction of markets over the course of this war? Johnston: You definitely get smaller drawdowns to these kinds of jawboning attempts today than you would have, say, in March and April, where there are multiple days that you saw $15 to $20 per barrel reductions in the span of a day. When you look at the history of oil, there’s a tendency on these geopolitical events to overdo it. That's a natural kind of fear-driven phenomenon. In some ways Trump has short-circuited that normal behavior in oil markets. Because while you're right that it's never coming true, the price action is coming true. At the end of the day, for prices to go higher, you need traders to bid higher. And if they bid higher and they get blown out of the water and they lose their jobs, they're going to be replaced by someone that doesn't bid higher on geopolitical risk. It has successfully arrested the upside volatility. But if we keep getting tighter, markets will continue to respond higher; we just won't get those runaway phenomena that we would've seen historically. Fraser: Since the start of the war, we’ve seen Saudi Arabia and the UAE successfully use pipelines as an alternative route to get oil out of the Gulf. How much oil are those getting out at this point? And has the Houthi blockade of Saudi shipping in the Red Sea had a meaningful effect on this? Johnston: The total volume coming out of Emirates at Fujairah and then the west coast of Saudi Arabia and the Red Sea rose to about 6-7 million barrels. It was about 2-3 million before, so that was an incremental change of 4-5 million barrels. To your question with the Houthis, it has absolutely been having an effect. As soon as they started attacking Saudi ships, the entire Red Sea fleet went dark. Everyone turned off their transponders, making it much harder to verify flows out of Saudi Arabia. Verifiable transits of Saudi tankers through the Bab al-Mandab have gone functionally to zero. They still are probably getting some out, but we're also seeing evidence of flows north into the Mediterranean. Pre-war flows here were around a million barrels a day, give or take. That's jumped over the past week or two to around 2.5 million barrels a day, presumed Saudi flow. Over the past two weeks, we've also seen Saudi Arabia begin loading tankers in the Gulf again, which they hadn't done since the collapse of the MOU. And the question is, does Riyadh know something? Is something big going to break in the Hormuz negotiations? Or are they being forced back into the Gulf? You're seeing reports now that they are participating in the Emirati-led shuttle trade, ship-to-ship transfers in the Gulf of Oman. It seems likely that some of that is displaced barrels coming back from the Red Sea. So Saudi Arabia is needing to diversify away from its diversification. There's a poetic side to it. Fraser: Pulling all these factors together, where are we left in terms of a kind of global supply shortage? And what kinds of price impacts can we expect if that persists over the next few months? Johnston: It's very hard to estimate global balance right now. My bet would be 2-4 million barrels a day undersupplied on a global basis. The rub on top of that is that we now have a parallel crisis that's emerging on the refining side of the slate. So even if we've sorted out what was happening on the crude oil side, we have the Ukrainian hammering of Russian refineries, the attacks in the Black Sea, the reduction in U.S. exports now that stocks have drawn down, and China is not exporting refined products either. All together this further tightens global refined product markets. If this persists and we keep drawing down crude oil stocks, the crude oil price is going to keep rising. On top of that, we could see refined product prices independently going higher. So that's just an amplification. For consumers, it's refined product prices and not crude oil that are going to drive those economic issues. Fraser: So even though these factors we’ve discussed have kept oil prices down so far, and the biggest of these can persist for a while, we could still be looking at those extremely elevated prices by a few months from now. Johnston: Easily. We're already feeling it. Refined prices are already at demand-destructive levels. It's just a question of whether they are at sufficiently demand-destructive levels. It’s the same fundamental concern I would've had back in April, playing out on a much longer timeline and now more on the product side than the entire oil complex. --- ### Turns out having nukes provided the US very little leverage **Published:** August 25, 2026 | **Author:** Sina Azodi | **Section:** Middle East **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/us-nukes-iran-war/.md For decades, the United States treated the prospect of an Iranian nuclear weapon as an intolerable threat. Yet when Washington and Tehran went to war twice in roughly a year, America’s own nuclear arsenal provided remarkably little leverage. In June 2025, the United States joined Israel in attacking Iran’s nuclear facilities. Iran retaliated against Israeli territory and a U.S. air base in Qatar. The following year, a far larger U.S.-Israeli campaign killed Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and much of Iran’s senior military leadership while striking the country’s nuclear, military, energy, and transportation infrastructure. Tehran responded by attacking Israel, U.S. bases across the Persian Gulf, and regional energy infrastructure. In neither war did America’s overwhelming nuclear superiority prevent Iranian retaliation or compel Tehran to capitulate. The paradox is striking: the weapon the U.S. had long insisted Iran must never possess proved largely incapable of shaping Tehran’s calculations, or determining the course of a war of choice that has consumed Trump’s presidency. Indeed, nothing in Iran’s observable behavior during the conflict suggests that the prospect of American or Israeli nuclear use materially shaped its wartime decisions. Aside from President Donald Trump’s occasional angry outbursts on social media, Washington issued no explicit nuclear threats, and there is no public evidence that Iranian leaders regarded nuclear escalation as a plausible wartime contingency. It was only after hostilities ended that Brig. Gen. Mohammad Reza Naghdi, a senior Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) commander, publicly warned that any U.S. use of nuclear weapons would be a “mistake.” Tehran’s wartime choices — including the decision to close the Strait of Hormuz — were responses to conventional military and economic pressure, not to America’s nuclear arsenal. Iran fought what its leaders regarded as a war of survival against two nuclear-armed states without visibly adjusting its strategy to account for possible nuclear use. Instead, Tehran relied on pre-existing capabilities. As Alireza Salimi, a lawmaker and member of the Iranian parliament’s presiding board, put it, “Under the current circumstances, the Strait of Hormuz is more valuable to us than a nuclear bomb.” The Iran war is the latest example of a pattern stretching from the Falklands War in 1982 to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. When a nuclear-armed state’s survival is not at stake, its nuclear arsenal provides remarkably little leverage to compel an adversary’s submission. Three wars involving nuclear powers across more than four decades point to the same conclusion: nuclear weapons may constrain escalation, but they rarely determine political outcomes. ## Contributors & Authors - [Jean-Francois Seznec](https://responsiblestatecraft.org/author/jeanfrancoisseznec/): Jean-François Seznec is a political scientist specializing in business and finance in the Middle Eas... - [Matthew MacKenzie](https://responsiblestatecraft.org/author/matthewmackenzie/): Matthew MacKenzie is a Foreign Policy Analyst at Americans for Prosperity. He holds a master’s degre... - [Sandra Davidovic](https://responsiblestatecraft.org/author/sandradavidovic/): Sandra Davidović is a PhD candidate in Political Science at the CUNY Graduate Center and a former Fu... - [Anchal Vohra](https://responsiblestatecraft.org/author/anchalvohra/): Anchal Vohra is a Non-Resident Fellow at the Quincy Institute and a Brussels-based columnist for For... - [Ali Latifi](https://responsiblestatecraft.org/author/alilatifi/): Ali M. Latifi is a Kabul-based freelance journalist. He has reported from Washington, Afghanistan, G... - [Scott Hibbard](https://responsiblestatecraft.org/author/scotthibbard/): Scott W. Hibbard is an Associate Professor and Chair of the Department of Political Science at DePau... - [John Ryan](https://responsiblestatecraft.org/author/johnryan/): John Ryan is a co-founder and editor at Lawdragon and author of "America’s Trial: Torture and the 9/... - [Sirwan Kajjo](https://responsiblestatecraft.org/author/sirwankajjo/): Sirwan Kajjo is a Kurdish-American journalist based in Washington D.C. He focuses on Kurdish politic... - [Johan Wennstrom](https://responsiblestatecraft.org/author/johanwennstrom/): Dr. Johan Wennström is a Research Fellow at the Swedish Defence University and the author of The Sta... - [Alex Rewegan](https://responsiblestatecraft.org/author/alexrewegan/): Alex Rewegan is a Post-Doctoral Fellow in the Technoscience Research Unit at the University of Toron... ## API Access & Integration - [Search](https://responsiblestatecraft.org/search): Site-wide content search - [Main RSS Feed](https://responsiblestatecraft.org/feeds/feed.rss): Latest content in RSS format ## Optional - [Navigation index (llms.txt)](https://responsiblestatecraft.org/llms.txt): Compact section index with markdown links for every section - [Main RSS Feed](https://responsiblestatecraft.org/feeds/feed.rss): Latest content in RSS format ## Content Discovery - **Search Interface:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/search - **All Sections:** Each section available at `https://responsiblestatecraft.org/[section-path]/index.md` - **Individual Posts:** Each post available at its URL with `.md` extension - **RSS Feeds:** Main feed at `https://responsiblestatecraft.org/feeds/feed.rss`, section feeds at `https://responsiblestatecraft.org/feeds/[section-path].rss` ## How to Use This Content 1. **For Site Overview:** Review the "Site Structure" section to understand content organization 2. **For Specific Topics:** Use section-specific RSS feeds or browse section markdown pages 3. **For Recent Updates:** Check the "Recent Content" section for latest articles 4. **For API Access:** Use the documented endpoints for programmatic access 5. **For Individual Articles:** Access any post by appending `.md` to its URL --- *This complete content index contains 100 recent posts and represents the current state of Responsible Statecraft as of October 2, 2026 11:45:12. 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