Hardline Forces in Iran are Poised to Gain Strength
With parliamentary elections upcoming, most analysts in Iran believe they will favor hard-line forces associated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
With parliamentary elections upcoming, most analysts in Iran believe they will favor hard-line forces associated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
Whether this move was self-imposed, or the result of President Trump threatening a 25 percent tariff on European cars, what do the U.K., France, and Germany hope to achieve?
There’s a reason why President Ford ended American-sponsored assassination as act of U.S. policy.
And as long as U.S. forces stay in Iraq, Baghdad and Tehran have a reason to stay close.
Triggering the Iran nuclear deal’s dispute mechanism is an assertive move by the E3, but it is also a gamble that could save or sink the agreement.
Leaving militarily does not mean leaving all together. The United States should continue to pursue its Middle East interests diplomatically and economically.
The fallout from Trump escalating tensions with Iran isn’t just felt in the Middle East.
The memory of the 1979 hostage crisis, and the visceral feeling of humiliation and rage it inspired, plainly colors Trump’s views on Iran today.
The biggest impediment to any resurgence of ISIS in Iraq would be good governance and stability in Iraqi politics. U.S. troops are not contributing to those goals.
If Iranian military and political leaders learn the right lessons from this incident, they will implement the long overdue reform of Iran’s political, economic, and administrative structures.
It is in the interest of the region, Europe, and the world to help Iran succeed in managing the economic fallout from Trump’s sanctions.
Can we breathe easy or have we merely paused to catch our collective breath before resuming the climb up the escalation ladder?
If there is a silver lining, it is that Washington and Teheran have moved away from the brink of war and have opted to take the de-escalation off-ramps they offered each other since Soleimani’s killing.
Individuals outside Iran who are advocating for an aggressive intervention or a war against Iran are primarily driven by their own ideological convictions, rather than by genuine care for the wellbeing of the people of Iran.
Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia have breathed a collective sigh of relief following signs of de-escalation between Tehran and Washington.
Thirty years later, perhaps it’s time to assess just how well the United States has fulfilled the expectations President Bush articulated in 1990.
There are plenty of intermediaries working to cool U.S.-Iran tensions. The European Union should be putting its recourses toward saving the JCPOA.
One well-established principle of sanctions policy is that the country or group imposing the sanctions must be prepared to take yes for an answer.
Few noticed Trump’s recent offer to work with Iran to combat ISIS and on other “shared priorities.”
The assassination of Qassem Soleimani emphasizes America’s confounding inability to think through the role of military force as an instrument of strategy.
It would be smart for Oman’s two closest Western allies, the United States and Great Britain, to reach out to work with the new leader as soon as possible.