# Responsible Statecraft - Complete Content > Responsible Statecraft: complete content export for LLMs - 24 sections and the 100 most recent articles. Navigation index: https://responsiblestatecraft.org/llms.txt **Site Overview:** - Domain: https://responsiblestatecraft.org - Total Sections: 24 - Recent Posts Included: 100 - Content Word Count: ~85319 words - Last Updated: 2026-09-12 - Generated: September 12, 2026 17:20:27 **Important Information:** - Site ID: 26264603 - Markdown version: append .md to any URL - Total sections: 24 ## Site Structure - [Analysis](https://responsiblestatecraft.org/analysis/index.md): The latest analysis and commentary on U.S. foreign policy from Responsible Statecraft (5005 posts; HTML: https://responsiblestatecraft.org/analysis; RSS: https://responsiblestatecraft.org/feeds/analysis.rss) - [Reporting](https://responsiblestatecraft.org/reporting/index.md): The latest reporting on U.S. foreign policy from Responsible Statecraft (1147 posts; HTML: https://responsiblestatecraft.org/reporting; RSS: https://responsiblestatecraft.org/feeds/reporting.rss) - [Latest](https://responsiblestatecraft.org/latest/index.md): (2639 posts; HTML: https://responsiblestatecraft.org/latest; RSS: https://responsiblestatecraft.org/feeds/latest.rss) - [Specials](https://responsiblestatecraft.org/specials/index.md): (428 posts; HTML: https://responsiblestatecraft.org/specials; RSS: https://responsiblestatecraft.org/feeds/specials.rss) - [Featured Video](https://responsiblestatecraft.org/featured-video/index.md): (3 posts; HTML: https://responsiblestatecraft.org/featured-video; RSS: https://responsiblestatecraft.org/feeds/featured-video.rss) - [Regions](https://responsiblestatecraft.org/regions/index.md): (5225 posts; HTML: https://responsiblestatecraft.org/regions; RSS: https://responsiblestatecraft.org/feeds/regions.rss) - [Europe](https://responsiblestatecraft.org/regions/europe/index.md): The latest coverage of Europe from Responsible Statecraft (2573 posts; HTML: https://responsiblestatecraft.org/regions/europe; RSS: https://responsiblestatecraft.org/feeds/regions/europe.rss) - [Middle East](https://responsiblestatecraft.org/regions/middle-east/index.md): The latest coverage of the Middle East from Responsible Statecraft (4020 posts; HTML: https://responsiblestatecraft.org/regions/middle-east; RSS: https://responsiblestatecraft.org/feeds/regions/middle-east.rss) - [Africa](https://responsiblestatecraft.org/regions/africa/index.md): The latest coverage of Africa from Responsible Statecraft (575 posts; HTML: https://responsiblestatecraft.org/regions/africa; RSS: https://responsiblestatecraft.org/feeds/regions/africa.rss) - [Asia-Pacific](https://responsiblestatecraft.org/regions/asia-pacific/index.md): The latest coverage of Asia-Pacific from Responsible Statecraft (1873 posts; HTML: https://responsiblestatecraft.org/regions/asia-pacific; RSS: https://responsiblestatecraft.org/feeds/regions/asia-pacific.rss) - [Latin America](https://responsiblestatecraft.org/regions/latin-america/index.md): The latest coverage of Latin America from Responsible Statecraft (482 posts; HTML: https://responsiblestatecraft.org/regions/latin-america; RSS: https://responsiblestatecraft.org/feeds/regions/latin-america.rss) - [North America](https://responsiblestatecraft.org/regions/north-america/index.md): The latest coverage of North America from Responsible Statecraft (1706 posts; HTML: https://responsiblestatecraft.org/regions/north-america; RSS: https://responsiblestatecraft.org/feeds/regions/north-america.rss) - [Video Section](https://responsiblestatecraft.org/video-section/index.md): Watch the latest analysis on issues of war and piece from Responsible Statecraft. 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These rapid changes have pushed Yemen’s war back into the regional arena, threatening Red Sea shipping and placing the country’s Saudi-backed, internationally-recognized government on the back foot. The rapid reversal came only days after the government declared a campaign to retake Sanaa, Yemen’s capital, amid a broader escalation in fighting across the country. A 2022 truce had reduced large-scale combat and allowed Saudi Arabia to distance itself from the conflict, but it left the capital under Houthi control and did nothing to establish centralized control over the country and its heavy weapons. Now, as the Houthis advance rapidly toward government strongholds in the south, Yemen’s military is scrambling to regroup and make progress on its planned offensive in the north. The question now is whether Saudi Arabia, the U.S., and other powers will now intervene to help blunt the Houthis’ rapid advances. --- ### Can 'America First' survive Trump's war-first presidency? **Published:** September 11, 2026 | **Author:** Blaise Malley | **Section:** QiOSK **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/america-first-jd-vance/.md In a Thursday address at the GOP midterm convention that exalted President Donald Trump and demeaned his opponents as “extremists who openly hate our nation,” Vice President JD Vance hardly spoke about foreign policy. He did not mention the war in Iran directly, and he only brought up foreign policy as an example of an issue that divides the party’s base. He urged voters not to “throw the baby out with the bathwater” because “you happen to disagree with us on a policy issue here or there.” The acknowledgement of foreign policy as a divisive issue in the MAGA coalition is a stark retreat for Vance, who staked his 2023 endorsement of Trump on the fact that “he started no wars despite enormous pressure from his own party and even members of his own administration,” framing the president’s America First record as a much-needed deviation from decades of bipartisan hawkishness. A few wars later, Vance appears to have backed down from the anti-war aspects of the America First movement. Meanwhile, in response to the Iran war and the administration’s supposed betrayal of its campaign promises, the Institute for Peace & Diplomacy has launched “Reclaiming America First,” an initiative meant to take back that mantle from what it describes as Trump's hawkish drift, and to articulate an alternative vision for American foreign policy. Arta Moeini, director of research at the Institute for Peace & Diplomacy and one of the project leads, laid out the parameters he believes should guide an “America First” approach during a Thursday panel marking the launch of the event: it should be neither ideological nor partisan, nor tied to any one individual; it should be grounded in realism; and it should prioritize core U.S. security interests and domestic renewal while rejecting unilateralism and nativism. “Trump has shown himself to be at least disingenuous about using the term ‘America First,’” Moeini said during the panel, adding that part of the inspiration for the discussion was to combat “the taint of that association of ‘America First’ with this version of Trump.” That question of who actually carries the tradition forward inevitably turned to Vance, long seen as its standard-bearer within the administration, but whose own words offer a measure of how far the movement’s foreign policy rhetoric has shifted since Trump’s return to office. While panelists mostly agreed that an “America First” foreign policy was likely only to come from a conservative U.S. president, the group's read on Vance as the steward of that vision was more measured. Moeini said Vance would have been “smart enough not to go to war" with Iran, even if he might not be the right person to fix U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. Michael Brendan Dougherty, a senior writer for the National Review, offered a grimly ironic assessment of how a more realist foreign policy could take hold in a hypothetical Vance administration. “If Vance is elected president after Donald Trump, he’s going to be looking at a munitions stockpile that is very depleted, and will be discouraging of him taking on unpredictable gambles. That’s not the way you want restraint to , but it is the way it’s going now,” he said. “The Iran war is bringing about a humiliation of America, and that will bring along at least some restraint.” Dougherty also pointed to the constraining effect of public opinion, saying that American opposition to war may have prevented Trump from taking even more dramatic steps in Iran, such as an invasion of Kharg Island. There is evidence that elements of Trump’s base have turned against him as a result of this war. A recent survey from Navigator Research found that roughly 20% of Trump 2024 voters regret their decision. Among that group, almost half cited the war with Iran as the primary reason for their regret. There were real policy disagreements over what "America First" meant. Daniel McCarthy, editor of Modern Age, warned that talk of a "multinodal" world echoes liberal internationalism and misreads an American public that is still proud of the country, while the panel also split over whether to encourage or deter a Polish or Japanese nuclear program. But all the panelists agreed that America First is a foreign policy movement that both predates and will outlive Trump. “America First as an ordering principle of American statecraft will long outlive MAGA and the current coalitional dynamics at play surrounding the president,” Reid Smith, Vice President for Foreign Policy at Stand Together, said. --- ### Milei has staked it all on Trump. Will he follow through? **Published:** September 11, 2026 | **Author:** Antonio De Loera-Brust | **Section:** Latin America **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/milei-trump-falklands/.md The territorial dispute between Argentina and the United Kingdom over the Falkland Islands (or Islas Malvinas in Spanish) continues to escalate. Last week, Argentine President Javier Milei, a close ally of U.S. President Donald Trump, announced a series of new measures aimed at pressuring Britain over the future of the islands. The most significant announcement was of new sanctions on companies involved in oil extraction in the waters around the Falklands, which Argentina has long claimed as its own. Argentina’s attempt to prevent the exploitation of the Falklands’ natural resources is a reminder that beneath the often farcical relitigating of sovereignty claims dating back to the 18th century is a very modern geopolitical conflict with real stakes for energy and maritime resources. Yet what was most remarkable about Milei’s announcement was what Milei did not announce — namely, a shift in U.S. policy regarding the Falklands. Given the hype that Milei built up ahead of his announcement, many observers speculated he would announce U.S. support for Argentina’s claim. Those expectations had been further raised by a steady trickle of reporting going back to April that the Trump administration has been considering recognizing Argentina’s claim to the Falklands, bolstered by Trump’s recent comment that the U.S. position on the islands was “one of many” under review. The Falklands question, though easily dismissed as a curiosity in the United States, has long presented a genuine dilemma for U.S. policymakers torn between its transatlantic alliance and the Western Hemisphere. Despite being officially neutral in the territorial dispute, the U.S. decided to side with Britain over Argentina in the 1982 conflict, providing significant material support to the British war effort. This support caused lasting damage to U.S. standing in Latin America. Now, geopolitical shifts in the United States, Europe and Latin America have all converged to Argentina’s advantage, and help explain why Milei sees an opportunity to push Britain over the Falklands without risking broader diplomatic isolation. It’s time to ask: what would it take to get Donald Trump to give Milei what he so clearly wants? Milei’s self-proclaimed ability to obtain U.S. support for Argentina’s claim has become a major part of Milei’s domestic pitch. As is often noted in Argentina, Milei’s recent focus on the Falklands is a new development. Milei had risen to power with bitter and divisive attacks on left-wing domestic opponents, whom the president blamed for Argentina’s economic problems. Milei’s belated embrace of the Falklands issue comes as his economic reforms have largely failed to deliver the widespread prosperity he promised. Milei’s bet is that close alignment with the U.S. will translate to U.S. support for Argentina’s territorial claim, reversing the recent pattern of Argentine diplomacy, which searched for allies in the Global South. In this effort, Milei may well be repeating the error of the Argentine military junta, which believed the U.S. would stay neutral or even support Argentina in the 1982 war over the islands. Milei is betting this time will be different. For the United States, however, most of the recent consideration about whether to back Argentina over Britain in the South Atlantic has not revolved around the Falklands at all. For Trump, the Falklands question is clearly about Iran, with reports pointing to his notable frustration with Britain for its perceived failure to support the U.S.-Israeli war. Yet regardless of Trump’s frustration, Britain remains a far more useful ally in the current Middle Eastern conflict than Argentina could ever hope to be. British bases on Cyprus and Diego Garcia have served as logistical hubs for U.S. operations, and even briefly came under fire from Iran and its allies. While Trump no doubt wants Britain to do more, he also wouldn’t want Britain to do less. Milei’s government has acted in lockstep with the United States on the diplomatic front, designating Iran’s IRGC a terrorist organization. Washington is clearly interested in such support, as indicated by the State Department’s trumpeting of Peru’s recent decision to break off diplomatic relations with Iran. Yet these diplomatic “wins” are more about recognizing U.S. dominance over the Western Hemisphere than anything else; neither Peru or Argentina can make any real military contribution to the actual armed conflict. Undersecretary of Defense Elbridge Colby effectively acknowledged as much in his recent Americas Quarterly essay, writing “we will not ask neighbors to project power out of this region.” This gives Britain the upper hand for now. Closer to home, though, the case for U.S. recognition of the Argentine claim is far more straightforward: the U.S. has a clear and permanent interest in close ties with Latin America. The Trump administration has embraced the Monroe Doctrine, the original purpose of which was to defend the newly independent states of Latin America from exactly the sort of European imperial predations that Britain accomplished by seizing the Malvinas from Argentina by threat of force in 1833. If the United States truly means to prioritize the Western Hemisphere over Europe or the Middle East, then trading Britain for Argentina makes much more sense. The Falklands also occupy another strategic waterway — the approaches to the Strait of Magellan and Cape Horn. Before the construction of the Panama Canal (another Trump obsession), the Falklands commanded the only maritime corridor between the Pacific and Atlantic oceans. Indeed, this is why Britain seized them in the first place, as part of its global network of maritime bases from Singapore to Suez to Cape Town to Gibraltar. The Falklands’ strategic importance was proved by the 1914 Battle of the Falklands, when the Royal Navy annihilated the German East Asia Squadron as it attempted to enter the Atlantic. More recently, U.S. aircraft carriers have traveled through the Strait of Magellan, a useful practice in case the Panama Canal becomes unavailable for any reason. Milei’s pitch to Donald Trump then seems to be this: in exchange for U.S. support against Britain, Argentina would offer unprecedented access to its South Atlantic territories to both the U.S. military and U.S. business interests. Yet there are good reasons to doubt that Milei, already increasingly unpopular domestically, can keep that promise. Many prominent leaders on the Argentine left who vocally support confrontation with Britain nevertheless see the U.S. as a similar threat to Argentine sovereignty, specifically warning against U.S. control of Argentine naval bases in Tierra del Fuego. Argentines are undoubtedly united on the Falklands across ideological lines, but they also envision the islands and the crucial sea lanes and natural resources around them returning to Argentine sovereignty, not U.S. control. The divisive and partisan governance style of both Milei and Trump makes any long-term U.S.-Argentine partnership fragile, particularly when, as seems likely, the Argentine left returns to power. For now, Milei seems to be waiting in vain for U.S. support. Trump has already done extraordinary political favors for Milei. From facilitating a $20 billion U.S. Treasury bailout to importing Argentine beef, Trump has done more for Milei’s political fortunes than any prior U.S. leader has for any Argentine counterpart. It is also clear that the calculus of 1982 no longer holds: Britain is militarily weaker, more diplomatically isolated, and less geopolitically relevant to U.S. security needs in 2026 than in 1982. Yet Milei still needs Trump far more than Trump needs Milei. Milei has increasingly staked his presidency on proving that his subordination to the United States will allow him to win the Falklands, the White Whale of Argentine foreign policy. Yet Milei’s needs are not Washington’s. The U.S. has no real reason to change position as long as it can string both of its nominal allies along. That is likely what Donald Trump, who is much better at talking about deals than closing them, will do. --- ### Britain banned settlement imports. Will Europe finally follow suit? **Published:** September 11, 2026 | **Author:** Anchal Vohra | **Section:** Europe **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/eu-sanctions-israel/.md Britain's decision this week to ban all imports from illegal Israeli settlements carries huge moral resonance, but the real test comes next: Will the European Union (EU) – the single largest market in the world and Israel's biggest trading partner – follow suit? The EU conducts trade worth tens of billions with Israel every year, but it has long hidden behind the need for consensus or the lack of a majority required to use its massive economic leverage to influence Israel's policies. The key question is whether the UK's decision will act as a catalyst and sway a sufficient number of European governments to act. The timing is critical. Last month, the Israeli government called for tenders to build more than 1,200 housing units in E1 – a 4.6 square mile area in the occupied West Bank that lies between Jerusalem and the large Israeli settlement of Ma’ale Adumim. Any such expansion would make a “contiguous Palestinian state virtually impossible,” as CNN reported last month. The EU has two options. It could find the unity needed to exert influence now, before Israel starts the construction and changes facts on the ground that later become difficult to reverse. Or it could squander the possibility of a two-state solution. In a speech at the House of Commons, British Foreign Secretary Ed Miliband delivered a scathing admonishment of the Israeli government, accusing it of turning a blind eye to the "ethnic cleansing of Palestinians" perpetrated by "settler terrorists" in the West Bank. Miliband cited United Nations reporting of an "average of six violent settler attacks against Palestinians per day this year, the highest on record." Settlement trade mostly consists of agricultural products and, as Reuters reported, represents only a fraction of the total bilateral trade between the UK and Israel. The UK's sanctions on companies and individuals that facilitate settlement expansion – including financial institutions – could prove to be more impactful. Israel’s banks and insurance companies that back construction projects in illegal settlements may think twice before risking their business interests in the UK. Yet, despite a scathing denouncement and a seemingly sweeping sanctions package, there is only so much the UK can do alone. The EU – a 27-member bloc of some of the most prosperous nations in the world – has much greater leverage. Last year, the EU and Israel traded more than €43 billion in goods. The popular debate has been about reducing arms sales to Israel, but Europe's real power is economic; using trade as leverage would offer a genuine chance of making the Israeli establishment rethink its settlement expansion and policies in occupied territories at large. Miliband said the UK coordinated with 11 other countries, including France and Canada, and shortly after, Paris announced that it will impose a ban on all imports from illegal settlements. Canada's foreign minister, Anita Anand, promised the introduction of "restrictions" in the coming months. Nine other states – Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Ireland, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden – expressed their intention to introduce national restrictions, support European restrictions, or at least "actively consider" a ban on trade in goods with settlements and other measures. The extent to which these countries will go against Israel remains unclear, but they need more countries to come on board for it to be a pan-European ban. There is no doubt that European countries have disapproved of Israeli methods and mass killings in Gaza and, lately, the exacerbation of settler violence in the West Bank. But the bloc as a whole has failed to turn its concern into a coherent policy that has an effect on the ground. Over the last three years, the EU and its member states have discussed several proposals about how they can persuade Israel to rein in its military campaign, send more aid to Gaza, and control the violent settlers unleashing havoc in the West Bank. Last year, the EU conducted a review of the EU-Israel Association Agreement, which provides the legal framework for economic and political relations. It later found Israel in breach of Article 2 of the treaty, which identifies respect for human rights and democratic principles as "essential elements." The EU leaders then discussed a slew of options, including fully suspending the agreement, but this required unanimity to push through and was never seriously considered. Under Viktor Orbán, Hungary was one of the principal opponents of suspending the EU–Israel Association Agreement, effectively blocking the unanimity required. (Hungary's new leader, Peter Magyar, has not joined the new national initiative but has been more willing to support EU action against Israel. This May, Hungary backed EU sanctions against some extremist settlers and entities.) The other option was a partial suspension of trade-related provisions, which required a qualified majority vote (QMV) – at least 15 affirmative votes representing 65% of the bloc's population. While Hungary was a convenient scapegoat, Germany's support for Israel, alongside Italy's, held back the bloc from moving forward. Suspending Israel's participation in the Erasmus+ student exchange programme or the Horizon academic research programme was also tabled. At the time, a senior EU official told me these were the "low-hanging fruit" and doable, but nothing moved forward. Some options were outside the scope of the association agreement – including halting visa-free travel for Israelis to the EU and banning imports from illegal Israeli settlements. According to an EU spokesperson, as of last week, the bloc had sanctioned a dozen individuals and nine entities related to illegal settlements, but there was no "clear outcome" to the discussions about other options on the table. He presumably meant a ban on imports from the settlements. This week, in a candid conversation, a senior EU official told me that the European Commission had later tabled a new proposal, specifically laying out options to deter Israel from expanding illegal settlements, including the ban on imports, but not even 15 member states are on board. In short, the EU has long discussed a hierarchy of possible measures, from the least to the most consequential, but has dithered on moving forward. It has a chance now, if it wants to stop Israel from expanding E1. If consensus and QMV cripple the EU from moving ahead as a bloc, the least European nations can do is take national measures. Will they? Trade in goods between the EU and Israel favored Europeans last year. Moreover, Europeans are likely to factor in a growing dependence on Israel's defense industry as relations with the U.S. decline and the U.S. itself runs short on critical munitions. Germany, Greece, Cyprus, Finland, and many others import Israeli defense equipment. For now, therefore, the chances of a pan-EU ban on imports from West Bank settlements remain low, and the odds of a suspension of trade with Israel are lower yet. --- ### Rubio's LatAm pep rally shows the limits of the Donroe Doctrine **Published:** September 11, 2026 | **Author:** Lee Schlenker | **Section:** Latin America **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/rubio-latin-america-trip/.md This week, Secretary of State Marco Rubio traveled to Colombia, Ecuador and Peru, where he pledged increased security assistance, signed critical minerals deals and warned the three countries’ recently-elected, ideologically-aligned leaders — two of them U.S. citizens — about China’s presence in the region. The tour, Rubio’s fourth to Latin America and the Caribbean since becoming secretary of state last year, comes as the Trump administration increasingly pivots U.S. foreign policy toward the Western Hemisphere, where it has expanded military operations on land and at sea to degrade “narco-terrorist” groups, including the ten designated foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs) operating in the three Andean countries Rubio visited. Rubio’s trip, however, transpired amid increased scrutiny, including from his traditional base of support in South Florida, over a controversial oil deal in nearby Venezuela, where Trump officials have touted Washington’s newfound leverage over interim Venezuelan President Delcy Rodríguez through its control over the country’s oil revenues following the bombing of the country and abduction of its embattled leader, Nicolas Maduro, in January. For America’s top diplomat, whose potential run for president in 2028 is caught between defending his boss’ “historic” deal and reassuring supporters of his commitment to democracy in Venezuela, the South American tour with like-minded conservative leaders offered an opportunity to shore up his image across the hemisphere as other administration officials tout the deal in Dallas and say the country is “not yet ready” for elections. Rubio met on Tuesday with newly-inaugurated Colombian President Abelardo de la Espriella in his coastal stronghold of Barranquilla, where the U.S. and Colombia signed a deal to “jointly identify and finance mining and processing projects within six months” — the country boasts large reserves of gold, nickel, coltan, platinum, tungsten and other rare earths — as well as to “establish a bilateral for strategic civil nuclear cooperation.” Rubio’s visit came on the heels of a devastating 7.4 magnitude earthquake last month that killed at least 330 and injured thousands more. The State Department responded by delivering nearly $27 million in aid. De la Espriella, who was endorsed by Trump before winning a razor-thin runoff election against the leftwing candidate backed by outgoing President Gustavo Petro, has, in turn, sought U.S. relief from 12.5% tariffs affecting the country’s flower industry and other U.S. exports, yet no announcement was made Tuesday. Answering questions from the press about much-anticipated joint military operations, Rubio stated that the new Colombian administration had not formally requested the deployment of U.S. troops to fight the country's crime syndicates, adding that it has, in the interim, agreed to launch in Medellín the regional headquarters of the administration’s counter-cartel coalition known as the Shield of Americas. Leading up to Rubio’s visit, the Colombian president has come under fire for holding press conferences surrounded by body bags of supposed “narco-terrorists,” loosening the country’s gun laws, justifying the death of minors in bombing campaigns against irregular armed actors, and eliminating nearly a dozen regulations on mining, which stands to benefit gold companies like the one formerly led by Colombia’s new ambassador to Washington, Maria Consuelo Araújo. On Wednesday, Rubio met with President Daniel Noboa in Ecuador, which in recent years has become one of the world’s most violent countries and has emerged as a major trafficking hub for the world’s cocaine, produced mostly in neighboring Colombia and Peru. While in Quito, Rubio announced Washington was placing terrorist designations on Los Tiguerones, an Ecuadorian gang that infamously took over a live TV broadcast in 2024; sanctioned seven former public officials over alleged ties to criminal groups; hailed Ecuador as an “aggressive partner” in the administration’s counterdrug push; and said he would seek $45 million in U.S. funding toward these ends. He was, in turn, awarded Ecuador's National Order of Merit, the Grand Cross. The secretary’s second visit to Quito coincided with joint U.S. military operations targeting armed groups along Ecuador’s border with Colombia, launched earlier this year, even as U.S. lawmakers and experts continue to raise concerns about democratic backsliding, growing insecurity, deteriorating rule of law and alleged official ties to drug trafficking in the country. Since Noboa won a special election in 2023 before getting re-elected early last year, his government has lobbied the Biden and Trump administrations for increased weapons sales, an elusive free-trade deal and the return of a U.S. air base in Manta that was closed down by former leftwing President Rafael Correa in 2009. Some of these requests have materialized, aided by Noboa’s eager support for Trump’s aggressive counternarcotics and immigration objectives in the hemisphere. Others have been constrained by a popular referendum last year rejecting the presence of foreign military bases. Sweeping changes to U.S. trade policy have also pushed one of Trump’s closest South American allies to deepen commercial ties with China. A similar dynamic has transpired in Peru, where on Thursday Rubio met with recently-inaugurated president Keiko Fujimori, the daughter of former authoritarian dictator Alberto Fujimori, who clinched a razor-thin victory in the country’s June runoff elections after three previous failed attempts at the presidency. While Rubio was there, Peru formalized its membership in the Shield of Americas, through which it seeks to bolster joint actions against transnational criminal groups, and requested U.S. support in the face of the weather phenomenon known as El Niño, expected to affect over a million Peruvians in the coming months. Rubio, whose visit triggered sizable protests in the capital, Lima, was awarded with the country’s highest civilian honor, the Order of the Sun. Named a non-NATO ally earlier this year, Peru purchased $3.5 billion in Lockheed Martin F-16s just months later in part due to pressure from U.S. Ambassador Bernie Navarro, a longtime Rubio confidant. But its conservative government has nonetheless withstood U.S. calls to decouple economically from China, which buys the country’s copper and iron and is heavily invested in its mining, energy and infrastructure sectors, most notably the multibillion mega-port of Chancay. Last year, the Peruvian government hired Rubio-aligned D.C. lobbying firm Continental Strategy in part to reverse 50% tariffs on its U.S. copper exports and to boost bilateral ties amid the bicentennial of the countries’ diplomatic relationship. Sources told Reuters that Fujimori is now, like De la Espriella, seeking relief from the more recent 12.5% U.S. tariffs affecting its agricultural trade with the U.S. Despite its relative economic prosperity and fiscal stability for the region, Peru has faced growing insecurity in ports and prisons, extortion of business owners by criminal groups, and high levels of coca production in rural areas. To these ends, the country’s foreign minister, a longtime employee of the U.S. Embassy in Lima, said before Rubio’s arrival that he hopes to strengthen cooperation on issues of “security and defense and the fight against transnational organized crime, which is so damaging to our country.” For an administration wielding all the coercive tools it has in its playbook to secure cooperation with its militarized anti-drug agenda in South America, striking security agreements with like-minded regional leaders is a walk in the park for Rubio. But receiving symbolic accolades in Quito and Lima and offering lofty platitudes about China’s threat ignore the even greater challenges the region faces — from authoritarian drift to low productivity, steep inequality and state capture. On these points, the administration’s “Donroe Doctrine” has thus far provided relatively little. --- ### By shunning the Taliban, the world is hurting normal Afghans **Published:** September 10, 2026 | **Author:** Ali Latifi | **Section:** Middle East **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/taliban-diplomacy-aisha-wahab/.md Kabul — Last month, when Aisha Wahab of California became the first Afghan-American elected to Congress, her victory was heralded as a sign that Afghans had truly made their mark in American society. Afghan social media was inundated with messages of pride and celebration, Western-funded diaspora media outlets rushed out “who is Aisha Wahab” pieces, and even former President Hamid Karzai congratulated the 38-year-old on her victory. But that celebration was short-lived. During an appearance on Democracy Now after her election, Wahab said the United States “should pursue diplomacy” with Afghanistan, “regardless of which group is in power.” Wahab acknowledged the severe limitations placed on women and girls under Taliban rule but said that, by exercising diplomacy with the Islamic Emirate government, the U.S. could possibly steer the Taliban “in the right direction when it comes to human rights, women’s rights and just civil rights across the board.” That interview led to immediate condemnation. A week after her victory, many of the same Afghans who were cheering her on turned against Wahab, labeling her a Taliban apologist and even leaking private photos of her and her family to social media. But here’s the thing: as much as the rest of the diaspora may hate to admit it, Wahab is correct. As an Afghan-American who has been living in Kabul since 2013, I have seen firsthand that the West’s efforts to punish the Taliban — seizing billions in Central Bank reserves, slashing foreign aid, closing embassies, cutting the nation’s banks off from the global financial system through financial restrictions — have greatly hurt the people, not the government. It’s not just me who says this, though. In 2023, Karen Decker, then chargé d'affaires of the U.S. mission to Afghanistan, told me Washington needed to pursue a policy of “pragmatic engagement” with the Taliban. As she put it, “isolation is ruinous. It's ruinous for the Afghan people. It's ruinous for the region.” The signs of that ruin are clear. At least 22 million Afghans, including 10.7 million women and girls, remain in need of humanitarian access. Since the Taliban returned to power in August 2021, that number has never been below 20 million, nearly half the population. And the unwillingness to engage with the Taliban authorities has only added to the pressures faced by the organizations trying to address the malnutrition, poverty, and displacement affecting tens of millions of Afghans. “Humanitarian actors have spent the last five years being the middlemen between the international community and the Taliban,” Samira Sayed-Rahman, an Afghan-Canadian humanitarian worker, told me last month in the lead-up to the fifth anniversary of the U.S. withdrawal. International organizations, she said, have been left with the onus of negotiating access, exemptions to edicts and bans, and the space to implement programs. Under normal circumstances, she said, all of that would fall to the donors themselves. This was most clearly borne out in late 2022, when the Islamic Emirate banned Afghan women from working for NGOs, including the United Nations. It quickly became clear that negotiations were unavoidable, especially for smaller local organizations. Heads of local female-run organizations went to work to secure workarounds and exemptions while international organizations were in the middle of a shut down in protest. Eventually, even the international organizations were left with no choice but to talk. In the summer of 2023, Norwegian Refugee Council Secretary General Jan Egeland, confirmed his organization had “resumed most of our humanitarian operations in Kandahar as well as a number of other regions in Afghanistan.” Every other NGO leader I spoke to at the time, including Afghan women who ran smaller local organizations, said they chose to keep their workarounds quiet, worried the publicity would get the exemptions pulled. Those exemptions, along with the continued operation of unofficial schools for girls beyond the sixth grade, prove that though their leader may be stubborn and unmoving, there are more moderate forces within the Taliban. Pushing organizations to negotiate directly with the government, rather than leaving that to the donors, Sayed-Rahman added, isn’t a mere inconvenience. It can be dangerous, especially for Afghan nationals. It also asks apolitical organizations that were meant to hand out food, build schools, and run clinics to take on issues like girls’ access to education, women’s right to work, and educational curricula. The recent global aid cuts, including the 2025 gutting of USAID, have only made the situation more dire in Afghanistan, Flora Alexander, Executive Director of IRC UK, said after a week-long visit to the country. “There are currently multiple converging and overlapping crises” in Afghanistan, Alexander said, citing issues around climate change, the return of five million Afghans from Iran and Pakistan, and the continued challenges to education for women and girls. Alexander said a visit to a medical center in the eastern province of Nangarhar illustrated how important it is for Western countries to find ways to provide assistance to Afghanistan. “This used to be a full-service primary health facility covering malnutrition, mental health, communicable and non-communicable diseases. Today, it’s just reproductive health and family planning,” she said of the Khogyani district clinic. Most jarring for Alexander was the fact that it would only cost about $5,000 a month to restore the clinic to its former status. Alexander said there is an ongoing debate over how to address humanitarian needs without formally recognizing the government. This philosophical debate “is used as justification by some countries to not engage in humanitarian aid,” she said. However, she added, what these countries must realize is that providing assistance to health programs, for instance, is “a proven way of meeting health needs and ensuring that women can work and girls can continue to develop,” despite the Islamic Emirate’s restrictions. Further, the Taliban does want a relationship with the United States. This was made clear by both George W. Bush’s ambassador to Afghanistan and the Islamic Emirate’s own Minister of Foreign Affairs, Amir Khan Muttaqi, who told the Financial Times that Washington is welcome to invest in Afghanistan $1 trillion in mineral assets. Most importantly, Muttaqi said sanctions and other restrictions on the Taliban leadership “did not achieve their intended objectives.” The biggest objection to engagement with the Islamic Emirate remains the serious human rights concerns in the country. Washington cited these, along with the charge that the Islamic Emirate is “a global terrorist organization” in their rebuke of Muttaqi’s offer, saying investment in mining would only enable the Taliban’s “horrific treatment” of the Afghan people. But the reality is that sanctions and diplomatic shunning have done little to disempower or dissuade the Taliban. Having seen the effects of international isolation with my own eyes, one thing has become clear: punishing the government has not worked. It has punished everyone but the government. --- ### Symposium: What I miss most about pre-9/11 America **Published:** September 10, 2026 | **Author:** Responsible Statecraft | **Section:** Washington Politics **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/america-before-911/.md While it is somewhat cliche to say that the “whole world changed” after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks on the United States, it does not detract from the reality of the statement. In numerous tangible ways, the culture, security, and politics of the nation were never the same after al-Qaida hijackers in passenger planes left nearly 3,000 people dead in smoldering ruins across lower Manhattan, the Pentagon, and a field in Shanksville, Pennsylvania. For many of us who lived through it all, a quarter century has passed in a blink, while at the same time the pre-9/11 Washington era paradoxically seems so far away, and perhaps softened a bit by wistfulness and nostalgia. Conversely, the “post” era is pockmarked by wars, and an expansion of the national security state that was unimaginable a generation ago. Those born too early to witness the events of that day know nothing other than the current atmosphere of hyper-securitization and political polarization. It wouldn’t be an exaggeration to say 9/11 and the “Global War on Terror” that followed are somewhere at the root of these woes. RS asked nearly two dozen foreign and national security experts — journalists, scholars, activists — what they miss most about the America that existed before the attacks on September 11, 2001. Their answers range from the personal to the philosophical, but all emphasize the sense of lament, for innocence and opportunities lost. ### Andrew Bacevich; Linda Bilmes; Christopher Coyne; Carolyn Eisenberg; John Feffer; Chas Freeman; Jacob Heilbrunn; William Hartung; Stephen Kinzer; Peter Kuznick; Lora Lumpe; Catherine Lutz; Scott McConnell; Jefferson Morley; Paul Pillar; Peter Van Buren; Katrina vanden Heuvel; Jim Webb ### Andrew Bacevich, co-founder of the Quincy Institute, author of “After the Apocalypse: America's Role in a World Transformed” I miss the "post-Cold War Era." During that brief interval between the Fall of the Berlin Wall and 9/11, it was still possible to believe that the United States might somehow salvage the ideals that informed the founding of the Republic. This was an illusion, of course, as events since have definitively demonstrated. Linda Bilmes, Harvard Kennedy School, author of “The Three Trillion Dollar War” On September 11, 2001, President George W. Bush was reading “The Pet Goat” to a group of elementary school children in Sarasota, Florida. At that exact moment, 50 million Americans watched live footage of airplanes being flown into the twin towers in Manhattan. The attacks killed 2973 civilians and wounded some 6000 others. Television and cable stations broadcast the aftermath for 93 continuous hours, the longest coverage for any event in U.S. history. The juxtaposition of this serene book-reading with the carnage unfolding in New York City epitomized a loss of innocence in America. There had not been a foreign attack on U.S. soil since Pearl Harbor in 1941. The 9/11 attacks had a profound impact on the American psyche. My childhood had taken place in a country that felt safe. I knew instantly that my three young sons would grow up in an atmosphere of uncertainty, facing a more dangerous world. I miss the era in which the U.S. felt gentler, and less vulnerable. Christopher Coyne, George Mason University, author of “Tyranny Comes Home: The Domestic Fate of U.S. Militarism” Violence has long been a part of the U.S. government’s foreign policy. But something shifted in the wake of September 11. The “war on terror” normalized repugnant practices of controlling and harming people. Torture, kill lists, drone strikes, global surveillance, and the militarization of police became routine government functions. Even when made public, there was little shame — real or feigned — associated with these actions. The killing of Abdulrahman al-Awlaki, a 16-year-old American, in a drone strike in Yemen, and the airstrikes on civilian wedding parties in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Yemen are but a few examples. Shame regarding U.S. foreign policies that violated laws and basic moral precepts was in short supply prior to 9/11. What I miss most about pre-9/11 America is that it existed at all. Carolyn Eisenberg, Historian, Hofstra University, author of "Fire and Rain: Nixon, Kissinger and the Wars in Southeast Asia" On this day, I especially miss a former student Peter Vega — a New York City fireman — who had joined the department because he wanted "to save people." He had served in the first Iraq War and wanted to do something helpful for humanity. On September 11, his firetruck crossed the Brooklyn Bridge, and Peter entered the tower — where he died trying to save people. His was a voice for peace. John Feffer, author and director of Foreign Policy In Focus at the Institute for Policy Studies Before 9/11, “democracy promotion” had not been successfully co-opted by neoconservatives as part of their campaign to topple the foreign governments they disliked and establish America-friendly regimes. I came of political age in the human rights movements in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. I was part of progressive movements on both sides of the Atlantic that quite deliberately promoted democracy. We did so only in solidarity with pro-democracy movements, and the democratic principles we embraced were homegrown, not manufactured in DC thinktanks. We promoted democracy against not only authoritarian regimes of the right but also neo-Stalinist tendencies on the left. Vestiges of those movements can still be found in efforts to oppose Putinism, Trumpism, LePenism, and “campist” movements on the left. What is missing is the belief, in the 1980s and 1990s, that we were part of a historic transformation. Osama bin Laden and the neoconservatives destroyed that illusion. Chas Freeman, former U.S. diplomat, U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia I miss the Constitution, the Bill of Rights, and the rule of law. These were the things that made the United States great. They have been steadily eroded to create a warfare state in which the executive exercises unbridled power, the legislature defers to the executive, and the courts are politicized. I also miss the interagency policy process in Washington. It has been replaced with ignorant, strategically illiterate decision making that produces forever wars — misadventures with no clear or fixed objectives, dishonest reports on their progress, and no war termination strategies. I miss diplomacy, which is MIA (possibly KIA) in foreign relations that rely exclusively on coercion, including military measures. I miss civility, tolerance, and friendship despite political differences, as well as governance guided by empiricism rather than a priori reasoning and ideological presuppositions. I miss the unflagging aspirations for self-improvement of the country I loved and served for three decades. Jacob Heilbrunn, editor of the National Interest, author of “They Knew They Were Right: the Rise of the Neocons” Once upon a time you could stroll to Dupont Circle or Farragut Square in Washington and frequent an establishment that carried not only newspapers from around the globe but also magazines. It was known as a newsstand. To visit it was to receive a shot of mental adrenaline, a bracing stimulant for what PG Wodehouse referred to as the old pineapple. There, arrayed in serried row after row, was a veritable cornucopia of magazines, from left to right, each promising their very own special induction into the world of ideas. The web, by contrast, cannot spin as enchanting a net to enfold its visitors. In the post-9/11 world, time has sped up and attention spans dwindled. If, like me, you are something of a dawdler, or even a luftmensch, then the vanished era of the newsstand was bliss indeed. William Hartung, co-author of "The Trillion Dollar War Machine" American foreign policy has always included a heavy dose of war and military intervention. But after 9/11 and the passage of the PATRIOT Act, during what was then called the Global War on Terror (GWOT), the urge to intervene accelerated, sparking a period of intensive war making — either through boots on the ground or drone strikes and special forces deployments — in Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia. The Costs of War Project at Brown University estimates that America’s post-9/11 wars have cost over $8 trillion, and over 4.5 million lives have been lost directly or indirectly on all sides, including a large cohort of civilians. In addition, hundreds of thousands of veterans of those conflicts have suffered severe physical or psychological injuries. Unfortunately, presidents and the majority of the Congress have still not learned from these disastrous examples, as the current war on Iran makes clear. Stephen Kinzer, author of "Overthrow: America's Century of Regime Change from Hawaii to Iraq" Americans used to admire themselves for creating a country that was a force for good in the world. That self-image has been largely shattered. The reality of American power did not change after 9/11, but our fantasy faded. We were rampaging around the world long before 2001. The difference is that today, it is no longer possible to ignore this fact. Denial is an important psychological tool. It allows us to reject unpleasant truths and shield ourselves from guilt and anxiety. Until 9/11, many Americans happily followed what Freud called the “ostrich policy.” That is no longer possible. The nature of American behavior has not fundamentally changed — it just seems that way. What has really changed is that today, our leaders no longer try to hide what they do. The last quarter-century has seen the veil drop from the face of American power. The denial option is no longer available. Peter Kuznick, American University, co-author (with Oliver Stone), “The Untold History of the United States” What I miss most about pre-9/11 America is that nuclear war felt remote — that it had been relegated to the dustbin of history. While neither peace nor the promised post-Cold War "peace dividend" ever actually arrived, the fear of nuclear war that had been so pronounced in the early-to-mid 1980s had largely abated. Nuclear activism, which had been so visible on campuses and beyond, had effectively disappeared. Even Russia and China seemed remote threats. Vladimir Putin was the first foreign leader to offer support after 9/11. Now the threat of nuclear war looms large with the U.S. and Israel losing in Iran, Russia bogged down in Ukraine, and tensions high across Asia. Talk of nuclear war is more pervasive than it's been in decades and a school of nuclear planners has emerged who, according to the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, believe that a nuclear war can be fought and won. What I miss most about pre-9/11 America is that it existed at all. Lora Lumpe, CEO of the Quincy Institute I miss my innocence. I had thought terrorism was not really a threat to the United States. Even after Oklahoma City, the first World Trade Center attack, and the U.S. embassy bombings in Africa, I believed that terrorism was the next in a series of trumped up, post-Cold War threats that the national security establishment conjured to fill the threat gap and keep the money flowing. The war on drugs had not worked, “instability” and humanitarian intervention had not worked. Engagement and enlargement was the best the Clinton administration could do, and the national security budget was flagging. Realizing on 9/12 that I was wrong to have dismissed a real threat and understanding that the response was going to be profoundly bad left me temporarily depressed, but it also made me want to grab life. My daughter was born a tidy 10 months after the attack. She grew up in Washington, DC, blocks from the Capitol and then later a little further out. She went to high school near the State Department. Every day of her childhood – during all of the U.S. military and economic twists and turns that blithely impacted or wrecked lives abroad – I wished that I could once again be dismissive of the very real threat she faced. Catherine Lutz, co-founder of the Costs of War Project, Brown University I miss the America of the 1990s. We hoped that the end of the nuclear-tipped Cold War between the Soviet Union and the United States would mean the transfer of America’s wealth and work to more productive and humane fields of endeavor, at home and abroad. I miss that decade for the opportunity it gave us to begin to imagine what an America at peace could accomplish, how many military bases could be turned into economic opportunity zones, how many military jet and nuclear weapon dollars could be transferred to healthcare, education, home construction, and science. But the military budget dipped a tepid 18% and began to grow again in the last years of the Clinton administration, and to then mushroom to what were once unimaginable levels with the militarism, Islamophobia, federal budget distortions, and other ills that the U.S. government response to 9/11 helped foster. And I miss my WWII and Korean War veteran father who mercifully died a few months before 9/11. He was spared the horror of that day — and of the U.S. response in the years since. Scott McConnell, co-founder of The American Conservative magazine Watching a movie from 1995 (for instance, “Party Girl” filmed in NYC, in the last pre-9/11 moments and before the internet commenced its doleful takeover), brings to mind Talleyrand’s “douceur de vivre” phrase about life before the French Revolution, roughly translated: "Anyone who has not lived in the years around 1789 does not know the sweetness of life." I worked for Pat Buchanan’s 2000 campaign; Pat was brilliant, accessible, terrifyingly prescient. We worked together on a speech about U.S. sanctions on Iraq, all the children they killed, the sheer hatred of America they (and our Israel policies more broadly) were generating throughout the Mideast, and the resulting dangers to us. The speech was delivered at a respectable Washington venue. Alongside Pat’s other warnings against our quest for global hegemony, it was sedulously ignored by the mainstream press, the only press that mattered to most voters at the time. In our post-9/11 social media age, there is less douceur de vivre, but I don’t miss the passing of the unchallenged America-promoting democracy-can-do-no-wrong narrative. Jefferson Morley, editor of “JFK Facts” and author of “The Ghost: The Secret Life of CIA Spymaster James Jesus Angleton” The ten years from 1991 to 2001 were a time when you could something you cannot do now: imagine an America at peace with the world without a cell phone in hand. The Cold War was over, though the habit of conflict persisted in an incipient war on terrorism which after 9/11 became another global conflict in which America cast itself disastrously as moral savior. Now the warfare state is the norm inside the surveillance culture. Thinking our way out of this bind begins with remembering when there was an alternative. Paul Pillar, Georgetown University, author of “Intelligence and U.S. Foreign Policy: Iraq, 9/11, and Misguided Reform” Although I miss some of the same pre-9/11 liberties that many fellow citizens do, I will identify a subject related to my work on counterterrorism in the 1990s as a public official and author. I was deputy chief of the Counterterrorist Center at CIA and subsequently wrote a book about counterterrorism and its relation to U.S. foreign policy. I miss well-reasoned discourse about terrorism and how to combat it — discourse that 9/11 badly distorted and emotionalized. The widespread tendency to treat America’s terrorism problem as if it suddenly began in September 2001 overlooks numerous lessons from the past about the variety of perpetrators and their motivations, terrorist techniques not just imagined but used, and the pros and cons of counterterrorist measures. I have missed being able to apply these lessons, calmly and rationally, and to put terrorism into proper perspective without being dismissed as insufficiently committed to a national crusade. Peter Van Buren, former State Department foreign service, author of “We Meant Well. How I Helped Lose the Battle for the Hearts and Minds of the Iraqi People” There is surveillance in my condo’s hallways. The city's facial-recognition cameras are on every corner, tied to license-plate readers, tied to our digital lives. Vast databases assure us no detail — no one — is too small to monitor. I learn to follow orders at the airport. After becoming an Iraq War whistleblower, I was placed on the SSSS list and sent to secondary screening every time I flew. I never knew who put me there or why. The agents searching me didn’t know either. They were following orders. An algorithm tagged me for something I had no idea I’d done. People once said, “If you have nothing to hide, you have nothing to fear.” Older people still joke about it. My kids don’t know the joke. They grew up assuming this way of life is simply part of life. That’s what we’ve lost, and what I miss most about pre-9/11 America. Katrina vanden Heuvel, publisher of The Nation magazine What do I miss about America pre-9/11? No Department of Homeland Security, no ICE, no Patriot Act, no AI. Advocating for peace didn’t seem as tough. We spent more time living, less on our smartphones and social media platforms. There was more time to think, read, converse about news and ideas. Public life was not mediated by toxic, isolating algorithms. I miss Christopher Hitchens as a Nation columnist, pre-Iraq War. Donald Trump was a bankrupt realtor, not the fictitious mogul of “The Apprentice,” nor the president. Jim Webb, former U.S. Senator and Secretary of the Navy What do I miss about pre-9/11 America? Real leadership. I served in the Reagan administration for four years as an assistant secretary of defense and secretary of the Navy. Of the presidents in office during my years in government, none surpassed Reagan’s inspirational leadership and experience. When he died on June 5, 2004, nearly three years after 9/11, more than 200,000 ordinary citizens visited his casket at the Reagan Library and at the Capitol Rotunda to pay their respects. The heightened security on Capitol Hill reflected the new normal. But the lines never slowed, often at a rate of 5,000 visits an hour. Setting aside political differences, something truly rare today, people came almost close enough to touch the leader who convinced us that we could be honorable and good. There was no provocation in the lines. For a moment, 9/11 and the Iraq invasion that Washington politicians used to justify it were far away, while America recalled an era fading fast into the mist of history. Watching the line, I thought of novelist Gore Vidal’s words: “you never really know when you’re happy; you can only know when you were happy.” Reagan may or may not have known. But we knew. --- ### The Iran war looms large as BRICS leaders gather in New Delhi **Published:** September 10, 2026 | **Author:** Michael Corbin | **Section:** Global Crises **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/brics-summit-2026/.md As diplomats prepare for the BRICS Summit in New Delhi this weekend, the Iran war is looming large. India, which assumed the BRICS chairmanship in January, was already facing the difficult responsibility of securing consensus to achieve concrete movement on a variety of trade, economic, and financial objectives. Now, the U.S.-Israeli campaign against Iran has dramatically complicated this effort, throwing the global economy into uncertainty and dividing BRICS countries, including some that are actively participating on either side of the conflict. The tensions within the bloc are far more significant than they were leading into last year’s summit in Brazil, which took place shortly after the 12-Day War against Iran. At that meeting, leaders condemned “the military strikes against the Islamic Republic of Iran since 13 June 2025, which constitute a violation of international law.” In addition, they called for an “immediate, permanent and unconditional ceasefire, and the full withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Gaza Strip.” The situation in 2026 is more complicated. India — one of the five original BRICS members, alongside Brazil, Russia, China and South Africa — continues to strengthen its relationship with Israel just as the war in Iran exacerbates other BRICS members’ relationships with Tel Aviv. Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu just a few days before Israel and the United States attacked Iran in February 2026. As the Guardian notes, the visit marked a continuation of “India’s evolving relationship with Israel, and it has deepened as conflict swept across the Middle East.” Given such overtures to Israel, one may understand if the majority of BRICS countries are uncomfortable with India’s chairmanship during this year’s summit. This was not the case last year in Brazil. Another aggravating factor is the fact that several BRICS members are now rival combatants. Iran, which joined the grouping in 2024, has damaged relations with many of its neighbors by attacking infrastructure and U.S. bases located on their territory. This includes the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, both of which are also BRICS members. According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, “the UAE has been attacked by more Iranian projectiles than all other states combined and incurred by far the greatest and most varied damage within the group.” As a result, the United Arab Emirates announced an indefinite trade embargo on Iran, saying “all trade, commercial exchanges and financial transactions with Iran have been halted until further notice.” At the BRICS Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in May, the bloc released a comparatively weaker outcome document than that of the previous year, encouraging the international community “to continue supporting the Palestinian people in their pursuit of independence and sovereignty.” Moreover, the ministers were unable to produce a unified statement supporting Iran’s calls for “nations to condemn the U.S. and Israel over what they described as their unlawful aggression.” Therefore, we should expect that any final BRICS declaration will steer clear of any mention of the war in Iran. Given these and other pre-existing divisions among BRICS members, the summit’s success will largely depend on whether India can achieve consensus on the economic agenda. Therefore, according to Asia One, it is important that India has centered its BRICS agenda on “institutional reforms that improve coordination while ensuring the bloc’s focus on development and cooperation rather than geopolitical rivalry.” According to the BRICS 2026 website, Modi defines Delhi's objective for the summit as to redefine “BRICS as Building Resilience and Innovation for Cooperation and Sustainability.” The BRICS “Namaste” logo for India 2026 importantly symbolizes “collective strength and unity.” This important message is graphically reinforced through the petal colors which represent all BRICS member countries. An example of BRICS cooperation and unity occurred during the BRICS Trade Ministers Meeting in Jaipur in August. As reported by India’s Nation Press, the ministers successfully finalized work on the BRICS Strategy for Economic Partnership 2030. This marks a significant achievement and now the plan will be referred for formal endorsement by the BRICS Leaders at next week’s summit. The strategy covers such issues as trade, investment, digital economy, and sustainable development. More specifically, BRICS Pay will receive a tremendous amount of attention during the summit as a result of threats to global payments and supply chains sparked by the wars in Ukraine and Iran. The cross-border settlement platform, which launched earlier this year, is designed to complement rather than replace SWIFT and reduce dollar dependency. BRICS Pay continues to integrate sovereign payment systems, including China's CIPS, India's UPI, Brazil's Pix, and Russia's SPFS. In addition, Reuters reported earlier this year that the Reserve Bank of India recommended to the government that a proposal to connect Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDCs) be included in the agenda for the 2026 BRICS summit. If the recommendation is adopted BRICS will move forward with a proposal to link the digital currencies of BRICS members for the first time. Trump has been sharply critical of any BRICS efforts to get around the U.S.-led financial system, which gives the U.S. extraordinary leverage over other countries through sanctions and other similar measures. "Any country aligning themselves with the Anti-American policies of BRICS, will be charged an ADDITIONAL 10% tariff,” he wrote on Truth Social last July, adding that there “will be no exceptions to this policy.” More recently, Trump's Treasury Secretary, Scott Bessent, has increased the aggressive trade stance of the U.S. by issuing “Operation Economic Outcast.” The purpose of the sanctions plan is to escalate the economic pressure on Iran, while also alerting countries that cooperate with Iran that the U.S. could restrict access to the U.S. financial system if they continue doing business with Tehran. Bessent’s policy reflects Washington’s frustration that the war in Iran has not achieved its aims. Instead, it has strengthened ties between some BRICS members and Iran, including Russia and China, which continue to provide crucial economic and political support to Iran’s efforts to withstand U.S. pressure. Subsequently, China and Russia now support a greater profile for Iran in BRICS institutions at the upcoming summit, which Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian will attend. Abdolnasser Hemmati, governor of the Central Bank of Iran, had indicated Iran would seek membership to BRICS Bank during the meeting in Delhi, according to CNBC. It is clear India will have a difficult task as this year’s BRICS Summit host, presiding over a growing and increasingly divided group. One would expect India, contrary to other BRICS members, to make a concerted effort to assure any final declaration underscores that BRICS does not exist as an anti-Western bloc or seek to accelerate de-dollarization. However, as a champion of multipolarity, economic sovereignty, and the Global South, India is positioned to overcome existing geopolitical divisions to successfully build a consensus among like-minded BRICS members. Ultimately, its success will require achieving cooperation on core BRICS initiatives related to the building of alternative structures for global economic growth, innovation, sustainability, and governance. --- ### How Congress gave up its power over war and peace **Published:** September 9, 2026 | **Author:** Courtney Rawlings, Alex Jordan | **Section:** QiOSK **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/congress-iran-war/.md In 1973, after it was discovered that the U.S. had secretly bombed Cambodia, Congress took action. In an effort to assert its power over matters of war and peace, Congress pushed through the War Powers Resolution despite then-President Richard Nixon’s veto, and it has been law ever since. Unfortunately, congressional enforcement of the War Powers Resolution has been mixed. In 2026 alone, Congress has put forward some 19 war powers resolutions in an attempt to rein in hostilities in Iran, Venezuela, Cuba, and Lebanon. So far, none of these resolutions has stopped a conflict. Take Iran, for example. There have been eight votes to end the war, seven of which failed. Just one of these passed and only because Sen. Bill Cassidy (R-La.) changed course after losing his primary to a challenger endorsed by President Donald Trump, giving him leeway to vote against the bulk of the Republican Party. Cassidy’s move highlights one of the main problems with the War Powers Resolution: too many of our elected officials cast votes for political gain, not American interests. In case you haven’t noticed, the war with Iran is still going strong. To understand why, we welcomed Tori Bateman to Always at War. She’s the Quincy Institute’s Director of Advocacy and spends her hours talking with constituents and lawmakers, while working to educate members of Congress on the importance of diplomacy and how they can use their power to protect the American people without needless force. As Bateman explains, even when a war powers resolution passes, the president can still veto it, meaning a two-thirds majority in both the House and Senate would be required to override that veto. As you may imagine, this has never happened. So the resolutions keep the wars top of mind on the Hill, but they rarely stop anything on the ground. Still, constituents aren’t powerless. Many of those calls Americans make to voice their concerns aren’t falling on deaf ears. Bateman relays a powerful story of how one member of Congress’s staff became familiar with Section 219 – the U.S.-Israel Defense Technology Cooperation Initiative buried inside this year's NDAA – after more than 50 constituents called the senator’s office about it. The lesson: there’s still hope our members of Congress can begin to reflect the needs and desires of their constituents on matters of war and peace. --- ### Norway's seizure of a Russian vessel is a dangerous escalation **Published:** September 9, 2026 | **Author:** Pavel Devyatkin | **Section:** Europe **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/barentsburg-russian-svalbard-norway/.md Last week, Norwegian authorities seized the Russian ship Professor Molchanov in Svalbard at the request of Ukrainian state energy company Naftogaz. The vessel now sits immobilized in the port of Barentsburg, a settlement of Russian citizens on the Svalbard archipelago, which is part of Norway. The seizure is an attempt by Naftogaz to implement a 2023 ruling from an arbitration court in The Hague, which ordered Russia to pay the company $4.22 billion for assets seized in Crimea. Naftogaz won the right to seize the ship in a 2025 case in a Norwegian court, which recognized the arbitration award as a legal basis for the move. Naftogaz aims to eventually force a sale of the vessel to recover part of its Crimea claim. This isn’t the company’s first move on this front: Finland seized $4.3 million in Russian funds this year and more than $46 million in assets since 2024, and there have been freezes or recognitions in other jurisdictions such as the U.S., UK, and France. The Svalbard seizure, however, is unique; it targets a state-owned vessel in a territory governed by a nearly century-old treaty that grants Russia special rights, making it a legally and diplomatically significant target. Moscow has summoned the Norwegian ambassador, demanded the ship’s immediate release, and called the seizure “piracy” and a “politically motivated violation of international law.” Naftogaz’s chief Serhiy Fedorenko called it “another important step toward restoring justice.” Under international law, state-owned ships used for non-commercial purposes, like transferring researchers, are immune from the jurisdiction of other states. Russia insists the Professor Molchanov is a scientific vessel operated by the Russian Hydrometeorological Service, but Norway alleges otherwise. Days before the seizure, a Norwegian court classified the ship as a commercial enterprise running expedition cruises, giving the go-ahead to enforce the arbitration order. Benedikte Moltumyr Høgberg, professor of law at the University of Oslo, points out a flaw in this process: the decision was made confidentially, without Russia being present to argue its case. Høgberg warns that “the district court’s inadequate handling (and lack of adversarial proceedings) gives Russia more legal ammunition against Norway than Russia has had previously.” The Svalbard Treaty of 1920 adds a layer of complexity. Svalbard is Norwegian sovereign territory, but signatories to the treaty (including Russia) have equal rights to economic activities on the archipelago. Russian state-owned coal company Arktikugol has had a mine in Barentsburg since 1932. By seizing the Professor Molchanov, Norway has effectively cut the only supply line to the settlement and its 300 Russian residents. Moscow argues that the arrest violates Russia’s rights under the 1920 treaty. Oslo has meanwhile promised to assist the stranded crew and passengers. --- ### Trump denials can't hide billions in US weapons sent to Ukraine **Published:** September 9, 2026 | **Author:** Jennifer Kavanagh | **Section:** Europe **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/ukraine-weapons-aid/.md Trying to pin the blame for the depletion of U.S. military stockpiles on something other than the war in Iran, President Donald Trump fell back on a usual scapegoat last week: Ukraine. “The Biden administration gave far more munitions away to Ukraine, at no cost to them whatsoever, than we have used in Iran,” Trump wrote on Truth Social. This is a familiar refrain. Trump loves to remind his audience that because of him, Americans are “not spending on Ukraine anymore” and instead, Europe is footing the bill. In truth, most people in the United States don’t think about Ukraine much these days. But since Trump himself brought it up, it’s worth asking: What exactly is going on with U.S. military support to Ukraine? The answer might surprise you. Despite Trump’s rhetoric, the United States remains deeply embroiled in Ukraine’s ongoing conflict with Russia in ways that create national security risks and run counter to Trump’s own foreign policy goals. It is true that Trump has reduced U.S. support to Ukraine compared to its high mark under his predecessor, Joe Biden. First, his administration has stopped the use of Presidential Drawdown Authority to transfer weapons from U.S. stocks directly to Ukraine. The Biden administration used this mechanism to give Ukraine almost $35 billion in weapons free of charge. Second, the Trump administration has not requested additional funds for the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI), which uses U.S. financing to purchase new weapons for Ukraine. But Trump has not cut off all assistance to Ukraine. Several important channels remain. First, there are about $13 billion in outstanding USAI contracts as of June 2026, down from $20 billion in January 2025. These contracts, signed by Biden and now implemented by Trump, will procure weapons for Ukraine through about 2028. Weapons in the pipeline include longer-lead time systems like NASAMs, Patriot missiles and components (Ukraine is reportedly receiving at 10-20 PAC-3s per month under these contracts), counter-drone systems, artillery rockets, and ammunition. These continuing deliveries are not new awards, but they are still taxpayer-funded military aid to Ukraine that will add up to about $20 billion in aid over the 4 years of Trump’s term. Weapons produced under these contracts come off overburdened U.S. production lines. This has a high opportunity cost given the limits of U.S. defense industrial capacity. Without obligations to Ukraine, industrial resources could shift to different weapons or systems that the United States needs more. If the Trump administration were serious about ending U.S. spending on the Ukraine war, it could still recoup these funds and reallocate the money to support U.S. defense production needs. It has instead allowed the aid to continue. There has also been some new funding approved since Biden left office. Congress included about $800 million of USAI funding in the 2026 and 2027 NDAAs. We can expect more in future bills as well. And the State Department has continued to send military aid of its own. A portion of this aid goes through the Ukraine’s Ministry of Interior, including drones, armored vehicles, guns, grenade launchers, and similar equipment. Since this equipment ends up with Ukraine’s National Guard and border police it is often counted as non-military and intended for things like counterdrug operations, but today these personnel serve as combat units. The State Department has also approved $3 billion of new arms sales to Ukraine in 2025 and 2026 that will be at least partially funded from foreign military financing (FMF), which means U.S. dollars supporting foreign government purchases of U.S. weapons. Some of these funds may come from money allocated but not spent under President Biden, but much of the funding will be new, coming from the State Department’s budget. The bottom line is that U.S. weapons transfers to Ukraine continue under Trump, amounting to, on average, as much at $5 billion per year. But this is no longer the most important, or expensive, type of support that the United States gives to Ukraine. What Ukraine needs much more than weapons, and what the United States continues to provide in increasing amounts, is intelligence, logistics, and operational support. The details of this support are classified, but public reporting offers some insight. For example, the United States gives Ukraine real-time targeting information, including on the movement of Russian troops and the location of key command centers. This information has been important to Ukraine’s mid-range strike campaign on Russian logistics as well as its deep strikes against military and energy targets inside of Russia. In addition, U.S. reconnaissance and surveillance assets in countries on the NATO border (including routine E-3 flights) are integrated with Ukraine’s air defense network, improving the accuracy and speed of Ukraine’s response. Beyond intelligence, the United States also provides logistical and maintenance support, including forward and remote assistance to repair American-made equipment, necessary spare parts to keep older systems running, and training. It also facilitates the expensive transfer of European purchases of U.S. weapons. The cost of the intelligence, logistics, and other operational support the United States provides to Ukraine does not show up anywhere as an itemized bill, even as U.S. assistance increases. But we can use available public information to draw some conclusions about the expenses incurred. The 2024 defense supplemental bill, for instance, allocated about $15 billion to “military training, intelligence sharing, increased presence, and other support activities.” In theory, these funds are intended to cover activities conducted in support of Ukraine that would not occur if the United States remained uninvolved in that conflict. Some portion of this money will go to the salaries of military personnel who would be paid no matter where they work. Since about a third of each military service’s budget is personnel costs, we could estimate the cost of extra activities conducted for Ukraine, excluding baseline manpower, at about $10 billion over the course of a year or so. If Trump has truly expanded intelligence sharing with Ukraine, this price tag may have increased over time. The money included in the bill is likely only a portion of the actual burden the U.S. military and intelligence community have shouldered to support Ukraine’s war. Many intelligence activities, like tasking and analyzing satellite data and collecting signals intelligence, might be covered in classified national security budgets. Starting in 2023, in fact, the classified intelligence budget increased by 10%, a large jump over the 2022 total. The increase was justified by intelligence community leaders as resulting from shifts in the national security landscape, including especially concern about China’s rise and spillover from conflict in Ukraine. Since the total increase in funding was about $10 billion, we can guess that Ukraine-related expenditures might amount to $3-$5 billion per year, or about one-third to one-half of the total increase. All told, then, U.S. taxpayers are still spending roughly $20 billion per year on Ukraine. Today, assistance to Ukraine comes primarily in the form of direct operational support, not weapons. But the shift in type of aid increases the risk of U.S. support to Ukraine to average Americans. First, assisting Ukraine in striking energy targets inside of Russia has a perverse effect on the Trump administration’s efforts to keep gas prices low. As Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent acknowledged, Ukraine’s strikes inside Russia push global oil prices up, imposing higher costs of living on Americans. Second, U.S. intelligence support deepens U.S. involvement in Ukraine’s war, making it an all-but-direct combatant. Russian assistance to Iran, both in terms of weapons and intelligence sharing, is a reaction to the comparable U.S. role in Ukraine, and it leaves U.S. servicemembers in the Middle East and elsewhere less safe. Growing U.S. participation in Ukraine also increases the risk that miscalculation leads to a direct U.S.-Russia confrontation, a nightmarish possibility given the degraded state of U.S. military readiness. Trump promised to end the war in Ukraine in 24 hours. He has instead deepened U.S. entanglement in ways that create real risks and new fiscal costs for the United States. American interests would be best served if the United States were to walk away entirely, but if Trump instead opts for the status quo, he should at least be honest about it. --- ### Hegseth has been a disaster. It's time for Trump to fire him. **Published:** September 8, 2026 | **Author:** Daniel L. Davis | **Section:** Washington Politics **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/trump-hegseth/.md It’s hard to determine who is more under siege today – the mullahs of Iran or the U.S. secretary of defense who is prosecuting the war against them. For months, negative stories about Secretary of War Pete Hegseth have peppered major newspapers. These include everything from his seeming “war on DEI” within the department, to combative engagements with members of Congress, to shade being thrown even by President Donald Trump himself on the lack of success in the (second) Iran War. As the midterms loom, one wonders if the president is ready to pull the plug on Hegseth in an attempt to distance himself from the failure of the Iran war. President Trump should have pulled the plug long ago. On November 12, 2024, I went on NBC News when Hegseth had been announced as Trump’s nominee for secretary of defense and argued that Hegseth might be just what we need, instead of another standard military-industrial-complex "veteran" who never met a war he didn’t like. But I included two key caveats in my support. First, I argued that he had to be different from his predecessors and not just be a yes-man who prosecutes wars even if a sober analysis reveals we could not win them. Second, I warned that if we continued to support other wars and saw our stocks of key weapons systems plummet – especially missiles – he had to tell the president we could not go down that path (as it would put our own national security in unnecessary peril). Hegseth violated both of those warnings. On the first point, when the president said he wanted to launch an air and missile-only war against Iran, the Hegseth should have been the first person to tell the Commander-in-Chief that it doesn’t matter what policies he wants to accomplish, there was no viable air-only military strategy that could bring the Iranian regime to its knees. To try anyway would be to set the country into certain failure. On the second point, to make the attempt would be to drain the stocks of our key offensive and defensive missiles (JASSM Long Range Cruise Missiles, Tomahawk missiles, PAC3 interceptors, and THAAD interceptors) to alarmingly low levels, which would put our global security requirements into danger. Hegseth failed on both of these points, and in doing so, helped set the president up for failure. In fact, Trump himself threw Hegseth under the bus in late March, claiming that far from arguing against the war, Hegseth was its chief cheerleader. “Pete, I think you were the first one to speak up,” Trump said. “And you said, ‘Let’s do it.’” On March 4, just days into the war, Hegseth went to the Pentagon podium and declared, “I stand before you today with one unmistakable message about Operation Epic Fury: America is winning decisively, devastatingly and without mercy.” Any objective assessment showed that we were not, in fact, winning. Now more than six months later, it is painfully clear there is no path to winning this war short of a full-scale ground invasion. The regime change effort has badly depleted our most vital offensive and defensive missile stockpiles. Has the secretary of defense acknowledged this depletion and done something to reverse it? To the contrary, he ignores the problem and pretends it doesn’t exist. Just days ago he said, “We've got no shortage of munitions," adding “our stockpiles of defensive and offensive weapons allow us to sustain this campaign as long as we need to." That’s not even fooling the president; Trump reportedly blasted Hegseth at a Camp David meeting for running low on ammunition. The secretary also is unwilling to acknowledge that the war is having a devastating impact on deployed troops, including those aboard the USS Abraham Lincoln. Like he did when he downplayed the dwindling ammunition stockpiles, Hegseth also accused troops’ and their families of ‘fake news’ and declared that morale aboard the aircraft carrier was good and that the media had “completely misrepresented” conditions. Sailors and their family members disagree. Whether it was failing to advise his boss about the genuine capabilities and limitations of the U.S. Armed Forces, not knowing whether a war was winnable, or failing to provide leadership to the deployed troops, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth is clearly unqualified for the task. President Trump is now deep in a war we cannot win. The last thing he needs is a defense secretary who doesn’t know how to do his job. Whether politically expedient or not, it’s time for Hegseth to go. --- ### Peace in Ukraine remains far off despite Witkoff-Kushner effort **Published:** September 8, 2026 | **Author:** Ian Proud | **Section:** Europe **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/kushner-witkoff-ukraine/.md In a renewed diplomatic drive, Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner travelled to Moscow this weekend to meet Russian President Vladimir Putin. They then traveled to Kyiv for talks with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, who said the pair presented him with some "worthwhile ideas." Yet, as the war drags closer to five full years of fighting, chances of success at the negotiating table appear slim. Don’t hold your breath for an end to the Ukraine war before the midterms in November. More likely, Putin will continue to shift the goalposts until he achieves his core goals: Ukrainian neutrality and the political decapitation of Zelensky. More than a year has passed since President Donald Trump met with Putin in Anchorage. The Trump Administration has been unable to deliver upon the compromises offered at that summit. The most notable proposed compromise was that Russia might agree not to conquer the remaining unoccupied fortress towns in Donetsk but rather enter into an arrangement in which control was shared. Offering this was a significant risk to Putin, who had laid claim to the whole of the Donbas. There has been palpable disappointment on the Russian side that the ‘spirit of Anchorage’ was a mirage. Putin had barely taken off from Alaska when it became clear that Trump lacked the leverage either to get the Europeans or Zelensky on board with the idea of compromise to secure peace. There is scant evidence of any change of mindset in Britain and Europe. Britain’s former head of MI6, John Sawers, recently said that peace talks with Russia appear inconceivable while Putin remains in power. Polish Foreign Minister Radek Sikorski recently argued that there should not be renewed dialogue until Russia’s strategic position was weakened. The ‘Ukraine can win this’ mantra appears a psychosis that has gripped the European elite since the war began. With his image in Europe shredded by America’s ill-considered war against Iran, Trump will therefore not be able to shift European resistance to peace in Ukraine anytime soon. Putin can see this and appears to have refocused Russia’s military effort to the capture of the rest of Donetsk. After very little movement of the frontline during the first half of this year, gradual grinding progress is now being made towards the remaining fortress towns of Kramatorsk and Sloviansk. There are signs that improvements in Russian tank armor technology is starting gradually to blunt the effectiveness of Ukraine’s drone defense. Estimates vary about how long it will take to seize control of Donetsk, from the end of this year through the end of 2027. In the intervening period, Ukraine will suffer a harsh winter in which its electricity and heating infrastructure will be further decimated. Europe will need to figure out how to find the money for a continuation of the proxy war. Many more service personnel and some civilians will die. Meanwhile, Zelensky will come under mounting pressure to step aside amid ongoing corruption scandals and more vocal opposition from key figures inside Ukraine, including his former defense minister, Mykhailo Fedorov. Russia has undoubtedly suffered badly during this war too, not least through the hundreds of thousands of personnel killed or injured. Ukraine’s campaign of deep strikes against oil refineries caused gasoline shortages and shifted the dial downwards on Putin’s popularity at home. Russia can’t fight on forever. Yet Putin appears guided by the sense that Ukraine and its western backers will run out of the political and economic stamina to fight before Russia does. Russia has the manpower, the financial reserves, the energy supply and the industrial base to keep fighting. Ukraine and Europe do not. Putin’s core goal has always been Ukrainian neutrality and, given a history of broken tacit understandings since the collapse of the Soviet Union, it is likely he will want a treaty-based commitment not to expand NATO. He also undoubtedly wants to see the fall of Zelensky. Until, at the very minimum, he achieves both, Putin won’t hurry to commit to peace, whatever exhortations Trump makes. Rather, he will continue to increase the cost of any future peace deal. There is history for this going right back to 2014. Having armed the Donbas separatists in 2014, Putin finally went all-in with direct Russian military involvement to seize the transport hub of Debaltseve in fierce fighting in January 2015. This action leveraged the Europeans to negotiate the Minsk II peace deal. When Putin’s efforts to negotiate new security treaties with the West came to nought in late 2021, he committed to launching a war in Ukraine to force the issue. After Britain and the U.S. scuppered the proposed Istanbul peace deal in April 2022, he committed to the grinding attritional war that we see today. Having indicated that Russia might trade the small pockets of land occupied in Kharkiv and Sumy Oblasts, Putin now appears to have hardened his position; Russia’s military is now making further advances in these areas. Having been open to some form of shared occupation of Donetsk in Alaska, Putin now seems determined to take the lot. That doesn’t mean Putin is unwilling to settle. Speaking about the need for peace at his yearly Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok last week, he emphasized the role other countries, including China, might play. Indian Prime Minister Modi renewed his call for Putin to move from “an endless war to the end to the war” at the recent Shanghai Cooperation Meeting in Bishkek. It was revealed that 51 Indian nationals recruited into the Russian Armed Forces have been killed since fighting began. The White House wants and probably needs to resolve the Ukraine war, particularly with the Iran conflict raging. Peace in Ukraine before the midterms might be a boon for Trump’s flagging popularity. But it’s not going to happen. In Donald Trump’s book The Art of the Deal, he says, “The best thing you can do is deal from strength, and leverage is the biggest strength you can have. Leverage is having something the other guy wants. Or better yet, needs. Or best of all, simply can’t do without.” Right now, and despite the challenges that war has imposed on Russia, Putin probably feels that he holds the bigger lever. If Trump can’t get Ukraine and Europe on side to compromise over peace, then he’ll start to think about how to increase the cost of any deal after Donetsk has been conquered. The salient question is what that cost will be. --- ### Why 9/11 mastermind KSM still awaiting trial after a quarter century **Published:** September 8, 2026 | **Author:** John Ryan | **Section:** Washington Politics **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/9-11-trial-guantanamo-bay/.md This year’s anniversary of the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks should serve as another reminder that the criminal prosecution of the accused plotters remains in limbo. One of the biggest cases in U.S. history, and potentially one of its most consequential, has continued to unfold in something of a vacuum at the U.S. Navy base on Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, against five long-held detainees. Ten additional war-on-terror detainees remain on the base; two of them also have cases in the military commissions, a court system established under President George W. Bush and amended near the start of President Barack Obama’s first term. Quite often, only two reporters are on the base to cover pretrial proceedings in the prosecution of the alleged plot mastermind, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, and four co-defendants. The case either dates to 2008 – when the detainees were first charged by the Bush administration – or 2012, when more than 50 reporters from around the world attended their rearraignment at Guantanamo Bay. That second military commission began after a failed attempt by the Obama administration to move the case to federal court in Manhattan. At some point, journalists and other members of the public wait for a trial. This hasn’t happened. A trial is still not scheduled to begin until at least June 2028, a frustrating reality for family members of the victims, journalists, and other members of the public as the 25th anniversary of the attacks approaches. To be sure, not all of what’s happened in court over the past decade has been riveting. Holding a five-defendant death-penalty trial for the worst-ever attacks on American soil in a sleepy, remote naval base – and in a new and untested court – was bound to create a time-consuming mix of logistical hassles and legal disputes that have little to do with the defendants or their alleged crimes. For many would-be observers and other stakeholders, this mind-numbing legal mess has come to define the case. But a closer look reveals an important legal experiment, one that pits the demands of national security against American principles of due process. Perhaps more than any institution, the Guantanamo court continues to reckon with the Bush administration’s decision to rendition terror suspects, including the eventual 9/11 defendants, to CIA black sites, where they were subjected to intense periods of torture and then held in isolation for three to four years. In the wake of 9/11, the strategic priority was to gather intelligence from the highest-value detainees to prevent future attacks, rather than to prosecute them. Once this process ran its course, the Bush administration transferred the detainees (a total of 14 at the time) in September 2006 from CIA custody to the naval base at Guantanamo Bay. The Senate’s report on the CIA interrogation program stated that the agency maintained “operational control” of the detainees for an unspecified time after their arrival on the base. Nevertheless, the Army commander of the detention camp told the detainees that they were in military custody and entitled to the protections of the Geneva Conventions. Then the priorities changed. About four months after the transfer, the FBI arrived and reinterrogated the five 9/11 suspects (and other detainees) to elicit ostensibly “clean” confessions that could be introduced as evidence at trial in the new court system. Four administrations later, the case has remained mostly trapped in a perpetual debate over whether these confessions are valid or inadmissible due to the brutality that preceded them at the CIA’s black sites. (One of the five defendants has been severed from the case over a finding of mental incompetency – which his lawyers blame on his CIA torture – though the government still hopes to prosecute him.) The United States lost credibility around the world both with the creation of the detention facility on Guantanamo Bay – and its unsuccessful attempts to completely block detainees there from access to U.S. civilian courts – and with the many revelations of abuses from the CIA interrogation program. As witnesses in the 9/11 cases have testified, it’s difficult to reestablish the context of the immediate post-attack panic in the U.S. – the fear of an even worse attack and the imperative to stop it. Still, democracies should be judged on their commitment to the rule of law in times of conflict, when the temptation to skirt international conventions is strongest. The U.S. could have chosen a different path to better balance the demands of intelligence gathering with the need to pursue criminal accountability on behalf of the victims. Instead, the government chose a linear sequence – to first operate outside the law, then to return to the law when doing so suited its shifting priorities. These decisions have faced significant criticism for apparent hypocrisy. In court, the result has been one of incoherence: The initial steps the U.S. took to capture, torture, and disappear the alleged perpetrators have proved irreconcilable with later efforts to prosecute, convict, and execute. The attempts to make it work, over so many years, have been both fascinating and maddening as the national security state has hovered over the proceedings. Fights over certain tranches of witnesses and evidence consumed the cases, with the parties engaged in an endless struggle over what can transpire in open court or in classified sessions that are closed to both the public and the defendants. The CIA program, the FBI’s role in that program, the operations of the Guantanamo detention facility – these and other topics contain information the government wants to keep secret. In 2024, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin overruled plea agreements that prosecutors had reached after lengthy negotiations with Mohammed and two co-defendants. The deals would have removed the death penalty as a possible sentence in exchange for full confessions and their participation in a sentencing trial expected to last three months. The defense teams have asked the U.S. Supreme Court to review a decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit upholding the legality of Austin’s move. If that fails, Austin’s decision may prove to be a lost opportunity at finality for an otherwise unresolvable conflict between the desire for criminal accountability and past national security policies that put that desire on hold. However the proceedings move forward now, any fair assessment – even the criticisms – should recognize the case’s evolving relationship to America’s credibility and commitment to democratic norms. In one part of the Caribbean, the government has been summarily executing suspected drug traffickers without due process; in another, it continues to provide the accused 9/11 conspirators with stables of military and civilian legal professionals led by experienced capital defense lawyers nearly two decades after they were charged. So far, three military trial judges – the current judge and his immediate predecessor in the 9/11 case, the other in a separate commission against the accused plotter of the USS Cole bombing – have sided with defense claims that the CIA's past abuse should render subsequent confessions obtained by the FBI inadmissible. It would be a greater risk to America’s credibility to simply terminate these proceedings out of frustration – and to recategorize the 9/11 defendants as detainees who will neither be released or face trial – than to let the experiment play out. The passage of time cuts both ways. By almost any viewpoint – prosecution, defense, victim family member, taxpayer – the court system has failed for the purpose it was created. But there has been no rush to judgement in court. The American adversarial system has proven resilient in the most unlikely of places. --- ### Somali piracy was under control. Then came the Iran war. **Published:** September 8, 2026 | **Author:** Khaled Mahmoud | **Section:** Africa **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/iran-war-piracy/.md From the start, the U.S.-Israeli war on Iran has been a story of unintended consequences. Contrary to President Donald Trump’s hopes for a quick victory, the conflict has morphed into a sustained crisis, one that has driven up oil prices, driven down tourism in the Middle East, and reshaped the region’s geopolitical map. Now, a new unintended consequence has emerged: the return of piracy to Somalia’s coasts. This shift, which comes after a decade of quiet, threatens some of the world’s most important shipping lanes and the interests of the United States and its allies. Pirates have attacked at least 15 vessels in the region this year, a sharp uptick from the five attacks that occurred last year, according to data from the International Maritime Organization. The renewed criminal activity has led to extended hostage situations, including one ongoing seizure of an oil tanker and its crew. A controversial operation to free the MV LATUF, carried out by Somali forces and the Turkish navy late last month, raised questions about whether a ransom was paid. The government of Puntland, a semi-autonomous region of Somalia, says it has evidence of phone contacts between Somali government officials and the pirates, which undermines the official story from both Ankara and Mogadishu. The vessel was carrying Turkish weapons and satellite and communication equipment bound for a Turkish training facility in Mogadishu. Global piracy dropped in the first half of 2026 to its lowest level since 1992 — only 38 incidents, compared to 90 in the same period of 2025 and 60 in 2024. But data from the International Chamber of Commerce shows that, by the end of last month, six commercial ships were still being held, with more than 90 seafarers on board. --- ### 25 years after 9/11, the US still doesn't know 'why they hate us' **Published:** September 8, 2026 | **Author:** Scott Hibbard | **Section:** Washington Politics **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/911-25th-anniversary/.md Twenty-five years ago, 19 hijackers took control of four American airliners and crashed them into symbols of American power, killing upwards of 3000 people. The American population watched the events unfold in real time. It was an emotionally jarring event that changed the country. In some respects, the events of 9/11 needed no explanation. The destruction of the World Trade Center buildings and the massive, and random, loss of life were horrifying to all. The meaning of the attacks, however – and the motivations of the hijackers – were less clear. The effort to explain the motives behind the attack, and to understand “why they hate us,” brought a pre-existing debate over Islamist militancy to the center of American public life. In the decade leading up to 9/11, the Washington policy community had been divided over how to deal with the Islamist movement and particularly those extremists who sought to use violence to impose a narrow vision of religious orthodoxy upon reluctant societies. At the heart of the 1990s policy debate was a dispute over causation: are religion and ideology the sources of violent extremism, or are poverty, marginalization and authoritarian misrule to blame? Commentators and politicians on the political right viewed the issue in terms reminiscent of the Cold War. The conflict with Islamism (or “Islamic fundamentalism”) was ideological in nature and, like international communism, had to be confronted with force. Hence, American foreign policy should prioritize security and support our regional allies in their efforts to eradicate both the Islamist opposition and violent extremists. Those on the other side of the debate rejected this vision of a new “green peril” and saw the underlying claims as inaccurate and misleading. To operate from such flawed assumptions, it was argued, would result in a foreign policy that served neither American interests nor those of the Arab (and Muslim) populations most directly affected. The best strategy for dealing with both militant violence and the non-violent opposition was economic development and political reform. Both the George H.W. Bush and Clinton administrations sought to find a common ground between these two perspectives, one that addressed both security concerns and the need for reform. The terrorist attacks of 9/11, however, upended this balance. The shock and horror of that day provided the George W. Bush administration a free hand to reshape American foreign policy. In doing so, the second Bush administration embraced the security side of the argument and the corresponding policy prescriptions. What motivated the administration was a view that this new war on terror was – like WWII and the Cold War – an existential “conflict between freedom and tyranny.” In the face of such a dire threat, the “gloves come off.” Many experts now recognize that the militarized response to 9/11 was counter-productive. In the two decades that followed, the number of groups and fighters that claimed allegiance to the jihadist cause increased, as did their geographic areas of operation. Even as U.S. forces made gains against al-Qaida, new groups such as the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) emerged that were even more extreme and violent. The precipitous demise of the Afghan government in August 2021 – and the return of the Taliban to power – further illustrated the limits of American military power. All of this occurred despite the concerted effort by the U.S. government and others to rein in Islamist militancy and counter the ideology of violent extremism. The problem, in short, got worse, not better. --- ### A test of nationalist right, German AfD victory echoes across Europe **Published:** September 7, 2026 | **Author:** Molly O'Neal | **Section:** Europe **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/afd-elections-victory/.md Legislative elections in the eastern German state of Saxony-Anhalt have ended with a huge victory for the nationalist-populist Alternative for Germany (AfD). The final results have AfD with just under 44% percent of the vote and the incumbent Christian Democrats (CDU) at just over 17%, followed by the Social Democrats (SPD), Greens and the Left (Linke) at about 9% each. The left-populist Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW) received 5.3% and won five seats. The turnout was above 75%. Although the population of Saxony-Anhalt is just over two million, this election has been closely watched across Europe, since Germany’s mainstream parties have agreed not to allow right populists ever to have a role in governing at the national or state level. It may be difficult to impose a governing coalition that excludes the AfD after this decisive popular victory. The AfD will have 39 seats, three seats short of a majority in the 83-seat body, putting the so-called firewall stopping a AfD control under acute pressure. The BSW has offered to cooperate with AfD in Saxony Anhalt, but the terms of any such arrangement would be the subject of negotiation. In the former East Germany (GDR), the AfD polls strongly, as does the Linke party, which was formed in part from the ruling communist party after Germany’s reunification. Both parties respond to popular grievances in the East about how the region lags behind western Germany on social and economic indicators. There is also a lingering sense of being considered inferior or “other” by western compatriots. Instead of angry grievance, the AfD leader in Saxony Anhalt, the 35-year-old Ulrich Siegmund, led a campaign with the slogan “Everything in Possible,” projecting a friendly and non-threatening image. In mid-August, the cover of Der Spiegel magazine featured his photo with the caption “Germany’s most dangerous man.” Siegmund cheerfully signed copies of the magazine in good-natured and festive campaign appearances. Under Germany’s federal system, states have authority over education, cultural matters, and some aspects of economic management and law enforcement. They have virtually no authority in foreign and security policy. Siegmund has stated that schools will follow a more traditional curriculum and will display the national tricolor rather than the rainbow flag. He said the Russian language should be offered in schools and educational exchanges with Russia should be relaunched. Unsuccessful asylum seekers would be detained pending deportation, and his administration would consider limiting the reach of national public broadcasting in the state. --- ### On this Labor Day, Trump offers no sympathy to working Americans **Published:** September 7, 2026 | **Author:** Harrison Berger | **Section:** Washington Politics **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/labor-day-trump-war/.md A Truth Social post in which President Donald Trump declared that there are "too many non-working holidays in America” and demanded that “it must change,” went viral on X this week, with analysts — incorrectly — labeling the post Trump’s 2026 “Labor Day message” to Americans. The post was actually written on June 19, 2025, more than a year earlier, yet its content and the economic conditions it describes have changed little enough in the interim that the mis-dating is almost irrelevant. As the War against Iran (or as JD Vance and the White House insist we refer to it: the “operation” in Iran) has entered its sixth month with no end in sight, and as American families continue to bear the costs of the conflict both directly through their tax dollars and indirectly through inflation, the Trump administration has settled on a midterm message that is essentially: everything is fine, and in fact, it could be worse, so stop complaining. This was the spirit of JD Vance’s White House press conference on Thursday, where the Hillbilly Elegy author told Americans who are now paying a national average of $4.15 per gallon of regular gas that fuel prices “frankly, could have been much, much higher were it not for our efforts,” attributing the problem to Iran being “really, really crazy,” and suggesting that Americans should be grateful for the current prices. This is recognizably propaganda, of the weakest variety. On February 27, one day before the war began, AAA reported the national average price of regular gas was $2.98 per gallon. But after the U.S. and Israel launched the war by bombing a girls’ school and murdering the spiritual leader of Shia Islam, Iran did what analysts had long predicted it would in that situation and asserted control over the Strait of Hormuz, through which about a fifth of the world’s seaborne oil normally passes. Iran has said that in order to re-open that crucial waterway, the U.S. must lift its naval blockade, end its sanctions regime, release frozen Iranian assets, pay compensation for war damage, and end “war and aggression against Iran and its allies in Lebanon, Palestine, Yemen, and Iraq,” conditions that are hardly unexpected and perhaps unrealistic, but would be a straightforward starting point for negotiations for most governments, except apparently our own. It is the U.S. bombing civilians and serving Israeli interests — rather than the supposedly crazy behavior of Iran’s leaders — that explain why six months later, American households have absorbed roughly $640 in additional fuel costs, as calculated by the Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy. The chief economist at Moody’s Analytics recently told NBC News that the Iran War has cost the average American household at least $1,200 more than they would have paid if it had never started. This does not include the costs of sustaining military operations, which are also siphoned away from American families through their taxes, with internal Pentagon estimates of that cost reaching up to $100 billion. The tens and perhaps hundreds of billions of dollars foisted upon Americans comes as the nation suffers through a grueling affordability crisis, which has only been exacerbated by the record rise in diesel prices — the fuel necessary to transport and produce goods caused by Iran War disruptions to global transit. A May story from local Louisiana news channel KTAL reported that “meals that once cost under $10 are now pushing closer to $15 or $20” at fast food restaurants across the country and attributed the problem to “food prices, transportation expenses, and supply chain pressures,” each of which has risen significantly due to the Iran War. The response from MAGA influencers like Marc Thiessen and Ben Shapiro, whose leader ascended to power on a promise to lower prices, has been to shame Americans and tell them it’s their own fault. This is exactly what Rep. Dan Crenshaw did when he posted that ungrateful Americans should “stop whining, get a job, eat Ramen.” The demands for Americans to treat fast food slop as a luxury item comes as the total U.S. household debt reached a record $18.6 trillion in the first quarter of the year, according to the New York Federal Reserve, and buy-now-pay-later borrowing — largely invisible to the credit files regulators and lenders monitor — adds to that number. A Lending Tree poll cited by CBS News in early September shows that nearly 30% of BNPL customers use the financial services to pay for groceries, 23% of respondents use BNPL to pay for medical, dental or veterinary expenses, or rent, while “more than half of those borrowers — 54 percent — say they wouldn’t be able to make ends meet without the loans.” The dire straits of Americans — and the refusal of the U.S. federal government to intervene to resolve the national interest of mitigating debt peonage— have been identified by Israelis as ripe for exploitation, with a viral Jerusalem Post op-ed this week suggesting that the U.S. government should use the record indebtedness of today’s youth as leverage to compel them to join the U.S. military. The op-ed argued that this would be necessary for achieving the Israeli goal of “a ground invasion of Iran,” that would certainly kill hundreds if not thousands of young Americans. Absurd as it is, the proposal seems more realistic than expecting the federal government to intervene on behalf of a national interest it has already abandoned. Because on a holiday meant to honor American workers, the administration’s response to mass discontent around surging debt and affordability has been to demand they pay even more for a war they didn’t choose, and to stop complaining about it. --- ### Massie, Kent join ex-officials lighting up Ron Paul ‘revolution’ **Published:** September 7, 2026 | **Author:** Hekmat Aboukhater | **Section:** QiOSK **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/massie-speech-iran-war/.md In his first non-Congressional public speech since his Republican primary loss to Ed Gallrhein, Thomas Massie brought some of the loudest energy to the Ron Paul Institute’s Washington conference on Saturday. He was full of jokes and promise for the future. Massie said he was not interested in mourning the defeat and declared that he was, in a way, happy he had lost. When addressing what he planned to do next, he joked that “you could scan my head” for an answer and still come up empty because he had not yet decided himself. One possibility, however, was firmly off the table: another run for Congress. Massie said he once held out hope that Congress could fix itself. His years inside the institution had convinced him otherwise. The energy with which he was received was indicative of his standing at the conference and within the broader antiwar movement. His name was invoked repeatedly throughout the day. His May 19 defeat followed more than $32 million in campaign spending, making it the most expensive House primary in American history. Pro-Israel groups spent more than $15 million to oust the representative after years of clashes over his foreign aid and U.S. policy stances on Israel. Beyond Massie’s dissent in Congress, former National Counterterrorism Center director Joe Kent and former State Department official Josh Paul offered the conference two examples of dissent from inside the Executive Branch. Paul resigned as director of congressional and public affairs from Biden’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs in October 2023, saying he could no longer participate in the expedited transfer of American weapons to Israel without consideration of civilian harm. Kent made a similar break with the current admin this March. He resigned as President Trump’s counterterrorism chief, declaring that Iran posed no imminent threat to the United States and accused Israel and its American supporters of pushing Washington into this latest war. Together, the two offered the conference’s clearest illustration of the remarkable coalition taking shape around opposition to US Middle East policy. One resigned from a Democratic administration over Gaza and the other from a Republican administration over Iran. Israel, unsurprisingly, was one of the dominant subjects of the day, with speaker after speaker challenging one aspect of Washington’s relationship with the country or another. Former Ohio representative Dennis Kucinich accused “traitors” in Washington of having surrendered American sovereignty, proclaiming: “We cannot reclaim our nation unless we first reclaim our sovereignty.” He added a sober warning about the threat of blowback borne out of our nation’s actions in the Middle East: “We will pay for the violence we are abetting in the future.” The day before, during the scholar’s seminar, journalist Brian McGlinchey voiced a similar warning reminding the scholars of how Israel’s operation Grapes of Wrath motivated the fanaticism of 9/11 hijacker Mohammad Atta. Josh Paul offered a more optimistic note regarding AIPAC. He declared that the influential pro-Israel lobbying organization was once a name that could make “knees in Washington shake.” Today, that name is increasingly becoming politically toxic. Institute for Peace and Diplomacy scholar Michael Vlahos placed these developments inside a much broader diagnosis of American decline. Drawing connections with the Western Roman Empire’s fall, Vlahos linked permanent war abroad with institutional decay, elite enrichment, and the concentration of power at home. The analogy outlined another theme that surfaced repeatedly throughout the conference: foreign policy failure, in Iran and elsewhere, is inseparable from the domestic dysfunction many Americans feel in their homes and communities. Speakers pointed to the $40 trillion federal debt, inflation, military overstretch and executive overreach as consequences of a political system increasingly unable to impose limits on itself. Massie was especially blunt about a Congress that allowed the executive branch to dominate decisions over war and peace. He argued that lawmakers had effectively allowed two branches of government to collapse into one, making Congress a "vestigial order.” That diagnosis creates a harder question for the movement represented in the room: Where do we go from here? Opposition to intervention may be finding new constituencies and prominent figures from both Republican and Democratic administrations have broken with their parties over war. But there remains little agreement about what political vehicle can translate that dissent into power and a viable path forward. Ron Paul, now decades removed from the presidential campaigns that first brought many in the room into antiwar politics, ended the conference by sharing some wisdom in his characteristic happy warrior fashion. He discouraged hopes for a third-party effort, arguing that authoritarian institutional barriers made such a path exceedingly impossible. His broader message was more cheerful: keep fighting, but remember to have fun doing so. --- ### No war? 377 US forces injured since July, 36 in last 2 weeks **Published:** September 5, 2026 | **Author:** Kelley Beaucar Vlahos | **Section:** QiOSK **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/updated-us-casualties-iran/.md According to new data quietly added to the Pentagon's casualty base, there were 36 new injuries in the last two weeks, mostly Army, as fighting renewed between the United States and Iran in the Persian Gulf. This brings the total wounded count to 794 and 18 killed since the war began on Feb. 28. The White House, including Vice President JD Vance just this week, likes to say this isn't "a war" but an "operation" but for the soldiers, sailors, and airmen who have been killed and injured, these semantics are meaningless. Just like the Pentagon's insistence that casualties that occurred before the July "ceasefire" must be classified under "Operation Epic Fury" and those after under "Overseas Operations." This is distinction without a difference. Turns out the number of servicemen hurt in the latter — 377, with four dead — is almost as much as the former. In the pre-July period, there were 417 men and women injured and seven killed. It is a grave insult to those who serve, and to the American people who support them, for politicians to downplay what is clearly a war in order to try and avoid the political cost and implications. Iran had been targeting U.S. facilities in Bahrain, Jordan, Iraq, and Kuwait in retaliatory strikes over the last week. The fact the Pentagon is not saying where, when, or how these men and women were wounded is a pathetic attempt to deter reality and ultimately it will backfire. --- ### Why 'D-Day' was destined to be a dud **Published:** September 5, 2026 | **Author:** Daniel Brumberg | **Section:** Middle East **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/d-day-impact-iran/.md On August 19, 2026, President Donald Trump announced that “ANY country that allows its financial institutions, businesses, airports, or government entities to provide any type of lifeline to Iran will itself face TREMENDOUS Economic Consequences . . . It all needs to stop NOW. . . This will be an ECONOMIC D-DAY.” Far from crippling Iran’s “ability to project terror worldwide,” or ensuring that “Iran will never have a nuclear weapon,” the White House’s new measures will not force Iran’s capitulation. Instead, they will reinforce the resolve of the hardline security officials to entrench their power. But this process of regime securitization is hardly complete. Indeed, it is unfolding even as Iran’s generals allow President Masoud Pezeshkian and his allies in the beleaguered reformist camp some space to pursue diplomacy. Hardliners and their rivals keep their options open. Their tense partnership is sustained by the absence of Iran’s new Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei. D-Day will not change these calculations, nor the complex domestic political dance between factions that has long animated Iran’s politics. US pressure will help to sustain the one goal that all Iranian leaders share: regime survival. --- ### Witkoff & Kushner to spend Labor Day weekend in Russia, Ukraine **Published:** September 4, 2026 | **Author:** Blaise Malley | **Section:** QiOSK **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/witkoff-kushner-russia-ukraine/.md U.S. envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner will reportedly travel to Moscow and Kyiv this weekend in an effort to revive negotiations to end the war in Ukraine. It will mark the diplomatic duo’s first trip to Kyiv since President Donald Trump’s return to office, and follows CIA director John Ratcliffe’s visit to Moscow last week. “It is unclear whether the Americans are bringing new proposals to the two presidents, or are pushing them to close the gap on the remaining issues, which include who will ultimately control the Donbas, Ukrainian territory that is partly occupied by Russia,” according to a New York Times report. George Beebe, director of grand strategy at the Quincy Institute, called the development “most welcome” and said all parties had strong reasons to find a way to end the fighting. He cautioned, however, that “seizing this propitious moment will require overcoming deep mistrust between the two countries” and addressing doubt that the “Trump administration has the political clout and persistence to overcome opposition in Europe and inside the Washington establishment.” Diplomatic efforts have been on hold since the start of the U.S. war in Iran at the end of February. News of the trip was initially reported by Russian state media outlet TASS and Axios. Reuters later reported that it was not yet finalized due to security concerns from the American side. The attempt to resume diplomacy comes at a time of escalating violence on both sides. Just on Friday, a drone of unknown origin reportedly targeted the headquarters of the Ukrainian Security Service in the capital. Kyiv’s mayor said nine were injured in the attack. In July, civilian deaths in Ukraine hit their highest levels since the first year of the war. Ukraine has also ramped up its own deep strikes inside Russian territory. However, while Russian forces have moved closer to Ukraine’s two remaining “fortress cities” in Donetsk, their advance has been slow. In confirming the news of Witkoff and Kushner’s visit on X, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy pledged that there “will be no air strikes from our side, and Russia must do the same, ensuring there are no air strikes from its side for the time needed to hold these talks and handle the logistical matters related to this American visit.” Beebe says that both Kyiv and Moscow will seek certain assurances during negotiations. Ukraine will want to ensure that it will not be left without support in case of future Russian invasion, while Moscow will seek understandings about broader European security matters and will seek normalized diplomatic and economic relations with Washington. Accomplishing these goals, and others, will not be possible without American involvement. “Neither Russia nor Ukraine can get the assurances they each need to end the fighting without the United States’ playing a central role in negotiations,” Beebe said. --- ### This Trump-approved trade deal is no tariff, in fact, it's duty free **Published:** September 4, 2026 | **Author:** Dan M. Ford | **Section:** Africa **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/agoa-trade-agreement/.md Tucked away in the funding package passed by Congress this week is a provision that extends the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) through the end of 2028. The two-year extension of AGOA — a preferential trade deal that offers eligible sub-Saharan countries duty-free access to the U.S. market for thousands of goods — answers the White House’s request that the agreement be extended on a short-term basis while negotiations take place over its long-term future. Originally signed into law by President Bill Clinton in 2000 to improve U.S. trade relations with sub-Saharan Africa, AGOA has had a topsy-turvy past year. Trump’s strong disapproval of preferential trade agreements led many Africa watchers to assume that AGOA was going to lapse without any effort by the administration to extend it past its September 2025 expiration. But just a day before the agreement expired, Trump came out in support of a short-term extension and expressed a desire to begin negotiations over what a long-term AGOA should look like. Competing bills were presented in Congress late last year for AGOA’s extension, including one sponsored by Sen. John Kennedy (R-La.) which included a provision that would have called for the review of the bilateral U.S.-South Africa relationship. This came in the wake of Trump’s spat with South African President Cyril Ramaphosa over the country’s handling of what the American president called, without providing proof, a “genocide” against the country’s white population. In the end, an AGOA extension (which did not include a bilateral review for South Africa) was signed into law in February, keeping the act in force until the end of this year and providing retroactive AGOA benefits to goods that had been sold during the months between its expiration and renewal. Now, with this new two-year extension, negotiations over the act’s long-term future can finally take place. Trump’s support for a long-term AGOA stands in contrast to his general opposition to preferential trade deals, which he has criticized for their tendency to remove tariffs on foreign companies exporting to the United States without providing the same level of benefit to American exporters. This, Trump has complained, worsens the U.S. trade balance (by increasing imports without increasing exports), consequently making American companies less competitive with foreign sellers that can produce goods more cheaply and thus undercut the prices of American-produced goods. (Of course, lost in the hoopla over the trade balance is that these cheaper imports — and the wider range of options in a competitive market — benefit American consumers.) Trump’s team has been outspoken in its pursuit of a long-term AGOA that provides more reciprocal benefits to the United States. In practice, this most likely means that the administration will push for a long-term agreement where African countries reduce or eliminate tariffs facing U.S. exporters in a similar vein to the benefits offered by the United States to sub-Saharan exporters. But these negotiations require nuance and complexity. American demands for greater trade reciprocity need to take into consideration how AGOA actually benefits its African partners, or else African exporters will turn elsewhere. Although AGOA has quite noticeably benefited certain African sectors — such as textiles and apparel — its benefits aren’t substantial enough to offset the cost that African countries would incur if they were to remove tariffs on thousands of goods at the request of the Trump administration. The widespread removal of tariffs would decrease revenue for African governments struggling to repay high levels of sovereign debt and hurt local companies that can’t achieve economies of scale to the same extent that larger American companies can. Such a move would render many African companies unable to compete with a new slate of American exporters entering their countries duty-free. And although accessing the huge American market remains a major goal of African sellers, the truth is that they now have a much wider international consumer base than in years past, which decreases American leverage. The Chinese government has given all African countries, except Eswatini (which recognizes Taiwan as an independent country), duty-free access for all exports to China. Unlike the U.S. trade deal, these agreements apply to all exported goods without requiring African partners to meet governance and human rights standards, nor forcing them to remove tariffs facing Chinese exporters. And African countries are also beginning to trade with each other at a much higher clip, especially now that the African Continental Free Trade Area, which aims to create an Africa-wide customs union, is beginning to take shape. The schizophrenic nature of AGOA’s stop-start renewals over the past year has already hindered U.S.-Africa trade relations, with African exports to the U.S. dropping sharply during the months AGOA had lapsed. Talks about reciprocity alongside Trump’s heavy tariffs have increased pessimism among experts about what benefits a long-term agreement might actually provide Africans. Continuing to push heavy demands on sub-Saharan countries for reciprocity could backfire, as many would-be African partners might increasingly turn to China and alternative markets, where they can reach a wide base of consumers without being forced to jump through hoops put in place by Washington. --- ### After SDF dissolution, how will al-Sharaa treat Syria's Kurds? **Published:** September 4, 2026 | **Author:** Sirwan Kajjo | **Section:** Middle East **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/syria-kurds/.md This article, which originally appeared in Arab Digest, is republished with permission. Last week, Syria’s Kurds entered a new stage in their struggle for political recognition. The Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) formally announced their dissolution as part of a complicated process of integration into the Syrian state. Shortly after the announcement, interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa appointed SDF commander Mazlum Abdi as a presidential adviser. After more than a decade as a major military actor in the Syrian conflict, particularly in the fight against the Islamic State, the SDF’s dissolution marks a dramatic transition for Syria’s Kurds, shifting their struggle from the military arena to the political sphere. But in Syria’s complex and fragile post-conflict transition, the reality is not as simple as it may appear from Damascus. The integration process, which began in January 2026, has been marked by distrust, tensions and occasional violence. If anything, this suggests that the next stage will likely bring its own set of challenges. Integrating the SDF and granting its leaders a degree of political power, at least at the local level, will not therefore, by itself, resolve the Kurdish question. Measures taken by the Syrian government such as recognising Kurdish as a national language, though not an official one, and granting citizenship to those who were stripped of it in 1962 are commendable steps, but they are certainly not enough to make Syria’s Kurds feel that they have a meaningful stake in the country’s national politics. The deeper problem is that, despite Syria’s status as a transitional country, there is little evidence of a genuine political transition taking place. The developments surrounding the SDF should therefore not be viewed as part of a broader, inclusive political process. Rather, they are the product of several converging pressures: Damascus’ desire to recentralise power, Ankara’s insistence on the dissolution of the SDF and, most importantly, Washington’s preference to move away from its partnership with the SDF and redirect its support from northeastern Syria toward Damascus. For Syria’s Kurds, their demands can broadly be divided into two categories. The first concerns their longstanding struggle for basic ethnic, cultural rights, and political representation. Historically, successive governments in Damascus deprived Syrian Kurds of fundamental rights, including by restricting their language, confiscating their lands and suppressing their cultural expression. The second category emerged during the Syrian war, when the Kurds established de facto self-rule across nearly one-third of Syria’s territory. This period allowed them to exercise governance for more than a decade with little to no effective authority from Damascus. Before the Syrian conflict, Kurdish demands were largely centred on the first category. The experience of self-rule, however, has expanded those demands to include greater autonomy, self-government, and decentralisation. The SDF’s dissolution, and the resulting abandonment of its pursuit of a decentralised system, should therefore not be mistaken for an indication that Syrian Kurds no longer want these forms of governance. Nor should the SDF and its political affiliates be assumed to represent all segments of Kurdish society in Syria, estimated at roughly three million people. Part of the Kurdish call for decentralisation in Syria is aimed at guaranteeing a meaningful degree of self-governance in Kurdish-majority areas. But decentralisation is not solely about securing special arrangements for the Kurds. It is also about ensuring that Syria as a whole does not return to the heavily centralised system that allowed successive governments in Damascus to suppress political freedoms, marginalise minorities, and concentrate power in the hands of the central government. For Syrian Kurds, therefore, decentralisation is both a means of protecting their own political gains and a broader safeguard against the return of authoritarian centralism. This distinction is particularly important as Syria enters a new phase with the Kurds. Even if Damascus were to agree to address the Kurds’ domestic demands, including language rights, political representation, and cultural recognition, those gains would remain vulnerable if the broader political system continued to concentrate power in Damascus. Without meaningful political participation, institutional checks on executive power, and some form of decentralised governance, Kurdish rights could ultimately depend on the goodwill of the central government rather than being protected by durable political institutions. The situation of other communities in Syria reinforces this concern. Damascus is not remotely close to resolving the case of the Druze in the south, where tensions between the central government and local actors remain unresolved. The Druze-majority of Swaida is effectively under siege. The situation among the Alawites in the coastal region remains tense following the violence in March 2025. Meanwhile, Christians across the country continue to face occasional harassment and intimidation by armed groups affiliated with the government. The challenges facing other minorities demonstrate that the question of political inclusion and power-sharing extends well beyond the Kurdish issue. Syria’s transition will ultimately have to address how different communities can exercise meaningful political agency while remaining part of a unified state. In short, long-term security for the Kurds cannot be guaranteed solely through an agreement between Damascus and the SDF. Their gains will be sustainable only if Syria develops a political system in which power is dispersed, local communities have a meaningful voice in governance, and political rights are protected through a modern constitution, regardless of who controls the central government. --- ### House to universities: Don't you dare boycott Israel **Published:** September 3, 2026 | **Author:** Blaise Malley | **Section:** Washington Politics **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/house-passes-bill-israel-boycott/.md The House passed legislation Thursday that would put federal funding at risk for universities that participate in certain boycotts of Israel, despite warnings from critics that the measure could chill political expression and effectively extend anti-boycott protections to Israeli settlements in occupied territories. The Protect Economic and Academic Freedom Act, introduced by Reps. Virginia Foxx (R-N.C.) and Josh Gottheimer (D-N.J.), would bar colleges that receive federal funds from engaging in what it defines as a “nonexpressive commercial boycott” of Israel, including “refusals to deal” or terminating business relationships in order to limit commercial ties without a “valid business reason.” The law would require these institutions to submit annual certification that they were giving students and faculty access to academic programs in Israel on the same terms as programs in other countries. The legislation, which passed in a 237-169 vote, could put universities in a precarious position. “The goal here is to basically say every university not only cannot refuse cooperation with Israel but must actively seek every opportunity to cooperate with Israel,” Lara Friedman, the President of the Foundation for Middle East Peace, told RS ahead of the vote. “And if they're not doing that, they're pro-BDS and anti-Israel.” In an earlier analysis of the bill, Friedman noted that the bill could open the door for legal action against a school, because politically minded individuals or groups could “search for and point to the absence of some relations with Israel to allege that a university lied in that certification.” House Education and Workforce Committee Democrats urged members to vote against the measure late Wednesday evening, arguing that it threatens constitutionally protected speech and targets conduct that no American university has actually undertaken. Thirty-three Democrats voted against the party line, while Reps. Thomas Massie (R-Ky.) and Warren Davidson (R-Ohio) were the only two Republicans to oppose the measure. Among the Democratic “yea” votes was Rep. Jared Moskowitz of Florida, who was recently named ranking member of the subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa — a move that angered progressives who see him as too pro-Israel. “There is overwhelming Democratic opposition to undermining American rights and institutions to shield Israel from accountability,” Dylan Williams, VP of Government Affairs at Center for International Policy, told RS in an email. “A lawmaker put in a position of trust by the caucus on these issues can’t just ignore that without consequences.” The legislation does not explicitly mention the Boycott, Divest, and Sanction (BDS) movement, an international grassroots effort to isolate Israel that draws inspiration from the global initiative to boycott South Africa’s Apartheid government. But statements from sponsors of the law and the committee debate make clear that BDS is the target. The legislation appears modeled, in part, after state-level anti-BDS laws that restrict government contracting or investment involving entities that boycott Israel; such laws have passed in 38 states since 2015. Supporters of the bill in Congress frame the measure as a preventative response to the growth of the BDS movement on college campuses, which they say has contributed to rising antisemitism in American universities. “A significant amount of unrest on campuses has resulted from efforts by anti-Israel radicals to coerce institutions into divesting from and boycotting Israel,” Rep. Joe Wilson (R-S.C.) argued during the bill’s mark-up in front of the Rules Committee. Boycotts of Israel, he claimed, are “anti-Semitic in design and discriminatory in their effect,” and are used “to isolate Jewish students” and “silence Jewish faculty.” Democrats on the rules panel focused much of their opposition on the more basic objection that the legislation is aimed at conduct no American university has actually undertaken. “There has not been a single case of an American college or university administration adopting the BDS movement policies that are described in the bill. Not one,” Rep. Bobby Scott (D-Va.) said during the mark-up. The minority party’s committee report similarly concluded that the bill was a “solution in search of a problem” and lamented that ensuring students are able to engage with their Israeli counterparts could have been a “building block for a bipartisan unanimous bill, but the Majority decided to include in the bill a section on the BDS movement.” The committee report also raises First Amendment concerts over conditioning federal student-aid eligibility on universities’ boycott policies, saying that Congress cannot avoid the constitutional issue by labeling the conduct “nonexpressive” because the BDS movement is “clear and open about the ideas it hopes to express.” The wording of “nonexpressive boycotts” in the bill stems from a 2022 Eighth Circuit ruling upholding Arkansas’s anti-BDS law, which ruled that the act of boycotting is nonexpressive conduct, and therefore not protected by the First Amendment, and that only calling for a boycott remains protected speech. The Supreme Court has thus far refused to take up challenges to that ruling. Friedman told RS that this distinction goes much further than the immediate fight over Israel, calling it part of an effort to “not just erode but, for all practical purposes, erase any First Amendment protection for the right to boycott.” During the mark-up, Rep. Morgan Griffith (R-Va.) retorted that, if universities are not currently engaging in the conduct the bill would prohibit, opponents should have little reason to object. “Let’s take my colleagues on the other side of the aisle and their argument, and that is the bill does nothing, and there’s nothing to see here,” Griffith said. “Then there’s no harm in passing it.” Outside critics have focused more on the potential ramifications of the bill. The measure “seeks to chill free speech by penalizing universities for engaging in constitutionally protected political expression in support of Palestinian human rights,” according to a memo written by the lobbying group A New Policy when the bill was initially introduced last summer. Some Democratic members made this case forcefully ahead of the vote. “No matter how much I may disagree with BDS, and find it strategically stupid and morally repugnant, I will always fight to protect Americans’ right to speech with which I disagree. It is the only way to ensure speech I do agree with is equally protected,” Rep. Jerry Nadler (D-N.Y.) said in a statement, calling the bill a “gross violation of the First Amendment.” --- ### US universities get millions to do military research for Israel **Published:** September 3, 2026 | **Author:** Mila Halgren, Alex Rewegan | **Section:** Military Industrial Complex **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/israel-military-us-universities/.md See an insect crawling in the corner of the room? It might be a surveillance robot, thanks to research at Carnegie Mellon University to develop cockroach-like robots with, and for, the Israeli military. Robot cockroaches, “terror-network” mapping, and rapid missile guidance are just three examples of at least 70 research projects U.S. universities have conducted on behalf of the Israeli Ministry of Defense (IMoD). Over a thousand pages of internal university and U.S./Israeli military documents reveal a sweeping, decades-long program to sponsor military research collaborations with at least 30 U.S. universities, from Cornell to the University of California at San Diego, since at least 2009. Projects are conducted in collaboration with the Israeli military and sometimes explicitly incorporate environmental conditions in Palestine into the work. One project designed fuel cells for “distributed sensor networks” tailored to the temperature and soil conditions of an Israeli border that could monitor “potential terrorist activity” for “border security.” Recent reports from Dropsite News, The Nation, and the Anti-War Initiative found millions of Israeli military dollars flowing into U.S. schools. Public records obtained from 13 U.S. universities reveal this money was directed via a U.S. arms export program to fund collaborations with Israeli scientists and military officials. These projects are not funded by traditional academic grants. Instead, they are procured as “defense articles and services,” paid for with U.S. taxpayer dollars via the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program – the same mechanism Israel uses to purchase F-35 fighter jets and other U.S. defense exports. At least 11 contracts sent U.S. scientists to Israel to work face to face with their counterparts at an Israeli university and/or the IMoD, earmarking funds for U.S. professors to attend meetings and present their research to the IMoD. --- ### Pentagon puts $131 billion price tag on 1970s-era fighter **Published:** September 3, 2026 | **Author:** Mark Thompson | **Section:** Military Industrial Complex **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/f15-fighter-jet/.md The Bunker appears originally at the Project on Government Oversight and is republished here with permission. --- ### Want to save NATO? Ask its members to do less. **Published:** September 3, 2026 | **Author:** Johan Wennstrom | **Section:** Europe **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/nato-europe-trump/.md This summer the Pentagon handed NATO members a questionnaire asking whether they support in part, “U.S. foreign policy priorities.” Dubbed a “loyalty test” in the press, it was seen by many Europeans as the most recent sign that the alliance is coming apart because of American petulance. Yet what is actually happening is that the U.S. is putting stress on an inherently flawed and now exhausted form of alliance politics. The roots of the present discord were planted not in the 2024 reelection of President Donald Trump, but in the moment of NATO's Cold War triumph thirty years earlier. Indeed, one of the more puzzling developments after the dissolution of both the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact was the conviction of Western leaders that the time was ripe for new, grand projects of expansion and integration. In the absence of a genuine counter-power, NATO abandoned its former role as a heavily armed defensive alliance anchored in the Atlantic and instead embraced a normative mission, often described as an “alliance of values,” to which even states far outside the Atlantic sphere and without any meaningful defense capabilities were encouraged to accede. Its principal purpose became the accumulation of ever more members – Sweden being the latest, in 2024 – regardless of their suitability. For a time in the late 1990s, NATO effectively served as the waiting-room for Eastern European candidates to that other expanding supranational project: the European Union. As the late English philosopher Roger Scruton observed, drawing on his involvement in the underground intellectual scene in Eastern Europe, the liberated Soviet states wanted nothing more than to reclaim the national cultures that communism had tried to erase during more than forty years of occupation. Instead, they were incorporated into an EU that reduced the multifaceted European continent to a vast trade area, whose inner borders and local identities simply could – and should – be dissolved. It was assumed that a single community could be built on the particular ones, supported by, among other things, a "European anthem" and euro banknotes depicting imaginary architectural heritage. The EU and NATO took a bet on the virtue of breadth, disregarding that both institutions in their modern incarnations were political creatures that, to paraphrase historian Peter Apps, were in fact organized controversies, “attempting to resolve sometimes irreconcilable and enduring differences between its members.” The price of breadth was cohesion, with the secretary-general’s role in Nato evolving from what Javier Solana once called a “catalyst of consensus” into something closer to a frustrated chief whip, struggling to discipline increasingly disruptive members – much as Ursula von der Leyen does in the EU as president of the European Commission. This was always an unstable arrangement that now faces a reckoning, accelerated but not caused by Washington’s retreat under President Donald Trump from NATO’s post-Cold War design; ironically, much as the Soviet Union did in 1989, when Moscow under Mikhail Gorbachev abruptly withdrew its protection from satellite governments. The response from Secretary-General Mark Rutte and major European capitals has been to propose more of the same, a "NATO 3.0" that leaves the alliance’s underlying logic intact while merely shifting the financial burden to non-US. members. The Istanbul summit in July advanced precisely this vision. Yet NATO’s future depends less on spending than on distinguishing itself from the EU it gradually came to resemble. What if NATO were transformed into an alliance with a more nation-centered character in which the highest degree of military solidarity would only be expected in the event of a threat against all members? States would then explicitly be allowed to participate in NATO operations around the globe in accordance with how they saw them as aligning with their own national beliefs and interests. If such a rule had been in place during the military aid effort for Ukraine, Spain, for example, would not have been reprimanded for focusing on security challenges along its southern border rather than on what, from its perspective, is a distant regional war – only to be criticized later for not doing enough to anticipate and reverse the Ceuta migrant crisis. Under such an arrangement, members would not be required to adhere to a single, often Western-aligned analysis of world affairs, yet would remain entitled to collective protection in the event of a genuinely shared threat. Suppose Iran were to permanently close the Strait of Hormuz to maritime trading to strangle energy supply to large swathes of the world or build a nuclear weapon, or China were to seize Taiwan and, to paraphrase the Stanford historian Niall Ferguson, discover that its appetite grows with the eating. In those kinds of scenarios, it would be in the interest of each member to contribute to collective security according to its means. Sweden could, with its diminished army but highly advanced defense industry, become part of "NATO’s workshop," producing fighter jets and other assets. Such a loosening of NATO, and the relinquishing of its current supranational character, would likely foster greater harmony among its members while keeping Trump – and future U.S. presidents – engaged. It would also strengthen solidarity where it matters most: in the event of a major war. The lynchpin of a "NATO of nations" would be a rewording of the mutual defense clause of the North Atlantic Treaty to require explicit military support. As it stands, Article 5 obliges members to take “such action as deem necessary” if one of them is attacked. In theory, Britain met that requirement during the “Phoney War” of 1939 by dropping supportive leaflets as the German blitzkrieg overran its ally Poland. If NATO members could agree to that, it would surely be acceptable for some of them – even the U.S. – to sit out the latest campaign in defense of “values” rather than core interests. The EU’s Lisbon Treaty is, by contrast, more explicit, calling on members to use “all the means in their power” in support of mutual defense (although Sweden has, over the years, done its very best to argue that the formulation does not imply military support). If NATO is to shed its EU-like illusions, this is at least one lesson worth borrowing. President Trump has asked NATO members to do more to assuage his doubts about the value of the alliance and the U.S. commitment to it. What if he is making the wrong demand, and should instead be telling them to do a lot less? Paradoxically, that may be the best way to keep America in. --- ### Trump’s Saudi nuke agreement may prolong the Iran war **Published:** September 2, 2026 | **Author:** Trita Parsi | **Section:** QiOSK **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/trump-saudi-nuclear-deal/.md A final deal between the United States and Iran is slipping further out of reach. Since the Memorandum of Understanding collapsed in July, the prospects for reviving it have deteriorated by the day. While Tehran publicly demands a return to the MOU, Trump’s current position is that even if Iran reopened the Strait of Hormuz, he would neither return to the agreement nor lift the blockade on Iran. And even in the unlikely event that he did, the MOU could not come back into force as long as Israel continues to bombard Lebanon. Iran is unlikely to accept an MOU minus Lebanon: its demand for a regional ceasefire is non-negotiable. But even if these obstacles were resolved, profound differences over the nuclear issue would remain. And those differences have now grown dramatically more severe because of Trump’s nuclear agreement with Saudi Arabia. The details of the deal were just made public, and Kelsey Davenport at the Arms Control Association has published an excellent FAQ addressing its most important aspects. The bottom line is: Trump is granting Saudi Arabia access to the same uranium-enrichment technology the United States has sought to deny Iran for more than three decades, while imposing a far weaker inspection regime on Saudi nuclear activities. In effect, Washington is providing Riyadh a pathway to the bomb while insisting that Iran have no enrichment capability whatsoever—the infamous zero-enrichment objective. As ACA writes, “the Trump administration rejected key nonproliferation conditions for U.S. nuclear cooperation that have long-standing bipartisan support and are internationally recognized best practices. Most critically, the deal does not require Saudi Arabia to adhere to the more intrusive International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards agreement, known as the Additional Protocol.” As a point of comparison, Iran began voluntarily implementing the Additional Protocol (AP) under Obama’s nuclear deal in 2016 and was expected to ratify it once the United States formally lifted sanctions through Congress. That never happened, however, because Trump withdrew from the agreement in May 2018. Moreover, Trump’s agreement with Saudi Arabia gives the kingdom a pathway to develop a uranium-enrichment program reaching 20 percent. Again, the comparison with Iran is revealing. When Iran expanded its enrichment to 20 percent in 2010 to produce fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor—which, ironically, the United States had given Iran in the late 1960s as part of the Atoms for Peace program—Washington pointed to the move as further evidence of Iran’s alleged nuclear weapons ambitions. State Department spokesperson Philip Crowley said on February 11, 2010, that Iran’s decision to begin enriching to 20 percent “further solidifies ... our impression and that of the international community that Iran’s nuclear intentions are anything but peaceful.” At the UN Security Council, then-Ambassador Susan Rice argued that Iran’s decision moved it “closer to weapons-grade material,” as she made the case for new UN sanctions against Tehran. Now, Trump wants Congress to approve a deal with Saudi Arabia that gives the kingdom access to precisely that technology—but with far fewer inspections—while bombing Iran to prevent it from having any enrichment at all. The double standard could hardly be more stark: enrichment is intolerable in Iranian hands, yet acceptable— in fact, even worth giving to Riyadh — when in Saudi hands. This will undoubtedly complicate matters with Tehran. Will Iran still agree to some of the terms discussed before the war and in the run-up to the MOU? According to Oman’s Foreign Minister, who mediated the draft agreement in February 2026 that Trump rejected in favor of war, Iran had agreed to a needs-based enrichment arrangement that, in practice, would have created a five-to-seven-year pause in enrichment — well beyond Trump’s term in office. In later discussions, Iran hinted that it was open to extending it for another three to five years. It is very important to understand that if the conflicts over the Strait and Lebanon are resolved and a genuine opportunity to revive the MOU emerges, these understandings will nevertheless unravel unless a nuclear agreement is reached at the end of the MOU’s 60-day period. And that nuclear agreement looks all the more difficult to achieve given the blatant discrepancy between what the US demands of Iran and what it gifts Saudi Arabia. And if there is no nuclear deal at the end of the MOU, war will likely erupt again. As such, Trump’s controversial Saudi deal may just have made an end to the war with Iran more unlikely. --- ### Why are so many Vance allies leaving the administration? **Published:** September 2, 2026 | **Author:** Connor Echols, Kelley Beaucar Vlahos | **Section:** Washington Politics **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/vance-rubio-rivalry/.md Army Secretary Dan Driscoll resigned this week, raising a flurry of questions about whether his departure is part of a larger political reordering that has pushed skeptics of President Donald Trump’s war policies to the margins. A long-time friend of Vice President JD Vance, Driscoll drew widespread praise for his efforts to modernize the Army. But he has clashed with Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, particularly over the latter’s firing of numerous senior military officials, including Army and Air Force generals and the Secretary of the Navy. Driscoll brought his concerns about these firings directly to Trump last week, who said he was unaware of how many officers had been purged, according to the Atlantic. Driscoll’s departure is the latest in a string of recent high-profile exits by Vance’s allies and ideological fellow travelers, including Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard, Deputy National Security Adviser Andy Baker, White House Director of Legislative Affairs James Braid, and Director of the National Counterterrorism Center Joe Kent. All of this takes on heightened significance as the second Trump administration reaches its halfway point. In some ways, sources tell RS, it is because Trump is expected to increasingly become a “lame duck” after the midterms that this churn in personnel is taking place. With Vance and Secretary of State Marco Rubio winding up for a widely anticipated fight to secure the 2028 Republican presidential nomination, we are spotting tantalizing clues about how their battle for influence is playing out, both inside and outside the White House. For Vance supporters, the rosiest interpretation is that he’s simply setting up an outside shop. Several lower-level Vance allies have left government and moved into positions at the sort of K Street firms that could play a crucial role in fundraising for a future Vance campaign, as Politico reported earlier this year. Such a network would be particularly valuable for Vance, who only spent two years in the Senate before ascending to the vice presidency. As one source with knowledge of the administration’s internal dynamics said, the “deluge of Vance-aligned departures” could give the vice president’s allies “more freedom to basically do campaign work” if and when he gets his 2028 operation whirring. For people like Baker and Driscoll, the decision to leave may simply be practical, argued Justin Logan of the Cato Institute. “We tend to underestimate the demands made on these people, especially for those of them who have spouses and kids,” Logan said. In other words, these younger officials may simply want to make some extra money and spend more time with their families before diving into a likely 2028 campaign. Rubio, meanwhile, is a Beltway creature par excellence, having spent 14 years in the Senate before joining Trump’s team. Given his extensive network of allies in DC, there is little need for Rubio’s aides to leave the administration and start working from the outside. Another plausible interpretation is that a turf war is underway, and the vice president is losing out. Vance and his allies are broadly associated with foreign-policy restraint and generally skeptical of the wisdom of Trump’s decision to go to war with Iran. Some sources with knowledge of administration dynamics say sides are forming up, and Rubio’s hawks are ascendant, in many cases getting promoted while Vance’s allies and fellow travelers are leaving altogether. “I think Andy Baker leaving is a much bigger deal than Driscoll (leaving the Pentagon),” said one source with knowledge of the dynamics inside the government right now. As deputy national security adviser, “Andy’s portfolio was everything,” the source added. “He is a career foreign service officer, deployed overseas, and is aligned with how JD sees the world. His leaving is unfortunately ceding some ground.” These sources describe a “war” on realists and restrainers that, along with the political intent of supporting a Rubio faction ahead of 2028, aims to impose a pre-Trump neoconservative foreign policy on the Republican party, which means anyone not with the program has to go. While Gabbard and Kent ultimately resigned, reporting indicates that Gabbard, who made a career out of criticizing the neoconservative war policies of the past, was one of the few top officials to warn Trump against attacking Iran; she was likely squeezed out, according to reports. Kent said he left because there was no room for dissent, and he could not “support sending the next generation off to fight and die in a war that serves no benefit to the American people nor justifies the cost of American lives.” Several of Gabbard's realist hires were later caught up in a mass “downsizing” by acting DNI Bill Pulte in June. These shifts have not completely eliminated dissenting opinions inside the administration. Multiple four-star generals warned Hegseth recently that “prolonging large-scale operations against Iran is unsustainable,” according to the Washington Post. But there is little evidence that these voices are having an impact on Trump’s policy decisions; Hegseth, who is recently reported to harbor presidential ambitions of his own, has consolidated control of military decisions in his office, all but boxing out the uniformed brass over the last year. Regardless of why the departures are taking place, the upshot is that Rubio and his hawkish friends “have cemented influence and power within the administration,” a source with knowledge of the situation told RS, pointing in particular to Deputy National Security Adviser Mike Needham’s hold over the National Security Council as well as the dominance of Rubio allies in the State Department. For now, these trends are all playing to Rubio’s advantage. Yet, as one well-connected source pointed out, this could come back to bite him. Rubio has so far kept his distance from some of Trump’s most controversial policies, including the unpopular Iran war, which Vance and Hegseth have addressed far more publicly. But, now that Vance’s allies are washing out of the administration, it could become increasingly difficult for Rubio to maintain this politically advantageous position. “The upshot of having more neocons in the room and losing more restraint-minded voices is that this thing doesn't seem to be going away anytime soon, and it certainly doesn't seem to be getting better,” a source said. “At some point, people are going to start pointing fingers, and someone's going to have to take ownership.” --- ### What Huckabee is doing about dead Americans in the West Bank **Published:** September 2, 2026 | **Author:** Blaise Malley | **Section:** Middle East **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/mike-huckabee-israel-settlements/.md Israeli settlers attacked an NBC News crew in the village of Jalud over the weekend, injuring the network’s correspondent, Matt Bradley, as well as two other crew members and Aida Ahmed Abdullah, the Palestinian woman they were interviewing. “They jumped out, beat us, then jumped back in the car,” Bradley, who was treated at a clinic, said of the incident. Abdullah was hospitalized following the attack. This is the latest episode in a surge of settler violence throughout the occupied West Bank, where assaults on Palestinians and attacks on their homes and property have risen sharply in recent years. Among the victims have been a number of Americans and Palestinian Americans, at least 14 of whom have been killed since 2003. U.S. Ambassador to Israel Mike Huckabee, a staunch supporter of Israeli settlements who has even previously signaled support for an Israeli annexation of the West Bank, has nevertheless condemned some of those attacks in unusually strong terms. After 20-year-old Palestinian American Saifullah Kamel Musallet was beaten to death while visiting family in the West Bank last summer, Huckabee called his killing a “criminal and terrorist act.” More recently, he denounced settlers who laid siege to three homes in the village of Qusra, including one belonging to a Palestinian American family, as “Israeli terrorists,” saying there was “no excuse for such thuggish behavior.” But the persistence of such attacks has raised questions about whether Huckabee — and, by extension, Washington — is doing enough to protect its own citizens, and what pressure the Trump administration is prepared to exert against Israeli authorities and settlers to protect them, and curb violence it claims to oppose. “It's good to see Mike Huckabee using the word terrorism,” former State Department career diplomat Josh Paul told Responsible Statecraft. “It would be nice to see actual terrorism designations following through on that, because that's where you give the word actual meaning rather than simply throwing it around.” Todd Deatherage, a former State Department official under President George W. Bush and co-founder of the Telos Group, a nonprofit focused on Israeli-Palestinian peacebuilding, said Huckabee’s response reflects the basic responsibilities of an American ambassador. “At a minimum the U.S. ambassador’s job in any country is to promote U.S. values, defend U.S. interests, and protect U.S. citizens,” Deatherage told RS. With settler violence harming Americans and undermining U.S. interests, he added, “you can just say he’s doing his job.” Musallet’s death is one of nine killings of American citizens by Jewish settlers or Israeli security forces in the West Bank between January 2022 and August 2026. Trump’s response to these violent deaths is now drawing scrutiny from Congress. Sens. Chris Van Hollen (D-Md.), Tim Kaine (D-Va.) and Bernie Sanders (I-Vt.) recently introduced a resolution seeking information about those deaths, as well as a broader examination of the human rights implications of Israeli actions in the West Bank. “The violence committed by Israeli settlers in the West Bank is reaching an unprecedented level, and as a result more and more Americans and Palestinians are being killed and injured,” Kaine said in a press release announcing the legislation. “These actions – and the Israeli government’s lack of response to this violence – are unacceptable and threaten the long-term safety and security of the entire region.” The list of killings also includes Palestinian American journalist Shireen Abu Akleh, who was shot in the head while wearing a press vest in 2022. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) eventually acknowledged that there was “high possibility” that Abu Akleh was killed by IDF gunfire, though no criminal charges were ever pursued. Despite the added attention that American citizenship can bring to such cases, it has historically done little to ensure accountability, according to Mike Casey, a former U.S. diplomat who worked at the now-defunct Palestinian Affairs Unit (PAU), renamed the Office of Palestinian Affairs when President Joe Biden took office, at the U.S. embassy in Jerusalem from 2020 to 2024. “It didn't really make much of a difference, unfortunately. We would try to use that angle to get engagement on certain topics,” Casey, who resigned over Washington’s response to Israel’s war in Gaza, told RS. “When you look at the case of Shireen Abu Akleh, which was probably the most high-pressure, high-focus and investigation of any Palestinian who's been killed, it still didn't amount to anything.” Huckabee is known as one of Israel’s strongest advocates in the Trump administration. He recently described Israel as “the 436th congressional district of the U.S.” and once told right-wing commentator Tucker Carlson that it would be “fine” if Israel took control of nearly the entire Middle East. But inaction by American representatives in Israel stretches back to well before Huckabee’s tenure as ambassador, Casey said. During the first Trump term, then-Ambassador David Friedman — who recently tweeted that “Qusra is not under siege, and Palestinian attacks against Israelis living in Judea and Samaria far outweigh Israeli attacks against Palestinians” — showed no interest in reports of settler violence coming from the PAU. “Most things didn't even make it to him because his chief of staff would gatekeep things, but then if they did get to him, they just wouldn't go out” to Washington, Casey said. After the 2022 election of the current, far-right Israeli government headed by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, the Biden administration took a more punitive approach, imposing sanctions on violent settlers and organizations that were part of the settlement movement. But Casey says that effort, which he initially considered promising, was ultimately limited and short-lived because U.S. officials were not willing to go beyond sanctioning individual groups and follow the ties between the sanctioned entities and the Israeli businesses and government officials supporting them, nor were they a part of a broader strategy to address expanding settlements. Trump eliminated the sanctions program shortly after returning to office. Huckabee has drawn a clear distinction between what he sees as violent extremists and the settlement movement itself. He has described the perpetrators as “unsettlers” who are “hurting the very people they claim to be fighting for.” For critics of U.S. policy, that distinction gets at the limits of Washington’s approach. “I would say that violent settlers in the West Bank have been a low-hanging fruit” for Western governments seeking to criticize Israel, said Paul, who also quit his State Department post at the bureau responsible for overseeing arms transfers to foreign countries after more than a decade of service, because of U.S. policy during the war on Gaza. Because these settlers can be portrayed as individuals acting independently of the Israeli government, he told RS, officials can condemn their violence without confronting the broader issue. “I think that is a fundamental misunderstanding — and an intentional one — of what the settlement movement represents,” Paul said. “I think concerns are ultimately not some fundamental opposition to settlement expansion by Israel in the West Bank (...) but just that the settler violence attracts too much attention and is therefore unhelpful to the longer-term objective on Israeli annexation.” The line between private settler violence and state action has become increasingly difficult to draw. The Biden-era ban on sending rifles to Israeli extremist groups fell short in part because after the Oct 7, 2023, Hamas attack on southern Israel the Netanyahu government expanded regional defense units on the West Bank that are composed largely of settlers operating under the IDF’s authority, and are thus not subject to the ban. “They operate with large degrees of autonomy and are essentially just advancing settler objectives while wearing the uniform of the IDF,” Sarah Sanbar, acting Israel and Palestine researcher at Human Rights Watch, told RS. That broader context is part of what the Van Hollen-Kaine-Sanders resolution, one of a handful of legislative efforts to investigate violence in the West Bank, could require the State Department to examine. The statute under which the senators plan to introduce the privileged resolution is a rarely used but potentially potent tool. Section 502b(c) of the Foreign Assistance Act allows members of Congress to request a report from the State Department regarding the human rights practices of any recipient of U.S. security assistance. If successful, the secretary of state would be required to produce the report within 30 days, or further assistance to Israel would be suspended. The law, however, has not been successfully invoked to obtain a report since 1976. Sanders introduced a resolution under the law to get information on the use of U.S. weapons in Gaza in 2023, but the bill did not pass the Senate. Experts who spoke to RS also listed other steps the U.S. government could take if it is serious about curbing settler violence, including reinstating targeted sanctions against specific individuals or groups, restricting U.S. assistance, or sanctioning banks or companies that support or finance settlement building. “They're just tools that we use everywhere else” that get rejected when it comes to holding Israel accountable, Casey said. “ It's not anything outrageous to suggest.” --- ### Trump plan to control Venezuelan oil has more holes than Swiss cheese **Published:** September 1, 2026 | **Author:** Orlando Pérez | **Section:** Latin America **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/trump-oil-venezuela/.md President Donald Trump announced Friday that the United States “has just entered into an Agreement” with Venezuela covering more than 65 billion barrels of proven oil reserves, secured “at no cost to the American Taxpayer.” He then proceeded to name Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, and acting Venezuelan President Delcy Rodriguez as the chief negotiators. The White House then released a fact sheet late Monday evening, without the underlying legal text. It offers one of three accounts of the deal, one that clashes with both Rodriguez’s version and the Pentagon’s own prior statements. The number of oil barrels will get the most attention over the next weeks. However, the financing structure is the key element because it determines who bears the costs of this arrangement and under what authority. Rodriguez described her interpretation of the deal on Telegram and expanded on it Saturday night on state television. Hers is a 25-year, bilateral project across 17 strategic fields and eight greenfield blocks, targeting more than 1.5 million barrels a day, drawing $100 billion in investment and returning roughly $209 billion to the Venezuelan state at a benchmark price of $65 per barrel, which would give the government about $19 of revenue per barrel. She insisted it preserves Venezuelan sovereignty over natural resources. Trump, for his part, claimed there will be majority American ownership of the reserves, which would be illegal under Article 12 of Venezuela’s constitution. A U.S. official told the Associated Press that Washington would control 55% of the output of a new private company called North American Blue Energy Partners (NABEP), the second largest oil producer in Venezuela, with an ownership stake and the right to buy crude at cost for the Strategic Petroleum Reserve and the military. The White House fact sheet later broke that figure down: a 35% equity stake for the Pentagon's Office of Strategic Capital, plus the State Department gets the right to buy 20% of output at cost. This framing appears at odds with that of Rodriguez; it’s hard to imagine, after all, that Caracas will get $19 per barrel if the U.S. is buying large amounts of it at cost. The Pentagon's Office of Strategic Capital could oversee and help fund the oilfield licenses, according to the Washington Post. The Biden administration created the office in December 2022, and Congress codified it a year later, establishing a pilot program to extend loans, loan guarantees, and technical assistance to companies developing dual-use technologies across 34 categories listed in the statute. The office made its first direct loan in August 2025: $150 million to a rare earths processor in California. Its pilot authority expires on October 1, 2028. Lifting heavy crude from Venezuela’s Orinoco Belt is not one of the 34 categories, and nothing in the law contemplates financing foreign upstream oil development. Pentagon spokesman Sean Parnell said the office’s role is confined to loans and guarantees and that it cannot take an ownership stake in private companies, which means the instrument available to the Pentagon cannot deliver the 35% the administration just described in the fact sheet. Three consequences follow from that mismatch. First, a loan guarantee costs nothing on the day it is issued and costs whatever the default costs on the day it is called. That is how a phrase like “no cost to the American Taxpayer” survives contact with a structure whose stated purpose, in the Post’s account, is to absorb risk that private firms have already declined to take. Francisco Monaldi of Rice University told the Post that oil companies will ultimately be hesitant, and ExxonMobil's chief executive called the country “uninvestable” in January. The guarantee is only being contemplated because neither of those judgments has changed. Second, the fact sheet now puts the lease at 100 years, two days after Rodriguez said 25 years. Either way, the financing authority floated to support the arrangement could sunset in 2028, unless Congress acts to reauthorize it. Whatever gets signed would outlive the legal instrument used to underwrite it, and no one has explained what would replace that authority or who would appropriate funds for it. Third, as the Congressional Research Service notes, information about the Pentagon’s loans and guarantees need not be made public. So, the administration has selected the federal credit facility carrying the least mandatory transparency to underwrite the largest resource claim in the hemisphere, which puts the claim about taxpayer cost beyond anyone’s ability to scrutinize. Venezuelan law raises a separate set of problems that no announcement has addressed. Article 12 of the constitution makes hydrocarbon deposits property of the government — property that is inalienable and non-transferable. Article 302 reserves the petroleum industry to the state, and Article 303 requires the state to hold all shares of PDVSA, as the state oil company is known. January's hydrocarbons reform loosened rules about joint ventures but stopped well short of authorizing a 55% foreign ownership stake, and constitutional changes may be required before the agreement can be finalized. Ricardo Hausmann, who ran Venezuela’s planning ministry in the early 1990s, wrote that Rodriguez “has no legitimacy or constitutional power to commit Venezuela to any such deal,” and that no major American oil company will treat it seriously because it will not last. According to the White House the U.S. would have veto power over who sits on the NABEP board. It would include "reputable U.S. auditors, lawyers, and advisors and the U.S. government’s agreement with NABEP is governed by U.S. law and is subject to the jurisdiction of U.S. courts." Right now it is controlled by Alejandro Betancourt, whom Swiss prosecutors sought to arrest on suspicion of financial crimes and whom Washington has declined to surrender. He has not been formally charged, and his attorney denies the allegations. Betancourt has also been the administration’s principal intermediary in Caracas. So, just about every party to this deal carries an unresolved question about its authority to sign. Venezuela has already run a version of this experiment on itself, in these same fields. In 2007, when the government converted the Orinoco projects into joint ventures, with PDVSA holding 60%, ConocoPhillips and ExxonMobil rejected the terms and were expropriated. Both companies eventually won. Conoco secured awards totaling roughly $10.7 billion, including an $8.7 billion ruling by an international trade court in 2019, and Exxon collected a $907 million award from the International Chamber of Commerce. More than 20 claims from that wave of litigation remain largely unpaid because tribunals cannot seize assets within Venezuela, and enforcement abroad has been slow and mostly fruitless. Any company that ends up holding a repudiated contract in these same fields would win a judgment it could not collect; a federal guarantee would shift this risk onto the U.S. Treasury. Within a day of its announcement, opposition to the deal surfaced across the entire Venezuelan political spectrum. Venezuelans protested in Caracas on Saturday; opposition figures called the arrangement a betrayal of the country’s resources; and Chavista hardliners attacked Rodriguez for conceding what the movement had spent 25 years claiming to defend. Indeed, it was just two years ago that, as then-President Nicolas Maduro’s vice president, Rodriguez accused opposition leader Maria Corina Machado of taking orders from her “master,” referring to the United States, to “hand over the oil, gas, and gold.” Rodriguez might be calculating that a deal of this size reduces Washington’s appetite for early elections. Ratification requires a legislature, and the only chamber capable of acting is the 2025 National Assembly, led by Delcy’s brother Jorge Rodriguez; that body’s constitutional legitimacy remains unsettled. However the situation shakes out, the upshot for the U.S. is concerning. Any claim arising from that unsettled status would default to whoever actually holds the risk, and under the instrument the Trump administration has chosen, that is ultimately the U.S. Treasury. --- ### Trump's 'golden age of science' is not just another war to be won **Published:** September 1, 2026 | **Author:** Pavel Devyatkin, Denis Simon | **Section:** Asia-Pacific **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/us-china-scientific-competition/.md In July 2026, the White House released what it called the most ambitious rethinking of American science policy in decades. Michael Kratsios, President Trump’s science advisor, penned a report titled “Science: A New Golden Age,” with the goal of charting a course to revitalize American research and development. The report contains ideas worth taking seriously. Kratsios is right that the system needs reform. Researchers have long complained about grant writing taking far too much time and how peer review leaves little space for bold new ideas. Kratsios wants to shake that up, proposing “golden tickets” for unconventional proposals, fast-tracking grants, and greater funding flexibility. All of this makes sense. But the overall vision behind the report is troubling. It presents science almost entirely as a weapon in great-power competition. The main goal isn’t advancing knowledge for everyone. Rather, it’s dominance. You see this fact clearly in President Trump’s letter commissioning the report: “We are not just competing with other nations; we are seeking, striving, fighting to make America greater than ever before.” Throughout the report, there’s a drumbeat about how simply publishing great science isn’t enough. The report emphasizes that America must be “formidable at turning breakthroughs into national power, or we risk watching the fruits of American discovery harvested first by others.” Competition undoubtedly matters. It has driven many of America’s scientific breakthroughs. But competition can’t be the sole defining feature of American science policy. There are entire fields where cooperation is the only way forward. --- ### Gulf states struggle to recover economically after 6 months of war **Published:** September 1, 2026 | **Author:** Giorgio Cafiero | **Section:** Middle East **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/gulf-states-economy/.md The Persian Gulf’s extraordinary wealth has long rested on an assumption of stability. The past six months of war have shattered that certainty, exposing a fundamental weakness in Gulf economic models: producing oil and gas is only half the equation when infrastructure and access to global markets can be disrupted. Ports, airports, power grids, desalination plants, financial centers, and tourism hubs are all vulnerable to the same regional shocks. The energy sector is particularly exposed, with damaged oil and gas facilities potentially taking months or longer to repair. Yet restoring production may prove easier than restoring confidence that Gulf exports can reliably reach global markets. Each Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) state enters this new era from a different starting point. Qatar, Kuwait and Bahrain are particularly exposed because of their reliance on Gulf maritime routes, including the Strait of Hormuz. Saudi Arabia has greater flexibility thanks to its East-West pipeline, as does the United Arab Emirates because of its oil export hub at Fujairah, which lies on the safe side of the Strait. Oman is also well-insulated, with its key export infrastructure beyond the Strait. In search of resilience, these states are now building alternative export routes, expanding overseas production, strengthening strategic inventories, and dispersing critical infrastructure. “The war doesn’t change the fact that the Gulf’s huge low-cost oil and gas reserves are the world’s most profitable,” Jim Krane, the Wallace S. Wilson Fellow for Energy Studies at Rice University's Baker Institute for Public Policy, told RS. “But the war signals to investors, including local national oil companies, that they may be prevented from moving cargoes to market.” Iran’s ability to close Hormuz adds a new layer of political risk, increasing the attractiveness of producers such as Algeria, Brazil, Mozambique, and the United States, which don’t have constraints on access to open seas, Krane noted. --- ### Western hawks are pushing Ukraine to draft its women **Published:** August 31, 2026 | **Author:** Branko Marcetic | **Section:** Europe **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/ukraine-draft-women/.md Ukraine is already suffering a severe demographic crisis as a result of the decision to eschew peace talks and pursue military victory instead — a decision backed emphatically by U.S. and European leaders earlier in the war. The ensuing combination of large-scale casualties and a mass emigration of Ukrainians has left the country facing several factors that imperil its future as a viable state: not enough young and able-bodied citizens to fund its welfare state, a potential future labor shortage, and a mortality rate that outstrips its birth rate nearly four times over. Now, some Ukrainian officials and Western war hawks are discussing an idea that would make this already crisis-level situation catastrophically worse: drafting women to fight in the war. The proposal had already been discussed earlier this year, after a female drone commander wrote in favor of the idea and a dozen Ukrainian women received erroneous military summonses, sparking headlines around the country. The start of this month saw a petition filed urging the conscription of childless women, an idea backed by some military figures. That includes former Ukrainian Defense Minister Alexei Reznikov, who, pointing to the example of Israel, said “we can survive only if everyone accepts that they must defend Ukraine,” adding that it would “double our mobilization resource.” Some of those cheering Ukraine’s war effort from outside the country have also embraced the idea. Keith Kellogg, who until December 2025 served as President Donald Trump’s special envoy to Ukraine, recently endorsed the proposal, adding that it is “very important for women, as part of society, to serve.” The Telegraph recently published a piece framing Ukrainian women’s military service as a victory for feminism; the article quoted one female drone operator endorsing the drafting of women and describing the idea as “inspiring.” In spite of all this talk, the idea hasn’t gained real traction. A senior official on Ukraine’s National Security and Defense Council said it “won’t happen”; Zelensky’s chief of staff Kyrylo Budanov deemed it “not necessary” since there were still many men who were yet to be drafted; and the petition referenced above has received only a small fraction of the signatures it needs to receive an official response from the president. By contrast, a petition in 2022 opposing the Ukrainian government’s increasingly aggressive recruitment strategies quickly received well over the 25,000 signatures it needed. Nevertheless, the growing talk about drafting women, particularly from Ukraine’s Western backers, is an ominous development for several reasons. One is that, as Western pressure to scuttle peace talks early in the war reminds us, Ukrainian policy on both the war and other matters isn’t always wholly up to Ukraine. This idea is a sign of the bleak situation facing Ukraine because of the decision to prolong the war. The fact that conscripting women is being floated at all indicates that Ukraine has suffered enormous casualties and suggests that the manpower shortage and recruitment crisis that have plagued Kyiv’s military campaign and led to deep social divisions and popular resentment may be even worse than we realize. It’s also a reminder of the vast imbalance between Russia and Ukraine that continues to make outright military victory for the latter unlikely. Moscow has also thrown its people into the proverbial meat grinder of war, but, simply put, it has a lot more bodies to work with than Ukraine does. Most mainstream discourse tends to discuss Kyiv’s military success or failure as a matter of the quantity of military aid it receives. But, the damage inflicted on Russia by Ukraine’s drone campaign notwithstanding, even modern conflict still requires human beings to use those weapons, not to mention man the broader industrial infrastructure necessary for any war effort. That serious thought is being given to drafting women is yet another signal that Ukraine is faltering in this area, lending credence to ousted former Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov’s recent warning that Ukraine is “gradually, slowly losing” the war. In a reasonable political climate, this sorry situation would lead us to rethink our definition of being “pro-Ukraine.” The war’s most ardent cheerleaders charge that the worst thing that could happen to the country is to be forced to cede territory in negotiations that end the war. Such a result is, of course, profoundly unfair to Ukraine. But is it truly worse than a future of perpetual crisis and dysfunction brought on by the eradication of vast swaths of its able-bodied population? --- ### What do current US military ops in Latin America actually look like? **Published:** August 31, 2026 | **Author:** Andrew M. Leonard | **Section:** QiOSK **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/us-military-latin-america/.md On Thursday, U.S. SOUTHCOM Commander Gen. Francis L. Donovan met with the Colombian and Ecuadorian defense ministers in San Lorenzo, Ecuador. The trio agreed on a plan to significantly expand their military cooperation along the Ecuador-Colombia border, moving past episodic U.S.-partnered missions and toward sustained combined operations against groups Washington has designated as terrorist organizations. This development is significant because it occurs at the time U.S. military forces are already operating on the ground with Ecuadorian forces in Esmeraldas, with the precise manner of cooperation publicly unknown. Additionally, on Aug. 23, Colombian President Abelardo de la Espriella announced all illegal armed and criminal groups will be classified and treated strictly as “terrorists” under a new “Comprehensive Security and Public Order Strategy,” further laying the groundwork for expanded military cooperation with the U.S. and Ecuador. The new U.S.-Colombian-Ecuadorian tripartite framework and broader commitments made at the recent Americas Counter Cartel Coalition (A3C) in Panama raise an even larger question: what types of U.S. military cooperation will occur across the Americas, and under what authorities? The framework, in deepening the integration of U.S. military forces on land, may see those forces advising foreign military forces, participating in combined operational planning, and supporting or even participating in future combined patrols and lethal strikes inside Ecuadorian and Colombian territory, and potentially elsewhere in the region. The distinction is important because ‘security cooperation and security assistance’ can describe varying levels of activity, each governed by different authorities and with different levels of risk and consequences. U.S. military engagement with foreign security forces is best understood as four increasingly consequential forms of involvement, each with their own unique legal and political requirements and associated costs: training and equipping; advising and assisting; partner-enabled U.S. operations; and direct employment of U.S. forces. Training and equipping foreign security forces is the day-to-day practice of U.S. military security cooperation with foreign military forces. The purpose of the Global Train and Equip program is to conduct or support programs that provide training, services and equipment to the national security forces of foreign nations, with the goal of enhancing the capability of partner nations. The legislative authorities to provide such training include 10 U.S.C. 333 and require human rights vetting of foreign security forces under the Leahy Laws and inclusion of training components on the law of armed conflict, human rights, the rule of law, and civilian control of the military. The second, and deeper, level of partnership with foreign security forces is advise and assist. Such longer-term advisory teams were developed because shorter-duration Mobile Training Teams under traditional train-and-equip authorities “did not provide the continuity” nor customized solutions necessary to achieve strategic goals. The U.S. has previously created two such teams in Latin America: one in El Salvador in 1984 and one in Colombia in 2003. These activities are conducted under different authorities depending on the activity. Two examples are 10 U.S.C. 321 and 10 U.S.C. 322, if the primary purpose of the activity is training of U.S. Forces. The next level is partner-enabled U.S. operations. Under 10 U.S.C. 127e, the secretary of defense, with the concurrence of the U.S. ambassador or chief of mission in a given country, may provide support to foreign forces, irregular forces, groups, or individuals that support or facilitate authorized ongoing U.S. special operation forces to combat terrorism. At this level, the previously noted relationship is reversed, with foreign forces now supporting or facilitating a U.S. military operation. However, 10 U.S.C. 127e does not in itself provide the authority to introduce U.S. armed forces into hostilities; separate authorities, such as a specific Authorization for Use of Military Force, are required for that purpose. The highest, and most intense, level of interaction is direct U.S. force operational employment within a foreign country. Such operations may be conducted in accordance with Article II of the U.S. Constitution, which, under the War Powers Resolution of 1973, requires congressional notification within 48 hours after the employment of forces. A War Powers Resolution notification was made in September 2025 following the opening boat strike that preceded Operation Southern Spear, and in January 2026 for Operation Absolute Resolve in Venezuela. Beginning on March 3, 2026, U.S. and Ecuadorian military forces launched joint operations, named “Operation Total Extermination”, including a combined strike against Comandos de la Frontera inside Ecuadorian territory. On March 9th, the president notified Congress of the operation, “consistent with the War Powers Resolution.” The report was made under 50 U.S.C. §1543(a)(3) regarding substantial enlargement of U.S. forces already located in a foreign country, and not the §1543(a)(1) provision regarding introduction of U.S. forces into hostilities. On August 7, 2026, Ecuador’s Ministry of Defense announced, and posted photos from, Operation “Piraña del Norte,” in which Ecuadorian forces, with U.S. support, destroyed a clandestine facility in Esmeraldas; no War Powers Resolution notification specifically addressing that operation has yet been made public. With Colombia’s entry into the Shield of the Americas and plans to host a coalition intelligence and operational headquarters in Medellin, Ecuador’s expanding partnered military operations with U.S. forces, and the U.S. looking to operationalize its activities in the region, security cooperation relationships could span all four levels of categories and authorities, including combined military operations that may require additional War Powers Resolution notifications to Congress. The question remains: as the Trump administration seeks to expand U.S. joint military operations across Latin America, will it continue to rely on presidential war powers or seek congressional authorization? --- ### Trump designates protesters terrorists. How far will it go? **Published:** August 31, 2026 | **Author:** Elizabeth Beavers | **Section:** Washington Politics **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/palestine-action-terrorists/.md Protesting is terrorism. At least, that is the message that the Trump administration has communicated in a series of recent actions, culminating last week in its designation of the U.K.-based Palestine Action as a terrorist group. The Trump administration placed Palestine Action and two other European entities on the Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) list, a category created in the wake of the attacks of September 11, 2001. By designating Palestine Action as an SDGT, the administration has unlocked the authority to impose economic sanctions against the group and all people associated with it, including freezing any of their U.S.-held assets and prohibiting them from financial transactions with any U.S. actors. Separately from financial transactions, it also means that all U.S. persons are prohibited from vaguely-defined interactions with the group that amount to “material support” or “services.” Anyone violating this prohibition could be subjected to civil or criminal penalties, or could themselves be placed on the SDGT list. The question of exactly what illegal “support” for Palestine Action could now mean is a troubling one. The group, which carries out so-called “direct action” protests that often include vandalism, says it is working to end “global participation in Israel’s genocidal and apartheid regime.” The U.K. “proscribed” Palestine Action as a terrorist organization last year, citing in particular a 2024 incident in which members broke into a military base and sprayed red paint on a pair of aircraft. Since the ban came into effect, hundreds of people in the U.K. have been arrested simply for holding signs in support of the group. In theory, U.S. law has an important feature not found in the U.K. system: the First Amendment’s protection of free speech and association. In its announcement designating Palestine Action as “terrorist,” the Trump administration reiterated that “constitutionally protected activities” would not result in sanction. But this is cold comfort for anyone paying attention to how the U.S. government has long chipped away at the First Amendment’s reach in the name of countering “terrorism.” Our Supreme Court has held that assisting a designated group with peacefully resolving its grievances amounts to criminal “support” for terrorism; our Treasury Department once suggested that hosting leaders of a designated group for peaceful dialogue could amount to prohibited “support” for terrorism; and, under the Trump administration, noncitizen students and scholars like Mahmoud Khalil have faced detention and threats of deportation for peaceful protest and expressions of opinion that the administration described as bolstering terrorism. At this point, we must ask the question: what even is “terrorism”? The Trump administration describes Palestine Action as part of a “violent far-left terrorist network,” yet criminal charges against members of the group primarily pertain to vandalizing property, namely, that of weapons manufacturers complicit in Israel’s military campaign in Gaza, which rights groups like Amnesty International and B’Tselem have deemed a genocide. (One protester was convicted of injuring a law enforcement official.) The designation calls to mind the Department of Justice’s recent prosecution of a group of protestors in Texas for setting off fireworks and vandalizing cars outside the Prairieland ICE detention center. One protester also exchanged gunfire with and injured a law enforcement officer during the incident, but the DOJ pursued “material support for terrorism” charges against 15 protestors and secured prison sentences totaling hundreds of years between them. What makes the actions of Palestine Action or the Prairieland protestors “terrorism” as opposed to mere crimes? Federal prosecutors insisted that the Texas protestors were part of an “antifa cell” plotting terrorism, pointing to evidence like their black clothing and possession of anti-fascist reading material to justify decades of prison time, even for protestors who were not involved in any violence. This eye-popping “terrorism” prosecution is consistent with the Trump administration’s National Security Presidential Memorandum (NSPM-7), entitled “Countering Domestic Terrorism and Organized Political Violence.” The memo pledges a crackdown on the forces of “anti-fascism,” as well as supporters of “anti-Americanism” and various forms of “extremism” and “hostility toward those who hold traditional American views on family, religion, and morality.” The administration has also insisted a protestor killed by ICE was a “domestic terrorist”; deemed “antifa” a “domestic terrorist organization” (despite the fact that this designation does not exist); and issued a bizarre report alleging a vast Cuba-led conspiracy propping up “powerful leftist nonprofits, anti-ICE collectives, socialist groups, and Marxist militant organizations across the United States.” What will this all mean for those who express disagreement with the U.S. government’s foreign policy regarding Israel or Cuba? What about those who “support” Palestine Action by asserting they have been improperly designated? What about nonprofits that fund and organize activism? What about those peacefully attending a law-abiding protest where others take rogue actions? It all comes back to the core question: “what is terrorism?” The clear answer is that those in power get to decide. In the post-9/11 era, the public became accustomed to the president, prosecutors, immigration enforcement agents and other national security officials wielding unchecked powers to target those they deemed “terrorists.” The folly in this foundational premise is now clearer than ever, as the term continues to be weaponized and politicized against disfavored populations. But, of course, it has always been a faulty system. Treating “terrorism” as something different from mere crime, considering crimes to be acts of war, framing protest as treason, and accepting that “terrorism” requires extraordinary extra-legal mechanisms to counter it — these are the load-bearing columns that have supported the War on Terror for nearly 25 years. --- ### After Iran, US signals major security shift in the Middle East **Published:** August 31, 2026 | **Author:** Abdelrahim Shalaby | **Section:** Middle East **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/us-withdrawal-from-middle-east/.md When President Donald Trump congratulated Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan for signing the Mecca Pact, describing it as a “BIG, BOLD, IMPORTANT FIRST STEP,” he was not simply trafficking in diplomatic pleasantries. The Trump administration also tacitly endorsed a multilateral, Saudi-led maritime initiative to protect shipping in the Red Sea, sending senior U.S. military officials to the meeting where the arrangement was agreed to. The thread running through both initiatives is clear: regional states taking greater responsibility for their own security. Behind Trump’s flattery, something more important appears to be taking shape. According to Pentagon planning reported by the Washington Post, the Defense Department is exploring a broader reduction of its forces in the Persian Gulf, which would entail moving units, command centers and aerial capabilities west toward Jordan, Israel and Saudi Arabia’s Red Sea coast. This would mean abandoning large, fixed bases in favor of small, hardened positions. The Pentagon views the destruction caused by Iranian attacks on U.S. bases in the Persian Gulf as a “once-in-a-generation chance,” in the Post’s words, to rethink America’s force posture in the region instead of simply rebuilding it. After six months of war with Iran, the efforts suggest that the U.S. is considering a dramatic adjustment to its force posture in the Middle East — one that would put far more emphasis on regional self-sufficiency. But it’s a far cry from a U.S. withdrawal from the region. The logic for the potential adjustments is straightforward. Moving troops to Jordan, Israel and the west coast of Saudi Arabia places them behind better air defenses, giving them longer warning times in case of future Iranian attacks, while maintaining the ability to carry out strikes of their own in the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb. Such smaller, more dispersed bases would be a practical response to a genuine weakness exposed by Iran’s missile and drone attacks. There is an aspect of this that could easily be lost in the discussion: for years, Iran has demanded that the U.S. reduce its military presence in the Gulf as part of any efforts to de-escalate between the two countries. So any troop adjustments that Washington undertakes to protect its forces can also become a bargaining chip for talks with Tehran — one that wouldn’t involve any real concession. In one fell swoop, the U.S. could transfer some of the burden of protecting the Gulf, harden its forces, and open the door to diplomacy with Iran. There has yet to be a final decision on this issue. A Pentagon official described the military’s analysis to the Post as “prudent planning,” not a withdrawal order. Any serious change in the size of America’s military presence in the region, currently estimated at 40,000-50,000 troops, would require the approval of Trump and Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth. Still, the direction is clear. America wants to remain in the region but with forces that are smaller and harder to target. The Pentagon’s planning makes clear that Washington expects regional powers to take on a bigger part of the regional defense burden and financial burden even as the U.S. lightens its presence. Trump’s public comments are consistent with this interpretation. While the administration has offered a range of objectives for its operation against Iran, Trump made his priorities clear in a recent post on Truth Social: “The number one Goal is, and always will be, that Iran cannot have, in any way, shape, or form, a Nuclear Weapon.” This is a far more modest goal than regime change or even opening the Strait of Hormuz using military force, which would require a large, continued U.S. presence around the Persian Gulf. If stopping Iran from getting a nuclear weapon is the first priority, and that goal has largely already been secured, Trump can reduce the U.S. military footprint without it looking like a retreat. Of course, history suggests this proposed process of burden-shifting will not go smoothly. Arab states have tried and failed to shoulder the regional defense burden on numerous occasions, including through efforts like the Gulf Cooperation Council, the Damascus Declaration of 1991, and the abortive Middle East Strategic Alliance, which Trump attempted to create in his first term. But the key difference with today’s regional efforts is that they are taking place as Washington appears to be seriously considering reducing its troop presence. Such a drawdown would significantly increase the incentives for Middle Eastern states to take on a greater role in their own security. Such a shift does not mean abandoning Israel militarily. Some of the forces that would move away from the Gulf would move to Israel, in addition to Jordan and the west coast of Saudi Arabia. Yet it’s notable that Washington is openly supporting the creation of an Arab-led security architecture, including Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Pakistan, and possibly Egypt down the line, that would take on some of America’s prior responsibilities in the region. Trump appears to like these regional arrangements because they contain Iran without requiring the U.S. to shoulder the burden. The possibility that these groupings may one day restrict Israel’s freedom of action does not seem to be part of Trump’s concerns. Given Tel Aviv’s close ties to Washington, Israel’s reaction to these emerging arrangements could play an important role in their success or failure. For now at least, Israeli officials and politicians have avoided addressing them directly, even as they express growing concern about a growing “Sunni axis” backed by Turkish military power. Pro-Israel analysts in the U.S. have echoed these concerns, even as they’ve endorsed the potential movement of more American troops to Israel as beneficial for both countries. America is not leaving the Middle East. At most, it is fortifying its presence and shifting some of the burden for regional security to allies who are willing to shoulder it. A new regional order is taking shape, one not designed with Israel’s interests in the forefront, but also not one that is explicitly opposed to those interests. Whether this trend will remain comfortable, for the U.S. or for Israel, may be a more important question a year from now than whether America is withdrawing from the Middle East. --- ### New US strikes on Iran may restart war Trump wants to freeze **Published:** August 30, 2026 | **Author:** Trita Parsi | **Section:** Middle East **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/larak-island-iran-strikes/.md Despite the excitement around Donald Trump’s new sanctions and even the US strikes against the Iranian island of Larak just hours ago, much suggests that Trump is not seeking a dramatic ratcheting up of pressure on Iran. According to reports Sunday, the U.S. military hit Iranian launchers on the island to prevent Tehran from planting new mines in the Strait of Hormuz. This is the first known U.S. strike against the country since Trump announced a ceasefire in July. Details are forthcoming. Meanwhile, the much-touted “major financial institution” that Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent promised to sanction for dealings with Iran turned out to be nothing more than Egypt’s second-largest bank. Though Banque Misr ranks among the region’s major banks, it is a dwarf beside the multi-trillion-dollar giants of global finance. It should come as no surprise that there is more bark than bite in Trump’s latest sanctions moves. That is not to say Bessent’s economic warfare won’t hurt ordinary Iranians or squeeze the Iranian economy. It will. But there is little to suggest that the pain will compel Tehran to submit to Trump — or that the sanctions are even designed to inflict significant harm, despite his rhetoric. Rather, Trump appears to be pursuing a very different gamble: maintaining a low-level conflict until the midterms—neither securing a diplomatic deal nor allowing the situation to deteriorate into full-scale war. A period of relative tranquility that pushes Iran out of the headlines and, in the run-up to the elections, weakens the connection between rising inflation and gas prices, on the one hand, and Trump’s foolish war of choice, on the other. The D-Day sanctions help create the perception that the U.S. has the upper hand while increasing pressure on Iran. Together with increased traffic in the Strait of Hormuz, they make the status quo more costly for Tehran than for Washington — but not so costly that Iran is incentivized to counter-escalate in the short term. Rather, it is a slow strangulation designed to ensure that, for the next two months, there is neither headline-grabbing diplomacy nor military escalation. This gives Tehran little cause for immediate panic. Its response will largely depend on what Washington does next. I see three possible scenarios. Trump may overshoot, pushing Iran beyond what Tehran deems manageable in the short term. For instance, the strikes against Iranian positions on Larak island will very likely generate an Iranian response. Moreover, if Trump confiscates Iranian oil tankers bound for China, Tehran will almost certainly respond by intensifying attacks on ships using the southern corridor of the Strait, while potentially also targeting energy infrastructure in the GCC. China, too, would likely respond forcefully to such a move. The result would be precisely the kind of escalation Trump wants to avoid over the next two months. In the second scenario, the D-Day sanctions neither incentivize Iran to counter-escalate in the short term nor alter its medium-term calculations. Tehran reckons that, despite the hype, its closure of the Strait remains sufficient and that the mounting economic pressure on Trump will eventually compel him to return to the table with a more pragmatic posture. Though this is not the most likely outcome, it helps explain why Iran is investing heavily in regional diplomacy even as all signs point to Trump not wanting a deal at this juncture. Omani, Pakistani, and Qatari diplomats are engaged in intense diplomacy with Tehran over the Strait. According to my sources, Trump has signaled directly to Iran that he will not lift the blockade even if Tehran reopens the Strait, nor does he favor returning to the earlier Memorandum of Understanding. Again, keeping Iran out of the headlines in the run-up to the elections requires avoiding developments of either kind—military or diplomatic. By engaging with regional mediators, Tehran achieves three objectives. First, it demonstrates to its domestic public that the war’s prolongation is due to American intransigence, not Iranian inflexibility. As the war drags on and Iranian civilians grow weary, controlling the blame narrative becomes increasingly important to Tehran. Fortunately for Tehran, Trump’s categorical public rejection of diplomacy plays directly into Iran’s hands. Second, this diplomatic engagement is also crucial for the regional blame game. If the war resumes, who regional states blame matters considerably, particularly because the war will inflict a heavy price on them. Tehran needs to demonstrate to regional governments that Iran is willing to compromise while Trump refuses even to negotiate. Finally, the current diplomacy builds regional consensus around specific solutions and principles. If Trump returns to the table, an infrastructure of semi-completed agreements with regional buy-in will already be in place — built while Trump voluntarily absented himself. Trump will pay a price if he seeks to unravel the progress the region made while he sulked in the White House. But the most likely scenario is neither immediate escalation nor a post-midterm return to talks. Rather, in this scenario the Trump administration’s newfound confidence proves warranted: the combination of new sanctions and growing traffic through the southern corridor of the Strait has created a new reality in which Iran is hurting more than the U.S., and its trajectory is becoming increasingly — but not dramatically — negative. Iran will therefore be weaker in a few months, and in a less favorable diplomatic and military position. While this will incentivize Iran to counter-escalate, Tehran may choose to delay its response and wait for a more opportune moment. If Washington wants to keep things quiet until the midterms, Tehran may conclude that the optimal moment to strike back is two or three weeks before the Congressional elections, maximizing the political damage to Trump. But Iran may not limit its response to tankers in the Strait. Iranian officials say, both publicly and privately, that they expect the U.S. and Israel to resume the war after the midterms regardless of the impact of the D-Day sanctions. Regional diplomats have largely reached the same conclusion. If sanctions weaken Iran over time while the global economy recovers and adjusts to the new reality in the Strait, a prolonged pause will work against Tehran. Iran may therefore decide to escalate dramatically, taking full advantage of Trump’s perceived vulnerability in the run-up to the elections. Iran appears encouraged by its performance in the second round of the war and by how quickly Trump halted his attacks. The first round lasted 38 days; the second just 13. Yet more than half of the American casualties were inflicted during the second round, despite it lasting only a third as long. While only one out of a plethora of variables in this war, the impacts of the second round suggest that American force protection had weakened, interceptor shortages had become more acute, and Iran had learned more from the first round of fighting in February than America did. Tehran appears to have improved both the sophistication of its attacks and the intelligence behind them. Iran had spent decades studying how America fought in Iraq and Afghanistan. Now, for the first time, it had direct experience fighting the United States — and Tehran has learned faster than Washington had anticipated. Still, while Iran’s calculation about Trump’s electoral vulnerability may prove correct, its apparent belief that an election loss will restrain Trump in 2027 may be misplaced. A Trump humiliated at the polls and potentially facing a third impeachment attempt may be forced to play defense at home, but precisely because of his domestic troubles, he may also be incentivized to lash out abroad. Freed from electoral constraints, Trump may be willing to take risks he previously eschewed, including deploying ground troops. After all, it was in the period following his November 2020 defeat that Trump displayed an unprecedented appetite for risk. Then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark Milley feared Trump might either provoke a war with Iran after losing the election or manufacture a domestic crisis to justify using the military and potentially remain in power. Trump reportedly floated proposals for an attack on Iran, which Milley vehemently opposed. “You're gonna have a fucking war,” he prophetically told Trump. Will there be a General Milley in Trump’s inner circle after the midterms? --- ### Did Trump put a poison pill in his own Saudi nuclear deal? **Published:** August 28, 2026 | **Author:** Yazen Zarour, Annelle Sheline | **Section:** Middle East **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/us-saudi-arabia-nuclear/.md This week, President Donald Trump formally submitted the U.S.-Saudi civil nuclear agreement to Congress for review, moving the deal forward despite continuing to insist that Saudi Arabia normalize relations with Israel before it can take effect. This condition could stall the agreement indefinitely: Riyadh demands a clear pathway toward Palestinian statehood before normalization, and Israel is dead set against statehood. Israel had strongly opposed the deal as originally negotiated, while Netanyahu had privately expressed hopes of delivering “the next big thing” by securing Saudi normalization before Israel’s October elections. Former U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia Michael Ratney described Trump as inserting normalization “at the last minute,” throwing the agreement into uncertainty. Trump’s decision to submit the agreement for congressional review further adds to this uncertainty. The president appears to want it both ways: his latest move is signaling to Riyadh that the agreement is moving forward even as he assures Tel Aviv that the deal is contingent on normalization. Creating yet more confusion is the timing of the agreement. As four congressional Democrats pointed out last month, Trump launched war on Iran to prevent it from enriching uranium, yet is prepared to grant Saudi Arabia the means to do the same. “That contradiction,” they wrote, “makes American policy impossible to take seriously and undermines any chance of reaching a durable agreement with Iran.” --- ### This creepy Israeli spy tech is likely operating in a city near you **Published:** August 28, 2026 | **Author:** Hayden Long | **Section:** Military Industrial Complex **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/israel-surveillance-tech/.md Since the 2013 Edward Snowden leaks, surveillance and debates surrounding it have become part of the American experience. In recent years, Ring video doorbell users have successfully pushed back against the company’s policy of sharing data with police departments. A nationwide movement is demanding the discontinuation of Flock Cameras, a widely adopted automatic license plate reader that gathers data on anyone who drives past. However, another concerning surveillance trend has flown under the radar. Since 2023, local and state police departments across the country have purchased technology for real-time monitoring of smart devices from the Israeli firm Cognyte Solutions LP. Israel is a hub of spy technology, with more surveillance companies per capita than anywhere else in the world. This phenomenon is largely due to the elite Israeli Military Unit 8200, a signals intelligence unit that serves as a pipeline to private industry, with a reported 80% of founders in the domestic homeland security industry having served in the unit. Cognyte had a slightly different founding story stretching back to 2018. The company was originally the security and defense division of Verint Technologies, another Israeli firm. In October of that year, a Haaretz investigation accused Verint of allowing its technologies to be used by authoritarian governments to oppress their citizens. The company’s telecommunications monitoring equipment, called Cell-Site Simulators (CSSs), was, according to the report, used by Azerbaijan and Indonesia to hunt down LGBTQ+ citizens, by South Sudan to spy on enemies of the regime, by Bahrain to imprison a famous human rights activist in the country, and by the Bogota Police to surveil political demonstrators. A year after the Haaretz report broke, in December of 2019, Verint announced it would spin off a new, independent company from its security technologies division, named Cognyte. In 2020, Cognyte was found, according to documents published by a Burmese human rights group, to have sold its proprietary CSS software, known as “FalcoNet,” to Myanmar’s military just before its coup attempt. According to a U.S. State Department report released after the sale, the regime was regularly monitoring cellular and electronic communications of its citizens, surveillance that helped enable extrajudicial killings, arbitrary imprisonment, torture, and a host of other abuses. Although the State Department report made no specific mention of Cognyte, the firm was one of only two major surveillance-for-hire firms to be doing business with the Burmese armed forces. The offending technologies in all of these cases, CSSs, are radio frequency transmitters that retransmit a signal from an existing cell tower, amplify it, and dampen any background signals. This tricks a phone’s innate connection algorithm into connecting with a CSS, allowing access to all unencrypted calls and messages. This means a CSS operator can then peek at the usage of all connected devices in real time, regardless of the devices' intended target. The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), a leading anti-surveillance legal and advocacy group, has found that the software is used in over 80 U.S. police departments nationwide. According to the group, it has played a role in a wide array of covert, warrantless searches. Worse, these simulators continue to advance. In recent years, we have learned these devices now operate on 5G and Wi-Fi bands, meaning app usage and internet searches can also be monitored. They can also be installed in false ceilings in police cruisers, which can be activated like a built-in GPS, or even specially made backpacks, both of which Cognyte sells. This makes them highly portable, easily deployable, and extremely difficult to track. Starting in 2022, the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) purchased Cognyte hardware to monitor the cell phones of Haitian refugees, with a further contract being finalized in 2024. That same year, Albuquerque PD awarded Cognyte a contract to be its sole Cell-Site Simulator provider. Baltimore Police Department also has a documented Cognyte connection, but it is unclear if they are still contracting with the firm. Cognyte is listed as a technology vendor on BPD’s website, but the contract appears to have expired in 2023 and, per the Atlas of Surveillance, a new CSS provider was engaged. The last calendar year has been especially successful for Cognyte in the American state and local law enforcement sector. Since late 2025, it has won bids with three major law enforcement agencies in the U.S.: the Metropolitan Police Department of Washington, D.C., in November; the New York Police Department in December; and the Texas State Police in March of 2026. The Texas State Police told RS the technology is being used solely for search and rescue. None of the other departments responded to requests for comment, nor did Cognyte Solutions. The major question remains: should citizens be concerned by the adoption of this technology, especially considering the company and country of origin’s respective records on human rights? Civil liberties expert Chip Gibbons of Defending Rights and Dissent, an advocacy organization in Washington, D.C., said that these systems, on their face, are violating Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable searches based on their tendency to collect more data than those of their specific target. ”I can’t imagine why law enforcement would want to use this technology unless the goal is…. to create a dragnet under the mistaken belief that new technology is somehow exempt from existing protections,” Gibbons told RS. Cognyte and its predecessor Verint are not outliers in aiding human rights abuses. Israeli defense and security firms are known to test their technologies on Palestinian citizens in the West Bank or Gaza, raising concerns even before their products are widely distributed. And despite the Israeli government’s role in approving and licensing arms exports, many Israeli firms continue to face accusations of misconduct. Firms such as Cellebrite, which sells hardware to hack locked phones, and NSO Group, a purveyor of “zero-click” malware that assumes control of a smartphone without any user interaction, are facing international scrutiny, in part, because of sales to repressive governments. Most of the contracts noted above displaced incumbent vendors. So why are agencies switching to Cognyte? It is hard to say at the moment. Part of the trend may be due to a highly usable AI-enabled data dashboard, dubbed “NEXYTE”, that, according to the company’s website, “allows law enforcement to connect the dots faster.” Public demonstrations featured on the site show a data-fusion system that takes publicly available information, like social media posts, and combines it with police investigative files. These are used to create a “threat score” and link a subject to “known accomplices.” One demonstration classifies an individual as a “drug mule” based on an Instagram post about expensive perfume, a purchase deemed inconsistent with the individual's expected income level. It should be noted that, although this software appears to be Cognyte’s central offering according to their public webpage, contracts obtained by RS do not indicate if this system is included in its CSS offerings. Gibbons stated that although the technology itself concerns him, the source gives him further pause since Israel is a nation with “very permissive surveillance.” “There are many problems in the United States…however, we have something more of a system, at least on paper, for regulating the police and intelligence agencies. These technologies are being produced in a context that is fundamentally different from ours,” Gibbons said. --- ### Trump's war and tariffs are having a nasty effect on interest rates **Published:** August 27, 2026 | **Author:** Karthik Sankaran | **Section:** Washington Politics **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/trump-interest-rates-war/.md Over the last month, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent has engaged in two controversial and rare interventions in financial markets. The first came in early August when the U.S. Treasury joined the government of Japan in its efforts to strengthen the yen by buying the Japanese currency, taking a step it had last taken during the Asian Financial Crisis in 1998. And late last week, Bessent announced that the Treasury could double the amount of long-dated Treasuries that it will buy back from current holders. The theme that unites both interventions is a concern that the interest rates the U.S government is paying on its long-term debt (also known as bond yields) are rising too high and too fast, with 30-year U.S. Treasury bond yields reaching 5.3%, levels last seen in 2007. Last February, Bessent said the administration was focused on lowering bond yields. The reason is simple: the interest rate the U.S. government pays on its long-term debt feeds into every other part of the economy, including how much businesses pay to borrow; the monthly cost of a new mortgage; how fast the government’s debt burden grows; and how the stock market might perform. But this crucial metric appears to have escaped containment. The rise in interest rates is a global phenomenon. Market professionals have long noted that bond yields across the world’s developed economies tend to move together. Indeed, that is likely one of the reasons that the Treasury took the very rare step of helping Japan in its intervention efforts. It worried that a vicious circle connecting a weakening yen, worries about higher Japanese inflation, and higher Japanese bond yields could feed back into U.S. bond markets as well. These worrying trends are in no small part a result of the Trump administration’s approach to foreign policy. By driving up defense spending, imposing waves of tariffs, and launching a war that has closed the Strait of Hormuz, President Donald Trump is placing enormous pressure on markets that Bessent is now trying to tame. Of course, some key drivers of this bond yield trend are at best tangentially related to Trump’s foreign-policy shifts. One is the sheer size of debt and deficits across the world. U.S. government debt crossed the $40 trillion mark, and the Congressional Budget Office estimates a $2.1 trillion fiscal deficit this year or about 6% of U.S. GDP, a level unprecedented outside recessions. Even more striking is that the U.S. Federal government interest payments on its stock of debt have hit a percentage of GDP last seen in 1990. Another factor often mentioned by market professionals is concern about the credibility of the Federal Reserve (Fed) and its commitment to fighting inflation. The new chair of the Fed, Kevin Warsh, entered the position with a reputation as a hawk (i.e., central bankers whose concerns about inflation make them more likely to raise interest rates), but U.S. interest rates were left on hold at his first outing, even as the decision was accompanied by three dissenting votes that wanted to see higher interest rates. This has come alongside persistent White House criticism of the central bank and a seeming revival of the effort to oust Governor Lisa Cook in the face of a Supreme Court decision favoring her stay. All this has sparked worries that the administration wishes to engineer a more compliant Fed through appointments. Insofar as investors see central bank independence from political interference as an essential tool to hold inflation in check (an opinion backed by academic research), it would not be surprising if they react to perceived threats to such independence by demanding higher interest rates as compensation for higher risks. But beyond all these factors linked to the U.S. fiscal outlook and interactions between America’s monetary and fiscal authorities, there is another factor that has pushed inflation higher both in the U.S. and in much of the world: a series of shocks to the global supply of goods and commodities. And while these shocks began in 2020 with Covid-19 and accelerated with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, they have since been amplified by foreign policy shifts in Washington that have heated up trade wars and started a hot war. Soon after taking office last year, the administration embarked on two signature measures — broad-based increases in tariffs, and an insistence that other countries spend a larger portion of their GDP on defense. The latest estimates from Yale Budget Lab estimate that tariffs increase consumer prices by 0.7%. This might not seem like a lot, but when considered against a 2.0% target for inflation that will almost certainly be missed for the sixth straight year, tariff-driven inflation represents another important factor that has pushed up bond yields, threatening the broader economy through the channels described above. It is worth noting that one of the administration’s justifications for tariffs has been that they add to government revenues. However, tariffs may also be increasing government costs to some degree, and not just through the widely noted compensation to groups suffering tariff retaliation, like the $12 billion has been set aside for farmers. Interest payments are also a cost to the Treasury, and with a debt stock of $40 trillion, an increase of even 0.1% in interest rates on U.S. government liabilities adds $40 billion to the bill. Beyond this, U.S. actions last year had two other impacts on the quantity of global savings available to invest in America. Forcing allied countries to spend more on defense most likely means that they have less to lend the U.S. This might not be an issue if the U.S. concurrently reduced its defense expenditures to the same degree, but that is not the case. President Donald Trump asked for a $1.5 trillion military budget, even as he insisted that other countries “pull their weight.” It also appears that foreign sovereign governments have become less important as lenders to the U.S. (perhaps reflecting a combination of their own spending needs and political misgivings about certain aspects of U.S. policy). This has meant that price-sensitive private investors are playing a larger role, and these investors want to be protected from inflation by receiving higher interest payments, pushing up bond yields. The Iran war has made things even worse for the bond market on three separate fronts: it has increased U.S. defense spending further; led to substantial physical damages and massive reconstruction needs in the Persian Gulf (reducing those states’ ability to invest in U.S. bonds); and raised global inflation risks to an even greater degree. For example, while crude oil prices have retreated substantially from the highs reached in the early days of the war, diesel prices are near the highs of the decade, reflecting physical damage to refineries in two war zones – the Persian Gulf and in Russia. These costs are in turn likely to feed into trucking and agriculture, with downstream effects on those prices. This might seem to be an especially difficult situation for the Global South, but thus far at least, the response of financial markets has differentiated among them on the basis of region, economic endowments, and vulnerability. As in 2022 at the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine War, some Latin American currencies have been helped by distance from the conflict and the status of Brazil and Colombia as exporters of fossil fuel, while Mexico has been rewarded for a relatively untroubled trading relationship with the U.S. thus far (certainly compared to the U.S.-Canada relationship). Conversely, things have been more difficult in South and Southeast Asia, an oil-importing region that secures the bulk of its energy from the Persian Gulf, where India and Indonesia have both been hit hard, with India also suffering from growing concern that its service export model could be hit hard by the AI revolution. Looking ahead, a swift end to the war and a resumption of global energy flows seems essential to assuage worries about inflation and government fiscal trajectories around the world, including the U.S. --- ### The rise and fall of 'resistance' hero Alexander Vindman **Published:** August 27, 2026 | **Author:** Blaise Malley | **Section:** Washington Politics **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/alex-vindman-resistance-foreign-policy/.md On paper, Alexander Vindman’s loss in last week’s Florida Democratic Senate was a shocking upset. After all, Vindman had a 16-to-1 fundraising advantage and far more national name recognition than the winner — progressive state Rep. Angie Nixon. But the results reflect more than one poorly-run campaign. Vindman is one of the most prominent faces of a bygone political era known as "Russia-gate" — a period which Democratic voters appear ready to leave behind. Just a few years ago, the idea of Vindman losing a Democratic primary would have been hard to imagine. The former director for European affairs on the National Security Council had emerged from Donald Trump’s first term as one of the most celebrated stars of the anti-Trump “Resistance” due to his role in the 2019 impeachment hearings. As contemporary profiles in major media outlets noted, he became, in the eyes of his supporters, a “patriotic truth-teller,” who was unafraid to confront power. One Democratic lawmaker, Rep. Raja Krishnamoorthi (D-Ill.), told him during the hearings that he and his family represented “the very best of America.” During a 2020 Democratic primary debate in New Hampshire, future President Joe Biden interrupted the proceedings to ask the audience to “stand up and clap for Vindman.” Vindman’s rise and fall offers a window into a broader shift within the Democratic Party. During Trump’s first term, opposition to the president elevated officials (think Gen.Mark Milley, ex-CIA Director John Brennan, and Robert Mueller, the former FBI director the former FBI director tasked with investigating the links between Trump and Russia) and helped turn the foreign-policy establishment and elements of national security state into pillars of the liberal resistance. Meanwhile, Democratic-led investigations attempted to prove Trump colluded with Russia to win his 2016 election. That blossomed into ongoing narratives about his skullduggery and deference to President Vladimir Putin at the expense of Ukraine and democracy. "Russia-gate" helped to bridge two enemies — Trump and Putin — for a winning political tool. Now, as that strategy has lost its appeal, its decline is creating space for Democrats more willing to challenge the hawkish foreign-policy consensus that flourished alongside it. And Vindman is hardly the only Resistance-era figure to fall out of favor with Democratic voters. His loss followed those of Rep. Dan Goldman (D-N.Y.), the majority counsel in the impeachment inquiry that grew out of Vindman’s report, as well as other members closely linked to various efforts to remove Trump from office, including Krishnamoorthi — who ran for Senate — Al Green (D-Texas), and Shri Thanedar (D-Mich.) Republican-turned-anti-Trump activist George Conway, meanwhile, finished a distant fourth in a New York City Democratic House primary. A Ukrainian-born Army officer, Vindman was serving on the NSC when he listened in on a phone call in which Trump pressed Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to investigate Joe Biden and his son or face losing U.S. military aid. That call triggered Trump's first impeachment, and Vindman became one of the key witnesses during the House's inquiry. He parlayed that appearance into liberal political celebrity. His memoir, "Here, Right Matters," became a bestseller, and he appeared on "Curb Your Enthusiasm.” His brother, Eugene, also a former NSC staffer, was elected to the House of Representatives in 2024. "Vindman and others like him were characters in the early Trump 1.0 saga," in which "the national security state was the hero that was going to save the country from the corruption and the illegalities of the Trump presidency," Elizabeth Beavers, a professor at Delaware Law School and former national security public interest lobbyist, told Responsible Statecraft. "We see that idea not resonating with voters so much anymore." Vindman had slipped easily into the role on the Russia-gate stage, which was already lit and primed when he got there. It started with the 2016 election. Beavers points out that during Trump’s first term, Russia became less a discrete foreign-policy question than an all-purpose explanation for Trump himself. It was a way of understanding his rise without confronting it. Russia, she said, became "almost like a Disney villain." Turns out that the very reason Vindman succeeded in those heady days is likely — at least partly — to blame for why he and others lost their primaries. Their democracies vs. autocracies (read: Russia) foreign policy is not salient with the voters anymore. Another country is, however. On Israel, Vindman has previously described himself as a strong supporter of the U.S.-Israel alliance but said that no American ally should get a “free pass.” When the House voted on an amendment that would have cut $3.3 billion in aid to Israel, Vindman gave an unclear answer on how he would have voted, saying he was a believer in “the security of the state of Israel as a generational partner of the U.S.” but was opposed to a “Netanyahu administration that has undermined a two-state solution.” Nixon, his opponent, drew a clear contrast on this issue, saying she would have voted for the amendment and accused Vindman of avoiding answering questions about Israel. Vindman's entire political identity was largely built around the issue of Russia and Ukraine, however. In a 2025 interview, he declared that Israel’s success in degrading its regional adversaries, notably Iran, was “all a ripple effect off of Russia-Ukraine.” Shortly after he left the NSC, Vindman told The Atlantic’s Jeffrey Goldberg that the American president “should be considered to be a useful idiot,” and “an unwitting agent of Putin.” In a 2025 book, he criticized U.S. policy — and what he sees as foreign-policy realists in particular — for being too accommodating toward Moscow after the fall of the Soviet Union. “Vindman unfortunately displays a woefully inadequate grasp of that which he tries to impugn: at no point does he demonstrate anything more than a cursory understanding of realist approaches to the issues he tries to elucidate,” the Quincy Institute’s Mark Episkopos wrote in a review of the book in RS. “Vindman represents a post-Cold War neoconservative view of America’s role in the world that has never enjoyed a firm grip on reality, but is especially unmoored from the challenges America faces today,” Episkopos told RS after the primary. “He stands as one of the most prolific standard bearers of the Russia-gate era, a credential that may have once earned him a prominent place in politics. Yet the public debate has moved on from the ill-conceived notion that Moscow lurks behind every major problem the country faces.” Vindman’s trajectory illustrates how the politics of the Resistance intersected with foreign policy. The fight over Trump and Russia elevated a figure who championed a more confrontational approach toward Moscow. “Neocons secured a foothold in the liberal establishment which will be difficult, though not impossible, to excise,” Eoin Higgins recently wrote in the Intercept. “And the Democratic leadership was able to put off actually offering voters tangible policy that would improve their lives for a decade by focusing on delusional fantasies — a strategy that’s now coming back to bite them at the ballot box.” Though these views were not a leading cause of Vindman’s defeat, the consequences of his loss offer a window into whether the party’s future could offer a new kind of politics. Democrats tended to treat Trump as an aberration from an otherwise sound American order, and to see the officials and institutions he attacked as the country's best defense against him. "The resistance liberals argued that Trump is not normal, he's not American, we must restore normality," Stephen Wertheim, a historian of U.S. foreign policy and senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, told RS. "The other approach was: Trump is something that comes from this country ... judge him on the results." That second camp, Wertheim added, "does seem to be on the ascent." Much of the institutionalist case against Trump rested on the related premise that he was abandoning America's forward-leaning role in the world. His second term has undercut that argument. Trump has launched strikes on Iran, sent troops into Venezuela, and threatened military adventurism elsewhere. Those who said that Trump would retreat from the world stage now have a harder time explaining why the U.S. alone can be trusted to lead on it. Democratic voters have already demonstrated a willingness this cycle to challenge the party's status quo on certain foreign-policy issues, most notably U.S. support for Israel. A series of House candidates in New York and Colorado, as well as Senate nominee Abdul El-Sayed in Michigan, have won primaries this summer that centered their skepticism of the U.S.-Israel relationship. Whether this momentum extends to a broader reckoning on foreign policy is a bigger question. That opportunity comes after nearly a decade in which the party's central strategies and messaging for opposing Trump did not keep him from returning to office. Beavers argues that Democrats have a chance to campaign forcefully on a foreign policy that “completely turns away” from the militarism of both the party’s establishment and Trump. “The lane is wide open for them,” she said. --- ### Israel's Lobby 2.0: What Walt & Mearsheimer didn't anticipate **Published:** August 26, 2026 | **Author:** John B. Judis | **Section:** Media **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/israel-lobby-book/.md In March 2006, the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) denounced the essay by John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, "The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy," as a "a classical conspiratorial anti-Semitic analysis invoking the canards of Jewish power and Jewish control." In their essay, which was the basis of the book of the same name that appeared the next year, Mearsheimer and Walt had been careful to distinguish the Israel lobby from a lobby by and for Jews, but it was to no avail in the furor that the essay and book provoked. Two decades later, as the United States and Israel wage a senseless war against Iran, Mearsheimer and Walt's case for the inordinate influence of Israel and the Israel lobby over American foreign policy looks pretty good. So does their contention that the policies promoted by Israel and its lobby are not in America's interest. Eli Clifton, an investigative journalist who has documented the lobby's influence, and Ian Lustick, a retired political scientist and expert on the Middle East, have written a worthy sequel to Mearsheimer and Walt's book, entitled "Israel's Lobby: America in the Grip of a Foreign Power". Like Mearsheimer and Walt, they use the term "lobby" to refer to a "loose network" of groups, media outlets, and wealthy individuals. They do an excellent job of explaining how this lobby has grown and altered its approach over the last two decades. As Clifton and Lustick show, the lobby has changed the way it tries to influence election outcomes. Before the Supreme Court ruled on Citizens United v. FEC in 2010, which opened the door to super-PACs and unlimited contributions, AIPAC and affiliated groups tried to influence elections and elected officials through campaign contributions. But AIPAC itself did not contribute to candidates or officials. Instead, its leadership urged its members, which included the very wealthy, to back certain politicians and to oppose others based on whether they had backed or opposed measures that were in Israel's interest. Members of the House and Senate committees that oversaw foreign aid could expect generous contributions if they backed aid to Israel. Donors gave these contributions directly to candidates and to sympathetic local PACs like Badger PAC or Gold Coast PAC, which in turn doled them out to candidates. In the last decade, national groups that support Israel's government have established their own super PACs that wage independent expenditure campaigns either for or against candidates. In 2019, Mark Mellman founded Democratic Majority for Israel. In 2021, AIPAC founded the United Democracy Project. These committees have spent huge sums. According to Federal Election Commission records, the United Democracy Project has doled out $104 million between January 1, 2025, and July 31, 2026. In August, the UDP alone spent $2.5 million to oppose an Afghan-American candidate, Aisha Wahab, in a runoff for the northern California congressional seat vacated by Democratic Rep. Eric Swalwell. In the past, wealthy American supporters of Israel's government also exercised influence as individuals. Businessman Abraham Feinberg was a major funder of Harry Truman's 1948 campaign, which gained him access to Truman and allowed him to influence Truman's policy toward the new state of Israel. Feinberg was, however, small potatoes by current standards. During the last decade, what Clifton and Lustick describe as a "small set of megadonors" have backed unconditional support for Israel. Clifton and Lustick highlight nine donors, including Miriam and the late Sheldon Adelson, Jeff Yass, Larry Ellison, Haim Saban, the late Bernard Marcus, and Paul Singer, who have contributed over $1.7 billion in disclosed contributions since 2012. These contributions, they note, do not include undisclosed "dark money." Some of these contributions, like those from the Adelsons, directly affected policy. The Adelsons’ contributions to Donald Trump in 2016 were reportedly based on an understanding that he would recognize Jerusalem as Israel's capital and move the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem, which he did upon taking office. While AIPAC and the formal lobbies have influenced Congress, the megadonors have specialized in winning over the executive branch. The groups supportive of Israel's government have also changed how they have made their case for supporting Israel. When Mearsheimer and Walt were writing their book, the groups could still rely on widespread public support for Israel. If anything, the pro-Israel set in American politics had grown to include Republican evangelicals as well as Democratic liberals. Labeling politicians as "anti-Israel" or "pro-Palestinian" could discredit them. In AIPAC's successful 1984 campaign to unseat Sen. Charles Percy (R-Ill.), for instance, one of the groups sent around a mailer describing Percy as "Israel's worst adversary in Congress." But as Israel's popularity has plummeted in the wake of its disproportionate response to Hamas's October 7, 2023, massacre and to Israel's continuing expansion in the Palestinian West Bank, the groups have had to resort to deception and diversion against Israel's critics. Instead of engaging the arguments of Israel's critics, groups like the ADL, American Jewish Committee, the Adelson-backed Brandeis Center for Human Rights and Law, and watchdog groups like CAMERA and the Canary Mission began charging Israel's critics with antisemitism. "Their goal was not to win debates about Israel," Clifton and Lustick write, "but to prevent discussion about it." They successfully lobbied the Biden and Trump administrations to endorse an official definition of antisemitism that included criticisms of Israel. The Trump administration used charges of antisemitism to bludgeon liberal universities and law firms they disliked. It would be surprising if Clifton and Lustick escape being charged with antisemitism for exposing the machinations of the Israel lobby. The groups have also altered their campaign strategy. In their advertising, the UDP and allied PACs have eschewed mention of American policy toward Israel. Instead, they have attacked candidates they opposed by citing their stands on whatever issues might resonate with the relevant electorate. In their ads this year against Wahab, the groups advanced a spurious claim that she had made "teenage girls more vulnerable to predators" by opposing a sex trafficking bill in the state legislature. In Michigan's Democratic Senate primary, AIPAC ran ads claiming that Abdul El-Sayed "disrespected women." None of the ads mentioned Israel. This tactic seemed to work in 2024 campaigns AIPAC and the groups waged against then-Reps. Cori Bush (D-Mo.) and Jamaal Bowman (D-N.Y.), but as the Iran War has deepened discontent with the U.S.-Israel alliance, it failed against Wahab and El-Sayed. Mike Rogers, El-Sayed's Republican opponent in the general election, even requested that AIPAC drop its plans to support him with ads against El-Sayed. As Clifton and Lustick show, the groups composing the Lobby have seen a sharp growth in their staffs and revenues over the quarter century. AIPAC and its educational foundation enjoyed a "fivefold increase in revenue between 2000 and 2022.” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy (an AIPAC spinoff) increased its revenues from $5.2 million in 2001 to $21.9 million in 2023. The Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), which led the charge in 2015 against the Iran nuclear pact, increased its annual haul from $1.12 million in 2001 to $17.8 million in 2022. Along with the megadonors, the Israel groups enjoy the support of wealthy foundations, including the $256 million Koret Foundation and the $220 million Swartz Foundation. But the growth of revenue has not been matched by a growth in influence. If anything, the lobby's influence has declined, forcing it to resort to deceptive advertising and incendiary accusations. There are two parts of Clifton's and Lustick's argument about which I wanted to read more. The first has to do with situating the lobby in American politics. Clifton and Lustick accept Mearsheimer and Walt's definition of the Israel lobby as "the loose coalition of individuals and organizations that actively work to shape US foreign policy in a pro-Israel direction." That might have been OK in 2007, but in 2008, Jeremy Ben-Ami founded J Street, which billed itself as "pro-Israel," and which has attempted to move American foreign policy in a completely different direction from AIPAC and the other "pro-Israel" groups that Mearsheimer and Walt had assigned to the lobby. The lobby Clifton and Lustick describe represents one interpretation of what it means to be "pro-Israel." As Clifton and Lustick note, the lobby has gradually shifted rightward in American politics and in its view of Israel. AIPAC, which was initially run by liberal Democrats and had its base in the Democratic Congress, began moving toward the Republicans in 1982, when it made Robert Asher its president. In 1993, it replaced its executive director Thomas Dine, a former aide to Sen. Edward Kennedy (D-Mass.), with Howard Kohr, a Republican operative. In its early days, AIPAC was aligned with Israel's social-democratic Labor Party, but it has moved closer to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s Likud Party and its aim for a Greater Israel. It harried Barack Obama's attempts to achieve a two-state solution. Its PAC has not merely targeted harsh critics of Israel like El-Sayed, but liberal Zionists like former Reps. Andy Levin (D-Mich.) and Tom Malinowksi (D-N.J.). And it's not just AIPAC. The constellation of groups is now weighted toward Republican proponents of a greater Israel. It includes Christians United for Israel, which boasts a larger membership than AIPAC; a revived, Adelson-funded Zionist Organization of America; and the Republican Jewish Coalition, which dwarfs its Democratic counterpart. The funders have also tilted rightward. In the 1970s, AIPAC's president and major donor was real estate developer Larry Weinberg, a liberal Democrat close to Vice President Hubert Humphrey. Clifton and Lustick's lobby still includes major Democratic donors including Saban, but more of the money is coming from Trump supporters like Miriam Adelson, Yass, Singer, and Ellison. In short, the lobby is increasingly part of a conservative, pro-Trump Republican faction that backs the right wing of Israel's politics. It is opposed not only by the Democrats who support J Street — or beyond that, Jewish Voice for Peace and IfNotNow — but also by a growing group of Republican conservatives who believe that in his support for Israel, Trump has betrayed his commitment to "America First." I would have liked to know more about the political debates that took place inside AIPAC in the 1990s when it shifted most decisively rightward and in AIPAC and other groups during the Trump years. What I would have also liked to read more about is the precise relationship between the lobby and the Israeli government. AIPAC, the main group in question, grew out of the American Zionist Council, which was founded in 1949 and was funded by the Israeli government. In 1963, in response to demands that it register as a foreign agent, AZC changed its name to the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) and rewrote its charter to exclude foreign contributions. Since then, as far as is known, AIPAC has no financial or other legal ties to Israel's government or institutions. But Clifton and Lustick suggest that the lobby is "the agent of a foreign power." The title of their book is similarly provocative. They called it "Israel's Lobby" rather than "The Israel Lobby," and they subtitle the book, "America in the Grip of a Foreign Power." That implies that the lobby is subordinate to the Israeli government, even if it is not financed or staffed by it. They give one example of how that relationship has worked, citing a quote in a book about U.S.-Israel relations from an unnamed Israeli diplomat who served when George Shultz was Ronald Reagan's Secretary of State. They wrote that the Israeli diplomat: came up with the idea of "turning Israel into a Major Non-NATO Ally. We told AIPAC, which started rolling the idea up and down Capitol Hill corridors until it was accepted." They also cite what an Israel official, unaware that he was being recorded, said in 2015 to an American audience about the government's efforts to get the Senate to oppose the Iran nuclear arms deal. "We have the FDD. We have others working on ...data gathering, working on activist organizations, money trail." They summarize the relationship in this way: "Israeli government operatives do not control the organizations ... Israeli officials send signals that guide the behavior and the rhetoric of Lobby leaders and thousands of activists." But these two examples don't go far enough in making that case. The first is from a single source decades ago, and the second is ambiguous. What does "having FDD" mean? One wants to know whether the staff or the leadership in these groups have relationships with people in Israeli government ministries who send them signals. Are there examples of Israel's government persuading one of the groups to do something it had not thought of doing or was wary of undertaking? Answering these questions about the group's political evolution or its precise relationship to the Israeli government would have required trying to get people who have worked in these groups to talk candidly about what went on. That kind of journalism is, perhaps, beyond the call of duty for this book. What Clifton and Lustick have provided is a comprehensive and much-needed account of how the groups and individuals that make up the lobby have attempted to influence American politics and policy. That's quite an achievement, and anyone interested in America's relationship with Israel should pick up Clifton and Lustick's book. --- ### Trump wants to stabilize Libya. Militants have other plans. **Published:** August 26, 2026 | **Author:** Khaled Mahmoud | **Section:** Africa **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/libya-trump/.md A series of crises have roiled Libya over the last month, undermining a U.S.-led initiative to resolve the country’s profound political predicament and open its markets to American investment. Violent protests over deteriorating living conditions have surged in western cities under the control of Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh, just as a series of drone strikes have hit energy and oil facilities in the city of Zawia, west of Tripoli. In the east near Benghazi, which is under the authority of strongman Khalifa Haftar, unknown assailants assassinated Major General Fawzi al-Mansouri, Haftar’s head of military intelligence. This chaotic stretch of events prompted the U.S. to belatedly recognize that the deteriorating security situation could undermine its peace initiative. In a tone reflecting concern over the spiraling situation, Massad Boulos, President Donald Trump’s adviser for Arab and African affairs, said the attacks “underscore the need for unified, professional military and security institutions capable of providing security for the Libyan people.” So far, Boulos has succeeded in bringing together military commanders from eastern and western Libya in joint exercises as well as bilateral meetings. But these nascent efforts are a far cry from an actual unification of military institutions. Without progress on that front, there is little hope of achieving a lasting political solution. --- ### Lindsey Graham's sister wins. The War Party wins. We lose, again. **Published:** August 26, 2026 | **Author:** Jack Hunter | **Section:** Washington Politics **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/lindsey-graham-sister-wins/.md Darline Graham won the Republican primary Tuesday and will likely win a full-term to fill her late brother Lindsey Graham’s U.S. Senate seat in the ruby red state of South Carolina in the upcoming November election. According to the latest tallies Tuesday night, Graham, who was appointed to her brother’s seat after his death in July, beat her opponent Rep. Ralph Norman, 53% to 46%. It’s a curious turn of events in a modern era where there are very few displays of hereditary power, but she had the full backing of the Republican establishment and the fulsome endorsement of President Donald Trump days before today’s primary runoff. To be sure, her self-confessed lack of foreign policy experience or even knowledge won’t be a bad thing for Trump. Graham has all but said she will follow her brother’s career-long support of a militarized U.S. foreign policy, which means she is likely to be no critic of Trump’s failing war in the Middle East. A win for the War Party, but a loss for the rest of us. Graham was given a chance to display her merits last Thursday when she was asked in a debate with Norman if Taiwan and the South China Sea were national security issues for the United States. “I’m just going to be honest here. I’m … not that informed on national security,” Graham replied. “But I do support the military." Many thought this gaffe would sink her. Not a chance. This just wasn’t Norman’s time. He has a mixed foreign policy record, yet campaigned on “peace through strength” and now-dated MAGA “no more forever wars” sloganeering. In the same debate Graham flubbed, he said of the Iran War, that “(Trump’s) going to have to tell the American people what it’s going to take if the Straits of Hormuz are still dominated by a country that’s supposed to be decimated.” Despite having voted more with Trump’s agenda than any other South Carolina Republican, Norman could not compete with the idea that Lindsey Graham’s sister somehow deserved the president’s endorsement more. Don’t think her potential rubber stamp for the military didn’t have a lot to do with that. Trump told reporters at the Graham rally four days ago that “she’s going to do what the military wants, and really what the president wants.” What the “military wants”? What the “president wants”? Is that the role of a U.S. Senator representing South Carolina? (Graham’s) candidacy has been bolstered by support from at least three political action committees, coordination with a national Republican Party group, and donations from “large business executives”, while Norman has done more self-fundraising, The State newspaper in Columbia reported on August 19. Some of Graham’s big backers include the PAC raising funds on behalf of major aerospace manufacturer Boeing, the CEO of private equity firm Blackstone, the head of public policy for TikTok, and an executive at Palantir, one of the most influential defense and surveillance technology contractors in the world today. Super PAC "Security is Strength", which was created for her brother a decade ago, pledged $900,000 for Graham in July. Palmetto Action spent $1.26 million targeting Norman, according to Federal Election Commission records. There was something ironic in the Security is Strength support of Graham after she admitted national security wasn’t her strength. Still this Columbia-based “neocon PAC”, which says it “is dedicated to promoting a strong national defense, conservative judicial philosophy, and the protection of traditional values,” was created in 2015 to support Lindsey Graham's 2016 Republican presidential primary run — the key purpose of which was to kill any potential momentum for fellow candidate and restraint advocate, Sen. Rand Paul (R-KY). The late Graham was clear a decade ago about who was bankrolling this PAC. “If I were a defense contractor, I’d be big time for Lindsey Graham, because I’ve been forward-leaning on rebuilding our military," he said at the time. “It’s not surprising, then, that the same warmongers who subsidized Graham are now subsidizing his sister — fully aware of her unwavering allegiance to Trump’s escalating war in Iran,” wrote Will Folks of South Carolina-based FITS News in July. Having an unquestioning Iran war supporter in Lindsey Graham’s seat certainly seems important to Sean Hannity, who promptly hosted Darline Graham on his Fox News show the night after her disastrous debate gaffe. “I bet based on all your time with your brother, that you know probably everything about the Middle East,” Hannity said to her, as if she received this knowledge through osmosis. “Absolutely,” she replied. “I know national security is important. We have a wonderful commander in chief.” “I know that we need to stand with the Israel,” Graham also exclaimed (emphasis added). Next to Graham on screen was a "Darline's Graham's Policy Positions" scroll letting Fox News viewers know the totality of her ostensibly conservative positions. Graham attempted to clarify and divert, “I tripped up on one question last night, regarding Taiwan. I don't speak politician. I was just honest. Of course, Taiwan is our friend.” “But I think people in South Carolina are more worried about boys in girls sports,” she went on. On Monday, Hannity made clear that he was supporting Graham and also interviewed South Carolina’s other senator, Sen. Tim Scott (R-S.C.) to explain why he, too, was supporting her. The reliably hawkish Sen. Tom Cotton (R-Ark.) and neocon pundit Mark Levin had already endorsed Graham. “What I really want you to do is pretend, please, that I’m on the ballot,” Donald Trump told South Carolina voters at the Darline Graham rally on Friday. “Just come and vote. It’s so important,” Trump pleaded. No doubt for the president and others invested in America’s current and future wars, it was important to vote for the sister of Lindsey Graham. South Carolina did. --- ### After 6 months of war, why aren't oil prices even higher? **Published:** August 25, 2026 | **Author:** Sam Fraser | **Section:** Middle East **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/iran-war-oil-prices/.md For decades, the potential closure of the Strait of Hormuz has been considered the ultimate doomsday scenario for global oil markets. So, when Iran effectively closed the Strait earlier this year in response to the joint U.S.-Israeli assault, many analysts warned that oil prices could skyrocket to record highs. The logic was straightforward. Prior to the war, about 20% of the global oil supply transited the Strait. A loss of supply on this scale could easily have pushed oil prices to $150 or even $200 per barrel — but it didn’t. Instead, prices peaked around $120 per barrel in April and have largely stayed below $100 since June. To understand the dynamics that have so far prevented an even higher price spike, and to get a sense of where oil supply and prices may be headed as the conflict drags on, I spoke with Rory Johnston, a leading oil markets analyst and the author of the Commodity Context blog. Our conversation has been edited for length and clarity. Sam Fraser: Let’s talk about why we haven’t seen the $150-200 per barrel oil prices that you warned about early in the war. You’ve pointed to a few reasons, including China's massive import cuts. As we understand it, what has China done with their oil imports and how have they managed it? Rory Johnston: It’s a bit of a mystery. At this stage, what we know for sure is that China reduced its crude oil imports by over five million barrels a day, roughly 45% of their total pre-war import appetite. For China, there's two endpoints of that crude oil balance: into a refinery or into storage. We know that China had been building up a massive volume of strategic reserves prior to the war. Essentially half of the 5 million barrels a day reduction can be explained roughly by reductions in refining runs in China. The remainder is a question of balancing in and out of stockpiles. Some of it would've been likely a drawdown of less visible or underground stockpiles. And the other portion of it is the halting of that prior pace of stockpile building. The main debate is how much each of these factors is contributing. If, let's say, 80% of that remainder is a halt to prior purchases that were building strategic stocks, that is a bearish outcome for oil prices because it means that Beijing doesn't need to replace those volumes anytime soon. But if they are aggressively drawing down less visible strategic stocks right now, that's a much more bullish interpretation because it means they can't keep going on forever and they're going to need to replace those stockpiles. On the refined product side, they cut refining runs by about 2.5 to 3 million barrels a day. What are they doing with that prior flow of diesel, jet fuel, et cetera? And that's where we start to get even more speculative. Above-ground storage tanks for refined products don't have floating roofs. We can't independently verify their fill. It comes down to the apparent consumption and the apparent available supply of these fuels within China. For gasoline and diesel, each of those supplies have apparently fallen by about 20%, which is a stark reduction. There’s no evidence that people in China are just driving a fifth less. If they aren’t actually cutting back that much on consumption, where is the fuel coming from? Prior to the war, we suspected that China was also building strategic reserves of refined fuels. Again, we can’t verify that, but if they had built that up, they could be drawing it down. We’re then faced with that same question as in crude oil, how much of this is a cessation of prior stock building and how much of this is the drawdown of existing stock? For reference, the last moment we saw anything like this in terms of apparent consumption collapse was COVID zero in 2022 when the country was entirely locked down. Fraser: So we can say that stockpiles of refined products must exist, but we have no insight into their size or how much is being drawn down or how sustainable those drawdowns would be? Johnston: Correct. There are mixed estimates, but I think they are at best estimates. It's funny, I think in some ways the lack of verifiable data allows people to speak very confidently about what's happening in China, because there's no data to rebut virtually any argument. That's just allowing people to run with it without any kind of real pushback. Fraser: How have we seen the Chinese buying patterns change since the U.S.-Iran Memorandum of Understanding and since it collapsed? Johnston: What we saw following the MOU was a surge of exiting cargoes from Hormuz. The vast majority of that seems to have routed towards China. What we saw was that, at the very bottom, Chinese crude oil imports fell to around 6 million barrels a day in June. And then those spiked back up to more than 10 million barrels a day in July, or at least that was the high point in July. Roughly a month later, those imports are back down around six. You've seen a rollover back to where we stood pre-MOU. Fraser: Do we know how long this import suppression can continue? Johnston:. Let’s say this has been entirely a drawdown of stocks, which seems implausible. Even then, they have more than a billion barrels of crude oil stocks that we know about for sure. If they want to support the market to their maximum ability, they can do that for months further. But in doing so, they would deplete the entirety of the energy security blanket they've spent almost two decades constructing. Fraser: Let’s move on to the strategic petroleum reserve releases by the U.S. and other partners. To what degree have those been instrumental in keeping prices from going a lot higher? Johnston: It’s part of the suite that the world has kind of engaged in to blunt those effects. This is the largest release of strategic stocks on record. Depending on the exact month you're talking about, it has potentially been over 3 million barrels a day of incremental supply coming from OECD SPRs. Without that, the market would've been much tighter and we likely wouldn't have experienced the same relief even with China's import cut at the same time. Fraser: Last week the U.S. SPR dipped under 300 million barrels. There's a lot of discussion of what the physical limits on those stockpiles are given that they're stored in salt caverns. They need a certain amount of fill to maintain structural integrity. Are we anywhere close to pushing up against the U.S. ability to continue drawing down from those stockpiles? Johnston: I do not believe we are. I think that you have probably at least another 200 million barrels that can be readily drawn down. With the required fill level, absolutely it would be a massive issue if you just drew it down and left a vacuum in there. It would implode on itself. But they don't do that. They one-to-one replace a barrel of crude oil extracted with a barrel of saturated brine. So theoretically it should maintain the same fill. The issue for SPRs is not necessarily fill level, but number of refill and empty cycles. It's the actual up-and-down motion that disturbs and further erodes the walls and structural integrity. I think that the SPR caverns can get below 100 million barrels of fill before we run into any issues. Fraser: So if we continued the current rate of drawdown, that would take us well into next year. Johnston: Correct. Fraser: Over the course of the war, Trump or someone in his administration will make a statement about how diplomacy is progressing or about how much oil is coming out of the strait. And even if those are quickly disproven, there is a downward impact on prices. So why do these traders keep listening to Trump? Has there been a change in the reaction of markets over the course of this war? Johnston: You definitely get smaller drawdowns to these kinds of jawboning attempts today than you would have, say, in March and April, where there are multiple days that you saw $15 to $20 per barrel reductions in the span of a day. When you look at the history of oil, there’s a tendency on these geopolitical events to overdo it. That's a natural kind of fear-driven phenomenon. In some ways Trump has short-circuited that normal behavior in oil markets. Because while you're right that it's never coming true, the price action is coming true. At the end of the day, for prices to go higher, you need traders to bid higher. And if they bid higher and they get blown out of the water and they lose their jobs, they're going to be replaced by someone that doesn't bid higher on geopolitical risk. It has successfully arrested the upside volatility. But if we keep getting tighter, markets will continue to respond higher; we just won't get those runaway phenomena that we would've seen historically. Fraser: Since the start of the war, we’ve seen Saudi Arabia and the UAE successfully use pipelines as an alternative route to get oil out of the Gulf. How much oil are those getting out at this point? And has the Houthi blockade of Saudi shipping in the Red Sea had a meaningful effect on this? Johnston: The total volume coming out of Emirates at Fujairah and then the west coast of Saudi Arabia and the Red Sea rose to about 6-7 million barrels. It was about 2-3 million before, so that was an incremental change of 4-5 million barrels. To your question with the Houthis, it has absolutely been having an effect. As soon as they started attacking Saudi ships, the entire Red Sea fleet went dark. Everyone turned off their transponders, making it much harder to verify flows out of Saudi Arabia. Verifiable transits of Saudi tankers through the Bab al-Mandab have gone functionally to zero. They still are probably getting some out, but we're also seeing evidence of flows north into the Mediterranean. Pre-war flows here were around a million barrels a day, give or take. That's jumped over the past week or two to around 2.5 million barrels a day, presumed Saudi flow. Over the past two weeks, we've also seen Saudi Arabia begin loading tankers in the Gulf again, which they hadn't done since the collapse of the MOU. And the question is, does Riyadh know something? Is something big going to break in the Hormuz negotiations? Or are they being forced back into the Gulf? You're seeing reports now that they are participating in the Emirati-led shuttle trade, ship-to-ship transfers in the Gulf of Oman. It seems likely that some of that is displaced barrels coming back from the Red Sea. So Saudi Arabia is needing to diversify away from its diversification. There's a poetic side to it. Fraser: Pulling all these factors together, where are we left in terms of a kind of global supply shortage? And what kinds of price impacts can we expect if that persists over the next few months? Johnston: It's very hard to estimate global balance right now. My bet would be 2-4 million barrels a day undersupplied on a global basis. The rub on top of that is that we now have a parallel crisis that's emerging on the refining side of the slate. So even if we've sorted out what was happening on the crude oil side, we have the Ukrainian hammering of Russian refineries, the attacks in the Black Sea, the reduction in U.S. exports now that stocks have drawn down, and China is not exporting refined products either. All together this further tightens global refined product markets. If this persists and we keep drawing down crude oil stocks, the crude oil price is going to keep rising. On top of that, we could see refined product prices independently going higher. So that's just an amplification. For consumers, it's refined product prices and not crude oil that are going to drive those economic issues. Fraser: So even though these factors we’ve discussed have kept oil prices down so far, and the biggest of these can persist for a while, we could still be looking at those extremely elevated prices by a few months from now. Johnston: Easily. We're already feeling it. Refined prices are already at demand-destructive levels. It's just a question of whether they are at sufficiently demand-destructive levels. It’s the same fundamental concern I would've had back in April, playing out on a much longer timeline and now more on the product side than the entire oil complex. --- ### Turns out having nukes provided the US very little leverage **Published:** August 25, 2026 | **Author:** Sina Azodi | **Section:** Middle East **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/us-nukes-iran-war/.md For decades, the United States treated the prospect of an Iranian nuclear weapon as an intolerable threat. Yet when Washington and Tehran went to war twice in roughly a year, America’s own nuclear arsenal provided remarkably little leverage. In June 2025, the United States joined Israel in attacking Iran’s nuclear facilities. Iran retaliated against Israeli territory and a U.S. air base in Qatar. The following year, a far larger U.S.-Israeli campaign killed Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and much of Iran’s senior military leadership while striking the country’s nuclear, military, energy, and transportation infrastructure. Tehran responded by attacking Israel, U.S. bases across the Persian Gulf, and regional energy infrastructure. In neither war did America’s overwhelming nuclear superiority prevent Iranian retaliation or compel Tehran to capitulate. The paradox is striking: the weapon the U.S. had long insisted Iran must never possess proved largely incapable of shaping Tehran’s calculations, or determining the course of a war of choice that has consumed Trump’s presidency. Indeed, nothing in Iran’s observable behavior during the conflict suggests that the prospect of American or Israeli nuclear use materially shaped its wartime decisions. Aside from President Donald Trump’s occasional angry outbursts on social media, Washington issued no explicit nuclear threats, and there is no public evidence that Iranian leaders regarded nuclear escalation as a plausible wartime contingency. It was only after hostilities ended that Brig. Gen. Mohammad Reza Naghdi, a senior Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) commander, publicly warned that any U.S. use of nuclear weapons would be a “mistake.” Tehran’s wartime choices — including the decision to close the Strait of Hormuz — were responses to conventional military and economic pressure, not to America’s nuclear arsenal. Iran fought what its leaders regarded as a war of survival against two nuclear-armed states without visibly adjusting its strategy to account for possible nuclear use. Instead, Tehran relied on pre-existing capabilities. As Alireza Salimi, a lawmaker and member of the Iranian parliament’s presiding board, put it, “Under the current circumstances, the Strait of Hormuz is more valuable to us than a nuclear bomb.” The Iran war is the latest example of a pattern stretching from the Falklands War in 1982 to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. When a nuclear-armed state’s survival is not at stake, its nuclear arsenal provides remarkably little leverage to compel an adversary’s submission. Three wars involving nuclear powers across more than four decades point to the same conclusion: nuclear weapons may constrain escalation, but they rarely determine political outcomes. --- ### Forest fires just the beginning of Israel's destruction of Lebanon **Published:** August 25, 2026 | **Author:** Janet Abou-Elias | **Section:** Middle East **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/israel-destroy-south-lebanon/.md For two years, Israel's war in Lebanon has been measured largely in a human toll: the dead, the wounded, the displaced. What has drawn far less attention is the destruction of the land itself. Across southern Lebanon, a combination of incendiary munitions, systematic demolitions, and now aerial herbicide spraying has degraded large stretches of Lebanese territory to the point where it is difficult to farm, unsafe to inhabit, and in many places, unrecognizable. American money and American weapons are behind nearly all of it. Since the attacks on Lebanon escalated in late 2024, Israeli forces have made extensive use of white phosphorus munitions across the south of Lebanon. The Israeli military's stated rationale is that phosphorus shells serve as smoke screens to mask troop movements and deny Hezbollah fighters cover; officials have denied using them intentionally to start fires. But that rationale does not hold up well against the pattern of use. Investigations by outlets including Al Jazeera have documented phosphorus shelling that torched oak and pine forests, destroyed decades- and centuries-old olive groves, and left soil contaminated with lead and other heavy metals. These effects persist long after any potential tactical need for concealment has passed. Lebanon's National Council for Scientific Research has estimated $25 billion in environmental damages from strikes between 2023 and 2024 alone, including thousands of hectares of destroyed forest and orchard. Reporting from the border village of Ayta ash-Shaab documented the destruction of the Monk Forest, one of the last intact woodland refuges in the border zone, through phosphorus shelling and bulldozing that left what satellite imagery shows as white craters scattered across what had been continuous forest cover. Where munitions have not flattened border villages outright, Israeli forces have often finished the job with remote-detonated explosives that level entire neighborhoods in seconds. Israel's official justification is narrower than the phosphorus rationale: that Hezbollah has embedded military infrastructure – tunnels, weapons caches, command posts – inside civilian buildings over decades. But the scale, method, and permanence of what has followed makes that justification fall flat. The Guardian reviewed footage of mass detonations in the villages of Taybeh, Naqoura, and Deir Seryan, in each case razing entire villages to the ground in a single blast rather than targeting individual structures; further mass detonations have been filmed and published by the Israeli military itself in Mhaibib and Majdal Zoun, in one case showing soldiers celebrating a village's destruction on camera. In Adaisseh and Kfar Kila, Lebanese state media reported explosions large enough that a single underground detonation was strong enough to trigger earthquake-warning systems in Israel. Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz has stated plainly that all homes in Lebanese border villages will be destroyed, comparing the plan to the demolition of Rafah and Beit Hanoun in Gaza, where the Israeli military leveled roughly 90% of homes. Journalist Lylla Younes, reporting from her own family's region near Bint Jbeil, described entire villages reduced to “moonscapes,” terrain so thoroughly cratered and flattened that residents have resorted to purchasing satellite imagery just to determine whether their homes still exist, since they cannot physically reach the villages to check. The detonations are also setting the land on fire, independent of the phosphorus shelling described above. “What our documentation increasingly shows, particularly over the past two months, is a sharp rise in fires coinciding with or following large-scale Israeli detonations and the demolition of entire neighbourhoods, particularly in occupied border areas and their immediate surroundings,” said Dr. Hisham Younes, president of Green Southerners, a Lebanese environmental organization working to protect South Lebanon's natural heritage. “But the destruction is not confined to these areas; it extends further into different parts of South Lebanon.” Israeli military maps released this spring marked a red line running through 21 villages and barred residents from returning to more than 50 others. A CNN review of satellite imagery identified newly built Israeli forward operating bases positioned inside Lebanese territory. NPR's reporting from the village of Mansouri described a town center reduced to rubble – shops blown open, homes crumpled, a mosque burned with its minaret split in two – six miles from the border but now sitting inside the militarized "yellow line." U.N. human rights experts have described the pattern of blanket evacuation orders and systematic housing destruction as consistent with what has happened in Gaza, and rights groups have said the mass remote detonations, as distinct from targeted demolitions, could amount to wanton destruction under the laws of war. In early 2026, Israel added a third tactic: aerial spraying of glyphosate, a controversial herbicide, across roughly 11 miles of the southern border. Israeli officials described this to Lebanon’s U.N. peacekeeping mission as routine vegetation management using “approved substances,” intended to clear dense brush that could conceal infiltration. Lebanon's agriculture ministry found levels 20 to 50 times higher than normal agricultural use, which could sterilize soil and prevent regrowth for years. Independent Dutch research organization PAX estimated between 1,000 and 1,600 acres of land affected on the Syrian side of the border alone, with additional spraying on the Lebanese side that satellite imagery did not fully capture. Israel initially told U.N. peacekeepers the sprayed substance was “non-toxic.” Laboratory testing subsequently confirmed Israel’s use of glyphosate, a chemical the World Health Organization's cancer research arm classifies as probably carcinogenic to humans, which helps explain why it is banned outright in both Lebanon and the European Union. The herbicide is blanketing land already stressed by years of phosphorus and heavy-metal contamination, compounding damage to soil, pollinators, and an agricultural economy that roughly 80% of southern Lebanon depends on. Lebanese President Joseph Aoun called the spraying “a flagrant violation of Lebanese sovereignty and an environmental and health crime.” Each of these three tactics has an official Israeli justification that sounds reasonable in isolation: smoke screens, tunnel denial, brush clearing. What is harder to explain is why, in each case, the actual scale and persistence of the harm so far exceeds what the stated rationale requires. “Heavy bombardment, incendiary attacks including white phosphorus, demolitions and chemical spraying have destroyed, contaminated and degraded these landscapes, while the extensive use of explosives has physically reshaped the terrain itself,” Younes said. “Taken together, we see this as a systematic process of destruction and place erasure, progressively dismantling the ecological and physical foundations that make return, recovery and continued life possible” The practical result is a southern Lebanon that an estimated 600,000 residents, per Israel's own defense minister, will not be permitted to return to, in villages that in some cases no longer exist in a form their own residents can identify from satellite imagery. This is not the conduct of a few rogue units. It is what the entire U.S.-armed Israeli military has done, systematically, for two years, and it calls for a systemic response. Most of what's being destroyed won't recover in any of our lifetimes, if it recovers at all. The response has to match the scale of the destruction: cut off the military aid sustaining it, before it's too late. --- ### A trillion budget but military can't 'afford' to attack mold on bases? **Published:** August 25, 2026 | **Author:** Stavroula Pabst | **Section:** QiOSK **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/military-installations-conditions-gao/.md A new Government Accountability Office (GAO) report finds that the maintenance backlog for military installations has ballooned to more than $285 billion — leaving many facilities in disrepair, while risking readiness and service members’ quality of life. This figure is a jump up from 2022, when the maintenance backlog was about $137 billion. But the backlog continues to grow, because the services only request about 80% of the funds they need for installation repairs and maintenance. “By requesting less funding for installation maintenance and improvement projects than its models and experts recommend, DOD has chosen to accept some degree of risk that mission or quality of life will be negatively affected,” the report, released Friday, found. Indeed, service members face a range of issues at the facilities where they work and live. Barracks at Naval Station Norfolk, for example, have had suspected mold since 2023. But the installation office declined requests to test the growth observed there “due to the cost of testing and potential remediation.” Another highly used facility at that Naval station had evidence of asbestos and significant water damage, GAO found. While all the station’s piers require renovation, the Navy was “actively improving” only one — leaving the rest to operate in a “degraded condition.” At one Naval Base Guam facility, GAO observed, rust build-up and algae on an emergency door’s lock could “affect the door’s functionality during an emergency.” The base’s facilities have also been prone to HVAC failures and roof leaks, GAO found, leading to suspected mold. Beyond physical hazards and operational risks, other issues undercut service members’ overall quality of life. About 3,000 soldiers live at Fort Wainwright, for example, yet the army installation’s dining facility was only built to serve 800. “The dining facility is not able to serve soldiers in a timely manner, so many opt to eat less-healthy food in their living spaces at their own expense, especially in the winter when it is too cold to wait in line outside,” GAO found. Officials have repeatedly advocated for expanding the dining facility, but the installation has not yet received the funding needed to do so. The maintenance backlog continues to swell despite the Pentagon’s rapidly expanding budget. The White House requested a record $1.5 trillion defense budget for FY 2027. --- ### Israel's Lobby: More powerful and more unpopular than ever **Published:** August 24, 2026 | **Author:** Blaise Malley | **Section:** Video Section **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/israel-lobby/.md The pro-Israel lobby is dominating American headlines during the current election because of its outsized role in competitive House and Senate races — a role that's drawn scrutiny as Israel's popularity among American voters declines. Eli Clifton and Ian Lustick’s new book “Israel’s Lobby: America in the Grip of Foreign Power” unpacks how this network of lobbying groups works to influence American politics, foreign policy, civil liberties and more. Clifton, a Quincy Institute co-founder, and Lustick, a professor of political science at the University of Pennsylvania, recently joined Alex Jordan and Courtney Rawlings on Always at War to discuss the impetus for the book. They also talk about how the Israel lobby has changed in the years since John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt published “The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy,” and how the lobby will try to to adjust to changing political realities in the United States. Clifton and Lustick say that beyond advocating for a foreign policy that does not serve the American national interest, the lobby has in recent years worked to curb free speech, particularly on college campuses. “We have the problem of the lobby’s' attack on American freedoms domestically,” Lustick said on the podcast. “This is a result of the lobby not being to defend Israeli policies because they’ve become so extreme. So it attacks American freedoms to try to suppress debate, intimidate dissidents and break the institutions that produce those dissidents.” Candidates supported by AIPAC, the United Democracy Project, its affiliated Super PAC, and other pro-Israel donors and groups, have had notable successes and failures so far in the 2026 primary elections. A challenger, backed by this pro-Israel network, managed to unseat sharp Israel critic Rep. Thomas Massie (R-Ky.) in the country’s most expensive ever House primary; while a similar effort in the second most expensive Senate primary in history was unsuccessful when Abdul El-Sayed defeated Rep. Haley Stevens (D-Mich.) earlier this month. The authors found nine billionaires who, in Clifton's words, indicate that “Israel is the driving motivation for their engagement in American politics.” These individuals have given over $1.7 billion in campaign contributions. In the Michigan Democratic Senate primary specifically, Clifton has noted, an outsized proportion of funds came from out-of-state donors who have previously given primarily to Republican candidates. As Israel’s popularity suffers in both major political parties, the authors warn that the lobby will look for ways to influence American policy in ways that are more difficult to overturn, turning their preferences into reality without clear oversight from elected officials and the public. “They want to keep the United States as close as it has been historically,” said Clifton. “And they understand that what that might look like might change over time because public opinion is swinging in a different direction. So they’re trying to figure out how you lock in the United States.” --- ### Dozens of ex-lawmakers, staff landed at military firms since 2015 **Published:** August 24, 2026 | **Author:** Julian Cooper | **Section:** Military Industrial Complex **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/defense-contractors-revolving-door/.md In the last decade, 31 former members of Congress and top staff have left Capitol Hill and joined the military-industrial complex as lobbyists or contractors, according to a new report from the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. The 21 lawmakers named in the report served on either the House or Senate Armed Services Committee, the legislative bodies that set the Pentagon’s annual policies through the annual National Defense Authorization Act. In addition, the report names 10 former senior committee staffers who transitioned to working as weapons industry government liaisons or lobbyists. These 31 former officials represent a snapshot of the military-industrial complex’s “revolving door,” through which ex-policymakers transition from setting the Pentagon’s agenda in Congress to cashing in on those same policies in the private sector. “That report we published is the most direct explanation we’ve ever seen of why the defense budget always goes up,” said John Mecklin, the author of the report and former editor-in-chief of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. The report highlighted a variety of potential ethics conflicts, focusing in particular on the growing path between Congress and Silicon Valley defense tech startups. Chris Vieson, the former staff director of the House Armed Services Committee (HASC), was appointed earlier this year to the National Commission on the Future of the Navy, established to advise Congress on everything “from shipbuilding and acquisition to maintenance and repair, workforce, training, and modernization.” Vieson is also an active registered lobbyist for two defense startups: Saronic Inc., a manufacturer of unmanned maritime vehicles; and watercraft builder Whiskey Project Group. Previously, Vieson worked as a lobbyist for Andreessen Horowitz, the venture capital firm gaining influence in the Pentagon and pushing AI integration. According to its executive director, the National Commission on the Future of the Navy aims to modernize the Navy to prepare for conflict with China and Iran. As part of this goal, the Commission will “test emerging ideas such as a hybrid fleet and expanded use of unmanned systems.” Vieson’s lobbying client, Saronic Inc., is one manufacturer of such unmanned systems. While the revolving-door phenomenon is not new, the report captures the increasing influence of a new generation of Silicon Valley military firms. Former HASC members Mike Gallagher and Jeff Miller have taken up jobs as an executive and a lobbyist, respectively, for Palantir. Former Republican staff director of the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) Christian D. Brose is now the Chief Strategy Officer for Anduril, an autonomous weapons startup valued at $61 billion in its latest round of fundraising. According to Mecklin, Congress is eager to let Silicon Valley officials into their bureaucracy. “It takes the Pentagon many, many years to acquire a new defense system like a fighter plane. With a high-tech system, you just can’t wait that long,” he said. “So they found a way around the complicated acquisition processes of the Defense Department.” Likewise, Silicon Valley weapons startups that wish to challenge prime contractors like Boeing and Lockheed Martin are desperate to hire former politicians. “If you’re a company that wants to get into defense contracting, it’s highly beneficial to hire people that understand the process of federal appropriations in the defense sector,” Mecklin explained. The Bulletin’s revolving-door report also details a who’s-who of top congressional stock traders. Rep. Austin Scott (R-Ga.), who has served on HASC since 2015, has been trading GE Aerospace stock via his spouse since 2023. Scott’s trades this year violated the STOCK Act, a bill passed in 2012 to curb insider trading. That makes Scott one of seven Armed Services Committee members to violate the STOCK Act this year, generally for failing to disclose trades within 45 days, as the law mandates. Rep. Lisa McClain (R-Mich.) is another HASC member who has benefited from military contractor stocks. In December 2025, she disclosed her husband’s $100,000-$250,000 purchase of stock in Elon Musk’s xAI, which merged with SpaceX soon after in February. McClain’s husband’s xAI shares were converted into SpaceX shares months before the company's historic IPO in June. McClain previously violated the STOCK Act for her delayed disclosure of a trade worth up to $450,000 in Palantir stock. The report also makes note of Sen. Tommy Tuberville (R-Ala.) trading stock for prime defense contractor Lockheed Martin and aerospace manufacturer Honeywell. Tuberville, one of the most active stock traders in Congress, has served on SASC since 2021. When President Donald Trump faced criticism this spring for his own portfolio of weapons stocks, Tuberville told a reporter for MeidasTouch, “I do the same thing.” Mecklin believes that laws like the STOCK Act are insufficient to curb members of Congress cashing in on defense spending. “The way you really stem this kind of behavior is to have inspectors general and law enforcement agencies that are on the lookout for them. Occasionally, take up one of these egregious cases and just prosecute it,” said Mecklin. “Unless you have a system that actually scares these people so they cut it out, it’s going to continue.” --- ### US can huff & puff, but without a political fix Iran won't come down **Published:** August 24, 2026 | **Author:** Andrew M. Leonard | **Section:** Military Industrial Complex **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/military-force-strategy/.md The latest U.S. strategy in the Middle East is defined as one of “maximum pressure,” combining military containment and economic sanctions in an attempt to compel Iran to accept a deal. But it lacks clearly defined, civilian-led outcomes, illustrating the persistent misalignment between military means and political ends. Military pressure can set conditions, signal resolve, and buy time for civilian action. It cannot determine political outcomes. When a civilian-led strategy rooted in clear end states is not determined ahead of sending military forces, those deployments turn into continuous rotations; it is how ‘forever wars’ get started. This essay is not an argument against the use of force. It is at times necessary, and even realist restraint doctrine says so. Instead, this essay is an argument that force is but one of many instruments of national security; when the other instruments of national security, like diplomacy, aren’t employed equally or greater than the military, it is service members who pay the greatest price. An earlier article laid the framework for this argument; this article shows what the habit of overreliance on the military looks like in practice. It is about what happens when whole-of-government strategic planning doesn’t take place before the first bullet is fired – leading to strategic failure even if the military objective is achieved. On March 4, 2026, U.S. Army Vice Chief of Staff General LaNeve testified that more than 108,000 U.S. Army soldiers only (not counting military forces from the other services) were deployed or forwardly postured across 160 countries. Many, more than 50,000 personnel from all the services, are deployed to the U.S. Central Command area of interest in the Middle East. They include sailors still at sea aboard the USS Abraham Lincoln. These forces have frequently been deployed to display U.S. resolve or apply “pressure” but have remained overseas longer than they or others anticipated. Legendary deterrence theorist Thomas Schelling described a difference between using force to physically destroy an adversary's capability and using force as a threat to change an adversary's behavior. The former is a military task; the latter is a political strategy, effective only if a settlement is feasible. According to Schelling, "the power to hurt is bargaining power." But when pressure is applied without the possibility of a political settlement, force is all that remains. In the 1991 Gulf War, the U.S. military stopped after liberating Kuwait and declined to advance to Baghdad. The political and military leadership (of President George H.W. Bush and Gens. Colin Powell and Norman Schwarzkopf, Jr.) agreed that continuing to Baghdad would trade a decisive military victory for an open-ended occupation for which the country wasn’t prepared. That was a wise political decision made before forces were committed. Twelve years later, the U.S. political leadership ordered an invasion of Iraq without first answering the question of who would pick up the pieces after the military had done its job. While postwar civilian authorities were established, they were deployed too late, and post-conflict planning failed to assign civilian responsibilities and resources for security beyond military control. What was missing was the whole-of-government strategy on the who, what, where, when, and how the desired political outcome was to be achieved. "You are going to be the proud owner of 25 million people,” then-Secretary of State Powell warned President George W. Bush before the invasion. “You will own all their hopes, aspirations, and problems. You'll own it all.” His warning, later dubbed the Pottery Barn rule — “if you break it, you own it” — underlined the importance of allocating responsibility for planning for the “day after” the use of force. The answer must always be America’s elected civilian leadership, not the uniformed members of the military; answers to the “who, what, where” questions must be known before forces are committed, not afterwards. In Afghanistan, the military removed the regime and won on the battlefield. But multiple U.S. administrations failed to answer what specific, achievable, and time-bound political outcomes the fighting was designed to achieve. Instead, drawdown plans were based on optimistic assumptions and insufficient preparation for a full withdrawal. So when the political decision was finally made to bring the troops home and abandon Kabul in 2021, it was done in a hurried and improvisational manner, turning the operation into an evacuation, on the fly and under fire. The 2026 Iran war has followed a similar pattern. On February 28, U.S. and Israeli aircraft struck Iran, opening the current phase of the conflict. While the military achieved its tactical objectives, there was no clearly defined civilian-led strategy to achieve the publicly stated political goal of overthrowing the Iranian regime, or at least forcing it to make significant concessions. An interim agreement established a 60-day negotiating period for a final agreement and temporarily paused military operations, but, without a clear political strategy, this had little hope of succeeding. The result has been a return to violence as both sides claim to control, or even own, the Strait of Hormuz. U.S. forces are once again deployed to the Middle East with no end in sight. What started as a military pressure campaign to first destroy nuclear-related infrastructure and then remove the regime — something pressure alone (particularly air pressure only) can never achieve — has turned into the longest ever deployment of a U.S. aircraft carrier at sea without a port call and another “forever” conflict. Ordering the deployment of forces is easy, but disengagement and redeployment are hard work. Powell used eight questions, and former Defense Secretary Casper Weinberger set down six criteria, including requirements that combat be a last resort and objectives be clearly defined before commitment. Which model used doesn’t matter so much as adhering to a model. It’s the discipline to not get into a fight without an exit strategy. This touches on one reason the military is repeatedly asked to accomplish strategic outcomes beyond its mandate. Unlike other government institutions, the military teaches strategy and planning, and at scale. It has dedicated masters degree-granting institutions and dedicated career fields, such as the U.S. Army’s Functional Area 59 (Strategist). In contrast, the Department of State has genuine expertise, and its foreign service officers execute complex diplomatic missions every day, but it lacks a year-long, in-residence, career-gated strategist program; so does every other major agency that make up the other elements of national security. The fix is for the president and Congress to build civilian capacity, tied to career advancement, to the same degrees the military currently possesses. Then, when national leadership convenes the government’s national security experts to consider the use of force, it is the civilian strategist who must be heard in at least equal measure as the military planner. Unfortunately, when the government equates military pressure to strategy, it asks military forces to do the work that would be far more appropriately assigned to their political, diplomatic, or development counterparts. Military forces are designed to close with and destroy the enemy, not negotiate or oversee political settlements. Deploying teams into high-risk environments and getting them home safely is common operational preparation. Every unit that deploys does it. Every combatant command does it. What is missing is the same preparation at the level above the uniform, from the civilian political leadership appointed over the military. Before you send them, know how, and when, you bring them back. Anything less is not strategy. It is the beginning of another long deployment. --- ### Pitch for defense treaty and moving US military to Israel is insane **Published:** August 24, 2026 | **Author:** Jennifer Kavanagh | **Section:** Middle East **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/us-israel-integration-mou/.md On August 18, Israel bombed a non-operational Syrian air base, reportedly to derail Turkish plans to deploy military forces to the installation. The move drew swift condemnation from the United States, which did not receive prior notification despite its growing support for Syria, its alliance with Turkey, and the presence of thousands of U.S. military personnel based nearby, in Jordan and other parts of the region. Is this the behavior of a “model ally”? The Jewish Institute for National Security of America seems to think so. The group, which promotes "strategic cooperation" between the United States and Israel, tries to defend this position in its new report, “Shifting the Center of Gravity: Transforming the U.S.-Israel Security Partnership.” It also lays out an ambitious set of proposals JINSA hopes will be part of a renewed 10-year U.S.-Israel Memorandum of Understanding (the current one expires in 2028). JINSA wants this "final" direct aid package to include $38 billion total and be "paired with new, mostly non-monetary initiatives that deepen and expand the U.S.-Israel partnership." The recommendations in this report — which also include signing a mutual defense pact, basing U.S. military forces in Israel, and integrating Israeli technology into U.S. homeland defense — should be rejected as threats to U.S. national security. Not only would they cost taxpayers tens of billions of dollars, but the prescriptions would make the United States less safe than it is today, by institutionalizing U.S. military entanglement with (and even dependence on) Israel and increasing the risk of future wars. Instead the Trump administration should instead let the current MoU expire in 2028 with no replacement. With a strong military and nuclear arsenal, Israel can defend itself. The JINSA report opens by heralding Israel as “America’s most important ally,” praising its military prowess, technological capability, and willingness to project military power in pursuit of supposedly shared goals. Missing from its account of Israel’s support during Operation Epic Fury, however, is any mention of Israel’s role in starting, escalating, or widening the war. These are certainly relevant details if we are judging whether the bilateral relationship is an asset or a liability to the United States. The report sidesteps these realities and instead moves quickly to a set of 10 proposals that it argues will take the bilateral partnership to the “next level.” From the perspective of protecting U.S. national interests, these ideas range from bad to insane. Among the more worrying recommendations are those that suggest the United States should form a mutual defense treaty with Israel and begin shifting U.S. assets away from current positions in the Persian Gulf to a wider and permanent force posture in Israel — including a new CENTCOM headquarters and a "regional U.S. prepositioned arsenal hub." These would break long-established firewalls in the U.S.-Israel relationship and undermine U.S. interests. Since 1975, the United States has had a security commitment to Israel, formalized in a memorandum of agreement, that promises “remedial action” should Israel face external threat. In recent years, this commitment has functioned as a de facto security guarantee on par with Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Still, the United States has intentionally refrained from signing a more explicit mutual defense agreement with Israel or basing U.S. personnel inside Israel’s borders for two reasons. First, it was Israel’s preference. Jerusalem has long prided itself on the fact that only its soldiers directly defend the country and that it could fight its own battles as long as the United States offered military support. Second, Washington feared a more formal defense obligation or forward bases in Israel would increase the risk that the United States would eventually become entangled in Israel’s ongoing border skirmishes or complicate relationships with U.S. Gulf state partners, like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, on whom the United States relied to keep oil prices low. The recommendations by JINSA, which count 43 retired U.S. officers — including 24 generals and nine admirals — on its roster discard these redlines. The mutual defense agreement they describe is framed as a narrow one that would be triggered “by the high bar of existential threat to Israel or Iranian use of weapons of mass destruction against U.S. bases in the region.” But history tells us that, for Israel, the “existential threat” threshold is met easily and often. In recent years, Israel has argued that Iran posed an existential threat while also claiming Hezbollah and Hamas as existential challenges to Israel’s security. In other words, signing onto this agreement would all but guarantee U.S. involvement in future Middle East wars against Iran or possibly even Turkey, which some in Israel have already identified as the next target despite the fact that it is a NATO ally. Of course, this is the goal of the recommendation: to ensure that no matter how far Israel falls in U.S. public opinion, the United States will be obligated to come to its defense, or risk undermining the credibility of its other commitments. Basing U.S military forces inside Israel would only worsen the moral hazard engendered by U.S. support to the country. With U.S. personnel as a tripwire, Israel’s leaders would feel assured that any attack would almost certainly drag in the United States, giving them little incentive to act with restraint. The risk that the United States might be ensnared in Israel’s future military adventures would be high. The second major focus of JINSA’s recommendations covers the sharing of military technology and joint industrial projects between Israel and the United States. Most of these proposals demand that Israel gain the same level of access to U.S. technology as is enjoyed by the closest NATO allies who have spent years working to meet U.S. security standards. That Israeli officials are suspected of spying on the United States should be warning enough that giving Israel this type of access to sensitive U.S. technology would be a mistake. The most dangerous of these tech sharing ideas, however, is one suggesting that Israeli technologies should be directly integrated into U.S. air and missile defense, specifically the Golden Dome project. This provision would mean that, if the Golden Dome project or something like it eventually covers the United States, Israeli technology would be part of its foundation, making the U.S. dependent on Israel for its own defense. The United States tried something similar once before with Israel and the project had to be cancelled. The reason? Israel refused to allow the United States access to the source code needed to integrate the Iron Dome systems it planned to purchase into the U.S. air defense network. Experimenting with this type of cooperation a second time would be an act of self-harm on the part of the U.S. government. Taken together, then, the JINSA proposals do not advance U.S. interests in the Middle East or elsewhere. In fact, they do just the opposite. They will increase the U.S. security burden and tie the United States down in the Middle East in ways that may quickly become irreversible while also undermining the physical security of the homeland. And they will do so at a cost of $38 billion from U.S. taxpayers in the form of annual military aid. This outcome should be entirely unacceptable to any American president, regardless of the specific ally or partner in question and especially for a president who ran on promises to put U.S. interests first. Elsewhere, President Donald Trump is pushing allies to defend themselves without so much (or any) U.S. support. He should do the same with Israel. The endless cycle of MoUs has run its course. The current one should be the last. --- ### Israel is sponsoring ads on Ted Cruz's podcast. Is that legal? **Published:** August 22, 2026 | **Author:** Connor Echols, Nick Cleveland-Stout | **Section:** Washington Politics **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/ted-cruz-israel/.md The Israeli government is running advertisements on a popular podcast hosted by Sen. Ted Cruz (R-Texas), raising questions about whether the staunchly pro-Israel lawmaker is indirectly receiving campaign funding from a foreign country. Radio and podcast giant iHeartMedia has syndicated Cruz’s show, “Verdict with Ted Cruz,” since 2022. Because of lobbying-related restrictions, the company cannot legally pay the senator for ad revenue. But, it turns out, that’s not the only way to ensure the money benefits Cruz. Under an unusual licensing deal, iHeartMedia agreed to donate revenue “associated with (the show’s) advertising sales” to the Truth and Courage PAC, a super PAC dedicated to “ensuring that Ted Cruz is re-elected to the United States Senate.” The company has given at least $1,738,000 of “digital revenue” to the Truth and Courage PAC since 2023, according to Federal Election Commission filings. The agreement has drawn significant scrutiny from watchdog groups, some of which filed a complaint against Cruz with the FEC alleging he “brazenly violated” laws that bar candidates from receiving corporate donations. Though the senator admitted to having met with representatives from the company to discuss the acquisition of the show, the agency ruled in his favor, finding that there was “no available information to indicate that Cruz solicited, directed, received, transferred, or spent the funds iHeart paid to the PAC.” “Cruz’s role was limited to hosting the Podcast and he does not appear to have been involved with the decision for iHeart to pay the PAC, meaning that he did not direct or solicit any funds,” the commission found. The Israeli government-funded ad revenue appears to operate in a similar gray area. The advertisements, which are part of the $7 million “I am Israel” campaign launched in June, are geared toward encouraging Christians to visit the country and see biblical sites for themselves. “Israel isn’t a destination; it’s a revelation, where every site you’ve studied, every scripture you’ve memorized, every sermon that ever moved you suddenly has an address, a landscape, a heartbeat,” Ben Ferguson, Cruz’s co-host, says in one ad. “This is the trip that changes not just how you see the Holy Land, but how you see everything.” Ferguson then urges listeners to “start planning your trip today” and tells them to follow “Visit Israel” accounts on social media. The ads do not disclose that Visit Israel is a public-facing entity of the Israeli ministry of tourism. The campaign appears to exploit a loophole in election financing laws. Candidates and PACs are banned from receiving any funding “directly or indirectly” from foreign nationals, according to the FEC. But Cruz would only run afoul of campaign finance laws if Israel explicitly earmarked its contribution to go to the PAC, said Craig Holman, a leading expert on campaign finance laws and an ethics lobbyist at Public Citizen. “Assuming there is no formal agreement, then the money is considered iHeartRadio funds, with which it can do as it pleases,” Holman said. Holman blamed court decisions like Citizens United for opening the path to Cruz’s “surreptitious financial arrangement” with iHeartMedia. “The courts have fabricated a myth that outside groups are ‘independent’ of candidates and therefore fall outside the campaign finance limits and disclosure laws,” Holman told RS. “So, wealthy interests and even foreign governments launder money to outside groups with the explicit intent of the outside group spending that money to support a specific candidate. Israel is exploiting this court-created loophole.” Neither Cruz nor iHeartMedia responded to requests for comment about whether the Truth and Courage PAC has received or will receive money from the “I am Israel” campaign. RS also reached out to a representative of the PAC, who did not respond. iHeartRadio’s last publicly disclosed donation to the PAC was in May. The PAC does not share detailed information about the ad revenue it receives from iHeartMedia, and it does not have to reveal any further donations until the end of the third fiscal quarter in September. The “I am Israel” campaign is part of the Israeli government’s efforts to reinvigorate the country’s tourism industry after years of war. In May 2019, 105,700 American tourists visited Israel. In May of this year, that number was only 22,600. At the campaign’s June launch event in New York, which was hosted by the Jerusalem Post, Israeli Ambassador to the United Nations Danny Danon encouraged attendees to help boost these numbers. “We have accomplished so much in the last 3 years. We have defeated our enemies,” said Danon. “Now it’s your turn…Now you have to start again, bring the groups to Israel.” The ads on Verdict target Christians in particular. The Israeli government has invested significantly in efforts to bolster support for Israel among Christians, including greenlighting a proposal to target churchgoers with pro-Israel ads during services and funding a Bible study program taught by IDF soldiers and West Bank settlers, as RS has previously reported. The Israeli government also secretly funneled $245,000 to Eagles’ Wings, a Christian Zionist organization based in New York, to lobby over 100 congressional offices for more military aid to Israel. These initiatives reflect Israel’s concerns that it is losing influence among American evangelicals. While they have long been one of the most influential pro-Israel constituencies in the U.S., that support is now slipping; a 2025 poll found that only 24% of evangelicals under 35 years old support the Israelis over the Palestinians. The Israeli ministry of tourism hinted at this dwindling support in a procurement document for the campaign. The goal of the June launch event was to broadcast “a message of ‘business as usual,’” according to the document, signed by Michael Yitzhakov, chief of staff of the Israeli ministry of tourism. The Israeli government agreed to pay the Jerusalem Post around $195,000 for the event. Cruz is among Israel’s most zealous allies in Congress. “There is no military on the face of the planet, including the U.S. military, that goes to the lengths that the Israeli military goes to avoid civilian casualties,” he said in November 2023. Just last week, Cruz lauded Israeli companies for “betting big on Texas, investing $3.2 billion and creating more than 4,200 jobs across our state.” Cruz is an adherent to Christian Zionism, a theological belief that Christians have a religious obligation to support the modern state of Israel. “I was taught from the Bible, those who bless Israel will be blessed, and those who curse Israel will be cursed,” he told podcast host Tucker Carlson last year, referencing a controversial interpretation of God's covenant to Abraham in Genesis. “And from my perspective, I want to be on the blessing side.” Over the years, Cruz has received significant financial support from pro-Israel donors, including Israeli-American billionaire Miriam Adelson, who gave $1 million to the Truth and Courage PAC in 2024. And, as he told Carlson last year, the pro-Israel lobbying group AIPAC “raises a lot of money for me.” --- ### Stepan Bandera is haunting the Ukraine War and Polish elections **Published:** August 21, 2026 | **Author:** Molly O'Neal | **Section:** Europe **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/stepan-bandera-ukraine-poland/.md For the last several months, relations between Ukraine and Poland — one of Ukraine’s main supporters in its war with Russia — have been unusually strained. The trigger for renewed mutual recriminations was the decision in June by Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky to name a Ukrainian military unit after the “Heroes of the UPA,” which was the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, the armed wing of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) during WWII. Polish President Karol Nawrocki immediately reacted to this honoring of the OUN-UPA by revoking the Order of the White Eagle award — recognizing Polish-Ukrainian friendship — given to Zelensky by former President Andrej Duda in 2023. Also this spring, Zelensky doubled down on Ukraine’s determination to honor WWII era nationalists by re-interring with military honors the repatriated remains of prominent OUN leader Andriy Melnyk. Zelensky announced plans to set up a pantheon in tribute to Ukraine’s national heroes. He said, “No one can tell us which heroes will honor.” This controversy has implications for Polish support for Ukraine’s war effort. The populist-nationalist right opposition has, for example, challenged the decision by the centrist government to transfer a small number of Patriot interceptor missiles to Kyiv earlier this year, arguing that Poland’s own territorial defense should have priority. The strain in Polish-Ukrainian relations will also feature in the effort of the Polish right as it seeks to defeat the centrist-left coalition in parliamentary elections to be held no later than October 2027 (they are not scheduled yet). No doubt, Poland’s populist-nationalist right shares the widespread popular enmity toward Russia, but it prioritizes the country’s territorial defense over arming and sustaining Ukraine. From the standpoint of the right’s opposition to Prime Minister Tusk, the pursuit of historical justice for the Polish victims of the Volhynia massacres is necessary to reverse the alleged neglect of this tragedy by successive centrist governments. Those pragmatists stand accused of tactically forgetting the martyrdom of fellow Poles for the sake of a strategic alignment of Poland’s interests with those of Ukraine. --- ### 'Orcas' with likely inside info win big on Trump Jr.-funded Polymarket **Published:** August 21, 2026 | **Author:** Stavroula Pabst | **Section:** QiOSK **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/trump-polymarket/.md The Trump-connected Polymarket is likely helping gamblers with inside military information cash in on wars the president wages. According to Reuters, a report by the Anti-Corruption Data Collective found that 152 “exceptionally successful” Polymarket wallets otherwise known as “Orcas” may have traded on inside military information to place high-stakes bets on critical U.S. defense operations, including the June 2025 attacks on Iran. According to the non-profit research group, these wallets had a 97.2% success rate and won $8 million collectively. President Donald Trump’s son, Donald Trump Jr., is an adviser for Polymarket. 1789 Capital, his venture capital firm, invested in the platform soon after it was founded. Moreover, Trump Jr. and his brother, Eric Trump, continue to profit from defense industry investments as the war with Iran continues. Powerus, a firm funded by both brothers, has received two Air Force contracts for interceptor drones this year. Eric Trump has also invested in Xtend, an Israeli drone firm that is also a DoD contractor. Xtend’s drones have been used during the Iran war, via a multi-million dollar contract with an unnamed Middle Eastern government. Eric Trump became an adviser to Space-Eyes, which makes software that detects and counters drones, in late July. Donald Trump Jr. is also on the board of Unusual Machines, a drone parts startup. According to Reuters, this latest report comes amid growing concerns about Polymarket betting on the outcomes of geopolitical events. In at least one case an insider was caught betting on U.S. military operations before they happened. Master Sgt. Gannon Ken Van Dyke, who reportedly helped plan and carry out the secret U.S. invasion that removed Venezuelan leader Nicolas Maduro from power on January 3, allegedly made more than $400,000 on Polymarket by betting on the operation and outcome. Van Dyke has pleaded not guilty to these allegations. Polymarket users have also repeatedly wagered that crude oil prices would drop just before Trump would announce supposed breakthroughs in talks with Iran or a cessation in U.S. airstrikes — declarations that would prompt oil prices to fall, suggesting such bets were based on insider knowledge. But these bets can pose broader national security risks for the U.S. "Most people vastly underestimate how observable unusual betting activity actually is on Polymarket. It's all right there on the internet, and we can see clear signs that big traders and bots are copying potential insider trades," Anti-Corruption Data Collective (ACDC) co-founder David Szakonyi told Reuters. "It would be ⁠naive to think foreign-intelligence agencies aren't monitoring these markets." The White House warned administration officials back in March that they cannot use “nonpublic government information to place wagers.” U.S. Senators have since barred themselves from insider trading on prediction markets; a House of Representatives ban on the practice is also being considered. “The status quo is indefensible," Rep. Ritchie Torres, D-N.Y., who has introduced a ban in the House, told NPR. "There's no justification for allowing members of a campaign or members of the government to bet on their own decision making." --- ### Why would the Pentagon want to hide weapons testing results? **Published:** August 20, 2026 | **Author:** Stavroula Pabst | **Section:** Military Industrial Complex **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/dod-weapons-testing/.md The Pentagon says it removed 25 years worth of annual weapons testing reports from public view late last month, a move that critics fear could hide potentially dangerous flaws in weapons systems. Justifying the move, the Defense Department said adversaries could use AI and other tools to “compile disparate, unclassified data points into highly detailed vulnerability profiles targeting critical infrastructure and defense capabilities.” In 1983, Congress created the Office of the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) to provide independent guidance and oversight to the services to test weapons. The move followed concerns that compromised testing practices repeatedly allowed for underperforming weapons systems to be deployed in the field. “The office was created in response to stories of a whole bunch of soldiers and Marines dying with M16s in their hands,” Greg Williams, the director of the Project on Government Oversight’s Center for Defense Information, tells RS. The rifles had been used in Vietnam despite known ammunition and jamming issues — left unresolved during testing, in the rush to get the guns to the troops. The DOT&E office’s annual reports have also been a critical source of information for the public about the status of key weapons programs. The Pentagon apparently wants to end this public access, however. A defense official told RS on condition of anonymity that the office has moved the reports “to a secure DOT&E Extranet” to “ensure they are accessed exclusively by authorized personnel supporting the defense mission.” The Pentagon says the documents can only be accessed with a military standard “Common Access Card,” which requires an FBI background check to obtain. That’s not entirely true. In fact, Williams tells RS the Pentagon only removed the annual weapons reports’ landing pages from its website, rather than deleting them entirely. Thus, many reports can still be accessed with the correct weblink. The Pentagon official did not deny the report URLs still work, nor did they clarify whether future annual reports would only be available on the DOT&E Extranet. --- ### As Baghdad tries to please Trump, Iran tells Iraqi militias not to disarm **Published:** August 20, 2026 | **Author:** Elfadil Ibrahim | **Section:** Middle East **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/iran-backed-militias-in-iraq/.md Esmail Qaani has a habit of not announcing his visits to Baghdad. He simply appears, meets whoever needs meeting, and leaves before most Iraqis know he was there. His trip on August 10 was no different. The commander of Iran’s Quds Force, the branch of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps responsible for backing armed allies abroad, met with Iraqi militia commanders and officials from the Coordination Framework, the alliance of Iran-aligned Shia parties that dominate Iraq’s parliament and effectively chose the current prime minister. Qaani reportedly pressed the militants to keep their weapons rather than hand them to the government. The Iraqi government, laboring under intense American pressure, has set a September 30 deadline for all militias operating outside state authority to disarm. On that same day, U.S. forces are scheduled to withdraw from their last bases in Iraq. Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi, who has publicly aligned more closely with the U.S. than Iran, did not receive Qaani. According to one source close to the premier who spoke to MBN, al-Zaidi “wants a political relationship, not a military one.” Two days after Qaani arrived, another story broke about Washington. Asharq al-Awsat reported that al-Zaidi’s cabinet, sworn in three months ago, still had nine ministries unfilled, including defense and interior. The reason? Tom Barrack, America’s ambassador to Turkey and special envoy for Iraq and Syria, has been vetoing candidates for the posts, according to the report. Barrack’s redlines are not limited to groups that command fighters directly. They reportedly extend to the political coalition of Nouri al-Maliki, the former prime minister whose bloc fields no militia of its own but has long governed in a coalition with the factions Washington wants disarmed. Notably, President Donald Trump had warned in January that the “United States will no longer help Iraq” if al-Maliki was reinstalled, blaming him for “total chaos” — a reference to the political purges and sectarian policies of the Maliki era that helped ISIS seize a third of the country in 2014. Barrack’s veto, then, is reinforcing a line Trump already drew publicly, sending the message that proximity to the militias also disqualifies candidates. While Washington and Tehran engage in a tug of war over Iraq’s weapons, al-Zaidi has asked parliament’s defense and security committee to draft legislation that would formally place all weapons under exclusive government control. Failure to disarm by the September 30 deadline could be met with terrorism charges. The bill would remove a legal grey zone that has let the Popular Mobilization Forces, an umbrella of mostly Shia militias that Iraq formally absorbed into its security apparatus in 2016, operate for decades as simultaneously part of the state, but answerable to no one in it. Whether the bill can pass a parliament stocked with the very factions it targets is another matter entirely. All of this is unfolding amid the ongoing war between the U.S. and Iran. On February 28, Israel and the U.S. struck Iran, opening a war whose aftershocks continue to reverberate. Iran’s supreme leader was killed in the opening strikes; his body was carried through the Iraqi holy cities of Najaf and Karbala last month in processions that drew crowds shouting “Death to America” and “Death to Israel,” a stark reminder of how thoroughly Iraq remains bound to Iran, even as its new premier tries to distance his country from the Islamic Republic. The Strait of Hormuz, through which Iraq once shipped the vast majority of its oil, remains largely closed. Oil revenue (accounting for roughly 90% of the state budget) has collapsed by roughly two-thirds since the war began, and Baghdad has struggled to pay public-sector salaries. To keep crude moving, Iraq has reportedly been selling oil at a steep discount (as much as $30 a barrel below benchmark) to Abu Dhabi’s state oil firm, ADNOC, which ferries the crude out of the strait by going “dark” — turning off transponders to evade detection by Iran’s navy. It was against that backdrop of economic and geopolitical tension that al-Zaidi flew on July 14 to Washington, where he secured a warm Oval Office reception. Trump called him “young and handsome” and touted their “tremendous chemistry.” Al-Zaidi also secured a raft of energy deals and pledged that all weapons would come under state control, an unrealistic claim that was nevertheless music to Trump’s ears. So far, progress on this front has been halting. Two factions, Asaib Ahl al-Haq and Kataib Imam Ali, announced they would sever ties to the Popular Mobilization Forces and place their weapons under state authority. However, Mohammed A. Salih, writing for The New Region, notes that Iraqi media reporting has found the handover ceremonies involved mostly scrap weapons, and that no independent mechanism exists to verify that heavier weapons — drones, missiles and the like — have actually changed hands. Tehran appears intent on formalizing that loophole: sources that spoke to Asharq al-Awsat relayed that Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf — one of Iran’s chief negotiators with the U.S. — visited Baghdad Wednesday and pitched a plan to conceal the factions’ heavier weapons or relocate them to Iran. Three other, more powerful factions have not bothered with the theater at all. Kataib Hezbollah’s leader, Abu Hussein al-Hamidawi, has said flatly his group will not disarm, calling the recent U.S.-Saudi strikes on Iraq “a serious precedent that may establish a new phase in the region.” Washington, by the way, has a $10 million bounty on his head. Harakat al-Nujaba and Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada have taken similar hardlines, the former arguing that weapons are needed to “defend the holy sites of Iraq and its people.” Indeed, since February 28, Iran-aligned factions have been blamed for repeated drone and missile strikes on Iraqi Kurdistan, which has long been a magnet for targets because of its close ties to the U.S. More consequentially, Saudi Arabia accused militias operating from Iraqi soil of launching drones at its oil infrastructure in late July, prompting joint Saudi-American strikes on Popular Mobilization Forces sites that killed roughly 20 fighters, including Iranian advisers. Al-Zaidi cancelled a planned trip to Riyadh in protest. Then, in a smaller and more telling gesture, he received Riyadh’s intelligence chief in Baghdad instead and pledged that Iraqi territory would not be used to launch attacks on anyone. Meanwhile, U.S. policy in Iraq, steered and articulated most clearly by Tom Barrack, does not view Iraq as a discrete problem so much as one node in an American project spanning Barrack’s three portfolios. He is ambassador to Turkey and special envoy to Syria and Iraq, and he treats the Gulf states as an extension of the same brief, using them as a financing arm for reconstruction projects and loans for Damascus and Baghdad. Iraq, as Barrack said after al-Zaidi’s visit to Washington, is “uniquely positioned to connect the region through deeper integration with the GCC, Türkiye, Syria, Jordan, Central Asia, the Balkans, and the Caucuses.” Iran is pointedly excluded from that list. Barrack has spoken of wanting to make the Strait of Hormuz “an afterthought” within two years. He is betting on overland pipelines, such as the revived pipeline from Northern Iraq’s Kirkuk to Syria’s Baniyas port, and new capacity feeding Turkey’s Ceyhan terminal, which binds Iraqi crude to Ankara and Damascus and distances it from the Gulf. While this vision is coherent, it requires Iraq’s own house to be in order first. But neither Tehran nor Baghdad’s most powerful political coalition seem prepared to allow that just yet. The reality is that Iraq’s September 30 deadline is not really Iraq’s to keep. Whether Iran-backed militias disarm, freeze, or fight depends less on al-Zaidi’s pledges and legislative proposals than on decisions being made in Washington and Tehran regarding the ongoing war. A war that drags on keeps Baghdad in financial distress and the militias’ argument for “resistance” alive. A deal that returns the U.S. and Iran to the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding they signed in June, which suspended hostilities between them, could give al-Zaidi some room, but easing the pressure is not the same as solving the underlying problem. Complete disarmament of the hardline factions requires two things not currently on offer: Iran deciding the militias are no longer worth protecting, and the Iraqi state actually using force against members of its own governing coalition. The former is unlikely, and the latter could be disastrous, risking precisely the civil war scenario analysts and even armed faction leaders have warned about. --- ### Houthis may meet their match as Yemen slips back into civil war **Published:** August 20, 2026 | **Author:** Mohammed Nail Abdulqader | **Section:** Middle East **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/yemen-war/.md Yemen’s front lines have barely moved since the 2022 truce, but the war around them is changing. Ballistic missiles and drones are striking far beyond established positions, and forces associated with the internationally recognized, Saudi-backed government are responding more aggressively to infiltrations and military buildups. As commanders review readiness across key fronts, Yemen’s political leadership is signaling that attacks will no longer be absorbed without a response. Together, the developments suggest that the country’s long period of “no war, no peace” may be coming to an end. There has been no ground offensive large enough to redraw the map so far. But war can return gradually as long-range strikes increase, forces reinforce positions and the rules of retaliation begin to change. --- ### Rolling Stone hits hysterical note suggesting Putin NATO attack nigh **Published:** August 19, 2026 | **Author:** Mark Episkopos | **Section:** QiOSK **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/russia-attack-nato/.md The Ukraine war has become fertile ground for a dangerously misguided way of thinking about the dynamics between Russia and the West — one that, if left unchecked, will set the stage for a larger and more destructive confrontation in the coming years. The increasingly popular narrative goes something like this: President Donald Trump, by undermining the transatlantic alliance, has provided Putin with a window for achieving his long-held aim of waging war on NATO. Journalist Mac William Bishop offers a thorough articulation of this view in a recent report for Rolling Stone. Putin “may be emboldened by the increasingly strained relationship between NATO and its most important member nation,” Bishop writes, as a result of the Trump administration’s “contempt for allies and unwillingness to defend Europe.” Putin, according to Bishop’s sources, is driven by a kind of megalomania, a fixation on himself as a great historical leader that may be enough to push him into the reckless decision to wage war on a military bloc orders of magnitude more powerful than Russia. Putin would take such a risky step, Bishop avers, because the Russian leader wants to “remove NATO from the geopolitical chessboard, and place Eastern and Central Europe firmly back in Russia’s sphere of influence.” In an attempt to advance the dubious narrative that Trump has somehow painted a bullseye on Europe’s back, Bishop pores over a cavalcade of criticisms of NATO made by Trump going back to 1987, when “he famously purchased a full-page newspaper ad accusing U.S. allies of free-riding, saying it was time to make ‘others pay for the protection we extend.’” The body of evidence presented here amounts to little more than an anodyne preoccupation with burden-shifting and concerns over regional stability. Yet it is apparently enough for the Atlanticist cognoscenti to cast Trump as handing Eastern Europe to Putin on a silver platter. But the author’s biggest challenge in building up his case is that, try as he might, he can’t quite get his own sources to agree with him. As the lone “NATO official” quoted in this story told Bishop, “I wouldn’t say that we’re seeing anything remarkably different than we’ve seen before.” Military expert Michael Kofman correctly stressed to Bishop at the outset that scenarios involving direct Russian assaults on NATO states are “low likelihood possibilities.” Of these possibilities, the one that’s most commonly cited and treated in depth by Bishop is the “limited incursion” model. This concept centers on the threat of a Russian lighting advance to chop off part of a NATO state’s territory, with Estonia commonly presented as the easiest target. Moscow would be gambling that the U.S. and potentially other NATO members will conclude that it’s not worth entering a full-scale war with Russia over a small chunk of an eastern flank state, and that this would set off a political crisis that may lead to the neutering or dissolution of NATO. My colleagues and I have explained in depth why this scenario is unlikely, but casting that aside, it should warrant some degree of reflection that Estonian officials themselves do not see such a threat on the horizon. “Every now and then, someone claims that Russia is about to attack NATO, particularly the Baltic states. At this moment, neither Estonia nor NATO sees any indication that Russia is preparing a large-scale military attack against the Alliance. Estonia’s threat assessment has not changed,” said Estonian Foreign Minister Margus Tsakhna last week. “There are two reasons for this: Russia is struggling in Ukraine and currently lacks the capability for such an attack. And Russia is deterred by NATO.” It was true long before Trump’s second presidency that there is no ironclad guarantee in NATO’s Article V collective defense provision that the U.S. will go to war with Russia over Europe. The fact remains that European NATO is more than capable of assuming the responsibility for deterring Russia without the U.S. acting as the region’s primary security provider. As with previous entries in this genre, the Rolling Stone report comes off as a rather cynical attempt to hinder a much-needed recalibration of the U.S. role in NATO by inflating the threat to Europe almost to the point of caricature. Worse still, it conjures a shibboleth that distracts from the real challenge of how to effectively manage transatlantic relations and advance regional stability in light of the most destructive war in Europe since 1945. The threat of escalation between Russia and Europe is real, but it is not being shaped, let alone accelerated, by the changing nature of U.S.-Europe relations. --- ### An independent Europe means no more US rooster in the henhouse **Published:** August 19, 2026 | **Author:** Doug Bandow | **Section:** Europe **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/trump-europe-independence/.md NATO continues to prepare for life without the United States, at least as the dominant alliance member. “Europeans are already backfilling what the U.S. cannot any longer promise,” explained Secretary-General Mark Rutte. America's foreign policy establishmentarians have long worried about losing influence as a result. Indeed, by driving Europe away from America, Donald Trump may be inadvertently spurring creation of a serious counterweight to Washington. As CNN Fareed Zakaria warned: “As Europe’s spending increases, the continent will become less dependent on the U.S., and less deferential to it.” American policymakers, he added, might therefore regret the disappearance of the continent as a military backwater governed by obsequious nonentities, which served as a convenient base for U.S. troops to operate around the globe. The rise of Europe as an independent power will almost certainly transform international politics. And the process could be painful. One issue will be the difficulty of coordinating the militaries of more than a score of often dissonant perspectives within the European Union. Another is the return of Germany as a significant military power. Moreover, as European states increasingly talk about the possibility and, worse, likelihood, of war with Russia, Moscow may perceive a growing threat from the West and increase its military preparations accordingly. However, the benefits for America will still far outweigh the problems. Europeans’ reliance on Washington has long reduced their mutual cooperation. For instance, in 2020, years after Moscow wrested Crimea from Ukraine and backed separatists in the Donbas, the Pew Research Center asked Europeans if they favored defending their neighbors. Overall, sentiment was 50% to 38% against. Only in three of 13 countries polled did more people favor fighting for their supposed allies rather than standing by in case of war. In two, pluralities opposed doing so. A majority said no in eight, reaching 66% in Greece. Yet most Europeans still believed that America would intervene on their behalf. This fecklessness encourages irresponsibility elsewhere. Last year the European Union surrendered economically, agreeing to President Donald Trump’s trade shakedown. EU policymakers and commentators claimed they had no choice, lest they be left to their own defense devices. For instance, European Trade Commissioner Maroš Šefčovič observed: “It’s not only about … trade: It’s about security, it is about Ukraine, it is about current geopolitical volatility.” And it’s about saving money; as Financial Times columnist Janan Ganesh asked: “How, if not through a smaller welfare state, is a better-armed continent to be funded?” Concern for such tradeoffs, until recently at least, trumped quaint concepts like sovereignty and self-respect. In this way, European subservience not only encouraged the administration’s irresponsible foreign policy, but also its modern, and destructive, mercantilist economic policy. If the Europeans, and especially the EU, can no longer rely on Washington’s military umbrella, they will have to do more for their own security. This will place greater pressure on them to limit sclerotic rulemaking and liberalize existing controls. They will also have good reason to reject dubious and costly U.S. demands. And they will be more likely to confront American administrations directly when the next George W. Bush or Donald Trump decides to create another international disaster. An equally important benefit would be to reduce America’s ability to meddle around the world, especially if a full U.S. military withdrawal from the continent ultimately results. Russia would no longer be viewed as a likely existential threat, at least in Washington, allowing the U.S. to follow by eliminating both its commitment to war and the force structure necessary to fulfill that obligation. Americans could then put these unlocked resources to better use elsewhere. Thus, what some see as a likely problem would actually be an enormous advantage. True, Washington risks losing a subservient Europe willing to back its political interferences and serve as a launching pad for Washington’s military interventions. However, these policies have, more often than not, turned out disastrously. Even the globe’s nominally benign hegemon requires restraint. The problem, as recognized by the historian John Dalberg-Acton, commonly known as Lord Acton, is that “power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely.” That maxim applies even to the well-intentioned who wield overwhelming and largely unrestrained power. This includes the United States — especially when that nation is governed by a narcissist with spectacularly poor policy judgment. Washington’s Cold War misjudgments were legendary. Vietnam was the worst but not alone. Seventy-three years on, supporting the coup that delivered absolute power to Mohammad Reza Pahlavi in Iran looks disastrous. Decisions like backing Pakistan’s Islamist government, headed by General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, and funneling aid to Afghanistan’s Mujahedeen through later Pakistani regimes, which empowered the most radical insurgents, look terrible in light of 9/11 and succeeding developments. However, such errors must be understood, if not excused, by the Cold War and competition with the Soviet Union. The latter was an Evil Empire like Ronald Reagan said, even if perhaps not as militarily aggressive as feared at the time. The same cannot be said for Washington’s missteps after the USSR’s collapse. “What we say goes,” announced President George H.W. Bush, when American policymakers really believed that the U.S. was the unipower and essential nation that could do no wrong. Alas, hubris overwhelmed judgment, yielding the Somalia, Iraq, and Afghanistan debacles. After a quarter century of the “Global War on Terrorism,” nearly 5 million people have perished, most as an indirect result of the many conflicts. Few in Washington appeared to understand that wandering the globe bombing, invading, and occupying other nations, as well as backing other nations that did the same, would create enemies prepared to strike back with often terrible consequences. Contra George W. Bush’s comfortable triumphalism, Americans were not attacked on 9/11 because they were so free and generous. Rather, a succession of administrations operating in their name spent years making other nations’ conflicts their own. Unfortunately, if you swat the hornet’s nest, you are likely to get stung. The usual suspects in Washington tend to share Zakaria’s error in conflating their power to intervene internationally and Americans’ national interest. The former is often negative. Blob members typically enjoy running the world, or at least attempting to do so. Unfortunately, the rest of us pay the price. If the president inadvertently strengthens Europe, so much the better for Americans as well as Europeans. U.S. policymakers have proved that their power, like that of adversary governments, require limits. A more powerful and dynamic Europe could help provide some. --- ### Officials say 'America-hating' media to blame for USS Lincoln outrage **Published:** August 19, 2026 | **Author:** Austin Campbell | **Section:** Washington Politics **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/uss-abraham-lincoln-news/.md Over the past week, Pentagon officials launched a broadside against reports of dire conditions on the USS Abraham Lincoln aircraft carrier, which has been deployed in the Middle East for more than eight months. Less than 24 hours after Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth first criticized reporting about the Lincoln as “completely misrepresented,” a seemingly coordinated messaging campaign spread across the Pentagon’s social media apparatus. At least six senior Pentagon and Navy officials and spokespeople, along with official department accounts, published or amplified substantially similar attacks on the reporting across X and Facebook. Recent reporting by Military Times and Stars and Stripes has drawn significant national attention to alarming conditions aboard the USS Abraham Lincoln, the flagship of Carrier Strike Group 3 operating under the U.S. 5th Fleet. Reporting by Natalie Oliverio, a Navy veteran and award-winning journalist, documented concerns from servicemembers and their families about suicide attempts, inadequate food, shortages of basic hygiene products, and deteriorating sanitation conditions aboard the carrier. The concerns have since drawn coverage from CNN, NPR and other national news organizations. U.S. Central Command subsequently placed Oliverio's reporting prominently in an infographic declaring that “multiple media outlets have reported several false claims” about the Lincoln. While five other reports displayed in the graphic were labeled “FALSE,” Oliverio's reporting was labeled “MISINFORMED.” On Aug. 14, Hegseth accused the “reckless & shameless ‘American’ media” of “completely & intentionally” misrepresenting the situation on the Lincoln, later referring to “fake, America-hating news.” Acting Navy Secretary Hung Cao released a prepared statement and graphic declaring that servicemembers and their families “are not victims,” while calling the reporting “dishonest” and saying it “takes away the focus on the enemy and the threat it poses against our nation, people, and way of life.” The message continued through the Pentagon’s press operation. Press Secretary Kingsley Wilson accused the “Fake News media” of ignoring the facts and called the coverage “disgraceful.” Chief Pentagon spokesperson Sean Parnell said legitimate hardships were being “twisted into a false narrative” and called the coverage “shameful.” Acting Pentagon Press Secretary Joel Valdez accused the media of peddling “doom-and-gloom stories,” while deputy press secretary Jacob Bliss accused journalists of “exploiting military families” to create “crisis theater, not inform the public.” U.S. Central Command chief Adm. Brad Cooper offered a more measured response in a post on CENTCOM’s X account after visiting the Lincoln. While not addressing the specific allegations about conditions aboard the carrier, Cooper said the Lincoln has “among the lowest numbers of cases related to mental health” among the Navy’s 11 active aircraft carriers. He also acknowledged that prolonged service at sea is “uniquely challenging and tough” and said mental health “requires our attention,” while praising the crew’s resilience and leadership. Matthew Hoh, a former Marine Corps officer and State Department official who reviewed the posts collected for this story, said the pattern was unmistakable. “This is obviously a coordinated effort,” Hoh said. “As expected, those speaking on behalf of the sailors and Marines are being demeaned and denigrated.” Katie Fallow, deputy litigation director at the Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia University, said the statements by senior defense officials were “attacking the loyalty and honesty of news outlets” and called them “the latest salvos in the Trump Administration's sustained war on the press.” “These attacks are designed to undermine the public’s faith in any press reports that criticize the government, a troubling anti-democratic trend,” Fallow said. RS asked the Pentagon to identify the specific reporting it contends was false or intentionally misleading and provide evidence contradicting those claims. Officials were also asked how many Lincoln sailors had reported suicidal ideation and how many suicide attempts or suspected attempts had occurred. Pentagon Press Operations did not answer the questions. Instead, a duty officer directed this reporter to Hegseth’s earlier remarks calling the reporting “completely misrepresented” and to a social media post about the Lincoln. The Pentagon also did not acknowledge a Freedom of Information Act request seeking records related to the public statements and potential communications guidance. The Navy separately confirmed receipt of the request and said it was working with its FOIA office and applicable offices to process it. Hoh said dismissing the accounts of service members and their families could have consequences beyond the Lincoln. “It does not just have an impact on the sailors and Marines of the affected ships but also throughout the Navy and Marine Corps, and can have a real effect on retention and recruitment,” Hoh said. Fallow also pointed to recent Pentagon restrictions on press access, saying the statements should be viewed as part of “a campaign by the government to limit what the public knows about the military.” “Especially in times of war, the public deserves to know about the conditions of its , and to hold public officials accountable,” Fallow said. --- ### The Mecca Pact could be an opportunity for Iran **Published:** August 19, 2026 | **Author:** Qamar Cheema, Mir Ahmad Murtiza | **Section:** Middle East **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/mecca-pact-iran/.md The Mecca Pact ranks among the most momentous developments to have reshaped the Middle East since the upheavals that followed the Hamas attacks on October 7, 2023. Though defensive in nature, the agreement — which creates a mutual defense commitment between Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Turkey — could have major repercussions for the regional balance of power. Much hinges on how its signatories define the threats they must face and, more critically, on how other regional players, especially Iran and Israel, react to its creation. Although the pact has come into being amid the ongoing U.S.‑Iran confrontation, it need not be construed as an expressly anti‑Iran coalition. On the contrary, Tehran has good reason to view it favorably. The Turkish foreign minister indicated that preparations for the agreement had been underway for over two years. The Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement (SMDA) between Riyadh and Islamabad was finalized within weeks of Israel’s attack on Qatar last year and may have been partially precipitated by it. Meanwhile, Egypt reportedly floated a proposal to establish a NATO‑style defense architecture in the region. Taken together, these developments suggest that Iran is not the target of the Mecca Pact. This distinction matters in deciphering Iran’s position. One of the objectives underpinning Tehran’s war strategy was to demonstrate to regional states that an American military footprint could itself become a source of insecurity. Should Iran succeed in that aim, those governments are likely to pursue alternative security arrangements. Hence, the emergence of alternative regional defense frameworks would not necessarily signify a failure of Iranian strategy. So far, Iran has expressed cautious optimism toward the pact. “Any plan that is based on the ⁠geopolitical and historical realities of the region, is comprehensive and inclusive, and correctly identifies the enemy ⁠and the threat, has a chance of helping to strengthen security ⁠and prevent instability and abuses by the Zionist enemy ⁠and its allies,” an Iranian foreign ministry spokesperson said last week. Tehran has strong incentives to continue viewing the Mecca Pact with an open mind. The Mecca alliance has opened its doors to “all brotherly countries” seeking “lasting peace and stability,” meaning there is a possibility that Tehran could one day join the alliance. This isn’t as much of a long shot as it might seem. After all, Iran has previously expressed openness to participating in the SMDA. If Tehran were prepared to enter into an alliance with Saudi Arabia, it would be all the less reluctant to do so when Turkey is also involved, given Ankara’s role in forestalling an Israel-backed Kurdish incursion into Iran this year. Moreover, Turkey and Pakistan share deep historical, cultural, and religious ties with Iran. Iran’s broader regional narrative continues to resonate, to some degree, within their societies. These bonds do not erase differences but they suggest that neither country is likely to morph overnight into an implacable foe of Iran. This leaves Iranian strategists with a clear choice. As it has done so far, Tehran should refrain from treating the pact as an anti‑Iran coalition. A pragmatic approach would keep alive the prospect of Iranian engagement with the emerging regional security architecture. Should U.S.‑Iranian diplomacy eventually yield a comprehensive nuclear agreement, many of the impediments to Iran’s participation in regional arrangements could also diminish. The alternative would be to respond to the pact as an inherently anti‑Iran project, a reaction that risks turning into a self‑fulfilling prophecy. The alliance would then be compelled to organize its collective defense explicitly around the Iranian threat. Iran would also risk losing popular goodwill in the broader Muslim world. In this respect, strategic restraint may be Tehran’s best option. --- ### US cries foul as Israel bombs Turkey-linked airbase in Syria **Published:** August 18, 2026 | **Author:** Connor Echols | **Section:** QiOSK **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/israel-bombing-syria/.md On Tuesday, Israel bombed a Syrian airbase that Turkish officials have been helping to renovate, marking the latest escalation in the Israeli government’s effort to beat back Turkey’s influence in Syria. The strikes, which reportedly damaged an airstrip and a storage facility at the Abu al-Duhur Airbase, did not lead to any casualties. Still, they drew a strong rebuke from U.S. Ambassador to Turkey Tom Barrack, a long-time friend of President Donald Trump who is also serving as the president’s envoy to Syria. The attacks “constitute an unnecessary escalation that does not advance regional stability,” Barrack posted on X, adding that the government in Syria has “repeatedly indicated a preference for de-escalation with Israel.” The comments represent unusually sharp criticism of Israel from the Trump administration, which maintains a close relationship with the government of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Barrack’s rebuke indicates growing U.S. frustrations over Israel’s habit of attacking potential threats pre-emptively rather than seeking diplomatic solutions. Indeed, Syria has turned into a major sticking point in U.S.-Israeli relations since the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024. Trump has sought to improve relations with Syria since he began his second term last January. He has lifted most sanctions on the country and seemingly developed a positive rapport with President Ahmed al-Sharaa, a one-time al-Qaeda fighter who later rejected jihadism and led the campaign that toppled former President Bashar al-Assad. Israel has been far more circumspect about the post-Assad government. Shortly after Sharaa took power, the Israeli military occupied a swathe of land in southern Syria and launched a campaign of airstrikes aimed at destroying the former government’s military equipment, lest it fall into the new government’s hands. Turkey has played an important role in this dispute. Ankara has been a key backer of Sharaa since the late 2010s, when his militant group ruled over a small region surrounding Idlib in northwest Syria. Growing Turkish influence on the new Syrian government has infuriated Israeli leaders, who increasingly see Turkey as a “new Iran” bent on countering Israel’s interests across the Middle East. Israel has so far been careful to avoid angering Trump through its anti-Turkey campaign. Prior to Tuesday’s strikes, the Israeli military had not hit Turkish interests directly, though it came close on several occasions, including when it launched a series of strikes in April 2025 on bases that Turkey had “scoped out” for potential troop deployments, according to Reuters. As Israel-Turkey tensions have continued to rise, Netanyahu has begun pressing Trump to take a more emphatic stance, or at least to accept the necessity of an Israeli military presence in Syria. Just last month, Netanyahu took time during a meeting on Iran to show Trump a map of Syria that claimed Turkey was occupying 5% of Syrian territory, while the Israeli military was only occupying 0.1% of the country. (As the Times of Israel noted, Turkey is doing so with the permission of the Syrian government, while Israel is not.) Netanyahu’s concerns appear to have fallen on deaf ears. According to a recent report from Israel’s Channel 13, Israeli officials asked Trump several weeks ago to approve an attack on a Turkish military site in Syria, and the president refused. It is unclear whether Tuesday’s strikes were related to these discussions. Syria’s government condemned Tuesday’s attack as a “dangerous escalation that threatens security and stability in the region,” calling on the United Nations Security Council to “clearly condemn this aggression and take a firm position against Israel’s repeated violations of Syrian sovereignty.” --- ### The never-ending myth of a looming Ukrainian 'breakthrough' **Published:** August 18, 2026 | **Author:** Branko Marcetic | **Section:** Media **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/is-ukraine-winning-the-war/.md For those casually observing the war in Ukraine, the failure of Kyiv’s recent strikes on Russian territory to impact the battlefield might be disappointing, even inexplicable. For those who have paid close attention to the war, it is just the latest demonstration that there is no feasible military solution to the conflict. Earlier this summer, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced a 40-day campaign of deep strikes in Russia, with the stated goal of pressuring Russian leadership to end the war. Mainstream media wrote triumphantly about the pain Ukraine was inflicting with its U.S.-assisted drone attacks inside Russia, claiming that Ukraine was “now turning the tide,” had a “decisive upper hand,” and was even “winning the war.” But detailed analyses of the actual battle lines showed that, when the 40-day clock expired earlier this month, little had actually changed on the ground. In fact, Russia had made some minor territorial advances, while Ukraine’s severe manpower, demographic and economic crises continued to deepen. Worse, the drone attacks have elicited the most severe Russian retaliation yet. Moscow has markedly stepped up its strikes on Ukraine, including one of the largest ballistic missile attacks of the entire war, at the precise time the United States and Europe are running low on interceptors to defend it. With Russia now attacking Ukraine’s port facilities and commercial vessels in the Black Sea, the country is being starved of billions of dollars of revenue, and its GDP could drop by as much as 1.5%. At the same time, it seems that the underlying goal of the Ukrainian drone strikes — convincing a skeptical President Donald Trump that Ukraine is winning and thus deserving of ongoing U.S. military support — has not succeeded: the Atlantic reported that, though the campaign initially seemed to have changed Trump’s mind, progress on this front had “fizzled in a matter of days.” On top of all this, Russian President Vladimir Putin has now reportedly hardened his negotiating demands and refuses to return any occupied territories in future talks. In other words, the ultimately unsuccessful Ukrainian drone assault is something we have now seen over and over again: Kyiv embarks on an audacious, headline-grabbing military gambit; Western media and officials seize on it to claim the tide is turning; and then when the smoke clears, it turns out nothing has been achieved but an escalation of the war. Ukraine winds up battered even worse, and with less favorable negotiating terms on the table. In late 2022, when Ukraine partially destroyed Putin’s prized Kerch bridge connecting the Russian mainland to Crimea, there was rapturous celebration on the Ukrainian side and among its Western backers. “Putin’s Regime Faces the Fate of His Kerch Strait Bridge,” blared the headline of a piece by the Atlantic’s Eliot Cohen, who told us it marked “the moment when Russian elites began to understand that they are losing.” “Russian propagandists are beginning to signal that they understand deep down that the Kremlin is losing the war,” wrote an analyst from the hawkish, weapons manufacturer-funded Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA). Of course, this is not what happened. The attack did, however, give Russian hardliners an upper hand in Moscow and consequently elicit a major Russian escalation that badly damaged Ukraine’s energy infrastructure just as winter was about to set in. Then there was the much-hyped Ukrainian counteroffensive of summer 2023. “Ukraine’s coming counteroffensive has a good chance of succeeding,” said a fellow at the similarly hawkish, similarly arms manufacturer-funded Atlantic Council. “Ukraine’s current counter-offensive likely will be slower, deadlier, and less impressive in making immediate territorial gains. But be patient — that does not mean it will not be a success,” cautioned CEPA. When initial results were indeed underwhelming a month later, Time magazine assured readers that “the Ukraine counteroffensive can still succeed.” Sure enough, after five months the counteroffensive was definitively determined to be a “disaster,” as Zelensky’s own former adviser put it. Between that January and September, Ukraine had gained only 143 square miles compared to Russia’s 331 square miles, and had done so at the cost of tens of thousands of lives, according to official U.S. estimates. Two months later, Ukraine’s top military commander at the time, Valery Zaluzhny, declared the war a “slatemate.” The following year saw Ukrainian forces launch a daring incursion into Russian territory, taking 28 settlements and 300 square miles in the border region of Kursk. “Ukraine’s gamble in Kursk restores belief it can beat Russia,” went the headline from Chatham House. “Ukraine can use the occupied territories as a bargaining chip for a territorial swap,” one expert proffered. It had revealed “critical truths,” wrote the American Foreign Policy Council’s Elliott Petroff, one of which was that Ukraine “can still find ways to break the stalemate and win this war.” Once again, none of this came to pass. The Kursk gambit ended up being a hugely costly operation for Ukraine that exposed the actual frontline to Russian forces, who then made significant advances into Ukrainian territory at the very time pundits were lauding the move, and ended up expelling Ukrainian forces from Russian territory anyway. It also scuttled ceasefire talks that would have halted further attacks on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, which instead escalated. It’s a consistent pattern: a combination of wishful thinking and misinformation does just enough to keep the idea of a military victory alive, undermining the chance for painful but necessary negotiations, and ultimately rebounding in ever worsening ways on Ukraine and its people. The major human, economic, and social costs for Ukraine of continuing war, meanwhile, remain invisible to much of the Western public, which is instead fed a recurring diet of headlines and rhetoric assuring it that victory is close at hand. Ukraine supporters’ unwillingness to let go of the fantasy of a military breakthrough is understandable. Ukraine is the victim, after all, and it feels inherently unjust that the aggressor state would come away unpunished or even having gained something from a flagrantly illegal and immoral act. But this fantastical thinking has served Ukraine poorly, to say the least, every time it has prevailed. It is not clear that either side is ready at this moment for serious peace talks. But when that chance comes again, we mustn’t be lured away from it by yet another media campaign promising one weird trick to defeat Russia. --- ### Did Fidel Castro's decades-long defiance doom Cuba? **Published:** August 18, 2026 | **Author:** Arturo Lopez-Levy | **Section:** Latin America **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/fidel-castro-us-relations/.md When Fidel Castro came to power in 1959, Cuba was legally sovereign but in an extraordinarily asymmetric relationship with the United States. As Earl E. T. Smith, U.S. ambassador prior to the revolution, told Congress in 1960, “the American ambassador was the second most important man in Cuba; sometimes even more important than the (Cuban) president.” Castro’s revolution changed that relationship. This is an essential part of his legacy — one worth exploring as Cuban authorities celebrate the centenary of the long-time leader’s birth. Under Castro, Cuba went from a country whose foreign policy was deeply constrained by Washington to one capable of challenging the United States for decades and pursuing an independent foreign policy far beyond what its size and material resources would have suggested. Fidel turned Cuban nationalism into the first principle of Cuba’s foreign policy. Revolutionary Cuba learned to say “no.” That is where the paradox begins. --- ### How Iran has staved off economic collapse despite the US-Israeli war **Published:** August 18, 2026 | **Author:** Djavad Salehi-Isfahani | **Section:** Middle East **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/iran-economy-war/.md Nearly six months after the U.S. and Israel launched an operation to overthrow the Iranian government, it’s fair to say their assault hasn’t exactly gone according to plan. Still, the ensuing war has followed a clear, predictable logic. After decades of sanctions failed to persuade Iranians to overthrow the regime, Israel and the U.S. resorted to war; after that failed too, they turned to a naval blockade. Each escalation has had an impact, adding to the misery of life in Iran, but so far each has missed its ultimate target: forcing a surrender. The military stalemate has once again turned attention to the economy and to the question that has always hovered over this strategy: just how much economic punishment can Iranian society absorb? We can document how far living standards have fallen. Iran produces mountains of economic and social data, and, despite its isolation, millions of people travel to and from the country. But no one knows how much additional punishment would produce the political outcome the strategy anticipates. No one should doubt that Iran's economy is in its worst shape in decades. Years of strict sanctions erased two decades of economic growth, and months of war caused hundreds of billions of dollars in damage to infrastructure and productive capacity and added millions to the ranks of the unemployed. The U.S. and Israel appear to have initiated this war believing that Iran was on the brink of economic ruin. Much as an Iranian nuclear bomb was repeatedly said to be only weeks or months away, economic collapse was expected to arrive with the next ratchet of pressure. But it has now become apparent that both the picture of extreme economic fragility and the expectation of regime change were highly exaggerated. Iran's economy has performed poorly since President Donald Trump imposed his maximum-pressure campaign in 2018, but slow growth and stagnation are better descriptions than collapse. Employment recovered after taking an initial hit, rising from about 23 million to 25 million before the June war. Employment growth actually outpaced the working age population, which grew by about 1.7 million over the same period. The war changed that. Both GDP and employment fell in spring 2026. By June, nearly half a million jobs had disappeared, largely as a result of the bombing campaign that began on February 28. The unemployment rate, which had remained below 8% for the previous two years, jumped to 9.1% this spring and is probably climbing as more businesses close for lack of imported inputs. Establishing what has happened to GDP — and particularly GDP per capita, a good measure of average living standards — is more complicated. It is easy to make serious mistakes when comparing Iran's GDP over time, especially when converting output from rials into dollars. Depending on the exchange rate used, the resulting estimates can diverge enormously. For example, valuing Iranian output at the free-market exchange rate, which fluctuates, produces a much smaller and more variable dollar value for Iran's economy. Currency depreciation should not be confused with an equivalent collapse in the volume of goods and services Iranians actually produce and consume. For comparisons of real output over time, purchasing-power-parity measures provide a more meaningful benchmark. PPP conversion avoids the distortions caused by fluctuations in the market exchange rate and allows output to be compared at constant prices. According to the World Bank's constant-price PPP measure, GDP per person, a popular measure of living standards, recovered after the imposition of harsher sanctions. In 2025 it was 9.6% higher than in 2018, when Trump launched his maximum pressure campaign, and 5.5% more than in 2011, when sanctions first tightened under President Barack Obama and increasingly restricted Iran's international trade. These are hardly impressive growth rates. Had Iran’s economy continued to grow at 5% per year after 2011, its GDP per capita would have been more than twice what it was in 2011. Still, these numbers do not describe an economy on the verge of collapse. That distinction matters because the political strategy of maximum pressure has rested heavily on the assumption that one more tightening of the economic vise could push an already exhausted economy —and therefore the political system — over the edge. How much did the war add to the grim picture? The latest GDP figures covering the period of the war are for spring 2026. They show a surprisingly small contraction: output was just 0.21% below its level in spring a year earlier. Part of the explanation for the limited decline was a 6.5% growth in utilities, a heavily subsidized and largely government-provided sector. Manufacturing grew by 1.46%, a distant second. Both sectors, however, have become increasingly vulnerable as the war has continued. Manufacturing has suffered from disruptions in supplies from heavily bombed steel and petrochemical facilities, while utilities themselves have become targets of U.S. attacks. The spring figures therefore tell us more about the economy's initial resilience than about how it will fare under a prolonged war and blockade. Turning to a more direct measure of household welfare, the income and expenditure survey collected annually provides a better gauge. Unfortunately, the results of the household survey covering the war have not yet been released; they are expected next month. Earlier surveys, however, reveal something important that the narrative of looming economic collapse misses. During the three years before the June war, from 2021/22 through 2024/25, real average per capita expenditure increased, and poverty rates declined. A major reason for this economic resilience was the revival and expansion of cash transfers under the Raisi and Pezeshkian administrations, which focused on redistribution of funds to the poor rather than the more market-and business-friendly policies of President Hassan Rouhani. The transfers did not fully compensate households for years of inflation and sanctions, but they helped cushion their impact and helped prevent hunger among the poor. Cash transfers have their limits. As sanctions and the blockade choke off oil revenues and force the government to print money to pay for the transfers, the cost of war is increasingly felt in rising prices. In spring, as bombs were falling on Tehran and major cities, prices rose at triple-digit annual rates. A brief pause came on June 17 with the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding between Iran and the US, which lowered the dollar by 15%. Taking advantage of the lull in fighting to visit Tehran, I passed by many upscale stores in northern Tehran that had (optimistically) put their luxury imports on summer sale. The brief respite was enough to bring overall inflation last month to half the 99% annual rate it reached the month before. The government's policy of allowing prices — including the exchange rate — to rise, rather than fixing prices and resorting to rationing, has contributed to the economy's resilience, and it helps explain why repeated predictions of imminent economic collapse have proved unreliable. It is difficult to predict how long the Pezeshkian government can continue this course and avoid rationing if food and fuel shortages emerge. Iran has paid an enormous price in resisting sanctions and war to preserve its independence. Sanctions have reduced growth, hurt investment, and exacerbated inflation, while the war has destroyed productive assets and jobs. But an economy can perform badly for a very long time without collapsing, particularly when the state is able to redistribute income to the poor and when the people place a high value on national independence. --- ### The Iran war flushed $1.3 billion of Reaper drones down the drain **Published:** August 17, 2026 | **Author:** Stavroula Pabst | **Section:** QiOSK **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/reaper-drone/.md The U.S. has lost 45 MQ-9 Reaper drones, worth at least $1.3 billion, since the start of its war on Iran, the Washington Post reported Friday. The drones can cost between $30 and $50 million each, depending on their sensor and weapons payload. The U.S. military has lost roughly 25% of its pre-war fleet in the past five months. A defense official told the Washington Post that some of the drones were not shot down by Iranian forces, but instead were lost after their communications link to their operators failed. They did not say how many were lost this way. Observers say the MQ-9 losses are par for the course amid a costly war with Iran. “The drip, drip, drip of this news shows how much the Trump administration is drawing down U.S. arsenals to support the war in Iran,” Justin Logan, the director of defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, told RS. “First it was interceptors, then it was naval deployments, now it is drones, and tomorrow it will be something new.” “U.S. allies in the region know better, which is why, with the exception of Israel and partly the UAE, they are all pressing for deescalation, not a full-on renewal of the war,” Logan said. To Logan’s point, the U.S. has suffered numerous high-profile and expensive weapons systems losses since the start of the conflict in late February. An MQ-4 Triton drone, worth $238 million, crashed in an accident over the Persian Gulf in April. An Iranian missile and drone attack on a U.S. base in Saudi Arabia damaged a E-3 Sentry AWACS plane, worth about $300 million, in late March. The U.S. has also burnt through many of its critical munitions since the war began, including “virtually all” its long-range precision strike missiles, according to sources who spoke to Reuters. The Pentagon has repeatedly floated requests for Congress to replenish these munitions — which can cost millions of dollars each, and can take years to make — with possible supplemental funding packages worth tens of billions of dollars. The MQ-9 has proven vulnerable beyond the war against Iran. Yemen’s Houthi Rebels shot down 7 reaper drones during Operation Rough Rider, the U.S. campaign against the group last spring, which aimed to stop Houthi attacks on vessels in the Red Sea. Three of those were shot down in one week in April of last year. As losses mount, the Pentagon has begun to seek out cheaper alternatives for the costly drone. A Defense Innovation Unit notice posted in July solicited designs for alternatives that can be produced in high numbers at low costs within five years. The notice said a “reliance on low-density, high-value” aircraft is “unsustainable” against advanced air defense systems. --- ### Suddenly Trump wants to scale back military drills with S. Korea **Published:** August 17, 2026 | **Author:** James Park | **Section:** QiOSK **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/us-korea-military-exercise/.md On Sunday, President Donald Trump abruptly announced that he had directed the Pentagon to “substantially reduce” major U.S.-South Korea military drills that began this week. In a post on Truth Social, Trump provided several reasons why: the exercises are too “costly,” send a “totally inappropriate and hostile signal” to Pyongyang, and could strain his “very good relationship” with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. Trump also hinted that he could consider suspending the exercises entirely if he had known about them sooner, stressing that he is “unhappy with the fact that the United States has, long ago, agreed to participate” in them, but it is “too late to cancel.” Trump’s decision is sudden, but not shocking. Since his first term, Trump has always been pessimistic about U.S.-South Korea joint exercises and has shown a flexible — and unpredictable — tendency toward them. He has often complained about how expensive the exercises are and has also acknowledged how provocative they can be to North Korea. Such thinking was reflected in Trump’s abrupt announcement to indefinitely suspend U.S.-South Korea joint exercises immediately following his first summit with Kim Jong Un in June 2018. Trump then argued that “we’ll be saving a tremendous amount of money. Plus, I think it’s very provocative.” The impacts of Trump’s decision remain to be seen, but there are both potential positive and negative implications. While it remains to be seen what a “substantial reduction” in joint exercises will look like, scaling down the U.S.-South Korea joint exercises program aligns with Washington and Seoul’s broad interest in stabilizing the situation on the Korean Peninsula and reviving diplomacy with Pyongyang. As Trump noted, the joint exercises have long provoked North Korea, which views them as hostile “invasion rehearsals.” Indeed, the resumption of the exercises was an overlooked factor in the collapse of Trump-Kim diplomacy in 2019. After the February 2019 Hanoi Summit, Trump and Kim continued to exchange letters and explored opportunities to re-engage, eventually meeting again in June 2019 at the Korean demilitarized zone. During their conversation, Kim raised a strong objection to the resumption of U.S.-South Korea joint exercises scheduled for that August, and Trump promised to suspend them. However, the exercises resumed, and Kim’s final letter to Trump reportedly expressed resentment over Trump’s unkept promise regarding the exercises. The suspension of U.S.-South Korea joint exercises is not the only condition Pyongyang would like to see before agreeing to resume dialogue. The most decisive condition is probably whether Washington and Seoul would give up on demanding “denuclearization,” as Kim himself has repeatedly emphasized. But there is little doubt that reining in the exercises would reduce Kim’s perception that Washington is pursuing a “hostile policy” against the regime. Therefore, if Washington and Seoul can coordinate to downsize and adjust the joint exercises in ways that minimize their offensive and provocative aspects and make them overall more defensive, such efforts could send a credible de-escalation signal to Pyongyang, although an indefinite suspension may eventually be necessary. Although Trump’s decision to reduce U.S.-South Korea joint exercises could be a positive step toward resuming dialogue with North Korea, the decision to unilaterally announce the changes may prove counterproductive, causing more distrust between Washington and Seoul. Seoul has publicly welcomed Trump’s announcement, saying it hopes U.S.-North Korea friendship will help promote dialogue. Internally, President Lee Jae-myung’s administration has debated the need to scale back joint exercises, and if Washington had raised the issue through bilateral coordination, Seoul likely would have supported it, given its keen interest in improving inter-Korean relations. Nevertheless, whether Seoul supports it or not, announcing changes to a major element of alliance cooperation in such an abrupt and casual manner, without prior bilateral coordination, cannot be good for U.S. credibility as an ally, which has already been eroded by Trump’s unilateral approach to U.S. alliances. Because the decision was made unilaterally by Trump rather than through bilateral coordination, it will likely cause a preventable political divide in Seoul. Reacting to Trump’s announcement, South Korea’s main opposition party — traditionally hawkish toward North Korea — and conservative media were quick to condemn and blame the Lee administration for causing a “security crisis” and damaging the U.S.-South Korea alliance. Also concerning is the possibility that Trump’s decision is driven by a desire to punish Seoul rather than by a genuine diplomatic motive toward Pyongyang. In his social media announcement of the joint exercises’ reduction, Trump expressed regrets about Seoul’s refusal to support U.S. efforts to denuclearize Iran — while acknowledging that these are “somewhat unrelated.” Nobody but Trump knows the actual motive behind his decision, but this is something to be monitored carefully. Ultimately, Trump's decision could represent a positive step toward reducing tensions with North Korea — so long as Trump is willing to coordinate with Seoul to make the most of it. --- ### US diplomatic incompetence is tanking hopes for Korean peace **Published:** August 17, 2026 | **Author:** Stephen Costello | **Section:** Asia-Pacific **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/south-korea-trump/.md The head of South Korea’s Ministry of Unification, Chung Dong-young, announced recently that the ministry will restart work on railroad sections leading north to the DMZ on the Korean Peninsula’s eastern shore. Chung’s initiative provoked Foreign Minister Cho Hyun to criticize the Unification Ministry’s “peaceful coexistence” agenda toward North Korea for being “too idealistic.” Chung countered, arguing that "Nothing will happen if we stay put…This is not idealism but the most realistic and practical approach at this point.” Chung is right. Unless South Korea can embrace a leading role in pursuing engagement and cooperation with North Korea, it is unlikely to escape the current state of prolonged hostility and frozen diplomacy on the Korean Peninsula. This would probably mean taking the lead in the engagement process and allowing the United States to take a background role until agreements are reached. Since entering office last year, South Korean President Lee Jae Myung has sought to improve inter-Korean relations and made some important changes to South Korea's diplomatic posture toward North Korea. The South has now returned to a "peaceful coexistence" policy toward the North. The principles he mentions date back to former President Kim Dae-jung’s March 2000 Berlin Declaration, which included respect for North Korea’s system, a pledge to end military provocations, and an end to South Korea's efforts to absorb the North. Nevertheless, despite these goodwill gestures, the Lee administration has so far failed to elicit a response from the Kim Jong Un leadership. At the heart of Seoul’s North Korea policy paralysis is Washington’s diplomatic incompetence. Like past U.S. administrations, the Trump administration has shown no genuine willingness to move away from the decades-long failed policy of pressuring and containing North Korea. Sanctions against North Korea have done nothing to reverse the regime’s nuclear buildup, but Washington continues to insist on sweeping non-military sanctions that only harm the North Korean civilian economy. Easing these sanctions was North Korean leader Kim Jong Un’s main ask at the 2019 Trump-Kim Hanoi summit; the economic restrictions remain a major obstacle to any meaningful inter-Korean cooperation or U.S.-North Korea negotiations. With no path to even partial sanctions relief, North Korea has hunkered down, and South Korea has struggled to articulate a path forward. As the public clash between Ministers Chung and Cho has shown, internal tensions and divisions within the South Korean government over North Korea policy have led to policy paralysis in Seoul. Within the Lee administration, different actors — the Unification Ministry, the National Security Council (NSC), the Foreign Ministry, and the Defense Ministry — have pursued differing and at times conflicting priorities. For instance, in his efforts to reduce tensions on the Korean Peninsula and improve inter-Korean relations, Unification Minister Chung has called for scaling down U.S.-South Korea joint military drills and halting the South Korean military’s live-fire and field exercises along the inter-Korean border. (In the past, such adjustments have been used repeatedly to lower tensions and promote dialogue.) Chung has also proposed acknowledging North Korea as a separate neighboring country, which would recognize the two-state reality and help end reunification myths on both sides. But other actors (the NSC, the Foreign Ministry, and the Defense Ministry) have been more reluctant, in part due to fears of pushback from conservative hawks in South Korea and U.S. officials. These agencies have acted as the "status quo" force, being more risk-averse in policy discussions. On the surface, this dynamic can look like a mere institutional rivalry, but it reflects a more fundamental dilemma South Korea has long faced: pursuing its own foreign policy while avoiding a policy gap in the South Korea-U.S. alliance. Given Washington’s crucial role in Seoul’s security, South Korean leaders must treat their relationship with the U.S. as a key consideration when formulating policy toward the North. The institutional division within the Lee administration can be understood in this context. The NSC, the Foreign Ministry, and the Defense Ministry are all in regular contact with their U.S. counterparts, and major projects are ongoing. Seoul is pursuing nuclear-powered submarines, shipbuilding, and an embrace of AI companies, all with U.S. cooperation. These projects could be at risk if Seoul proposes actions or initiatives regarding North Korea that anger the U.S. government, especially given U.S. President Donald Trump’s unpredictability. These entrenched institutional interests are driving the Lee administration’s internal division on North Korea. Still, a determined president could move his administration toward a more proactive North Korea engagement initiative. If Lee hopes to forge a path out of the diplomatic deadlock, he cannot count on a U.S.-North Korea breakthrough. By subordinating its most essential national interest to a dysfunctional and disinterested White House, South Korea will deny its own responsibility. As soon as possible, the Lee administration should initiate a bolder diplomatic initiative, and Washington should support it. For this to work, Washington will have to remain in the background as Seoul works to advance a clear roadmap aimed at exchanging partial U.N. sanctions relief for a verified end to production of nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic missiles. As in the 1990s, that halt would be overseen by the International Atomic Energy Agency on the ground in North Korea. Other elements could be added, but the core exchange would likely be of interest to Pyongyang. If Seoul assumes greater leadership in engaging with Pyongyang, that would also help the Trump administration, which is constrained by many other foreign policy priorities and distractions. The Lee administration can take up the heavy lifting of outlining a negotiating framework, allowing President Trump to jump in for a high-profile role and claim a U.S. diplomatic win that Bush, Obama and Biden were unable to get. President Lee has been aware of this internal tension since he took office. He has been trying to please all parties until now. This posture is unsustainable and will not bring about any meaningful positive change in the worsening status quo. There will be no better time for him to make a new, realistic move on North Korea issues. --- ### Israel creates fake think tank in likely attempt to dupe AI chatbots **Published:** August 17, 2026 | **Author:** Nick Cleveland-Stout | **Section:** Washington Politics **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/israel-influence-chatgpt/.md At a glance, the Hanover Institute for Public Policy looks like a new think tank dedicated to Israel/Palestine. The organization churns out think-tank style reports on questions such as “Does AIPAC Use ‘Dark Money in Elections?” and “Is Israel Carrying out a Deliberate Campaign of Starvation in Gaza?” But the Hanover Institute is not a real think tank. None of the reports have bylines. A small disclaimer at the bottom of the webpage notes that the organization was created on behalf of the Israeli Government Advertising Agency by Piro, Inc, a firm co-founded by Daniel Rosenberg, the producer of Spike Lee’s “Inside Man.” The Hanover Institute’s reports — all of which are about Israel and Palestine — appear to be part of an Israeli effort to influence chatbots. The institute’s “data reports” have footnotes and tables of contents, and they present arguments in a neutral tone, helping them appeal to chatbots like Claude or Gemini. Piro’s website says that it “author(s) content engineered for how LLMs evaluate credibility,” describing this service as "AI Story Optimization." Others refer to this practice of influencing artificial intelligence as “LLM poisoning.” According to its “about” page, the Hanover Institute “studies the inputs fueling antisemitism in the United States, and publishes what the evidence shows.” Many of the reports are formulaic, starting with an innocent question that someone might ask a chatbot. “What Caused the Displacement of Palestinians in 1948?” “Which Humanitarian Organizations Have Documented Israeli War Crimes?” “What is the Current Situation in the Gaza Strip?” In an article titled “Is the IDF the World’s Most Moral Army?” the Hanover Institute cites a 2022 poll that found that 47% of Israeli Jews believed that statement. Another report casts doubt on UNICEF's assertion that “90% of water and institutional infrastructure has been damaged or destroyed” in Gaza. Many of the reports conclude by linking the topic to rising antisemitism, oftentimes citing the same studies. In a few cases, the Hanover Institute publishes what it claims are original findings. For instance, it put out a study saying 19 of the 36 most-watched Israel-Gaza explainer videos contain contested claims, with most of the contested claims aligning with the Palestinian narrative. The Hanover Institute’s publications sometimes contradict Israeli government narratives. For instance, one report says that foreign funding of universities as an explanation for antisemitic incidents is “weak and full of exceptions.” Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has pushed this theory, telling Breitbart last year that Europeans and Qataris have spent “billions of American universities, vilifying, vilifying Israel, vilifying Jews, also, frankly, vilifying the United States.” Alice Lee, an analyst at NewsGuard, a disinformation tracking company, told RS that the sites appear designed to reach a U.S. audience curious about the ongoing conflict, either through search engines or AI chatbots. "LLMs favor concrete statistics and data, as well as strong citations and sources, which these articles all have," Lee said. "It's a perfect mimicry of a typical credible American think tank, right down to the generic name, the site layout, and the red-white-blue color scheme," Lee added. Piro, Inc, the firm that created the Hanover Institute, has received $900,000 from the Israeli government for its work. Like many other contractors working for Israel, Piro’s work is subcontracted through Havas Media, a French public relations conglomerate. The fake think tank has churned out over 100 reports since it started publishing on August 6. The Hanover Institute claims that “cited research is peer-reviewed and academic,” although it frequently cites Israeli government sources such as the Israel Defense Forces and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. RS analyzed 12 random Hanover Institute articles using GPTZero, a popular AI detection software that claims a low false-positive rate. GPTZero flagged 11 of the articles as AI-written with “high confidence”; it flagged one article as AI-written with “moderate confidence.” Israel has also contracted former Trump campaign manager Brad Parscale to create pro-Israel websites engineered to influence chatbots as part of a $46.5 million contract. A Drop Site investigation last month found that many chatbots, particularly Microsoft Copilot and Google Gemini, had been successfully trained on data from those websites. Other chatbots frequently cite those websites without flagging them as part of an Israeli influence operation. Piro does not explicitly state in its agreement submitted to the Department of Justice that its work for Israel is to influence AI. In an email to Politico, which first reported the filing, Rosenberg said his firm’s work is to “put accurate, sourced facts into the public record and to counter misinformation about Israel with verifiable information.” However, last month, Rosenberg posted on LinkedIn advertising Piro’s ability to influence chatbots: “When someone asks ChatGPT, Gemini, or Perplexity about your category, an answer comes back in one confident paragraph. Most brands have no idea how that paragraph gets built. So we spent months reverse-engineering it…At Piro, we already knew how to build stories that move people. The question was: how do you make sure AI knows how to tell them?” --- ### Stop gaslighting, USS Lincoln families didn't sign up for this **Published:** August 17, 2026 | **Author:** Brandi Jones | **Section:** Military Industrial Complex **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/uss-lincoln-families/.md The United States has always asked extraordinary things of its service members. But this week, a series of remarkable news stories came out documenting the dire conditions of sailors aboard the USS Abraham Lincoln, a ship that has been at sea so long that those aboard have not stepped foot on land since 2025. Even families like mine, who have experienced multiple combat deployments, are alarmed by the depictions we read in this news. We know that behind every sailor and Marine we read about on that ship, there is an entire family unit thousands of miles away wrestling with fear, exhaustion, confusion, anger, and loneliness every day that ship remains in harm’s way. From the spouses who suddenly became the only parent in their home, to the parents waiting anxiously for a phone call, to the children whose birthday parties and baseball games have an empty chair at them this year. We also know that the sailors and Marines on the Lincoln may be in the spotlight at the moment, but their stories are merely a fraction of the bigger picture. Across the region, thousands of service members and their families are being worn down by new or extended mobilizations right now, with diminishing supplies and without a clear end in sight. As advocates, we are hearing from those families. One spouse told us her Marine was supposed to be gone for 60 days. It has now been six months. A common theme we’re hearing from many deployed families is that communication back home has been abysmal — so much so that it has fundamentally changed how family members feel about the institution their family has entrusted with the life of someone they love. Another spouse of someone deployed told us: “If my spouse were to be injured or killed, I feel like the military wouldn’t even tell me. I’ve lost all trust.” That statement stopped me in my tracks. For our military community, communication is not a luxury; it is integral to caring for the families who sacrifice behind the uniform. Trust is not a courtesy; it is literally all we have left when we hug our service member good-bye. That trust extends to the political leaders making decisions over war and peace, whom we rely on to deliberate somberly and send Americans into war only when absolutely necessary. That trust also includes the military leaders overseeing operations to acknowledge a military family’s sacrifice and incorporate them into communication. Her statement: “I’ve lost all trust.” Do not mistake that for some petty complaint from a person who simply cannot handle military life. Rather, it is an urgent warning sign for a country that relies on an all-volunteer force. I am the spouse of a two-time Iraq War combat veteran, and the granddaughter of a Medal of Honor recipient. I have lived this life firsthand. When my spouse deployed in 2004, and again in 2009 for nearly a year, our family knew that separation was part of military life. We knew there would be uncertainty. We knew there would be fear. But there was also an acknowledgment that the family was part of the equation. There were attempts at communication from commanders. I heard from my spouse by satellite phone once or twice, and received a handful of letters. It wasn't perfect, but there was an understanding that those of us waiting at home were carrying a burden, too. There were also tangible efforts to support us. Our command provided respite care in the form of free childcare at our Child Development Center. The housing office made sure yard work was taken care of, recognizing that the spouse left at home was already carrying more than enough. Those things may sound small, but they were not. They communicated something profound: We see you. We know this is hard. You are part of this military family, too. There is often a familiar, infuriating response when military families speak publicly about their concerns: "You knew what you signed up for." What we signed up for was to serve when service was absolutely necessary. We signed up with the understanding that military force should be wielded with purpose, accountability, and constitutional authority — not for some indefinite excursion of choice. And we signed up believing that when our loved ones went into harm's way, the institution they served would not forget the people waiting for them to come home. We did not sign up to surrender our right to ask questions when deployments change dramatically, when communication disappears, or when families are left wondering whether anyone is paying attention. The same voices telling military families to sit down and stop complaining are often perpetuating the veteran’s version of a “pick yourself up by your own bootstraps” myth. But in doing so, they ignore the reality that more than two decades of post-9/11 war left veterans and their families in such dire need of support that Americans had to create an enormous network of military and nonprofit institutions to scramble and pick up the broken pieces. Families can’t afford to go through that again. In an interview at Joint Base Lewis-McCord, the president claimed that the families of the USS Abraham Lincoln had no concerns regarding their deployed service members’ wellbeing or mental health. Instead, he crowed that the deployment should last even longer — a position that the Pentagon reversed one day later. The president ignores military families at our country’s peril. We need to listen to military families, not gaslight them — and not just after the deployment is over, but now. If we are serious about supporting those who serve, we must stop measuring the cost of war only by what happens on the battlefield. The cost of war is also measured in the families left waiting at home. The Constitution places the power to declare war with Congress for good reason. It’s the most democratically responsive branch of government and carries the power of the purse. Earlier this summer, the House and Senate took historic votes opposing this war with Iran, yet the executive branch has proceeded with operations anyway. Military families are being asked to sacrifice months and years of their lives, endure repeated separations, and watch their loved ones enter harm's way — all for a patently unconstitutional conflict. Sending someone else's husband, wife, mother, father, son, or daughter into harm's way should never be an executive afterthought. It should be a decision made in the light of day, with accountability and transparency. Military families like ours deserve nothing less. --- ### Sen. Van Hollen: Iran war is illegal and we cannot fund another dime **Published:** August 14, 2026 | **Author:** Martin Di Caro | **Section:** Washington Politics **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/van-hollen-iran-israel-war/.md Today, there is no all-out war, no peace, and no light at the end of the Strait of Hormuz. The Trump administration’s crack at transforming Iran is drifting along in the Persian Gulf, as on-again, off-again negotiations fail to resolve a conflict that has roiled the global economy while the president’s approval ratings plunge. Meanwhile, the Gaza Peace Plan is sinking, too, leaving ordinary Palestinians in a state of abject misery amid the rubble and tent cities of Gaza, cowering from Israeli air strikes that have killed more than 1,200 people since a “ceasefire” went into effect in Oct. 2025. To assess whether there’s a way out of these dismal situations, Responsible Statecraft spoke to Sen. Chris Van Hollen (D-Md.), a potential 2028 presidential candidate who is known for being one of the Senate’s most vocal critics of Israeli conduct and of AIPAC’s influence on the Congress. This is a partial transcript of Van Hollen’s podcast interview with Martin Di Caro, edited for length and clarity. You can listen to the full conversation on the History As It Happens podcast here. Martin Di Caro: Let's begin with the Iran war. In June, the House and Senate passed a concurrent War Powers resolution. It directed the president to remove U.S. forces from hostilities. The administration says it does not have to abide by the vote because of the ceasefire, which it says reset the 60-day withdrawal clock. Is the War Powers Act of 1973 irreparably broken? Sen. Van Hollen: Well, it's very damaged. Donald Trump has really shredded its provisions and done so with the complicity of Senate Republicans. Our constitutional framers believed that, by setting up a separate branch of government with its own powers, including the power to declare war, that as an institution Congress would protect its prerogatives. But now we have a Republican Party that is just a rubber stamp for Donald Trump… It's my strong view that this was an illegal war when Donald Trump started it and it is an illegal war now as he continues it in violation of the concurrent War Powers resolution. Di Caro: What other means does Congress have at its disposal to stop an unnecessary war? Van Hollen: Ultimately, Congress has to use its power of the purse. I've been very clear: not one penny for this illegal war. As you know, the administration has asked for a supplemental of around $70 billion. My view is Congress should not appropriate those funds because by doing so, we'd be giving consent and approval to an illegal war retroactively. So it's very important that we hold the line and not provide that funding. We're also expending munitions at a tremendous and expensive rate. That's another constraint potentially on the administration's continuation of the war, at least at the intensity level. Di Caro: One more question about the War Powers Act and Congress's failure going back decades to restrain the executive. For example, the Libya intervention under Barack Obama in 2011. The United Nations did authorize NATO intervention there to protect civilians, but when Congress challenged President Obama about the 60-day withdrawal clock — this was in June 2011 — Harold Koh, a legal adviser at the State Department, testified on Capitol Hill. He said, “As everyone recognizes, the legal trigger for the automatic pullout clock — hostilities — is an ambiguous term of art that is defined nowhere in the statute. The legislative history which we cite makes clear there is no agreed upon view of exactly what the term hostilities would encompass. Nor has that standard ever been defined by any court or by Congress itself.” I have a two-part question. What do you make of that statement 15 years on? And do you regret voting in support of the Obama intervention in Libya? Van Hollen: No, to second point, and here's why. I recognize this is a very gray area in certain instances. And the Libya circumstances were a gray area. Iran is not a gray area. Not one bit. We've obviously lost 18 service members. There's no question about whether or not we're engaged in hostilities in Iran. In the case of Libya, as you know, in addition to the U.N. resolution and NATO's involvement, the Arab League also urged the United States to support the effort as part of a coalition to prevent what was viewed as an imminent massacre of hundreds of thousands of people. And it was exclusively air power. So I do recognize that it was a murky area, but my view was that for the limited period that the Obama administration was engaged in that action, with the support of both the U.N. and the Arab League, the administration's argument was sound. At least it wasn't frivolous. Let's put it that way. Whereas in the case of the Iran situation, the Trump administration's argument is plainly frivolous. Di Caro: In Libya, it started with good intentions, but there was mission creep and it ended up a regime change operation after President Obama had said he would not militarily. And ultimately Libya became a failed state. Maybe it would have been a failed state without U.S. intervention, but I think Libya is an important example in this long story of how we got here today. Van Hollen: I agree that it resulted in mission creep. No doubt about it. You asked me about the original justification, but if you're looking at the results, on the one hand, it was successful at preventing a mass slaughter, and I think that's obviously a good thing. On the other hand, as you say, the mission did seem to evolve and resulted in the toppling of Gaddafi, and Libya became a failed state. So, I'm not suggesting the Libya operation was an ultimate success. I do think it was a limited success with respect to its original purpose. Di Caro: Let's move on to Israel now. You wrote an op-ed in the New York Times calling on Democrats to reckon with their failure to use U.S. leverage to restrain Israel's conduct. Some former members of the Biden administration have recently come under intense public scrutiny for not conditioning aid to Israel as it was destroying Gaza. Yet today, U.S. weapons and U.S. manufactured bulldozers keep flowing to Israel. Why is that? Van Hollen: It's because we still haven't mustered enough votes to stop it. We've made gains. I remember in the March-April period of 2025 when there was a full blockade of all food and humanitarian assistance into Gaza that lasted almost 80 days. We had about 17 votes or thereabouts in the Senate to prevent the transfer of U.S. weapons to the Israeli government. In a more recent vote, we were able to secure 40 Democratic senators to block weapons and bulldozers. So, the trend is in the right direction, at least on the Democratic side. Now, on the Republican side, you have a continued blank check to the Netanyahu government regardless of the conduct of Israel, whether in Gaza or the West Bank. So I guess the answer to your question is there's growing sentiment that United States taxpayers should stop providing a blank check to Israel. My view is that any offensive weapons should also be conditioned on withdrawal of the Israeli occupation in the West Bank, according to an agreed upon timetable. Di Caro: You've been one of the more vocal senators criticizing Israel. I often wonder if privately your colleagues in the Senate voice those same opinions, but they're afraid to say them publicly. Van Hollen: The short answer is yes, that is very true. Mine was a lonely position a number of years ago. In fact, before the war in Gaza, I was very focused on trying to end the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and to use leverage to do so. I had colleagues even then who agreed with me privately, but it was politically inconvenient for them to agree openly. And then with the war in Gaza, people have witnessed the horrendous destruction, what human rights organizations, historian Omer Bartov, and others have concluded is genocide. They have the right analysis. So, more and more of colleagues are finally waking up to the idea that providing a blank check to the Netanyahu government is undermining our security in the region and undermining our position around the world. Di Caro: It's not unusual for Congress to trail public opinion. That was the case during the Vietnam War. The public turned against the war before a majority in Congress did. But across the political spectrum now, especially among younger voters — left, center, and right — they have soured on U.S. support for Israel. Why are some of your Senate colleagues still afraid to vote against Israel? Is it as simple as AIPAC or is there more to it? Van Hollen: The number one driver is politics here in the United States. It’s AIPAC. AIPAC has traditionally been a very strong political player. They weigh into elections. Look, we've just witnessed them putting $30 million into the race against Abdul El-Sayed . They’re involved in many other races. They've shown a willingness to use their political muscle to defeat any candidate that doesn't support unconditional aid to Israel. Now, their position is obviously weakening among Democrats. And there are a lot of other groups in this space, including other prominent Jewish political organizations like J Street, that take a very different position. But AIPAC has been the biggest player, and that is why Congress remains largely in a bubble on this issue, although the bubble is being pierced here and there. Di Caro: Is U.S. hegemony waning and is that such a bad thing for the rest of the world? Van Hollen: I would say two things are happening. One is that complete U.S. dominance is certainly waning. We've seen the ongoing rise of other powers, China being the biggest one. Di Caro: Primacy. You're referring to primacy? Van Hollen: Yes, I'm talking about the U.S. being an unchallenged leader. What it means, though, is other countries do need to take on more responsibility for their collective defense. I will say that the Trump administration has completely shredded and destroyed U.S. credibility. We used to be a champion for international law and the rules-based order — I would say a very imperfect one. I'm well aware of that, and the Biden administration did a lot of damage in that regard, with respect to not applying international law in the case of Gaza, for example. The Trump administration has just abandoned altogether. It’s in the United States interests to again work to adhere to a rules-based order internationally. There's a lot of repair work to be done there. Di Caro: To me, this often comes down to the ability to recognize the limits of power... To those of us who’ve been arguing for a more restrained U.S. foreign policy, the primacists don't understand the limits of power — even though we're seeing it everywhere today, and not just with the United States. Van Hollen: Well, I think you're right. I think your analysis is spot on. What we're witnessing in Iran is Exhibit A of the limits of power. Donald Trump thought he could go into Venezuela, grab Maduro, and in a short period of time he can do whatever he wants anywhere in the world. Obviously that's just not true. So we need to reassess the huge military footprint we have around the world. --- ### Erdogan's party pours millions into new DC pied-a-terre **Published:** August 14, 2026 | **Author:** Hekmat Aboukhater | **Section:** Washington Politics **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/turkey-lobbying-washington/.md On Washington’s 16th Street, overlooking Meridian Hill Park, Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) is transforming the former French Embassy into a permanent base for its growing influence operation in Washington. The party bought the Beaux-Arts mansion for roughly $4.9 million in 2024, and its latest July 12th Foreign Agents Registration Act filing shows that another $1.3 million has since flowed from AKP headquarters, much of it going toward renovation work at the property. The office is run by Halil Mutlu, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s cousin and the AKP’s registered representative in the United States. The same filing lists 85 political activities over six months from December until May of this year, including meetings with State Department officials, congressional staff and some of Washington’s most prominent Turkey and Syria think tank experts. Since the Oct. 7, 2023, Hamas attack on southern Israel, the relationship between Ankara and Tel Aviv has gradually moved from surface-level diplomatic hostility toward something closer to an open strategic rivalry, with Syria becoming the most visible flashpoint between the two regional middle powers. Much of this tension is airing out in President Donald Trump’s Washington. --- ### The road to Trump's heart goes through Israel **Published:** August 14, 2026 | **Author:** Blaise Malley | **Section:** Latin America **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/latin-america-israel/.md In the early months following Israel’s brutal war on Gaza, Latin American leaders emerged as some of the world’s sharpest critics of the military campaign. Then-Colombian President Gustavo Petro was among the first world leaders to call Israel’s actions a “genocide.” Chile and Honduras recalled their ambassadors from Tel Aviv, and Belize and Bolivia severed diplomatic ties with Israel. But just two years later, across the region, governments that had distanced themselves from Israel are now moving quickly to repair ties. Not surprisingly they are the same leaders who have rushed to ingratiate themselves with the Donald Trump administration in Washington. Venezuela’s foreign minister announced Monday that it would restore consular services with Israel for the first time since 2009, marking a sharp foreign policy shift in the wake of Trump’s military ouster of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro in January. Colombia’s new right-wing president, Abelardo de la Espriella, declared just days after his inauguration that the country would recognize Israel’s claim of sovereignty over the occupied Golan Heights. Colombia is one of two nations in the world to offer such a recognition, following the United States, which did so during President Trump’s first term. Then, earlier this month, Chile and Honduras restored their ambassadors to Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, respectively, for the first time since November 2023. Latin America analysts tell Responsible Statecraft that while there may be ideological, economic, or security motivations peculiar to each nation, this pivot functions primarily as a way for regional leaders to curry favor with the Trump administration. “In the end, the main interest for all of these countries is the United States,” Marta Tawil Kuri, a professor at College of Mexico who researches the foreign policy of Latin American countries towards the Middle East, told Responsible Statecraft. “There is a new generation of the right (...) using rapprochement with Israel as a way of signaling alignment with Washington,” she said, adding that each government filters this relationship through their domestic political factors. One cannot discount Israel’s own deliberate diplomatic push to shore up ties with friendly governments at a moment when global public opinion is turning against it. For some of these countries, this isn’t a stretch. Colombia, for example, had a long-standing security relationship with Israel until the left-wing Petro took office in 2022. The former president was able to mostly end that relationship, says Tawil Kuri, but did so under opposition from the military. Israel had long helped to train Colombian armed forces including during their fight against the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), and later against transnational drug traffickers. Now de la Espriella has spoken about ramping up efforts to combat “narcoterrorists” and will likely seek out Israeli, and especially American, backing for it. “I think you have to show that you're aligned with the broader security agenda of your patron in order to secure that support,” Mike LaSusa, a journalist who writes about organized crime in Latin America, told RS. Meanwhile, while de la Espriella’s recognition of the Golan Heights was significant, Tawil Kuri said, it marked “more a return to a decades long baseline” of support than a departure. For states like Colombia, Chile, or Argentina — which in 2023 elected the self-proclaimed “most Zionist president in the world” — the shift toward Israel is largely a function of right-wing governments taking over. Venezuela’s shift, meanwhile, is more surprising on its face. “The Israel-Palestine conflict is a central theme in anti-imperialist movements. If there's anything that has lasted in Chavismo through the years it’s anti-imperialism,” said David Smilde, a professor at Tulane University, referring to the political ideology of Hugo Chavez, the Venezuelan president from 1999 to 2013. “And so, it’s quite significant that Venezuela would re-establish consular relations with Israel, precisely at the time that Israel is more deeply questioned across the world than it's ever been in its history.” Smilde pointed to Israel's assistance following a recent earthquake as the immediate catalyst, calling it a case of "disaster diplomacy," in which humanitarian aid opens space to strengthen or repair a damaged relationship. But experts agreed that the more important driver is Caracas’ overwhelming dependence on Washington since Maduro’s removal. “This is a very different leadership which operates under constant tension of collaboration with Washington, of course, but inwardly, (feels) the need to sustain this Chavista narrative,” said Tawil Kuri. LaSusa called the move a “low-cost, high-reward situation,” in which interim President Delcy Rodríguez can reestablish relations with Israel and “in return you smooth your relationship with the United States when it comes to all the other issues that are more important to you,” including strengthening its negotiating position with domestic political opposition. The rise of evangelical Christianity across Latin America is another factor. In Central American countries Honduras and Guatemala, Evangelical Christians — many of whom embrace Christian Zionism — make up roughly 40% of the population. Both nations moved their embassies from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem in the past decade. Christian Zionist discourse has also become increasingly common in Latin American political rhetoric, particularly among the conservative leaders that have emerged over the past decade from Argentinian President Javier Milei or Jair Bolsonaro, the former president of Brazil. One of the largest voting blocs in the Brazilian National Congress is the Evangelical Parliamentary Front, which largely supported Bolsonaro and opposed his successor’s decision to join the case in front of International Court of Justice accusing Israel of genocide. Many of the sources who spoke with RS attributed the speed and depth of the region's ideological swings to Latin America's strong presidential systems. Unlike in the United States, where support for Israel has remained largely stable across administrations, foreign policy in much of Latin America shifts sharply from one election to the next. “When you have a presidential system and at the same time you have very weak institutions or you don't have a bureaucratic diplomatic body, it's very easy for personal or individual preferences (...) to be confused for national interests,” said Tawil Kuri. But Lee Schlenker, a research associate with the Global South program at the Quincy Institute who focuses on Latin America, cautioned against reading this trend as simply a byproduct of individual leaders’ desires. “I think it's a more robust and multi-faceted,” he said, pointing to coordinated, organized advocacy by pro-Israel groups that has helped establish pro-Israel caucuses in national legislatures across the region. Beyond legislatures, Schlenker adds “it's a lot of public diplomacy work. They're working with influencers, journalists, the health sector, innovation, those sorts of things.” That organizing work shows how Israel, increasingly isolated by international opinion, has identified Latin America as fertile ground to rebuild diplomatic standing. Regional governments, in turn, have pinpointed Israel as a good route to Trump's Washington. But some warn that this gambit could backfire, leading only to increased demands from the U.S. in the future with little tangible benefits. “It is a very wrongheaded bet,” Jorge Heine, a Chilean former cabinet minister and ambassador, told RS. “Because the way it works in international politics, the moment you align yourself with one of the great powers in competition you become a subordinate. And then you are treated as such.” --- ### Maria Machado hiring DC lobbyists for access to Venezuela's future **Published:** August 13, 2026 | **Author:** Julian Cooper | **Section:** Latin America **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/machado-future-venezuela/.md Opposition leader-in-exile Maria Corina Machado has hired veteran Republican lobbyists in Washington DC in what experts say is an effort to gain the support of the Trump administration as she continues to seek the Venezuelan presidency. Machado has retained lobbyist Ed Rogers as a U.S.-based “government affairs and public relations” consultant, according to a recent disclosure made to the Department of Justice under the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA). Rogers, a veteran of the George H.W. Bush administration, is a founding partner of BGR Group, the third largest lobbying firm in Washington. Last year, Rogers’ firm was paid $800,000 to lobby on behalf of oil companies that are now their expanding business in Venezuela. “She wanted a lobbyist because she’s been essentially written out of the script of U.S. policy in Venezuela,” Miguel Tinker Salas, a professor of Venezuelan history at Pomona College and a non-resident fellow at the Quincy Institute, said. “I think it’s an act of desperation. What she wants from Trump is to become a player again in Venezuelan politics, to reassert herself as the dominant opposition figure.” Machado has been a leading opposition figure in Venezuela for over two decades. In 2002, she endorsed a coup attempt against socialist President Hugo Chávez by signing the Carmona Decree to dissolve Venezuela’s constitution and legislature. In 2004, with funding from the U.S. National Endowment for Democracy, Machado led a failed recall vote against Chávez. In 2024, the regime headed by President Nicolas Maduro prohibited her from running for president, and she threw her support behind opposition candidate Edmundo González. Maduro declared victory, but the United Nations and election monitors at the Carter Center criticized the election’s integrity. Months later, the international community, including the Biden administration, declared Gonzalez the winner and rightful president. Soon after, Gonzalez and Machado both fled the country under threat as the chorus grew for an audit of the results (though critics point out that while González left shortly after the elections in 2024, Machado left clandestinely more than a year later in December 2025 to receive her Nobel Peace Prize, knowing she would not be able to come back). Two years later, Machado may still have her eyes on office in Venezuela and is gaining political allies via the oil industry. After the U.S. capture of Maduro in January, the Trump administration imposed new rules on the Venezuelan oil industry, weakening state control and effectively permitting Washington to take control the country’s oil exports and revenue. The Financial Times recently calculated that under the new oil regime, the U.S. has extracted about $13 billion from Venezuela but only returned $300 million of the profits. In Rogers, Machado is retaining a lobbyist who is exceptionally well-connected among U.S. oil companies that are seeking to expand operations in Venezuela. Machado herself, speaking at the Houston oil convention CERAWeek in March, told an audience of oil industry insiders that “the Venezuelan state will get out of the way and pave the way to give the conditions so that the oil and gas sector in Venezuela will go fully private.” Machado used the conference to introduce herself as the figure in Venezuelan politics who will work the hardest to attract investment from American energy companies. “We need your input,” she said at CERAWeek. “One of the reasons I’m here is because I want to invite you…to come up with your ideas, your suggestions in order to have the right incentives in place.” She is hoping BGR will come through for her as it did for the U.S. oil company Valero Energy, which paid BGR Group $320,000 for lobbying services in 2025. Just weeks after Maduro was captured, Valero became one of the first U.S. firms to purchase crude oil from Venezuela, in a deal that also involved Dutch energy trader Vitol. Before the coup, Valero was prohibited from buying crude by U.S. sanctions. Vitol also paid Rogers’ BGR Group $320,000 for lobbying services last year. Just last month, Vitol opened its first office in Venezuela, where the firm will handle more than 100 million barrels of exported oil. John Addison, a senior trader at Vitol, donated $6 million to President Trump’s reelection campaign, a potential conflict of interest called into question by Rep. Robert Garcia (D-Calif.). Multinational oil giant BP also made major inroads with the new Venezuelan regime this spring. Like Vitol and Valero Energy, BP is also a client of BGR Group, having paid the firm $160,000 for lobbying services in 2025. BP signed an agreement with the Venezuelan government in April allowing it to develop new offshore gas projects. Machado’s decision to hire Rogers comes as a new series of talks begins between the Venezuelan government – led by President Delcy Rodriguez since the U.S. Maduro’s capture in January – and opposition voices inside the country. Reuters reported this week that Machado has so far been excluded from the talks. According to the New York Times, Secretary of State Marco Rubio “effectively controls Venezuela’s finances, distribution of natural resources and its government.” Tinker Salas believes that lobbying the U.S. government may be the most effective way for Machado to lobby her own government. “Many Venezuelans refer to Rubio as the viceroy of Venezuela. It has become essentially a colony of the United States.” Machado had been planning for the privatization of Venezuela’s oil industry since long before Maduro’s ouster. According to a 2025 FARA disclosure, Machado met with the U.S. energy secretary and Venezuela’s “Ad Hoc Board of Petroleos de Venezuela,” an unofficial board of oil industry governors appointed by the opposition government in Venezuela’s National Assembly. According to the filing, Machado attended a video conference with a representative of the Inter American Development Bank to discuss Venezuela’s “future energy policy, particularly on oil, gas, and electricity.” At the time of this meeting, Machado had not served in public office in Venezuela for over a decade. A year later after this meeting, Machado has been excluded from official negotiations regarding Venezuela’s future. But, according to Tinker Salas, that doesn’t mean her quest for the presidency is finished. “Her overwhelming aspiration has always been to become president of Venezuela, and she has said that clearly on multiple occasions. Being an oil broker would be a step down.” --- ### US looking for 'new creative' ways to fight a war it's already 'won' **Published:** August 13, 2026 | **Author:** Mark Thompson | **Section:** Military Industrial Complex **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/us-military-procurement-problems/.md The Bunker appears originally at the Project on Government Oversight and is republished here with permission. When you run out of munitions, start launching threats. That’s obviously President Donald Trump’s latest strategy (to misuse the word) as his promised short war against Iran drags into its sixth month. It’s The Bunker’s grim mission to note where the U.S. military is falling short. Much of that is due to the military itself, but just as large a share is the responsibility of the institutional factors that fund it, enable it, and order it into action. Bottom line: Focusing on fixing an airplane in hopes that it can fly right won’t work if you only tinker with those ailerons trailing off its wings, while ignoring the fuselage, engines, and crew. And that’s the fundamental pickle the U.S. now finds itself confronting. It’s become so dire that U.S. commanders are seeking “new creative and unconventional ways to pressure and punish Iran,” a peculiar position for the globe’s most powerful fighting force (The Bunker’s copy of that email apparently ended up in the spam folder). It’s also hard to square with the administration’s repeated claims that it has won the war. To mangle another metaphor, the U.S. national-security state now sees itself as a punch-drunk chef whose only response to culinary mediocrity is more salt. At the Pentagon, of course, that translates into more money. The soaring defense budget — Trump wants a bloated $1.5 trillion next year, a porcinely wasteful 42% boost — would make sense if might made right. But it doesn’t. American power, writ large, is a three-legged stool. The most critical leg is the will of the U.S. citizenry. That was ignored when Trump launched his war against Iran. The second is the nation’s willingness to nurture good relations with allies. With the exception of Israel, that too was disregarded in Trump’s February 28 surprise attack on Iran. The third — and arguably the least important in the overall scheme of things, given the U.S. military’s overwhelming strength — are the U.S. armed forces themselves. When one leg of a stool gets too long — spending $1.5 trillion on the military, for example — while the other two are neglected, geostrategic geometry happens. The stool — like the U.S. role in the world — begins teetering and increasingly is in danger of toppling over. This is where the nation now finds itself. The U.S. public doesn’t want this war. The rest of the world doesn’t want this war. Yet you can bet every taxpayer’s bottom dollar that the futility of the Iranian stalemate will be leveraged by the Trump administration, and its allies, as proof that the U.S. military needs more money. --- ### Trump wants to talk to Hezbollah. Will they pick up the phone? **Published:** August 13, 2026 | **Author:** Ali Rizk | **Section:** Middle East **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/trump-hezbollah/.md For decades, U.S. policy in Lebanon has focused on the elimination of Hezbollah, or at least its military wing. But the Trump administration has taken this effort to new heights. The State Department is sponsoring the first ever direct talks between Lebanon and Israel since the Madrid peace talks, with the disarmament of Hezbollah being a central objective of those talks. Washington has also taken the unprecedented step of sanctioning individuals from outside the party whom it accuses of undermining the campaign against Hezbollah, including members of Lebanon’s state security apparatus. Meanwhile, the U.S. and Israel are engaged in an unprecedented financial crackdown on Hezbollah, as the New York Times reported this week. Ironically, however, Donald Trump is also the first sitting American president to express a willingness to hold direct talks with the Lebanese Shiite movement. “I would speak to Hezbollah. I speak to everybody. I’ll speak to people that a lot of people think I shouldn’t be speaking to, and things work out,” Trump told reporters during an oval office meeting with his Lebanese counterpart Joseph Aoun last month. While it would be easy to dismiss these remarks as typical Trumpian grandstanding, there appears to be more to the story. Multiple reports have recently emerged indicating that serious attempts have been made to open direct channels between Washington and Hezbollah. According to Middle East Eye, Trump told Beirut’s ambassador to Washington last May that he wanted to talk to the group in a bid to salvage a shaky ceasefire with Israel. The Lebanese presidency reportedly turned down the request over concerns that holding such talks would undermine Aoun by bypassing the Lebanese government. That same report quotes senior Lebanese officials saying that both the Trump administration and some of its predecessors have attempted to open direct channels with Hezbollah, but the group rejected these advances. Another recent report by the Lebanese daily Aljoumhouria revealed that senior Iraqi officials told a visiting Hezbollah delegation that Iraq was ready to sponsor and host direct talks between Washington and the Lebanese Shiite movement. The offer, the report noted, was made shortly before Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi’s recent visit to Washington, only to be turned down by Hezbollah. Sources from within the Lebanese Shiite movement confirm that there has been a recent push to establish direct channels between the two sides. “The Americans have made several attempts through a number of intermediaries to engage directly with Hezbollah,” a Hezbollah source explained to RS. “It’s true that al-Zaidi pursued such efforts, but certainly not at our request.” Interestingly, however, senior Hezbollah officials refused to clarify the group’s stance on the issue despite media reports that it had flatly rejected such offers. “Hezbollah wants to keep its stance concerning this issue out of the media, without giving any indication as to how it will respond to such initiatives,” a political official in the Lebanese Shiite movement told RS. “Our policy is to not reveal how we intend to approach this issue”. This suggests that Hezbollah is not necessarily rejecting dialogue with Washington out of hand. Talks “will happen if there is an opportunity that presents itself,” said Muhanad Hage Ali, deputy director for research at the Carnegie Middle East Center in Beirut. “But there will be an ambiguity because the organization basically tries to avoid acknowledging that they’re discussing anything with the ‘Great Satan,’” Hage Ali said, referencing a term Iran and its allies use to label the United States. According to Hage Ali, who has authored numerous publications about Hezbollah, the group stands to benefit from such dialogue in more ways than one. “Direct contact between the U.S. and Hezbollah would eventually undermine the Lebanese government track,” he explained, in reference to the direct talks Lebanon’s government is holding with Israel. “This is useful for Hezbollah.” Hezbollah could also use talks with Washington to make a deal under which any measures related to its weapons and military activities would be conditioned on amending Lebanon’s constitutional system to “grant Lebanese Shiites a bigger share of power,” Hage Ali said. Still, it is difficult to see Hezbollah negotiating away its weapons absent an Israeli withdrawal from Lebanese territory and a genuine guarantee that Israel will permanently end military operations in Lebanon. This stems from the fact that the group was founded as a resistance movement against Israel back in the early 1980s, long before it became a political party in 1992. Meanwhile there is little to suggest that Israel is willing to take any steps that would encourage Hezbollah to take a more flexible stance. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu reportedly told a recent cabinet meeting that he will not succumb to American demands to withdraw troops from Lebanon. Israel’s Foreign Ministry even published a map where parts of southern Lebanon appeared incorporated into Israel. The map, which Israel posted on X, stirred an uproar in Lebanon before it was taken down. (Israeli officials described the controversial map as the result of “an artificial intelligence error.”) There is also the issue of Iran which has only doubled down on its support for its Lebanese ally. Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Mujtaba Khamenei has framed support for Hezbollah as a “strategic mandate” for the Islamic Republic, while underscoring that any deal with the United States is contingent on respecting Lebanon’s territorial integrity and an end to Israeli military operations in the country. That Khamenei cast his country’s support for Hezbollah in strategic terms — and not merely as an ideological obligation — supports the notion that the Iranian leadership believes supporting the group has become a greater necessity in the wake of the recent conflicts, not least given how Israel has directly attacked Iran in these wars. In other words, rather than weakening the bonds between Tehran and Hezbollah, Israeli attacks on Iran have apparently strengthened these bonds, giving them a stronger strategic rationale. Against this backdrop, it is far more plausible that, at least for now, Hezbollah is pinning its hopes on what comes out of a potential agreement between Washington and Tehran, as opposed to riskier paths like direct talks with the Trump administration. “The objective behind the American attempts to establish direct channels with us is to remove Lebanon and Hezbollah specifically from the Islamabad talks,” explained the first Hezbollah source, referencing U.S.-Iran negotiations in Pakistan. Holding talks with the United States as a separate track from Islamabad would place Hezbollah in a weaker position, he argued, while being part of a framework with Iran which “hold strong cards” means that any agreement reached “will have guarantees.” --- ### Pentagon says it killed at least 150 Yemeni civilians in strikes **Published:** August 12, 2026 | **Author:** Stavroula Pabst | **Section:** QiOSK **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/us-strikes-yemen/.md The Pentagon acknowledged for the first time that U.S. military operations killed Yemeni civilians last year, in an annual report on civilian casualties it sent to members of Congress Tuesday. CENTCOM determined that three operations in Yemen last year “more likely than not” resulted in civilian harm, the report said. It assessed that 153 civilians and wounded 243 others were killed as part of Operation Rough Rider, its campaign against Houthi targets in Yemen. The U.S. initially did not acknowledge that these operations, which were meant to stop the Houthis from attacking vessels in the Red Sea, killed civilians last year. The strikes included attacks on a port, a residential building, and a migrant detention center in Saada, where civilians were likely to be present. At the time, the U.S. limited the details it would disclose about its strikes, citing the need "to preserve operational security." The report also acknowledged civilian deaths from 2018, including 8 deaths and 14 injuries in Iraq and one death in Somalia. Fifteen assessments were still pending for Yemen from 2025; three were pending for Somalia. The Pentagon’s figures are lower than independent estimates. The Yemen Data Project, for example, found at least 238 civilians were killed and 467 injured in Operation Rough Rider. In addition, the Pentagon report assessed that no civilians were killed in repeated boat strikes around the Caribbean over the past eleven months. “By its own count, the U.S. killed over 100 civilians in its boat strikes in 2025 alone — people simply accused of a crime, outside of armed conflict,” Annie Shiel, the U.S. advocacy director at the Center for Civilians in Conflict (CIVIC) said. “These are extrajudicial killings, or murder, plain and simple.” "Congress must put an end to these executions, including by refusing to fund them, and must demand accountability for civilian victims and survivors of the strikes,” Shiel said. The Pentagon's 2025 report does not include figures of how many civilians were killed in the U.S. war on Iran, which began in late February of this year. But observers are skeptical the DoD will properly acknowledge these deaths in its next report. “They chose to hit 13,000 targets in Iran in 40 days — that’s 10 times more than in the Yemen campaign,” Emily Tripp, the executive director of Airwars, an organization tracking civilian harms during conflicts, told the Washington Post. The Human Rights Activists News Agency (HRANA), a U.S.-based monitoring group, estimates at least 1,700 Iranian civilians have been killed since the conflict began. That includes a U.S. attack on a girls’ school in Minab, Iran, at the beginning of the war, which killed more than 100 children. A Pentagon official told the Intercept this year’s report was a “f*cking joke.” --- ### The Houthis could be first big test for Mecca mutual defense pact **Published:** August 12, 2026 | **Author:** Mohammed Nail Abdulqader | **Section:** Middle East **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/mecca-agreement-turkey-pakistan/.md When Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan signed their joint defense agreement in Mecca on August 7, the alliance’s first test was already taking shape. A day before the signing, Saudi Arabia was preparing for the possibility of attacks by the Houthis in Yemen alongside threats from Iran-linked groups in Iraq, amid concerns that energy facilities, ports, and airports could be targeted. The new pact establishes a striking principle: an armed attack on any one of the three countries is to be regarded as an attack on all of them. Yet what has been made public does not specify the military obligations that would follow, whether assistance would be automatic, or what form of response the other signatories would be expected to provide. So far, there are no indications that Turkey and Pakistan are preparing to enter the Yemen war directly. But a new Houthi missile or drone attack on Saudi Arabia could force the three countries to answer the question the agreement leaves unresolved: What does it actually mean to say that an attack on one is an attack on all? --- ### How the Egypt-Ethiopia feud could upend Trump's plans in Africa **Published:** August 12, 2026 | **Author:** Jonathan Fenton Harvey | **Section:** Africa **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/egypt-ethiopia-tensions/.md On July 19, President Donald Trump’s top Africa adviser, Massad Boulos, held a series of talks in Cairo with the foreign ministers of Egypt, Eritrea and Somalia. The participants framed the discussions as an effort to bolster security in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea. These talks came as Egypt and Eritrea separately insisted that governance of the Red Sea should remain the exclusive responsibility of its littoral states, a thinly veiled warning to Ethiopia, a landlocked nation of 140 million people with growing maritime ambitions. Later, on August 4, Boulos rejected speculation that Washington was assembling an anti-Ethiopian alliance, insisting it seeks amicable relations with all regional states. That rebuttal signals Washington’s delicate balancing act in an increasingly fractured region. Indeed, just days after the talks in Cairo, Washington declared its interest in seeking deeper involvement by more American companies in Ethiopian Airlines’ planned $12.5 billion airport near the capital, Addis Ababa. The U.S. may not be deliberately favoring Cairo over Addis Ababa, or vice versa. But without a coherent strategy, it is taking a scattershot approach to addressing thorny issues like the Egypt-Ethiopia Nile dispute, Red Sea access, and the African Union’s security mission in Somalia. This risks hardening the very alignments from which Washington is trying to distance itself. “I think Washington believes it can have its cake and eat it too: it can advance its own strategic objectives in the region around counterterrorism, critical minerals, maritime security and commercial diplomacy, while managing through ignorance the increasingly volatile regional competition playing out,” said Cameron Hudson, a former U.S. official who worked on Africa at the CIA, State Department and National Security Council. At the heart of the dispute is the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). Despite Cairo’s protests since work on the dam began in 2011, it was inaugurated in September 2025, and is now Africa’s largest hydroelectric dam. The $5 billion project remains contentious. Attention today has shifted to how Ethiopia will manage water releases to downstream Sudan and Egypt, especially during droughts, and whether any commitments will be binding. In January, Trump informed Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi he was ready to restart mediation between Egypt and Ethiopia, calling for Ethiopia to undertake predictable water releases during droughts. But words alone may prove futile. During Trump’s first term, the U.S. suspended some assistance to Ethiopia after Addis Ababa refused to sign a proposed U.S.-brokered agreement. Trump later suggested Egypt might “blow up” the dam. Given Trump’s prior support for Egypt, Ethiopia has been suspicious of American motives, David Shinn, a former U.S. ambassador to Ethiopia and adjunct professor at George Washington University, told RS. “U.S. engagement with Eritrean officials in Cairo will add to Ethiopia’s concerns,” he said. Indeed, the contact was notable given decades of strained U.S.-Eritrea relations, and because it came amid heightened tensions between Eritrea and Ethiopia. Addis Ababa’s wariness toward Washington will further complicate any U.S. efforts to soften the Egypt-Ethiopia rivalry, which has now spilled into the Red Sea. Along with Eritrea, Egypt has sought to contain Ethiopia’s ambitions for maritime access in the Red Sea. In January 2024, Ethiopia signed a memorandum of understanding with the governing authorities in Somaliland, a breakaway region of Somalia whose independence is recognized only by Israel. The agreement envisaged granting Ethiopia a 50-year lease for a 12-mile stretch of coastline near the Gulf of Aden in exchange for the eventual recognition of Somaliland as an independent state. Egypt responded by offering arms and troops to Somalia, while reaffirming its support for Somalia’s territorial integrity. Amid increasing regional and international pressure on Addis Ababa, Turkish mediation in late 2024 helped restore diplomatic relations between Somalia and Ethiopia, effectively sidelining the MoU. But Ethiopia remains determined to gain access to the Red Sea, which Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has framed as an existential economic necessity. Abiy has barely concealed Ethiopia’s ambition to secure access to Eritrean ports, particularly Assab, at times framing the port as historically Ethiopian territory that was lost when Eritrea seceded in 1993. His rhetoric has provoked deep alarm in Asmara, pushing Egypt and Eritrea closer. Egypt and Eritrea signed a maritime transport agreement in May, announcing a shipping route linking their ports and again insisting that the maintenance of Red Sea security be reserved for littoral states. In response, Ethiopia accused Egypt of attempting “to encircle and obstruct our efforts to gain maritime access to the Red Sea.” This has created a self-reinforcing cycle: Egypt views Ethiopia’s drive for a port as key to its ambitions to become the dominant regional power in the Horn, while Ethiopia sees Egyptian cooperation with Somalia and Eritrea as encirclement. It would be a mistake to describe Egypt, Eritrea and Somalia as a fixed bloc, however. Somalia, after restoring diplomatic ties with Ethiopia, now seeks to balance its relations with Cairo and Addis Ababa. Meanwhile, Eritrea’s distrust of Ethiopia stems from the neighbors’ own deep history of conflict — including their devastating border war in 1998-2000, which killed tens of thousands — rather than Cairo’s influence alone. Still, growing distrust could harden these alignments into lasting divides. And Washington’s cross-cutting diplomacy may worsen that risk by leaving regional governments unsure of its intentions. In May, the U.S. pursued a reset with Eritrea after their long period of cold relations, including the prospect of sanctions relief, which can be read as an attempt to discourage Ethiopia from using force in its quest for maritime access. At the same time, Secretary of State Marco Rubio met his Ethiopian counterpart, Gedion Timothewos, for talks on security cooperation, commercial opportunities and promoting regional de-escalation. Washington’s decision to withdraw support later this year from the United Nations logistics operation underpinning the African Union’s mission in Somalia adds a complication. The mission has provided a unique multilateral mechanism for Egyptian and Ethiopian cooperation – in this case, in maintaining security in Somalia. Mogadishu may now seek to forge bilateral agreements with both countries that would encourage them to compete for influence instead of cooperating. Washington’s initiatives in the region aren’t necessarily contradictory. But American outreach to Cairo and Asmara may reinforce Addis Ababa’s perception that it is being contained, while Egypt and Eritrea may see closer U.S. commercial ties with Ethiopia as a boost to their rival. “Absent a real strategy, these are all zero-sum policies. It’s one reason why Boulos keeps having to try to defuse the conspiracies swirling around U.S. policy by denying their existence,” said Hudson. “At some point, Washington needs to make clear to everyone what it is hoping to achieve.” Now, Washington risks watching regional escalation outpace its diplomacy. The stakes extend beyond diplomatic tensions. Even though Abiy ruled out war with Eritrea last year, military mobilizations and hostile rhetoric have kept the risks of miscalculation and escalation alive. Washington may also find working multilaterally with regional partners to devise a unified strategy desirable. On the Nile, Washington could support an AU-led agreement on drought management, data-sharing and predictable water releases. On Ethiopia’s Red Sea access, it could build on Turkish mediation by backing a commercial deal under Somali sovereignty, while tying its outreach to Asmara directly to regional de-escalation rather than treating it as an isolated Red Sea transaction. “Washington could encourage Ethiopia and Eritrea to engage in discussions for guaranteed Ethiopian access to the sea and even suggest some incentives that Eritrea might find attractive,” said Shinn, adding that other key players could participate in such an initiative. --- ### When US left Afghanistan, China moved in. So how's it going? **Published:** August 12, 2026 | **Author:** Giorgio Cafiero | **Section:** Asia-Pacific **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/afghanistan-china-taliban/.md When the Taliban reclaimed power five years ago, China appeared poised to capitalize on Afghanistan’s new realities. Beijing quickly took important steps to establish de facto relations with the Islamic Emirate, such as keeping its embassy open in Kabul, maintaining direct ties with Taliban leaders, and expanding political and security cooperation. In January 2024, Xi Jinping became the first head of state to accept credentials from a Taliban-appointed ambassador. Many analysts latched onto these moves as evidence that China would quickly assert great influence in Afghanistan after the hasty U.S. withdrawal in August 2021. Yet Beijing has pursued a far more cautious course, stopping short of formal recognition, which China sees as a bargaining chip for possible future use. Beijing’s clear message is that recognition will depend on how the Taliban addresses China’s interests and concerns. --- ### Trump's $23 billion ship will be outdated before it even hits water **Published:** August 11, 2026 | **Author:** Dan Grazier | **Section:** Military Industrial Complex **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/trump-class-battleship/.md The first proposed Trump-class battleship now has a price tag: $23 billion. This cost, as assessed by the Congressional Budget Office, will garner a lot of attention. But the primary concern for policymakers and citizens alike should be the complexity of the ship’s design. The U.S. Navy has a poor shipbuilding record in the 21st century. The Zumwalt-class destroyer, the Littoral Combat Ship, and the Constellation-class frigate have been complete failures. The final verdict of the Ford-class aircraft carrier is not yet in, but when the ship’s crew can’t even rely on the sewage system to work properly, the case isn’t looking too good. It becomes clear reading through the CBO’s report that Navy officials in Washington have learned nothing over the past 25 years from their shipbuilding mistakes. In typical Washington fashion, the new ship is being touted as “the fastest, the biggest, and by far 100 times more powerful than any battleship ever built,” as President Donald Trump put it. In practical terms, the ship will be armed with “antiair, land-attack, and antiship missiles, hypersonic missiles, nuclear cruise missiles, large lasers, and a rail gun (a weapon that uses electromagnetic energy to fire nonexplosive projectiles at hypersonic speeds),” according to the CBO. All of these systems will require a tremendous amount of electrical power to operate. To meet this challenge, the new ship will also be nuclear-powered. The addition of a nuclear reactor will dramatically increase both the cost and complexity of the ship’s construction. The original sin of all the Navy’s 21st century shipbuilding failures is a lack of design discipline. The architects of each program attempted to incorporate every gadget the technologists could imagine, several of which (including cutting-edge rail guns) remain unproven to this day. Excess complexity drives up costs and delays delivery, often by years. Officials compounded that essential mistake when they began building ships before the underlying technology had been developed. The practice of beginning construction before the development process ends is known as concurrency. When the overlap between manufacturing and development is too great, as it has been with acquisition programs like the Littoral Combat Ship and the USS Gerald R. Ford, costs rise and schedules slip because it becomes more difficult to incorporate the new technology into work that has already been completed. A glance at America’s shipbuilding capacity suggests that the construction timeline for the battleship program is also unrealistic. Navy leaders plan to buy 15 of the new ships between 2028 and 2056. But naval construction is already years behind schedule. The next Ford-class aircraft carrier, for example, is already five years late, yet the Pentagon hopes to assemble the new battleships at the same Newport News shipbuilding dock used to build aircraft carriers. The Navy’s current fleet of 289 ships is already far short of the legally required 355 ships. Attempting to build the largest and most complex surface warship in nearly a century hardly seems like the proper course of action to expand the fleet and alleviate the strain on the Navy’s already harried sailors. The size of the fleet matters because it directly impacts the quality of life and service of the nation’s sailors. The U.S. Navy has played an integral role in maintaining freedom of navigation around the globe since the end of World War II. Having fewer ships in the fleet means that the existing ships and their crews must work longer and harder to meet the Navy’s operational demand. Since leaders in Washington show few signs of reducing the number of missions the Navy must perform, adopting a shipbuilding plan that will see the fleet continue to shrink for the foreseeable future makes little sense. The fact that the battleship program is projected out over the next 30 years also deserves scrutiny. Instituting a warship program of this size to span three decades at a time when uncrewed vessels and anti-ship missiles are proliferating means that officials today believe a large surface warfare ship will remain viable throughout that timespan. That is a bold assumption to make. It is doubtful many people in 1996 would have anticipated the Ukrainians effectively denying the Russian fleet the use of the Black Sea with uncrewed vessels and shore-based missiles. A $23 billion American battleship will be an inviting target for submarines, anti-ship missiles, and hypersonic weapons. The current National Security Strategy released in November 2025 calls for the United States to concentrate on defending the Western Hemisphere. Building the largest surface combatant ship since World War II, armed with conventional, hypersonic, and nuclear-tipped missiles, is hardly necessary to defend the seas close to home. Such a ship is designed specifically to project military power around the globe. The battleship plan provides more evidence that the national security establishment will do precisely what it wants to do, no matter what defense strategy the government adopts. --- ### US military marching into Puntland as Red Sea tensions escalate **Published:** August 11, 2026 | **Author:** Blaise Malley | **Section:** Africa **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/us-military-base-somalia/.md In early August, the top U.S. special operations commander for Africa signed a security agreement with the president of Puntland — a semi-autonomous region in northeastern Somalia — to expand the American military installation there. The deal surfaced through a short statement from the Puntland government. “Under the agreement, the United States will expand its military base in Bosaso to improve operations against terrorism and to help protect maritime security,” the Puntland Government of Somalia wrote in a statement. “The Puntland state remains committed to fighting terrorism and any threat that could harm the security, stability, and development of Puntland, Somalia, and the Horn of Africa.” There are few details regarding the arrangement, which has no public text and has not yet been confirmed by the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) or anybody in Washington. “The informality is really important,” said Samar Al-Bulushi, associate professor of anthropology at University of California, Irvine, and a non-resident fellow at the Quincy Institute. “If the U.S. wants to be able to stand by its claim — that seems to be a claim only — that it respects the sovereignty of the Somali government, then, in theory, it wouldn't be negotiating formal agreements with these semi-autonomous regions.” The deal was reportedly negotiated without input from the central government in Mogadishu — whose authority the government in Puntland does not recognize — marking a notable shift toward treating Somalia's federal peripheral states as sovereign negotiating partners in their own right. Though the agreement itself is vague, it signals a potential new direction in the Trump administration’s Horn of Africa policy. Experts say the driving force is the expansion of the Iran war into the Red Sea, not a reaction to events inside Somalia itself. But the move also risks deepening a rift between Mogadishu and the federal states it has long struggled to hold together. American engagement with these states is not entirely new. Cameron Hudson, an analyst who previously served as director for African affairs at the National Security Council, told RS that the U.S. has used Puntland as a staging ground for operations inside Somalia for years, largely via an Emirati-run base in the port city of Bosaso. “The United States probably now sees a longer term need to have a kind of wholly owned, wholly operated U.S. base in the region,” Hudson said, a move that likely indicates either an increase in military strikes within Somalia or part of a larger effort to combat growing threats in the wider region. Washington has for years maintained what is known as a dual-track posture in Somalia, in which it supports Somalia’s internationally recognized central government while simultaneously building direct relationships with regional and local authorities outside Mogadishu, such as Puntland or Somaliland. AFRICOM says that it has no plans to build a military base in Somaliland, though some Republicans in Congress have called on Trump to recognize the state’s independence. The U.S. was also recently the only member of the United Nations Security Council that did not condemn Israeli recognition of Somaliland. That engagement with Somalia’s peripheral states has taken on new strategic significance as the Iran war has spilled into the Red Sea. Since Yemen’s Houthis announced on July 20 that they would impose a maritime blockade against Saudi Arabia in the Red Sea in what they say is a response to renewed attacks from Riyadh, Washington and its allies have been looking for ways to to prevent the blockade from further destabilizing the global supply chain. A base in Bosaso would position U.S. forces closer to that front in the war. “The Trump administration might be reconsidering its engagement in Somalia,” Ahmed Ibrahim, a socio-cultural anthropologist who has written extensively about the Horn of Africa, told RS. For the past year and a half, the Trump administration has largely eschewed expanding its presence on the ground in East Africa, Ibrahim said, instead focusing on drone strikes to combat threats from terrorist groups like al-Shabaab. Trump launched a record 124 airstrikes in Somalia last year and has added an additional 78 so far in 2026, a massive increase from the 51 total strikes during President Joe Biden’s term. Although the move may reflect a shifting approach toward Somalia, the war in Iran and its aftershocks are the key accelerants, says Michael Woldemariam, an associate professor at the University of Maryland and non-resident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council. “It's really only understandable in terms of the Red Sea question,” he told RS. “I find it hard to understand what the logic would be independent of increased focus on the Red Sea, Gulf and maritime security questions.” That logic could help explain why Puntland, rather than Djibouti, which borders Somalia’s northwest, has become one of Washington’s preferred partners for expanding access near the Bab al-Mandab Strait — the body of water that connects the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden, and through which 10-12% of global shipping travels —according to al-Bulushi. Djibouti hosts Camp Lemonnier, the U.S.'s largest permanent base on the continent, but its government has drawn a line since the start of Israel’s war in Gaza and the subsequent attacks in the Red Sea, telling Washington that it could not strike the Houthis from the naval base in their country because of concerns that this would bring drag them into the conflict. The base in Puntland could offer AFRICOM that level of operational flexibility. Al-Bulushi described the nascent arrangement as reflecting a "military-to-military style" of engagement that appears to largely leave out elected representation, diplomats, or political appointees on both sides. “This traces back to the first Trump administration and then the Biden administration, who maintained far greater leeway for the U.S. military, and AFRICOM specifically, to not only engage in negotiations and reach agreements but to engage in operations on the ground without consultation within the U.S. government,” she told RS. Hudson says the Puntland base expansion could be part of a broader effort for the combatant command to try to “justify its existence,” noting that AFRICOM was reportedly on the chopping block early in Trump’s term but has since found renewed purpose across the continent. AFRICOM officials also met with leadership in Jubaland, another federal member state that does not recognize Mogadishu's authority, in the days before the Puntland government announced the deal. These efforts could reinforce a pattern that risks deepening the divisions the U.S. says it wants to see resolved. “We create this self-fulfilling prophecy,” Hudson told RS.“If we complain about the weakness and division and then we suspend our support and we strengthen the peripheral states, then we are going to accelerate the thing about which we are complaining the most.” Woldemariam argues that Somalia’s politics were already trending unstable well before this deal, pointing to unresolved disputes over constitutional changes that have frozen cooperation between Mogadishu and the breakaway states. "I'm not sure security cooperation with Puntland or Somaliland really makes it any worse. I think we're already at a pretty alarming stage,” he says. But he nonetheless warns about the trajectory of U.S. regional policy after the Puntland military base expansion. "There's a lot of smoke here," Woldemariam said. "I think we're headed in the direction of a scaled-up U.S. presence across the Horn's Red Sea littoral. Ultimately the form it takes remains to be seen.” --- ### Russia's lockdown of Odessa ports could be a grim turning point in war **Published:** August 11, 2026 | **Author:** George Beebe | **Section:** Europe **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/odessa-ports-ukraine-russia/.md Over the course of a few short weeks, a grim new reality has taken shape in Ukraine. Russia has shown that it need not conquer and occupy Ukraine’s entire Black Sea coastline to turn that country into the equivalent of a landlocked state. It need only deny access to Ukraine’s critically important Odessa port complex, something it is doing quite effectively through air and missile strikes on port facilities and approaching ships. That reality will probably not amount to a knock-out blow in the ongoing war. But it is likely to have a profound impact on Ukraine’s already gloomy post-war prospects — and, by extension, on the contours of a new European security landscape in the current conflict’s aftermath. Only a handful of months ago, Russia was conducting few military operations against Odessa. Early in the war, attacks by Russia and Ukraine on merchant shipping in the Black Sea had threatened to choke off agricultural exports vital to world markets. Under pressure from India and other key partners in the Global South, Moscow agreed to the so-called “Grain Deal” with Ukraine, brokered by Turkey and the United Nations, to allow unimpeded commercial exports from the region. For some four years thereafter, the Odessa port system remained open to Ukrainian imports and exports, handling some 90% of Ukraine’s agricultural trade. Russian hardliners bristled at Russian President Vladimir Putin’s refusal to attack Ukraine’s vital but vulnerable port, grumbling that Putin seemed more interested in avoiding rifts with Global South states than defeating Ukraine. Several factors have combined to change this picture. One was the evident failure of the West’s campaign to turn Russia into a pariah state, a brainchild of the Biden administration that had magnified the importance of the Global South to Moscow as a means of avoiding international isolation. A second has been the depletion of Ukrainian air defense interceptors, which has left Odessa largely defenseless against Russian ballistic missiles and allowed bomb-carrying aircraft to operate in closer proximity to the port complex, increasing the accuracy and destructiveness of Russian air strikes. Ironically enough, perhaps the most important factor was Ukraine’s own “40-day influence campaign” announced in late June, which included long- and medium-range drone strikes on energy infrastructure in Russia and merchant shipping in the Sea of Azov. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said the campaign was aimed at “influencing the aggressor state in order to compel it to end the war.” President Trump described it more plainly as an “escalation that we hope will lead to peace.” In practice, however, the escalation allowed Russia to deflect Global South criticism for violating terms of the Grain Deal by arguing it was Ukraine that had kicked off the recent cycle of shipping and port attacks. The near-term effects have been disturbingly clear. Since July 22, the Russian military has effectively closed the Ukrainian port complex in and around Odessa to all shipping. The loss of its remaining deep-water ports is already having a devastating effect on Ukraine’s agricultural exports — the backbone of its economy — which officials warn may plummet by 50% in the coming months because alternative land, rail, and river routes have much less capacity and are much more costly. The damage to Ukraine’s economy probably will be manageable in the near term so long as Europe steps up its flow of aid. But the impact of Odessa’s closure on Ukraine’s post-war prospects may prove to be much more profound. It has long been assumed in both Washington and Europe that the main alternative to a compromise settlement of the Russia-Ukraine war is the transformation of Ukraine into a “steel porcupine.” The concept envisions a heavily armed and fortified Ukraine that can serve as a barrier to further Russian aggression and allow the hot war to settle into a stable, frozen conflict. Proponents of this vision dismiss prospective “land for peace” deals with Moscow and oppose any quantitative or qualitative limitations on Ukraine’s military — points that Russian officials say are essential to any peace deal — arguing that such concessions would “reward Russian aggression” and prevent Ukraine from becoming an Eastern European variant of Israel, a “Major Non-NATO Ally” that punches well above its weight-class in regional affairs and serves as a keystone of broader European defense plans. However, if Russia can use air and missile attacks to deny Ukraine the use of its port facilities, it can also prevent Ukraine’s post-war reconstruction and economic revitalization. Just as merchant ships will not risk Russian attacks to enter Odessa, construction firms are unlikely to risk Russian airstrikes in attempting to build or repair bridges, roads, factories, ports, and other vital infrastructure. Nor will investors risk hundreds of billions of dollars if Russian missiles and bombs can destroy any Ukrainian reconstruction project in a matter of hours. Without large-scale economic reconstruction and the jobs and stability that would follow, few of the millions of Ukrainians who fled the war (most for Europe but many for Russia) will return. Absent mass repatriation, Ukraine is likely to enter a demographic death-spiral. By Ukrainian officials’ own admission, a population that approached 52 million people when the Soviet Union broke up now stands at between 22 and 25 million people, and nearly half of them are retirees. According to one estimate, Ukraine’s working age population – the backbone of both its civilian economy and its military — could lose an additional third by 2040. The number of children, the embodiment of Ukraine’s future, could decline to half its pre-war level. This raises an obvious but under-discussed question: How can an aging and dying Ukrainian population, lacking a strong economic base, serve as a “new Sparta” countering a nuclear-armed Russia that is seven times its size? The closure of Odessa should highlight two salient points for Western leaders. First, neither Ukraine nor the West can eliminate the threat of Russian air and missile strikes through military means alone. Second, Russia will have strong reason to continue them, even after it eventually halts large-scale ground operations, if the Kremlin worries that the West will otherwise turn Ukraine into a safe haven for threatening Russian security. As a result, the alternative to an uncomfortable compromise settlement of the war will not be a steel Ukrainian porcupine. It will be a weak and dysfunctional rump state that ill-serves Ukrainians and undermines Europe’s broader security. All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the U.S. Government. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying U.S. Government authentication of information or endorsement of the author's views. --- ### Israel is going all out to stop Turkey from getting F-35s **Published:** August 10, 2026 | **Author:** Fatih Kocaibiş | **Section:** Middle East **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/turkey-f-35-s400/.md For the first time in years, Washington is discussing Turkey's return to the F-35 program as a serious possibility. At the NATO summit in Ankara last month, President Donald Trump said he would lift the CAATSA sanctions that the U.S. imposed on Turkey after Ankara purchased Russian S-400 missile defense systems in 2019. Trump added that he was “certainly” considering restoring Turkey’s access to the F-35 program, which was also suspended at the time.. Notably, a separate sale of American engines for Turkey's domestic KAAN fighter jet has advanced through congressional review. Ankara is also reportedly exploring the transfer of its S-400 batteries to a Gulf state, a step Washington has demanded for years. But the Russian system is no longer the only source of resistance. Israel argues that Turkish F-35s would, in Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's words, "destroy the power balance" in the region. The phrase invokes Israel's “qualitative military edge,” a provision in U.S. law according to which Washington cannot sell weapons to Middle Eastern states if those arms would give them capabilities on par with Israel’s own weaponry. Yet these rules have never been formally applied to Turkey, which is, after all, a U.S. treaty ally. What is being tested is thus not only an arms sale, but whether Israel's claim to regional primacy can restrict American policy toward a NATO ally. --- ### US Military testing sowing chaos in civilian skies **Published:** August 10, 2026 | **Author:** Stavroula Pabst | **Section:** Military Industrial Complex **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/military-testing/.md Almost every day, the military tests various emerging technologies across the U.S., including drone and counter-drone systems and GPS jamming. To a certain extent, this testing is inevitable. But, as experts told RS, the government has in many cases not ensured that the proper safeguards and necessary interagency coordination are in place to make sure such tests can be conducted safely. These testing issues strain civilian airspaces — increasingly disrupting aircraft and even sometimes leading to accidents. --- ### Why the Trump administration will have to accept a Hormuz toll **Published:** August 10, 2026 | **Author:** Dan DePetris | **Section:** Middle East **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/straight-of-hormuz-toll/.md In the weeks since the U.S.-Iran Memorandum of Understanding collapsed, Washington and Tehran have used the time to strengthen their respective positions in the event negotiations resume. For the United States, this has largely taken the form of overt threats by President Donald Trump himself and hints that an even more comprehensive U.S. bombing campaign against Iranian strategic targets is on the table. For Iran, the strategy is familiar: ensure maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz is kept to an absolute minimum. U.S. and Iranian officials continue to give conflicting accounts of where negotiations stand. Despite Trump’s repeated declarations that Tehran is begging for a deal, the Iranians stress no talks are occurring with the United States. Still, both sides seem to agree that any pending agreement will center on the Strait of Hormuz, the strategic waterway that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has proved capable of shutting down at will. Various schemes have been proposed between Iran and Oman, the two countries on either end of the strait. While a deal is not finalized, Iran will most certainly retain more power over the strait’s traffic than it did before the war began in February. The question now is whether tolls or fees will accompany any arrangement worked out between Tehran and Muscat. The Trump administration is dead set against acceding to any fee structure because it would provide the Iranian government with additional revenue and represent visible proof that Trump’s preventive war was a strategic mistake. Referring to the Strait of Hormuz, Secretary of State Marco Rubio reiterated the U.S. position in July: "If we create a precedent in the Middle East where a nation-state can decide that they are going to control an international waterway, charge a toll…we have created a very dangerous precedent which will repeat itself in other parts of the world.” Of course, permitting an Iranian toll or fee structure isn’t ideal. Before the war, such a hypothetical would have been difficult to imagine. The strait at that time was free and open, and roughly 120 to 150 ships relied on the route each day to get their products to customers worldwide. The United States wants Iran to return to this status quo. Yet Iran has no intention of doing so — and to expect otherwise is to be completely ignorant of how events have played out since. Trump’s war handed Iran the perfect excuse to leverage its geography, and the Iranians didn’t hesitate to do so. Originally, Tehran’s shuttering of the strait aimed to increase the cost on Washington and eventually convince U.S. partners in the region to pressure Trump into ending the war. But over time, the Strait of Hormuz, in addition to Iran’s more aggressive posture toward its neighbors writ-large, has become something far more valuable: a strategic card Iran can play whenever Trump threatens to accelerate military operations. Re-opening the strait is now as important to the United States as containing Iran’s nuclear program, if not more so. The question is how to do it. Trump originally tried to pursue this objective through military force, hoping U.S. strikes could degrade Iran’s military capacity to such an extent that the IRGC would have to stop shooting at ships. The strategy overestimated the U.S. military’s power to force a change in Tehran’s strategic calculus and underestimated Iran’s ability to manufacture and launch cheap drones and missiles at scale. Every U.S. strike merely reaffirmed the Iranian government’s belief that the war was existential for them. Instead of capitulating, Iran fought back, targeting vessels that used the southerly route near Oman’s coast and making it clear that heavier U.S. bombing would compel more Iranian attacks on Gulf energy infrastructure. U.S. military attempts to bring the strait back to its pre-February state have failed and will likely continue to fail. If the Trump administration seeks to extricate itself from a war without end, its best option is to accept a toll or fee structure in the regional chokepoint. Hawks on Capitol Hill would no doubt scream bloody murder, and some of Trump’s own political allies will have a difficult time explaining how such a scheme is appealing. But if the choice is between swallowing fees or endless conflict, then the former is the better option. The Trump administration may not like paying for the privilege of using the strait, but its decision to go to war in the first place created the situation the United States is now in. Bad policies have unintended consequences. Fortunately, fees in the strait would not be the end of the world. This wouldn’t be the first time a country located next to a critical trade chokepoint received some form of compensation. The most obvious case is the Strait of Malacca in Southeast Asia, where shipowners contribute to a voluntary fund, administered by Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore, for navigational assistance, maritime safety, environmental protection and search and rescue. A similar arrangement in the Strait of Hormuz would thus not set a precedent. In fact, shipping companies and the insurance carriers that underwrite them might even view these voluntary payments as in their own interest if it helps prevent even costlier disasters or accidents. There’s no use brushing the obvious under the rug: U.S. acceptance of Iranian tolls or fees would be an embarrassing acknowledgment that Iran is now a principal arbiter of the strait. Moreover, depending on how high the fees are — Tehran is reportedly demanding 7% of the value of a ship’s cargo — the Iranians would be collecting revenue they wouldn’t have had prior to the war. But even this scenario is not as dire as many assume. In practice, Iran’s leverage dissipates with every month that passes by. The Gulf Arab states are not sitting still and watching the new status quo helplessly. Rather, Tehran’s neighbors are increasingly adapting to Iran’s machinations by tapping into pipelines that bypass the strait altogether and exploring future projects that make their energy infrastructure more durable and less vulnerable to a single chokepoint. Saudi Arabia is using its cross-country east-west pipeline to export more crude oil through the Red Sea. While this alternative route remains vulnerable to strikes by the Iran-aligned Houthis and doesn’t fully compensate for the loss of normal traffic in the Strait of Hormuz, it has still allowed the kingdom to avoid shutting down production entirely. Ditto the United Arab Emirates, which is sending more crude through its Fujairah export terminal, located outside the strait. Fujairah’s share of UAE exports increased to 66% in July from 51% a month earlier. Iran’s actions during the war will only reinforce Persian Gulf oil producers’ desire to diversify their routes, reducing Tehran’s ability to obstruct energy flows in the future. Negotiations on reopening the Strait of Hormuz continue. If there comes a point where fees for passage are unavoidable, then U.S. policymakers should keep a cool head. Ceding the point would be the most efficient way for the United States to remove itself from a foolish conflict at minimal cost. --- ### Let them eat burritos: Out of touch influencers risk all for Trump war **Published:** August 8, 2026 | **Author:** Jack Hunter | **Section:** Washington Politics **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/burrito-war-affordability/.md As the 2026 midterm elections near, polls show American voters’ top priority is the economy, including concerns that the unpopular U.S. war in Iran appears to be driving up prices at home. Might these voter concerns give Republican hawks pause? Apparently not. "If we can't handle four dollar oil for a period of months in order to disarm Iran of a nuclear weapon then we are not a superpower anymore,” former George W. Bush speechwriter Marc Thiessen told Fox News last week. One of the biggest pro-Israel lawmakers in Congress had a similar message. "As much as it stinks to pay an extra dollar for a gallon of gas… think about the damage of a nuclear bomb going off in Washington, or New York, or Miami,” Rep. Randy Fine (R-Fla.) said Monday on News Nation. Surely some of these Republicans would recognize that fear of inflation combined with growing opposition to the war could hurt their party come November — that maybe an adjustment in language and tone is in order? Sen. Tom Cotton (R-Ark.) gets it. Sort of. He wants to keep prices down for Americans but thinks the only way to do that is to bomb the hell out of Iran for “two to three weeks” to get the Hormuz Strait open. He says the Iranians cannot be trusted to broker a deal without military force, so why not keep doing what hasn’t worked yet over the last five months? Others are leaning hard into the notion that higher prices are just “fake news” — no doubt in hopes that repeating that enough will just make the problem go away. The Iran war "has had basically no impact on food prices in the US,” declared The Daily Wire’s Ben Shapiro on Wednesday, seemingly responding to what writer Sohrab Ahmari is calling the “great American burrito debate” on social media over the current cost of food and how that might relate to the current cost of war. Ahmari’s essay notes that, to Cotton’s point about Hormuz and prices, “even though the United States is the world’s chief net energy exporter, the supply squeeze in the Strait of Hormuz puts inflationary pressure on gas prices in America. And it’s not just gas prices which are affected, but those in many other sectors, too — from transportation to agriculture to restaurants and hospitality.” In addition to rising prices, new data released Friday showed that 23,000 jobs were lost in July, an unexpected number for economists. All eyes are on the new inflation figures to be released this upcoming week. In May, it rose to 4.2%, the highest since 2023 and relaxed in June to 3.5%. Never to be left out, regime change maven and Fox News host Mark Levin on Sunday urged Donald Trump to attack Kharg Island to bring Iranians “to their knees” and not to worry about sparking "a worldwide depression and so on. It won't happen!" Trump seemed to share the same reality-detached hopefulness, proclaiming on Monday that, "Now, US is the King of OIL!" The president shared a chart showing U.S. “oil exports to historic high!” He is likely hoping that his audience won’t read up on the subject and find that it doesn’t matter how much the U.S. produces; it won’t affect current gas prices at the pump today. One time MAGA-darling turned Trump critic, former Republican Congresswoman Marjorie Taylor Greene, wasn’t having it. She called out the president on what Americans are actually experiencing. "The national price of gas is $4.10 and diesel is $5.36. Your illegal senseless war on Iran is crushing the very people that voted to end foreign wars, lower inflation, and lower the price of gas,” Greene said on X. Trump even went so far as to suggest that greedy energy companies might be to blame, saying at the Oval Office this week that Chevron and Exxon Mobil are making "too much money,” amid the war. "I don't like it... They ought to give some of that back to the public,” he said, according to C-SPAN. The Independent’s Eric Garcia couldn’t help but notice that Trump sounded like Democrats complaining about "greedflation" under President Joe Biden. None of this appears to be fooling voters, including Republicans. On Tuesday, CNN pollster Harry Enten rattled off some of Donald Trump’s approval numbers among moderate Republicans. “On Iran, he's six points underwater within his own party. Within his own party! You think that's low? (He’s) about 17 points underwater on inflation.” “Inflation was the name of the game with the economy back in 2024,” Enten noted. “If I am a Republican running for Congress in those swing districts, I need those moderate Republicans, and they are leaving Donald Trump, and they may be leaving those Republican candidates as well.” The New York Times suggested on Tuesday that the war was undermining Trump’s presidency. "The war in Iran, along with a cycle of threats and walk-backs, has upended President Trump’s domestic agenda at a dire political moment. Americans are facing rising gas prices." It went on to cite the most recent Quinnipiac University poll, which found that 60% of voters opposed military action against Iran, “a slight uptick since May.” Furthermore, a recent CNN/SSRS poll found that 74% of Americans — including about 43% of Republicans — said the war was not “worth the cost in terms of the financial burden or American casualties," the paper noted. While some hawks are doing mental gymnastics to say war costs and domestic affordability are unrelated, other conservatives have told them to knock it off and course correct. The Daily’s Wire’s Matt Walsh shared an X post on Monday that at the time of this writing had 4.4 million views and climbing. “Grocery prices are insane. They’re still rising. Addressing this problem should be the number one priority of every elected leader,” Walsh wrote. “End the stupid foreign wars and focus on this issue.” In response, Charlie Kirk Show producer Andrew Kolvet tried to downplay current inflation as "hangover from Covid and Biden-era inflation," but also quoted one of his TPUSA college students bemoaning that, "a burrito shouldn't cost $20." The forever-hawkish Marc Thiessen was back again, completely dismissive. "Cry me a river. The burritos in the college cafeteria are included in your meal plan.” Add to that Rep. Dan Crenshaw (R-Texas) who recently lost his primary by double digits. "Stop whining, get a job, eat Ramen like the rest of us did in college, on a budget with 4 roommates. The market does not care what you think something should cost," he posted. To which conservative commentator Ryan Girdusky responded: "Can't understand why you lost your re-election." Hence the foreign policy-inflation-driven-burrito-cost debate that is probably still raging on X and that Ahmari insists “the neocons are losing.” He might be right. No matter how much hawks doth protest, there are costs to any war, often including affordability. Iran war defenders pretending otherwise is just something reality won’t afford them. --- ### DRC president claims Trump deal requires he seize another term **Published:** August 7, 2026 | **Author:** Dan M. Ford | **Section:** Africa **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/congo-minerals-deal/.md Last week, the Constitutional Court of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) opened the door for the country’s sitting president, Felix Tshisekedi, to seek a third term. In a widely expected but nonetheless dramatic decision, the court ruled that the country’s constitution — including its provision limiting presidents to two terms in office — can now be amended via a referendum in the event of “major dysfunction” of state institutions. The country’s 2006 constitution not only limits a president to two five-year terms, but Article 220 stipulates that “the number and length of the terms of office of the President of the Republic … may not form the object of a Constitutional amendment.” Tshisekedi already expressed interest in the idea of a referendum on term limits, saying in June, “I have not asked for a third term, but if the people want a third term, I will accept.” The next presidential election is scheduled for 2028. The court’s decision now threatens to set off a political crisis in the country — one in which the United States, which has actively tried to influence both political and economic issues in the DRC for years, has unintentionally become embroiled. In a press conference on May 6, Tshisekedi argued, without evidence, that amending his country’s constitution was among the conditions put in place by Washington in the minerals agreement the two countries signed last December, which gave American firms preferential access to the country’s resources. Members and supporters of the ruling coalition are now repeating this claim across the media, pointing to Article XII of the Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) as the condition requiring an amendment to the country’s constitution. The article in question says that the DRC must commit “to undertake any legislative and constitutional reforms within a maximum period of twelve (12) months in order to align its legal framework with the relevant provisions of this Agreement.” But the SPA does not require any specific changes to the Congolese constitution, let alone any that focus directly on presidential term limits. The only explicit requirement in the SPA is that the Congolese government agrees to amend a 2014 law focused on “the fiscal, customs, parafiscal, non-tax revenue and exchange regime” and to “undertake any legislative and constitutional reforms … to align its legal framework” with the SPA. In order to avoid the appearance of foreign interference, the Trump administration should clearly indicate that the SPA does not require the DRC to make any constitutional amendment relating to presidential powers or term limits. Another argument advanced by Tshisekedi and his supporters is that, since the constitution was largely written by foreigners, it never sufficiently accounted for domestic Congolese realities. The text therefore needs to be amended, if not completely overhauled, in order to be more responsive to local needs. U.S.-based organizations funded by the U.S. government were among those that sent experts to the DRC to help in the drafting and implementation of the constitution. A third major argument presented by Tshisekedi and his supporters has to do with the long-standing war ravaging the DRC’s east. The DRC has for years been fighting a proxy war against Rwanda, in which both countries are providing munitions to various armed groups in a conflict whose origins date back to the Rwandan genocide of 1994. In early May, Tshisekedi said “If we cannot end this war, unfortunately we will not be able to organize elections in 2028.” “The resources are there, we can do it, but we cannot organize them without North Kivu and South Kivu,” he argued, referring to two of the country’s eastern provinces where much of the recent fighting has taken place. The United States is directly implicated in the conflict’s future. Washington brokered an agreement in June 2025 to end the war in exchange for preferential access to the region’s minerals — access which was codified in the December SPA. Despite Trump’s claims to have ended the war, fighting has continued sporadically in the year since. If peace continues to be elusive, and if Tshisekedi continues to cite the conflict to argue for deferring elections, Washington could find itself in a difficult position. In such a case, it would need to pressure Tshisekedi to live up to his end of the peace deal, including ceasing “any state support to non-state armed groups except as necessary to facilitate implementation of this Agreement.” Reporting suggests the DRC continues to provide support to several of the armed groups fighting in the country’s east. Ultimately, the United States’ primary objective in the DRC shouldn’t be to support Tshisekedi’s effort to cling to power, no matter how amenable he’s been to U.S. mining interests. The DRC has long struggled to support a liberal democracy where reliable elections happen as scheduled. The country was under a dictatorship until 1997, when long-time ruler Mobutu Sese Seko fled the country under threat. Laurent-Desire Kabila took over the next day, installing an autocratic government. After years of conflict and unstable governance, a constitution was approved in 2006, providing for two five-year term limits for the office of the president. In 2015, then-President Joseph Kabila — the son of Laurent-Desire — expressed his interest in seeking an unconstitutional third term in office. Tshisekedi, who was in the opposition at the time, spoke out against Kabila’s plans, claiming that they were a breach of democracy. Widespread protests and pressure from foreign governments ultimately forced Kabila to step down at the end of his second term, allowing for elections to be held, in which the Constitutional Court declared Tshisekedi the winner amid claims of electoral fraud by the opposition. The opposition has voiced disapproval over Tshisekedi’s apparent attempt to hold onto power. In a speech before the Conference of Catholic Bishops a couple weeks ago, Martin Fayulu, who officially came in second in the 2018 presidential election and third in 2023, said “Tshisekedi has betrayed the oath he took to respect and defend the constitution.” For the United States, the goal in the DRC shouldn’t be to advance or hinder the interests of any single domestic politician, no matter how powerful they might be. Getting embroiled in the domestic political affairs of the DRC risks pulling the U.S. into a crisis from which it has nothing to gain. Rather, Washington should remain focused on promoting its own interests by seeking access to the region’s economic opportunities and extending its investments across the Congo in an effort to integrate the region’s vital resources into global supply chains. The United States should also work to continuously hold each of the belligerent sides accountable for the peace accord signed last year in Washington. If peace takes hold, then the U.S. wins twice: first by securing a diplomatic victory, and second by lowering barriers to investment for American private sector firms. --- ### The rise or fail of middle powers will determine Middle East peace **Published:** August 7, 2026 | **Author:** Gabrielle Rifkind, Tom Pickering | **Section:** Middle East **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/middle-east-peace/.md For more than two decades, endless wars have destabilized the Middle East, creating huge amounts of human suffering, displacement and trauma. The region is exhausted, with little faith in the possibility of peace and few structures to enable it. The region is now at an inflection point; it can continue endless violence or undertake serious mediation and conflict resolution. The war with Iran has exposed the limits of U.S. military power, leaving only one practical option on the table: pursuing negotiations that recognize the balance of power in the region and the security concerns of all parties. This requires very careful engagement and mediation. There are multiple overlapping conflicts and rivalries within the region. Breaking this cycle requires more than another round of emergency diplomacy; it requires permanent structures for mediation and peacemaking. This article proposes a regional peace table, not for crisis management alone, but to work continuously toward transforming hostile regional relationships into pragmatic ones based on mutual self-interest rather than enduring enmities. The long-term goal is an order built around dialogue, engagement and mutual dependency rather than coercion. The United States, long regarded as the region's principal power broker, has emerged from this period with a bruised reputation. Gulf partners, while recognizing that the U.S. will remain relevant, now view Washington as unreliable and insouciant toward their security concerns. Against this backdrop, so-called "middle powers" have gained new relevance. Countries such as Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Oman, Qatar, and Egypt are emerging as both mediators and security partners within the Gulf. Over the coming years, their rising role could shape conflict management and resolution across the region and beyond. Ideas for a more durable regional security architecture in the Middle East are emerging, one in which Iran and Israel will eventually sit at the same table. This does not require trust between the various countries. Moves toward peace rarely start with mutual confidence; a regional peace table would provide the necessary container through which trust can slowly be rebuilt. War breeds hatred and typically ends not through goodwill but exhaustion, when both sides have hurt each other badly enough to recognize that this old path can't continue. Therein lies the good news: great destruction can spark great creativity. --- ### Syria walks a tightrope as war engulfs the Middle East **Published:** August 7, 2026 | **Author:** Giorgio Cafiero | **Section:** Middle East **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/iran-syria-war/.md Syria has so far avoided becoming a battlefield in the U.S.-Israel-Iran crisis, but it has not escaped the consequences. As regional peace remains elusive, Syria is confronting the challenge of rebuilding following years of gruesome civil war while shielding its fragile recovery from a new wave of geopolitical turmoil. The relatively new Syrian government has prioritized reconstruction, foreign investment, and institution rebuilding. However, the expanding crisis has already created economic and security pressures through trade disruptions, investor uncertainty, and new refugee flows. Higher transportation and insurance costs, along with increased caution among investors, threaten to slow Syria’s recovery just as the country seeks to move beyond its long civil war. Making matters worse is the fact that most Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states’ economies are experiencing contraction as a result of the Iran war, meaning that their earlier economic memoranda of understanding (MoUs) and agreements with Damascus are likely to be cut back, if not eliminated. Despite these challenges, the regional upheaval has created openings that may work in Syria’s favor. The dual blockades of the Strait of Hormuz have reduced Iraq’s ability to export oil through the Gulf and increased overland shipments across Syria to Mediterranean ports. There is also renewed discussion of building pipeline routes linking Gulf producers to the Mediterranean through Jordan and Syria — routes that could eventually generate significant foreign investment if regional conditions permit. Moreover, Turkey and Saudi Arabia’s plans to revive the historic Hejaz Railway, which once connected the region from Mecca all the way to Istanbul, may position Syria as an increasingly important trade and logistics hub in the region, making it essentially a land bridge between Europe and GCC states. Such opportunities could “exponentially” improve Syria’s regional standing, said Karam Shaar, director of Karam Shaar Advisory Limited and a non-resident senior fellow at the New Lines Institute. He added that they could help the Syrian government “solidify its position in power,” a critical objective for Damascus, as the “order of the day for the Syrian regime…is basically consolidation.” --- ### Surprise strikes signal Iran is digging in for a long war **Published:** August 6, 2026 | **Author:** Hadi Kahalzadeh | **Section:** Middle East **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/us-iran-strikes/.md In recent weeks, Iran has gone on the offensive, striking commercial ships in the Strait of Hormuz and launching a surprise attack on U.S. forces in Jordan. From a distance, these moves look like self-defeating escalation. Why should a badly damaged state, under severe economic pressure, lash out at the U.S. instead of pushing for a ceasefire? The answer, simply put, is that Iran is digging in for a long war. Whatever Washington's intentions, Tehran increasingly interprets sanctions, negotiations, temporary ceasefires and military strikes as different instruments aimed at a single objective: regime change. As long as this primary objective remains, Iran expects no sanctions relief or meaningful de-escalation. My conversations with Iranian foreign policy analysts suggest that Tehran now believes the war will continue in different forms until the end of Donald Trump's presidency. There is no doubt that the war has punished Iran’s economy. Over 23,000 U.S. and Israeli strikes heavily damaged the country's energy, industrial, transportation, and civil infrastructure, which had kept the country functioning despite decades of onerous sanctions. The country is experiencing the largest contraction in its labor market, along with the highest inflation rate, in its modern history. Beyond economic costs, the war has profoundly changed Iran’s perception of costs and its decision-making logic. The February 28 decapitation strike did not replace old, conservative political leaders and military commanders with more hard-line ones dominated by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), as mainstream U.S. media has suggested. Instead, it formed a shadow decision-making system that is more confident, less patient, less predictable, and guided by a different calculation of risk. Iran's experience of failed negotiations with the U.S. before the two major airstrikes in 2025 and 2026 intensified this new perception. In Tehran's view, a comprehensive agreement with the Trump administration is virtually unachievable. Trump either cannot deliver a durable settlement because he cannot afford its domestic political cost, or he does not want to. Even if the administration wants to change course, Israel, which clearly maintains substantial influence within Trump’s inner circle despite the recent rhetoric of Vice President JD Vance, will do what it can to disrupt it. The debate over the June Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) is illustrative. Under the MoU, bombing stopped, and the blockade was lifted despite some violations of the Lebanon ceasefire. But the promised economic incentives were never realized. Tehran exported $6 billion in oil but did not receive the $12 billion in foreign assets it had expected. This limited implementation of the deal hurt Iran’s negotiating team at home. Sources told me that Iranians were also deeply dissatisfied with the Qatari-administered mechanism for allocating Iran’s frozen assets to import essential foods and medicine, and blamed Doha for misleading them. Altogether, these deepened the suspicion that the United States had paused its attacks in order to rebuild its defenses, update its military targets, bring oil prices down, and manage domestic grievances before returning to war. Ironically, hawks in the U.S. complained that the MoU had allowed the Iranians to rebuild their military capabilities in the interim. In Iran, a fragile MoU with no clear economic benefit was seen as a one-sided pause that exposed the Islamic Republic to societal and political pressures that had eased during wartime. While inflation, unemployment, poverty, and mismanagement fueled public anger, power struggles among political and security factions intensified. On one hand, Tehran could wait, ignoring some of Washington’s violations of the MoU while taking advantage of its limited economic benefits, and retaliating if the U.S. resumed the war. A factor weighing on the minds of leaders was that a renewed full-scale war would target Iran’s remaining energy, industrial, and civilian infrastructure, on which the state still depends. However, the leadership in Tehran came to believe that the relative benefits of waiting flowed overwhelmingly in favor of the United States and Israel. In particular, as long as Washington controlled the tempo of the war and decided when the war began, paused, and resumed, Tehran would lack agency. Seeking to break the deadlock, Tehran has thus adopted a strategy of managed confrontation, a form of active deterrence to raise the cost for the United States. Such a confrontation is limited enough to avoid full-scale war but would still increase political pressure on the Trump administration. Even limited attacks can disrupt the U.S. military’s focus, spread out its forces, engage its defensive systems, and force it to spend more on defensive operations than on preparing for a resumption of the war. At the same time, Tehran could keep negotiation channels open and demonstrate its desire for diplomatic solutions. Iran’s economic experience reinforces a confidence that Iran can win this gamble. Iran has absorbed enormous damage without collapsing. As the government allows inflation and currency depreciation to rise, goods keep moving; shelves are not empty, although fewer people can afford what is on them. Iran’s diverse geography helps to bypass the blockade and meet its essential needs. Its privileged welfare system has protected public employees on whom the effective functioning of the state relies, but much of the burden falls on informal workers and small firms. In contrast, a fragile MoU without economic benefits, combined with high uncertainty, will not ease the war’s economic burdens but will lower the cost of a new U.S. attack. As such, a controlled confrontation is more worthwhile. Iran's military and geographic leverage over the Strait of Hormuz helps the country raise the costs of war in a way that could exhaust Trump, perhaps forcing him to abandon the confrontation and change his Iran policy. The pressure is growing: as public support in the U.S. has declined, Trump’s popular approval has fallen to an unprecedented low. Of course, Tehran may underestimate Trump’s tolerance for a prolonged conflict. Another risk is that, while Tehran might be able to calibrate the targets and scale of its own attacks, it cannot control how Washington responds. In addition, Iran's neighbors may lose patience with Iran’s retaliatory attacks on them and join the U.S. in the attack. Finally, domestic discontent over the destruction wrought by the war (on top of a collapsing economy and increased repression) remains a persistent possibility that would fracture wartime solidarity. Still, Iranian leaders appear determined to continue down a path of extended, low-grade war. For Washington, the upshot of this change in Iranian thinking is straightforward. If the U.S. is truly interested in ending the war rather than engaging in endless military confrontation, it must recognize the limits of military pressure. The military campaign might be effective in damaging Iran’s military and economic infrastructure, but, until now, it has been politically counterproductive. It has heightened Iran’s economic crisis and increased poverty, but failed to force Iran's capitulation. More military strikes are most unlikely to alter this seeming paradox. What may yet change this state of affairs is a U.S. effort to incentivize de-escalation. If even part of the $12 billion promised by the MoU had actually reached Iran, its leadership would have been much less likely to take the military initiative. That is the lesson of the broken memorandum: Washington has put enormous effort into making escalation costly, but far too little into making restraint worthwhile. Until that changes, more pressure is unlikely to end Iran's resistance; instead, it may reinforce the lesson Tehran least wants to hear: that resistance is still the only option that pays. --- ### American veterans know the cost of a military-first foreign policy **Published:** August 6, 2026 | **Author:** Andrew M. Leonard | **Section:** Military Industrial Complex **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/veterans-us-foreign-policy/.md My nearly 32-year career in uniform has taught me many lessons. One of the most important is that the gap between operational military success and strategic political outcomes can be significant and is rarely, if at all, closed by increased military activity. It is common to invoke military voices when arguing for military force and to treat restraint as a “civilian” position. But the reverse is often true. Those who have served, and seen and felt the impacts of warfare, are the most cautious about resorting to it. Leading with, and relying on, the military has never been a foundational U.S. value. Throughout much of its history, the country has rightly regarded the use of force as a last resort. In his Farewell Address, George Washington warned that "overgrown military establishments" were "inauspicious to liberty." U.S. professional military education teaches Carl von Clausewitz’s theory that military force must remain subordinate to political ends. Colin Powell, as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, argued that military force should only be used to achieve clear, definable objectives supported by public opinion. Other retired military officers, including those cited by Andrew Bacevich and Daniel Sjursen in Paths of Dissent, have offered similar arguments. --- ### Bored of Peace: Why is Trump undermining his own Gaza plan? **Published:** August 5, 2026 | **Author:** Khaled Elgindy | **Section:** QiOSK **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/hamas-disarmament/.md A lot can change in a week. Barely five days after President Donald Trump hailed the “historic agreement” on Hamas’s disarmament by the Board of Peace (BOP) — the body Trump created to oversee his Gaza Peace Plan — the very same Board of Peace has now effectively reneged on its own agreement. The deal emerged from eight months of intensive negotiations between BOP High Representative Nicolay Mladenov and Hamas, along with various regional stakeholders, and was expected to pave the way for implementing the long-delayed second phase of Trump’s 20 Point Plan. This would have included desperately needed reconstruction and the establishment of a Palestinian governing body and police force, alongside the disarmament of Hamas and withdrawal of Israeli forces from the devastated enclave. Trump and his BOP had already given Israel an effective pass on most of its Phase 1 obligations, refusing to call out Israel’s daily violations of the ceasefire. Israel has persisted in carrying out near daily airstrikes across Gaza, killing at least 1,250 Palestinians since the ceasefire was signed last October, even as it continues to severely restrict aid, seize more territory, and block the return of Palestinian governing and policing bodies. Last week’s agreement would’ve required each side, notably Israel, to meet all of its outstanding obligations. The two most contentious points — distinguishing between heavy weaponry and small (private) arms, and the sequencing of weapons decommissioning and Israeli withdrawal — were finally agreed after intense pressure on Hamas by the Egyptians and other interlocutors. Most crucially, the deal called for a parallel, phased process in which Israeli military withdrawal and the decommissioning of Hamas weapons occurred concurrently — a pragmatic provision that would ensure progress and prevent either side from exercising a “veto” over the process. Keen to make the deal work, Trump administration officials even lodged an implicit threat, warning that if Israel rejected the plan, “obviously President Trump would be very, very disappointed.” But Israel rejected the terms of the deal, insisting there would be no Israeli withdrawal unless Hamas was fully disarmed and Israel maintained the freedom to continue conducting military operations in Gaza. Instead of calling Israel out, the Trump-aligned BOP did a complete about-face, adopting the Israeli position wholesale. “Contrary to inaccurate reports,” read Monday’s BOP statement, “we note that the withdrawal of the IDF beyond the Yellow Line will take place only once decommissioning is complete, as Hamas committed to the mediators .” Of course, the agreement said no such thing. Article 8 of the BOP’s Road Map expressly states that the decommissioning “process is linked to a phased Israeli withdrawal from the areas it controls in Gaza and the inventorying of weapons held by armed militias.” Indeed, Mladenov himself had said “Withdrawal must move in lockstep with decommissioning.” As such, Trump’s Board of Peace has essentially rewritten its own peace plan, requiring Hamas to meet all of its Phase 2 obligations even before Israel has met any of its Phase 1 obligations. The implications of the Trump administration’s whiplash-inducing turn will be serious and far-reaching. First and foremost, it badly undermines Mladenov’s credibility as a broker. If anything he negotiates can be so quickly and easily negated by the White House, why should Hamas — or for that matter other regional actors like Egypt and Qatar — talk to him? Trump is also undercutting his own peace plan more broadly, jeopardizing one of his few concrete foreign policy achievements. Hamas is unlikely to go along with this latest shifting of the goalposts; after all, the demand that the group unilaterally disarm even as Israel entrenches and expands its control over Gaza while carrying out deadly attacks on a daily basis would be widely (and accurately) viewed as surrender. Most devastatingly, for Gaza’s 2.2 million inhabitants, who have already withstood unspeakable horrors and are now living in the most horrid of conditions, Trump’s U-turn will indefinitely delay desperately needed relief, recovery and reconstruction. --- ### El-Sayed overcomes $30 million AIPAC spend, wins Michigan primary **Published:** August 5, 2026 | **Author:** Blaise Malley | **Section:** QiOSK **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/michigan-democratic-senate-primary/.md Abdul El-Sayed became the latest progressive insurgent to win a Democratic nomination contest on Tuesday, when he bested sitting House Rep. Haley Stevens to become the party’s nominee for Senate in Michigan. At the time of writing, with 95% of the votes counted, El-Sayed had 48.6% to 47.3% for Stevens. Major media networks have called the race for El-Sayed, the former Wayne County health department director. Similar to recent races in New York and Colorado, El-Sayed made his opposition to the U.S.-Israel relationship and pro-Israel lobby groups such as the the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) central to his campaign, framing his critiques as both a stand against the corrupting influence of big money in American politics and an indictment of U.S. foreign policy. “AIPAC has spent a record amount in this race to elect my opponent because she'll be a reliable vote to a foreign government that is aiding, arming, and abetting a genocide,” the presumptive Democratic Senate nominee wrote on X one week before votes were counted. “I want your tax dollars spent on schools in Michigan, healthcare in Michigan, and roads in Michigan.” Shortly before the election, he poked fun at the interest group for finding “the least capable candidate in America,” referring to Stevens. However, unlike earlier results elsewhere in the country, the result in Michigan was a statewide race in a competitive state, where November’s result could easily play a decisive role in which party controls the Senate in 2027. El-Sayed will run against Mike Rogers, a former congressman who lost a narrow Senate race during the last election cycle and ran in an uncontested primary race this time around. Before the votes were counted, allies of the eventual winner made the case that this race represented more than simply choosing the nominee for one Senate contest. Ben Rhodes, a former top aide to President Barack Obama who has become a critic of the U.S.-Israel relationship, wrote a long thread on social media that accused AIPAC of resorting to lying because they could no longer make a strong, substantial case. “Money must lose. Abdul - and Michigan voters - can show that democracy is still something that is the hands of ,” Rhodes wrote. AIPAC spent so much money in this race, he added, “because they want you to feel powerless. So that you think that nothing can change.” For her part, Stevens has described herself as a “proud pro-Israel Democrat” and accused her opponent of trying “to blame all of problems on Jewish Americans.” She voted against a recent amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act that would have cut $3.3 billion in aid for Tel Aviv. The largest Super PAC arm of AIPAC, the United Democracy Project (UDP), spent a record $30.6 million in this race. In total, AIPAC has spent over $60 million on Democratic primaries in the 2026 cycle, compared to roughly $40 million two years ago, according to a recent report from the New York Times. Once NBC News declared El-Sayed the winner, supporters said his win should send a message to the Democratic Party. "“AIPAC spent over $30 million to stop Dr. Abdul El-Sayed in this race, and that record-high sum wasn’t enough because Democratic voters have had it with the fringe and extremist view that our tax dollars should pay for Israel’s bombs, wars, and genocidal ambitions," the IMEU Policy Project's executive director, Margaret DeReus, said in a statement. As the Quincy Institute’s Eli Clifton wrote in Responsible Statecraft in July, the money donated to UDP, outside of that which came directly from AIPAC, came disproportionately from Republicans and out-of-state donors. UDP is pushing back against a rising anti-Israel sentiment among the Democratic party's base, while largely avoiding taking on the issue directly in its advertisements. “Abdul El-Sayed’s win last night is a significant setback for AIPAC and Israel’s Lobby, groups that spent record sums of money to elect Haley Stevens, a politician who would continue to support unconditional aid to Israel,” Clifton told RS. “Michigan Democrats sent the message that they rejected this influence over their primary election and the politics it represents.” Across the country on Tuesday, results were more mixed. In Missouri’s first district, incumbent Democratic Rep. Wesley Bell defeated progressive challenger Cori Bush by more than 20 percentage points. Bell unseated Bush in 2024 in a race that was then the second most expensive House primary in American history. AIPAC, which was an important funder in Bell’s victory, spent roughly $2 million to support the sitting member this time around, compared to more than $9 million in 2024. --- ### Will Trump meet his Suez moment & seize Hormuz deal on the table? **Published:** August 5, 2026 | **Author:** Trita Parsi | **Section:** Middle East **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/iran-oman-deal-hormuz/.md Oman and Iran appear close to a temporary arrangement to reopen the Strait of Hormuz, potentially providing both an exit from the current round of fighting and the foundation for a more durable maritime order. Washington should welcome such an agreement—even if it acknowledges a degree of Iranian authority in administering traffic through the strait—because US interest dictates that open and non-discriminatory passage must be given priority over control. The emerging formula would reportedly divide responsibility for the shipping lanes. Vessels entering the Persian Gulf would travel through waters administered by Iran, while outbound traffic would pass through an Omani-administered route. Iran would be notified of departing vessels and, while this has not yet been discussed, Tehran appears open to also ensuring that Oman would be notified of incoming traffic. Tehran and Muscat may collect and share fees for specified security and environmental services, although this sensitive issue has not yet been settled. The negotiations remain fluid, and any agreement is reportedly linked to the lifting of the American blockade on Iranian ports. The arrangement would represent a slight climbdown by Tehran. Iran’s earlier position would have required traffic in both directions to pass through some portion of Iranian waters as well as Omani waters. That would have brought even ships already inside the Persian Gulf under an Iranian-administered transit system. The emerging division of lanes would give Oman primary responsibility for outbound shipping and limit the universe of vessels requiring Iranian approval or coordination. If successful—and if Washington accepts it—the agreement could help end the present fighting. It remains unclear whether that would restore the previous American-Iranian memorandum of understanding or require a new framework. Nor does it in and of itself move the needle on two other major stumbling blocks: Iran’s demand for a regional ceasefire and Washington’s demands on Iran’s nuclear activities. The Trump administration will likely receive strong pushback from hawkish elements in Washington and Israel who will complain over the arrangement’s de facto acceptance and legitimization of Iran (and Oman’s) management of the Strait. But this critique is borne out of a confusion of what the US’s actual core interest in the Strait is: The free and predictable flow of commerce or preventing the ability of a hostile power to assert control. The Trump administration has increasingly framed the objective as preventing Iran from “controlling” the strait. Yet the central American interest in strategic waterways has historically been less about who administers them than about whether ships can pass through them freely, predictably and without discrimination. Preventing a hostile state from acquiring coercive leverage has generally been a means of preserving passage, not an end that supersedes passage itself. That hierarchy of interests matters. If reopening the strait requires acknowledging that Iran possesses some capacity to regulate traffic in waters along its coast, Washington should not reject an agreement merely because it fails to preserve the appearance of unqualified American dominance. The Suez crisis provides the clearest example. In 1956, Egypt’s president, Gamal Abdel Nasser, nationalized the Suez Canal Company, displacing the British- and French-controlled corporation that had operated one of the world’s most important commercial arteries. Britain and France regarded nationalization not merely as an economic injury but as a strategic humiliation and, together with Israel, invaded Egypt. President Dwight Eisenhower refused to support them. After rejecting the Anglo-French invasion, Eisenhower’s administration did not make restoration of British or international ownership a condition for accepting Egypt’s continued administration of the canal. Instead, Washington opposed the invasion and pressed for a diplomatic arrangement that would preserve international access. The applicable legal regime emphasized the canal’s free use by ships of all countries on equal terms, while leaving Egypt responsible for administering and defending the waterway. Egyptian control was not the same as unrestricted Egyptian discretion. The distinction was crucial. Washington could accept Egyptian sovereignty over the canal while insisting that sovereignty be exercised within rules guaranteeing nondiscriminatory passage. The overriding American interest was not which flag flew over the canal authority, but whether the canal remained open under internationally accepted rules. A crucial detail that should not be overlooked: Egypt at the time was not an American ally, whereas France and the UK were. Indeed, Egypt was at the time closely aligned with the Soviet Union though not formally allied with Moscow. Washington nevertheless accepted continued Egyptian administration of the canal rather than seeking to reverse nationalization, provided freedom of navigation was preserved. The Turkish Straits offer another instructive precedent. Under the 1936 Montreux Convention, Turkey recovered control over the Bosporus and Dardanelles, including the right to remilitarize and defend them. Yet commercial vessels retained freedom of passage under an internationally recognized regime. The United States has lived for decades with a strategically important NATO ally exercising extensive authority over a waterway connecting the Black Sea with the Mediterranean—even though Turkey can regulate warship access and, in wartime, exercise additional powers. The South China Sea makes the same point from another direction. The United States does not claim territory there and formally takes no position on sovereignty over most disputed features. It objects instead to excessive maritime claims, coercion and unlawful restrictions on navigation and overflight. American naval operations are designed to demonstrate that ships and aircraft may exercise rights recognized by international law regardless of which government claims nearby rocks, reefs or waters. Washington certainly cares about China’s growing regional power. Its legal position, however, is not that the United States must control the South China Sea. It is that no coastal power may transform contested waters into an exclusive domain or condition lawful passage on political obedience. Once again, the preservation of navigational rights lies at the heart of the U.S. legal position. Strategically, Washington’s concern about control extends beyond navigation alone, but it is precisely because control creates the capacity to restrict those rights—and to alter the regional balance of power—that it commands such attention. Iran, of course, is viewed in Washington as a hostile power. Few American officials would be comfortable with an arrangement that left Tehran able to close the Strait of Hormuz at will. Any agreement must therefore contain credible safeguards: passage should be nondiscriminatory; notification procedures should not become a discretionary licensing system; service charges should be limited to reasonable fees for services rendered rather than function as political tolls; and disputes should be subject to an agreed international mechanism. But Washington must also acknowledge the strategic reality the war has exposed. The conflict did not give Iran the capacity to close the strait. It revealed a capacity Iran already possessed—perhaps to a greater extent than either Washington or Tehran had fully appreciated. Crucially, a diplomatic agreement recognizing that reality would not expand Iran’s military power. Rather, it would seek to limit that ability through a legally and politically binding agreement that can be sustained for the simple reason that it meets the core interests of all relevant parties. The alternative is to insist that even the symbolism of Iranian control is intolerable. But unless the United States can reliably eliminate Iran’s ability to threaten shipping—a goal it has thus far failed to achieve and appears increasingly incapable of achieving—that position offers no practical path to reopening the waterway. Instead, it creates the conditions for an endless war: a militarily unattainable objective coupled with a political dynamic that makes pursuing it indefinitely more acceptable than abandoning it. If President Trump concludes that keeping the strait open is more important than denying Iran all visible administrative authority, an agreement appears possible. If he decides that American primacy requires rejecting any arrangement that acknowledges Iranian leverage, the likely result will be renewed military action—even though military action has so far failed to guarantee passage. Incidentally, the elevation of control over access is closely associated with the postwar American pursuit of global primacy - the very same grand strategy that has led to America almost always being at war. A settlement that subjects Iranian and Omani administration to predictable, nondiscriminatory international standards may not appear attractive, but would meet America’s core interest of free commerce in a region with fast diminishing strategic significance. Washington should judge it by whether ships can pass—not by whether the agreement preserves the illusion that Iran lacks leverage over waters along its own coast that we now know it always enjoyed. This was republished from Trita Parsi's Substack --- ### The Helsinki Commission is a Cold War relic that needs to go **Published:** August 5, 2026 | **Author:** Steve Nicandros | **Section:** Europe **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/helsinki-commission/.md Every government institution should periodically be asked a simple question: is it still performing the mission for which Congress created it? That principle has become a hallmark of the Trump administration. Through the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE), the closing of USAID, and the restructuring of federal agencies, the administration has encouraged the reexamination of longstanding institutions to ensure they remain faithful to their original purposes. That question should now be asked of one of Washington's least scrutinized congressional bodies: the U.S. Helsinki Commission. Congress established the U.S. Helsinki Commission in 1976, one year after the signing of the Helsinki Final Act, the culminating political agreement of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE). The CSCE was a landmark diplomatic process that brought together the United States, Canada, the Soviet Union, and virtually every European nation at the height of the Cold War. The CSCE later evolved into today's Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). The Helsinki Final Act established a political framework intended to reduce East-West tensions by promoting military transparency, economic cooperation, and respect for fundamental human rights. Congress established the U.S. Helsinki Commission as the United States' oversight body for monitoring implementation of the Helsinki Final Act. Today, members of the commission also serve as the U.S. delegation to the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, linking the commission directly to the broader institutional framework that grew out of the Helsinki process. There’s just one problem: the Cold War ended more than three decades ago, and the Soviet Union no longer exists. Yet the organization — and its $3 million annual budget — have continued trudging along. The question today is not whether the commission once served an important purpose. Rather, it is why Congress has allowed it to continue operating beyond the mission for which it was originally created. The commission's sustained and biased focus on the country of Georgia over the past several years illustrates why that question deserves serious attention. Most recently, at its 33rd Annual Session on July 8, 2026, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly adopted the “Resolution on Upholding Election Integrity and Fundamental Freedoms in Georgia.” Sponsored by Rep. Joe Wilson (R-S.C.), co-chair of the U.S. Helsinki Commission, the resolution was a political attack on Georgia's elected conservative government, exemplifying the kind of institutional overreach that has increasingly come to characterize the U.S. Helsinki Commission. This stands in stark contrast to the Trump administration’s approach. On July 16, 2026, Secretary of State Marco Rubio welcomed Georgia's vice prime minister and foreign minister, Maka Botchorishvili, to Washington to participate in a high-level ministerial meeting alongside representatives from more than sixty nations. One day later, President Donald Trump wrote directly to Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze, expressing appreciation for Georgia's friendship and affirming his desire to strengthen U.S.-Georgia cooperation in support of sovereignty, security, and lasting prosperity. Yet during this same period, Congressman Joe Wilson was helping advance a resolution through the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly that sought to further isolate Georgia. Acting through the U.S. Helsinki Commission, Wilson has repeatedly advanced biased foreign policy initiatives toward Georgia that diverge from the administration's friendlier approach. Through projects like these, the commission has evolved beyond its original oversight mission into an independent platform for pursuing foreign policy initiatives as individual members of Congress see fit. The commission's campaign against Georgia rests on the unproven premise that the country's current government lacks democratic legitimacy. The OSCE alleged that the October 2024 parliamentary elections were undermined by voter intimidation and the implementation of a law aimed at reducing foreign influence in the country. In part as a response to these concerns, the European Parliament called for the elections to be re-run. Yet no international election observers — including the OSCE — have rejected the results. Georgia's 2024 elections produced an 89-61 parliamentary majority for the governing Georgian Dream party. The results were certified under Georgia's constitutional process and confirmed through a recount. Nearly 90% of ballots were cast using electronic voting technology supplied by Smartmatic, an international election technology company, with the voting system independently tested by the American laboratory Pro V&V. One year later, Georgian voters again returned the governing party to victory in nationwide local elections. Based on these facts, it is difficult to understand how the commission can credibly continue to advance the premise of democratic illegitimacy. In any case, the Trump administration has made clear that such debates are immaterial to its foreign policy approach; the 2025 National Security Strategy states that U.S. foreign policy should be grounded in respect for national sovereignty and cooperation based on shared strategic interests rather than attempts to reshape the domestic politics of partner nations. Since 1997, my company has invested significantly in Georgia's oil and gas sector. During that time, I have watched Georgia welcome American companies like mine across virtually every sector of its economy, recognizing U.S. investment as an important contributor to its economic growth and its strategic partnership with the United States. I have also watched the country evolve from a struggling post-Soviet state into one of America's most reliable strategic partners in the South Caucasus and one of Eastern Europe's leading examples of democratic and economic transformation. My firsthand experience bears no resemblance to the picture repeatedly presented by Wilson and the commission. Congress did not create the commission to act as a shadow State Department. Wilson’s relentless campaign against Georgia's elected government has become a one-man crusade intent on undermining relations with Georgia, a longtime ally and strategic partner. Even the Commission's own leadership has begun to distance itself from his approach. Sen. Roger Wicker (R-Miss.), the commission's chairman, recently told Wilson to “stop embarrassing yourself” over a proposal to bring the 2027 OSCE Parliamentary Assembly to South Carolina at a taxpayer cost of approximately $4 million. There is a broader disturbing pattern in the commission's treatment of Georgia. Its hearings on Georgia have consistently featured biased critics and political opponents of the country’s democratically elected conservative government while excluding credible alternative viewpoints, resulting in a one-sided record of advocacy. This pattern was evident in the commission's September 2025 hearing entitled “From Partner to Problem: Georgia's Anti-American Turn.” The panel featured former President Salome Zourabichvili, a vocal figure in Georgia's political opposition, as a principal witness without providing representation from Georgia's elected government or any witness offering a contrary perspective. Moreover, Wilson has repeatedly referred to Georgia's democratically elected government as "illegitimate" and “anti-American,” a characterization that goes unchallenged and stands in marked contrast to the broader conduct of official U.S.-Georgia relations, including continued constructive engagement by the administration and members of both the House and Senate. The commission's institutional overreach has consequences that extend well beyond foreign policy. It also undermines American economic interests by exaggerating political risk, discouraging investment, and placing U.S. companies operating in Georgia at a competitive disadvantage. Congress created the U.S. Helsinki Commission to monitor compliance with the Helsinki Final Act during the Cold War — not to advance foreign policy agendas of its own choosing. The U.S. Helsinki Commission fulfilled the mission Congress assigned it nearly fifty years ago. The Cold War has ended, the Soviet Union no longer exists, and the commission has outlived the purpose for which it was created. Its conduct toward Georgia has demonstrated how far it has strayed from its original mission. The time has come for Congress and the administration to sunset the U.S. Helsinki Commission for the benefit of the American taxpayer. --- ### Trump's quick hits allow for AFRICOM comeback on continent **Published:** August 5, 2026 | **Author:** Alex Thurston | **Section:** Africa **URL:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/africom-mali-trump/.md Donald Trump’s foreign policy features chaotic decision-making and bombastic rhetoric. But some of his half-baked ideas could have lasting consequences, creating escalation pathways that his successors may be unwilling to close. West Africa provides a crucial case study. Trump ordered strikes in Nigeria in December 2025 and May 2026, and his team has reportedly considered striking Mali. These moves are drawing West Africa deeper into the ceaseless “War on Terror.” U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) – which was rumored to be on the chopping block early in Trump’s second term – may emerge from these years as a bureaucratic winner, with dangerous implications for the future. West Africa has always been part of the War on Terror, but with limitations. After 9/11, as Washington argued that further threats were likely to emerge from geopolitical peripheries, the Bush administration created the Pan-Sahel Initiative, a counterterrorism training program. The broader Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership followed in 2005, and then AFRICOM in 2007. None of those programs forestalled the crises they were meant to prevent. In 2009-2010, the Boko Haram sect in Nigeria transformed into a mass insurgency that continues to trouble that country today. In 2012, a rebellion in Mali produced the first large-scale jihadist takeover in West Africa and gave way to a multi-sided war that still roils the Sahel. Amid those developments, the U.S. avoided direct and overt confrontation with jihadists in West Africa but stepped up its involvement there: the U.S. logistically supported France’s intervention in Mali in 2013; increased its engagement with militaries in Nigeria and the Lake Chad Basin, particularly after Boko Haram’s infamous 2014 kidnapping of nearly 300 schoolgirls; and constructed a $100 million drone base in Niger starting in 2016, from which it conducted surveillance flights. Occasional scandals and shocks – the strangling of a U.S. Green Beret in Mali in 2017 by his colleagues, and a jihadist ambush that killed four American soldiers and five Nigeriens in Niger the same year – hinted at more “kinetic” U.S. presence in the region than was officially acknowledged. Yet in the Sahel and Nigeria, the U.S. avoided the kind of cyclical strikes that unfolded in Somalia, Yemen, Libya, and elsewhere. Trump’s moves in Nigeria and potential moves in Mali are breaking down longstanding limits on applications of U.S. military power in a delicate region. For Trump, short-term political expediency may be a driver of these decisions. Striking Nigeria in the name of defending Christians caters to significant constituencies and organizations in the United States. Boasting that U.S. forces killed “ISIS Terrorist Scum” reinforces Trump’s brand of toughness. The president and his political appointees may not have a long time horizon in mind. But these short-term decisions, intermittent strikes, and leaked debates over opening new fronts all have long-term implications – especially for AFRICOM and for overall U.S. counterterrorism policy. Early last year, amid the Trump team’s initial fervor for cutting and reorganizing federal agencies, outlets reported that the administration was considering folding AFRICOM into European Command, effectively reversing the process that created AFRICOM in 2007. Yet AFRICOM not only survived but has played a significant role. Bureaucratic survival has allowed AFRICOM to continue deepening long-term relationships and institutional investments on the continent. The military command has pursued an old, failed model of counterterrorism, courting the would-be Libyan strongman Khalifa Haftar and cultivating ties to West Africa’s civilian authoritarians in Cote d’Ivoire, Benin, and elsewhere. After being expelled from the drone base in Niger by that country’s new military government in 2024, AFRICOM simply pivoted to seeking new sites for drone bases nearby – a search that seems to be continuing under Trump. Meanwhile, strikes in Somalia have increased in 2025-2026, underscoring AFRICOM’s multifaceted diplomatic and kinetic role. As the White House’s 2027 Pentagon budget request sets a record, at well over $1 trillion, AFRICOM stands to grow along with the rest of the military. Trump’s successor will likely inherit an AFRICOM engaged in at least periodic strikes in both East Africa and West Africa. AFRICOM presents itself as vital to core American interests. In the command’s 2026 posture statement, Gen. Davgin Anderson insisted that the Sahelian jihadist group JNIM (an affiliate of al-Qaida) “has the ambition to threaten the Homeland and conduct attacks on U.S. personnel and facilities.” Yet JNIM, formed in 2017, has never attacked a target outside of northwest Africa, not even in France. Anderson also offered a selective account of what the drone base in Niger had facilitated, trumpeting a 2020 hostage rescue operation in Nigeria as proof of the need for surveillance of the Sahel. Anderson did not mention that other American hostages in the region have had very different outcomes. Another American, kidnapped in 2016 in Niger, was released in 2023 after negotiations. Also unmentioned was the fact that violence in the central Sahel nevertheless steadily increased even at the peak of U.S. surveillance from Niger, which coincided with a high tempo of French counterterrorism operations that killed numerous JNIM and Islamic State commanders. Meanwhile, Anderson offered no detailed plan for success or even drawdown, but rather made a set of generic assertions about the difference that AFRICOM supposedly makes, for example: “Through traditional military operations and a focus on innovation, defense economics, and information operations, we amplify our impact and meet strategic objectives.” The command clearly looks to Africa as a long-term theater of operations: in the posture statement, Anderson twice referred to 2050, adding in one instance, “Africa’s vast resources, strategic geography, and growing population make it critical to U.S. national security.” Strikes in West Africa are all too easily folded into a portfolio that contains many activities but few off-ramps. Africa also features prominently in Trump’s new counterterrorism strategy, released in May. The document includes a section on Africa that purports to end “decades of forever wars” and “failed counterterrorism policies under President Biden,” but the rhetoric reframes and escalates previous approaches, rather than meaningfully breaking with them. In an effort to square the disavowal of “forever wars” with the reality of an open-ended, heavy-handed commitment to training missions, dubious bilateral partnerships, and direct strikes, the document resorts to the same kinds of conflations and expansive language that have recurred throughout the War on Terror: “We are set on bringing home our troops and downsizing our global footprint. This, however, does not mean we will ignore threat groups in Africa capable of External Operations which seek to attack our interests.” The two key words here are “capable” and “interests” – any militant group is potentially “capable” of attacking the United States, and U.S. “interests” are often so broadly defined that any instability anywhere can be construed as a threat to “interests.” The next presidential administration may not continue the Trump White House’s polarizing rhetoric characterizing Christians as “the most persecuted people on earth” or condemning past U.S. policies as “globalist left-wing cultural hegemony.” But the next president will likely build upon some of the precedents Trump has set. This combination – the normalization of strikes in West Africa, and the underlying maintenance, from administration to administration, of sweeping, unfalsifiable rhetorical justifications for military involvement in Africa – is particularly dangerous. ## Contributors & Authors - [Anchal Vohra](https://responsiblestatecraft.org/author/anchalvohra/): Anchal Vohra is a Brussels-based columnist for Foreign Policy magazine focusing on conflict and geop... - [Ali Latifi](https://responsiblestatecraft.org/author/alilatifi/): Ali M. Latifi is a Kabul-based freelance journalist. He has reported from Washington, Afghanistan, G... - [Scott Hibbard](https://responsiblestatecraft.org/author/scotthibbard/): Scott W. Hibbard is an Associate Professor and Chair of the Department of Political Science at DePau... - [John Ryan](https://responsiblestatecraft.org/author/johnryan/): John Ryan is a co-founder and editor at Lawdragon and author of "America’s Trial: Torture and the 9/... - [Sirwan Kajjo](https://responsiblestatecraft.org/author/sirwankajjo/): Sirwan Kajjo is a Kurdish-American journalist based in Washington D.C. He focuses on Kurdish politic... - [Johan Wennstrom](https://responsiblestatecraft.org/author/johanwennstrom/): Dr. Johan Wennström is a Research Fellow at the Swedish Defence University and the author of The Sta... - [Alex Rewegan](https://responsiblestatecraft.org/author/alexrewegan/): Alex Rewegan is a Post-Doctoral Fellow in the Technoscience Research Unit at the University of Toron... - [Mila Halgren](https://responsiblestatecraft.org/author/milahalgren/): Mila Halgren is a freelance writer covering law enforcement and defense tech in Boston, where she's ... - [Hayden Long](https://responsiblestatecraft.org/author/haydenlong/): Hayden Long is an independent journalist and former software engineer covering technology, the defen... - [Yazen Zarour](https://responsiblestatecraft.org/author/yazenzarour/): Yazen Zarour is a research intern with the Middle East Program at the Quincy Institute for Responsib... ## API Access & Integration - [Search](https://responsiblestatecraft.org/search): Site-wide content search - [Main RSS Feed](https://responsiblestatecraft.org/feeds/feed.rss): Latest content in RSS format ## Optional - [Navigation index (llms.txt)](https://responsiblestatecraft.org/llms.txt): Compact section index with markdown links for every section - [Main RSS Feed](https://responsiblestatecraft.org/feeds/feed.rss): Latest content in RSS format ## Content Discovery - **Search Interface:** https://responsiblestatecraft.org/search - **All Sections:** Each section available at `https://responsiblestatecraft.org/[section-path]/index.md` - **Individual Posts:** Each post available at its URL with `.md` extension - **RSS Feeds:** Main feed at `https://responsiblestatecraft.org/feeds/feed.rss`, section feeds at `https://responsiblestatecraft.org/feeds/[section-path].rss` ## How to Use This Content 1. **For Site Overview:** Review the "Site Structure" section to understand content organization 2. **For Specific Topics:** Use section-specific RSS feeds or browse section markdown pages 3. **For Recent Updates:** Check the "Recent Content" section for latest articles 4. **For API Access:** Use the documented endpoints for programmatic access 5. **For Individual Articles:** Access any post by appending `.md` to its URL --- *This complete content index contains 100 recent posts and represents the current state of Responsible Statecraft as of September 12, 2026 17:20:27. 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